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ABSTRACT: 
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Marquette University, 2016 
 
In this dissertation I examine Hume’s secular re-definition and re-evaluation of 
the traditional Christian understanding of pride and humility as part of his project to 
establish a fully secular account of ethics and to undermine what he thought to be the 
harmful aspects of religious morality. Christians traditionally have seen humility, 
understood as receptivity to God, to be crucial for individual and social flourishing, and 
pride as the root of individual and social disorder. By contrast, Hume, who conceives of 
pride and humility immanently in terms of our self-appraisals, sees pride as a key virtue 
that serves as the ultimate source of moral motivation and deems humility a ‘monkish 
virtue’ (i.e., a vice). Hume, moreover, sees religious appeals to a transcendent moral 
source to be a threat to individual flourishing in that they encourage the formation of 
what he calls ‘artificial lives’ (of which the monkish virtues are an expression) as well as 
a threat to social concord, insofar as they foster unnecessary religious factions, 
intolerance, and theologically sanctioned violence. In part to combat this, Hume 
promotes a wholly secular ethic rooted in common life. 
 
I uncover the real points of agreement and disagreement that underlie Hume and 
traditional Christian conceptions of pride and humility in order to articulate what is 
essentially at issue between these contrasting perspectives and, ultimately, to identify 
some of what is gained or lost in Hume’s secularization of ethics. I, thus, explore the 
reasons that Hume rejects Christian morality and seeks to replace it with a secular one. I 
then assess whether Hume’s secular perspective has sufficient resources for addressing 
the biased judgments and rivalries that can arise precisely because of what Hume sees as 
our natural desire for the ‘passion of pride’ (i.e., for a positive sense of ourselves before 
others). I conclude both that Hume identifies genuine dangers in attempting to go 
beyond the human and also that there are genuine dangers in Hume’s attempt to close the 
window to a transcendent moral source. I, therefore, contend that any adequate view of 
human flourishing must take account of both these dangers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In this dissertation I want to examine Hume’s attempt to establish a fully secular 
account of ethics, which is one of the first of its kind and continues to be influential 
today.1 I will focus specifically on Hume’s secular transformation of the traditional 
Christian understanding of pride and humility as a key locus for seeing what is at stake 
in Hume’s project.2 In the Christian tradition, pride and humility are defined primarily in 
relation to God, where humility is regarded as a fundamental virtue and pride as the root 
of sin. By contrast, for Hume pride and humility are defined immanently in terms of 
one’s self-conception in relation to social approval and disapproval, where pride is seen 
as a particularly important virtue and humility as a debilitating vice. Correspondingly, 
while key Christian figures have thought that receptivity and submission to God (i.e., 
humility) is crucial to the flourishing of life in human community, Hume sees religious 
appeals to a transcendent source to be a threat to our common life, and instead he 
promotes a wholly secular ethic based on social praise and blame.3  
I want to look at what difference these contrasting views in fact can make for 
human flourishing so as to identify what is gained or lost in Hume’s secularization of 
ethics. Exploring Humean and Christian conceptions of pride and humility is an 
especially illuminating angle from which to view issues surrounding flourishing, since of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 By the term ‘secular,’ I mean either that it does not (or seeks not to) depend upon answers to 
larger metaphysical questions about the nature of the universe, or that it assumes atheism (or an 
agnosticism that has no bearing on practice) as a default position.  
2 I will only be examining pride and humility in Western Christianity because the forms of 
Christianity that Hume has in mind and engages with explicitly are the Protestant and Catholic traditions, 
rather than Eastern Orthodoxy.  
3 By ‘transcendent source’ I am referring to God or the gods or some “higher” reality (we could 
think of Plato’s Forms in this vein). The notion of transcendence is complex, deserving thorough analysis 
in its own right, but I trust that the reader has a general sense of the sort of appeals to which I refer. (See 
Charles Taylor 2007 for some interesting discussions of transcendence (pp. 13-16, 542-44, 625-34).) 
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all character traits these two pertain most intimately to the self and one’s identity, 
especially as we stand in relation to ourselves, to others, and possibly also to God or 
some other transcendent moral source. Accordingly, with particular attention to the role 
positive self-assessment plays in Hume’s conception of a good life, I will examine why 
Hume declares humility to be a “monkish virtue” (i.e., a vice) and seeks to recover pride 
as a virtue. I will also show how his reevaluation of pride and humility is bound up in his 
project of overturning Christian morality (and thereby mitigating what he sees as some 
of its harmful effects) and replacing it with a secular one.  
This project was highly controversial given that the vast majority in the 
eighteenth century believed that some sort of deity, be it the Christian God or a more 
bleached, deistic God, provided a necessary foundation for morality and served as the 
ultimate source of moral motivation by ensuring that virtue would be rewarded and vice 
would be punished. An attempt to assert that God was irrelevant to morality thus would 
have been seen as a threat to the moral fabric of society.4 Samuel Clarke’s friend 
Richard Bentley expresses a fairly widespread concern in this regard when in The Folly 
and Unreasonableness of Atheism he remarks:  
if Atheism should be supposed to become universal in this nation…farewell all 
ties of friendship and principles of honor; all love for our country and loyalty to 
our prince; nay farewell all government and society itself, all professions and 
arts, and conveniences of life, all that is laudable or valuable in the world. (Works 
3:25)  
 
Although there is good reason to think that Hume may not have been an atheist as we 
understand the term today (i.e., someone who holds that God or some deity does not 
exist), his skepticism towards religion, his clear view that the Christian conception of 
God and Christian revelation lack sufficient epistemological basis to be anything more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See David Fate Norton’s (1986) thorough discussion of this issue. 
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than highly dubious, and his attempt to establish the autonomy of ethics from God 
altogether would have been seen to be a form of “atheism” by many at the time that 
Hume was writing, and, in any case, Hume’s ideas would have been regarded as 
dangerous by most.5 The way in which Hume tends to veil his deepest critiques of 
religion in his earlier works (especially in the Treatise of Human Nature)6 and his 
decision not to have the (posthumously published) Dialogues, his most explicit and 
formidable attack on religion, sent to press in his lifetime indicates just how 
controversial Hume’s moral philosophy was in the context in which he was writing.  
I will concentrate on two central ways in which Hume thinks that Christian 
morality is detrimental to human life, both of which emerge in the very way that he 
reverses and redefines the traditional Christian moral categories of pride and humility. 
First, Hume is concerned with the potential of religious morality for spawning social 
discord. This worry was particularly pressing for Hume because although the religious 
wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth century had subsided, eighteenth-century Scotland 
continued to be divided by religious factions, which Hume thought hindered Scotland’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Russell’s discussion of the various ways that the term “atheism” was employed in the 
eighteenth century (2008, 47-57).  See Bernard Williams (2006, 267), Terrance Penelhum (1994, 255), and 
Peter Millican (2002, 37) for arguments that Hume is rightly seen as an atheist if atheism is understood in 
the broader eighteenth-century sense. For discussions of Hume’s religious views and how to best 
characterize them, see J. C. A. Gaskin (1983), Shane Andre (1993), Keith Yandell (1990), Paul Russell 
(2008, 278-89). Russell helpfully characterizes Hume as irreligious, pointing out that the terms “agnostic” 
or “religious skeptic,” though fitting, “fail to identify properly and highlight the wholly hostile and critical 
character of Hume’s general attitude toward religious doctrine and dogma” (2008, 284). Furthermore, 
these terms, if applied to Hume, could misleadingly suggest that he merely suspends judgment with 
respect to religious claims, when instead he indicates that “thicker” conceptions of theism (such as 
Christian concepts of God) are highly doubtful and probably false (2008, 284).  
6 Russell (2008) shows particularly well that despite the relative silence in the Treatise about 
religion (a silence which has lead many to regard the work as largely unconcerned with religion), Hume’s 
arguments systematically aim to dismantle the foundations for Christian belief and morals. 
Notwithstanding these aims, Hume prudentially does not explicitly draw out the serious implications for 
religion that his arguments entail.  
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progress towards modernization (Herdt 1997, 11).7 Hume saw religion (particularly 
monotheistic religions) as being prone to spark the kind of zeal that would make factions 
especially heated (NHR IX, 160-163).8 Additionally, Hume thought that religious 
controversies were ultimately irreconcilable, since they rest upon matters that he argued 
are beyond the scope of human experience and hence of what we can be decided through 
(empirically grounded) reason.9 More importantly, though, Hume thought that religious 
principles have no actual bearing on how we ought to conduct ourselves, and so he 
believed the social divisions and violent intolerances that arose from religious disputes 
to be unnecessary. As he says:  
But where the difference of principle is attended with no contrariety of action, 
but every one may follow his own way, without interfering with his neighbour, 
as happens in all religious controversies; what madness, what fury can beget 
such unhappy and such fatal divisions? (ESY 60, emphasis mine)  
 
It was in this context Hume arguably sought to provide a common, non-sectarian basis 
for moral discourse that would cut across religious division, thereby rendering the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  See Herdt (1997, 10-12) for a discussion of the political debates between the Moderates of the 
Church of England, the Popular Party (the Evangelicals), and the Covenanters. See also Penelhum’s 
discussion of the Moderates in relation to Hume and to the Presbyterian kirk in Scotland (2008, 324-26). 
See also chapters XII-XIII of MacIntyre (1988) for an appreciation of the philosophical and theological 
issues underlying some of the political disputes in Scotland. 
8 More precisely, Hume saw “revealed” religion (i.e., religion that depends upon divine revelation) 
rather than “natural” religion (i.e., religious conclusions attained by rational argument) to carry particular 
potential for exciting faction-inducing zeal among its adherents. I discuss the common eighteenth century 
distinction between natural and revealed religion in Chapter Two. Although I there discuss how and why 
Hume sought to undermine both forms of religion, it was revealed religion that Hume thought to be 
damaging to human life. Until I introduce these distinctions, however, I often will refer to revealed 
religion simply as religion, since religious forms as we commonly find them almost always contain 
elements of revealed religion.  
9 See “Of parties in general” in ESY, pp. 54-63. He says, for example, “the controversy about an 
article of faith, which is utterly absurd and unintelligible, is not a difference in sentiment, but in a few 
phrases and expressions, which one party accepts of, without understanding them; and the other refuses in 
the same manner” (ESY 59). 
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religious disagreement peripheral to social and political life (see Herdt 1997, 14). His 
secularization of ethics is therefore, in part, an attempt to promote social peace.10 
Hume’s concern to foster social concord is also, as I will later argue in Chapter 
Three, connected to why he thinks that pride, or warranted self-esteem, is an especially 
important virtue. He sees a well-founded pride, when its display is appropriately 
modulated by good manners, as contributing to the flourishing of human community in 
two ways. First, Hume observes that the sort of genuine positive self-regard constitutive 
of merited pride provides the security of being needed to facilitate the cultivation of a 
wider, more extensive sympathy. Humility, which Hume understands to be habitual self-
depreciation, leads not to greater sympathy but to vicious comparisons whereby one 
seeks to inflate one’s depressed sense of self-worth through criticizing others (T 3.3.2.7, 
380). Sympathy is vitally important for Hume because he thinks that it is fundamental to 
our capacity for moral discernment, and also, he sees sympathetic understanding of 
different points of view to be vital for a harmonious social body.11 Thus proper pride, 
that virtue which makes an extensive sympathy possible, becomes a virtue that is central 
to Hume’s sense of what contributes to a healthy way of relating to others.  
Second, pride is a chief virtue for Hume because he regards it as motivationally 
significant for all other virtues. Proper pride, on Hume’s account, involves possessing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Hume’s interest in promoting social concord is immediately evident in the opening paragraph of 
the first statement of his moral philosophy given in Book III of the Treatise, where he says “Morality is a 
subject that interests us above all others: We fancy the peace of society to be at stake in every decision 
concerning it” (T 3.1.1.1, 293). For the centrality of Hume’s concern for social peace, see Seibert 1990, 
Chapter Two, which is entitled “Religion and the ‘Peace of Society’.”  
11 See Jennifer Herdt’s Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy (1997) for an astute 
treatment of the relationship between Hume’s concern with social conflict and his attempt to root moral 
judgment in sympathy. See also Annette Baier’s remarks on how Hume’s “concentration in Book Two [of 
the Treatise] on conflict and emotional see-saws…are also important topics for Hume’s later account of 
how morality depends on a calm and steady sentiment, and of how its role is to prevent or end unwanted 
conflict, both within a person and between persons” (1991, 133). 
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sense of one’s moral dignity, and it is precisely a prideful attachment to our character 
that can ultimately empower virtuous action towards others in those cases where we 
would seem to be able to profit through vice. Hume argues that a noble pride is 
particularly important for motivating justice (EPM IX.2, 282-83), a virtue that is 
especially necessary to the peaceful functioning of society. Thus, in this way, too, pride 
plays a significant role in fostering social concord.  
Hume’s position on pride and its relation to social peace can of course be 
contrasted with the traditional Christian view, wherein pride is seen to be the root cause 
of social strife and humility is regarded as integral to its healing. In City of God, for 
example, Augustine contends that true peace is found only in the heavenly city, where 
humility before God is a defining stance of its members (CG XIV.13, 573). Pride, which 
reigns in the earthly city, leads to lust for domination (CG XIV.18, 593), which, 
Augustine thinks, naturally follows when we make ourselves, rather than God, the center 
of our loves (CG XIV.13, 573).12  One aim of this dissertation, thus, will be to assess the 
differing perspectives of Hume and Christians such as Augustine with respect to issues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Augustine says: “That is why humility is highly prized in the City of God and especially enjoined 
on the City of God during the time of its pilgrimage in this world; and it receives particular emphasis in 
the character of Christ, the king of that City (cf. Phil 2, 8-11). We are also taught by the sacred Scriptures 
that the fault of exaltation [i.e., pride], the contrary of humility, exercises supreme dominion in Christ’s 
adversary, the Devil. This is assuredly the great difference that sunders the two cities of which we are 
speaking: the one is a community of devout men, the other a company of the irreligious, and each has its 
own angels attached to it. In one city love of God has been given first place, in the other, love of self” (CG 
XIV.13, 573). 
The teachings of Father Zosima in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov represent another 
example of a Christian perspective that regards pride to be a key source of social discord. In Zosima’s 
retelling of his life, it was his offended pride that led him to request a duel with the husband of the woman 
he fancied, and, indeed, we see throughout the novel the connection between pride and rivalry. Humility, 
on the other hand, is at the center of Zosima’s spiritual teachings (e.g., that “each of us is guilty before 
everyone and for everyone” (298), that humility enables an affective appreciation of the goodness and 
beauty of all things (299), and that humble love is the strongest response to human sin (319)). Humility, 
for Zosima, leads to unity and reconciliation and is necessary to heal the social strife caused by pride.     
 7 
surrounding religion and conflict as they are bound up with the concepts of pride and 
humility.  
The second central way in which Hume thinks that Christian morality is inimical 
to flourishing is that in his view it contains an unnatural vision of life, requiring at times 
a break from what he calls the “natural and usual force of the passions” (T 3.2.2.18, 
311). Hume’s moral philosophy is rooted in a conception of ordinary human happiness, 
and with it he sought to counter and reveal to be nonsensical the ways in which 
Christianity requires the subversion of the normal operation of human passions. We see 
this most explicitly when Hume condemns the “monkish virtues” for opposing both 
pleasure and utility in the second Enquiry (IX.1, 270), but his opposition to what he saw 
as the anti-natural demands of Christian morality is also suggested elsewhere, for 
example, in his implicit endorsement in Book II of the Treatise of our natural love of 
property, fame, and beautiful bodies.     
Hume’s concern to promote ordinary happiness is likewise captured in his 
inversion of the Christian categories of pride and humility. Although Christians have 
classified pride as the first sin, Hume places pride as the first of the natural virtues. On 
his account it is natural to want to think well of ourselves, and a basic self-esteem is a 
necessary ingredient for any intelligible conception of a satisfying human life. 
Correspondingly, Hume regards humility, which he understands to involve self-
abnegation and servility, to be contrary to any comprehensible picture of human 
happiness. This is why in “A Dialogue” Hume takes the humility of Pascal to be 
indicative of how his life has been made artificial by the “illusions of religious 
superstition” (EPM 343). Cultivating humility, Hume thinks, is so contrary to our natural 
 8 
impulses that such habitual self-deprecation can be undertaken only when a person 
succumbs to a worldview that has lost traction with human experience.  
We can imagine that the obligation to self-denial contained in the Christian 
promotion of humility and condemnation of pride would have touched a particular nerve 
in Hume, who was raised Presbyterian and lived in a time when Calvinism exerted a 
powerful influence on Scottish culture. A conversation Hume had with James Boswell 
just days before his death is revealing on this point. Boswell reports that Hume 
said he had never entertained belief in Religion since he began to read Locke and 
Clarke. I asked him if he was not religious when he was young. He said he was 
and used to read the Whole Duty of Man; that he made an abstract from the 
Catalogue of vices at the end of it, and examined himself by this, leaving out 
Murder and Theft and such vices as he had no chance of committing, having no 
inclination to commit them. This, he said, was strange work; for instance, to try 
if, notwithstanding his excelling his schoolfellows, he had no pride or vanity. 
(Boswell 1931, 227-228)  
 
The Whole Duty of Man was a treatise on spiritual formation that was popular in 
eighteenth-century Scotland.13 Not only does it dwell especially on the sinfulness of 
pride, but it, moreover, encourages us to regard ourselves as “worms of the 
earth…polluted and defiled, wallowing in all kinds of sins, and uncleanness.” 
Cultivating this attitude allows us to acquire “such a sense of our own meanness, and 
[God’s] excellency, as may work in us a lowly and unfeigned submission” to God’s will 
(II.1.1, 34). Although little is known about Hume’s religious upbringing, we can imagine 
how this sort of perspective might have negatively affected him at a young age. It is 
unsurprising that Hume would reject a Christian conception of humility that involves 
self-castigation and servile obedience, as well as the moral framework within which this 
conception of humility is at home.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Jacques B. H. Alblas 1991 for an account of why and how this spiritual treatise, though 
arising out of the Anglican tradition, became popular among Calvinists. 
 9 
It is important to note, however, that the portrait of humility given in The Whole 
Duty of Man is quite different from other dominant conceptions of Christian humility. 
Aquinas, for instance, takes pains to distinguish humility from the self-depreciating vice 
of pusillanimity and in fact links humility to the virtue of magnanimity (II-II:129.3.r4; 
II-II:162.1; II-II:162.1. r3; II-II:162. 2.r2; II-II:162.4.r3). Aquinas furthermore explicitly 
states that if by pride one means proper self-esteem, then it is virtuous and is not to be 
confused with the kind of pride he deems to be vicious (II-II:162.1.r1). Moreover, since 
Aquinas sees the virtues as constitutive of flourishing, humility on his account 
contributes to rather than hinders human happiness. A second key component of this 
dissertation therefore will be to look at the rival perspectives on pride and humility vis-à-
vis the issue of individual happiness or flourishing, i.e., how pride or humility stand in 
relation to our affective formation and how they might foster or inhibit human 
fulfillment. 
It should now be apparent though that a key difficulty in assessing the 
significance of Hume’s secularization of pride and humility is that there is substantial 
disagreement about the nature of virtuous humility within the Christian tradition itself. 
Accordingly, what is gained or lost in Hume’s secular transformation of these concepts 
will depend greatly upon which Christian conception of humility is under consideration. 
While Hume’s account of pride and humility looks like more of a strict reversal of the 
account of these traits given in The Whole Duty of Man, it is not diametrically opposed 
to how, for example, Augustine and Aquinas understood them. What is needed, then, is 
first to look at how the concepts of pride and humility are understood within the two 
major theological traditions in Western Christianity. 
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In Chapter One, I therefore discuss these two dominant theological trajectories 
and explain how pride and humility take different shape within them. I show how the 
forms of Christianity with which Hume would have had the greatest contact (i.e., 
Calvinism and Jansenism) fall within what I will, following Charles Taylor, call the 
‘hyper-Augustinian’ strand of Christian thought (represented, for instance, by Luther, 
Calvin, Pascal, and Pierre Nicole). I, furthermore, argue that Hume was quite right to 
reject the ways of conceiving of the relationship between religion and morality and, 
correspondingly, the conceptions of humility that are prevalent within this theological 
trajectory. I contend, however, that the really interesting and important issues emerge 
with respect to religion and human flourishing when we engage Hume’s stance on pride 
and humility with the conceptions of these traits found within what I will call the 
‘Christian humanist’ strand (represented, for example, by Aquinas, Erasmus, and the 
Cambridge Platonists).14  
Indeed, I show that once we move beyond semantic differences we will see that 
there is widespread agreement (amidst crucial disagreement) between Hume and the 
Christian humanist trajectory, particularly with respect to the moral significance of self-
esteem and the security of the self. I argue it is only when we fully appreciate this point 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Charles Taylor coins the term ‘hyper-Augustinianism’ in Sources of the Self (1989, 246-47) and 
continues to use it in A Secular Age (2007, 227-28). In the latter work he contrasts it with ‘devout 
humanism,’ which in the historical context in which this comparison is made specifically refers to certain 
seventeenth-century thinkers, such as St. Francis de Sales, who suppose that “we can find within us that 
élan towards God on which we can build, the seed which we can nourish” (227) as opposed to hyper-
Augustinians, who thought that our nature is so depraved that attempting to find that élan within us only 
further entraps us into self-delusion and pride. Although I want to draw the same the contrast that Taylor is 
making between these two streams of thought, I use the term ‘Christian humanism’ to signal that I am not 
limiting my discussion to seventeenth-century theologians but rather am referring to the broader 
theological trajectory in which ‘devout humanism’ was a seventeenth-century expression. Admittedly 
‘Christian humanism’ is itself an imperfect designation since humanism is apt to suggest that I have in 
mind theologians from the Renaissance and onward, in which case it would seem odd that I am using 
Aquinas as the key spokesperson for this stream of thought. Despite the risk of possible confusion, I have 
not, however, found a term that better captures the spirit that unites theologians of this trajectory as a 
whole.  
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of agreement that we can adequately assess what difference a transcendent or immanent 
perspective might make to individual and social flourishing. I maintain that Hume has 
important critiques of religious morality; however, I also argue that Hume’s failure 
sufficiently to engage with what I take to be better versions of Christian humility and 
morality in fact obscures problematic features in his own aim to render religion 
peripheral to the good life. The thesis I seek to defend is that Hume identifies genuine 
dangers in attempting to go beyond the human but also that there are genuine dangers in 
Hume’s attempt to close the window to a transcendent moral source. I will therefore 
contend that any adequate view of human flourishing must take account of both these 
dangers. 
Additionally, in and through making this larger argument, two secondary goals 
emerge. The first is to critique the hyper-Augustinian tradition, not only for its 
conception of humility but, more importantly, for the broader theological commitments 
that make this conception possible. Instead, I argue that the sorts of theological 
commitments characteristic of a Christian humanist model (and the version of humility 
that those commitments inform) offer what I take to be a more coherent and holistic 
account of flourishing and better allow for shared discourse and greater receptivity to 
important criticisms from without. These two theological streams can find analogous 
expression in other religious traditions, and, while drawing these connections to other 
religious traditions is beyond the scope of this dissertation, this study gestures towards 
wider implications for thinking about the relationship between religion and human 
flourishing in general.  
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My other secondary aim is to defend is the importance of humility for human 
flourishing. Although there has been renewed interest in humility as a virtue in recent 
years, by and large it has been neglected or rejected as a virtue since the rise of secular 
ethics—most likely because it was defined in explicitly religious terms for so long. In 
the sixth chapter I sketch an account of virtuous humility—one that is compatible with a 
Christian humanist understanding of humility (though the Christian conception goes 
beyond what can be made intelligible naturalistically) and that can also be situated 
within a broadly Humean moral outlook. (My suggestions for how to conceive of secular 
humility, however, will need to be distinguished from Hume’s portrayal of humility as a 
vice and will require significant modifications to his account of the virtue of modesty.) I 
contend that humility, properly understood, should be seen as an important virtue—
indeed, one that has the potential to mitigate the ways in which vicious forms of pride 
can be harmful to social and individual flourishing. 
 
Summary of Chapters: 
 
Chapter One: Pride and Humility in the Christian Tradition 
In Chapter One I discuss the main features of the two dominant theological 
frameworks that have developed in Western Christian history and show how these 
different theological frameworks correspondingly influence how pride and humility are 
understood. I begin with Augustine, whose conception of pride and humility has been 
decisive for the accounts of these traits that later emerge within these two streams. I 
show how, for Augustine, humility is situated within his Christian eudaimonism. We are 
made for God, Augustine famously declares, and thus only find true happiness when we 
rest in God (C I.i.1, 3). Humility, for him, primarily refers to proper recognition and 
 13 
joyful acceptance of our status as creatures and is thus constitutive of the upward turn of 
the soul to God by which we find the fulfillment of our being. Augustinian humility at its 
core also involves awareness of our dependency on God, not only for our existence but 
also for his grace in helping heal our inwardly divided souls. By contrast, we exhibit 
pride when we make ourselves our final resting place and think that we can achieve 
ultimate happiness solely through our own power.    
I show that, for Augustine, pride and humility are of utmost significance in his 
theological and moral outlook, since they mark the distinction between the two cities in 
City of God: the earthly city is ruled by the prideful, i.e., by those for whom the self 
reigns; God reigns in the heavenly city where the people of God practice the humble 
turning of creature to creator. In this way, Augustine not only sees humility as central to 
the flourishing of individual souls, but, as was mentioned above, he regards it as 
necessary for genuine social peace. This is because the receptivity to God characteristic 
of humility includes seeking to be transformed by the will and love of God, which in 
turn involves coming to love others as persons made in God’s image. Pride, by contrast, 
leads to domination, as the emphasis placed on self causes one to seek to lord over 
others, either directly or by striving to attain glory in others’ eyes.  
I go on to explain that Augustine’s notorious contention that seeming pagan 
virtue is in fact only splendid vice is one consequence of Augustine’s account of pride 
and humility. Since Augustine understands humility to be essentially bound up with the 
love of God in such a way that the failure to love God inevitably involves pride, 
Augustine’s final assessment in City of God is that even the good works of pagans will 
always be contaminated with prideful love of glory. I then show how the two great 
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theological trajectories that emerge in the West after Augustine (the Christian humanist 
stream and the hyper-Augustinian stream) respond differently to the possibility of pagan 
virtue and hold correspondingly different conceptions of what is involved in humility 
and its relation to flourishing. 
Central to the Christian humanist strand is the affirmation of reason’s ability to 
discern the human good and the power of human agency to set about achieving it, even 
though thinkers in this stream affirm that human nature has been affected by sin and that 
we stand in need of grace. In other words, Christian humanists agree that human nature 
has suffered the corrupting effects of the Fall but maintain that these effects are not 
totalizing;15 although we have a rooted tendency towards sin, we also have a natural 
orientation to God, as manifested in the way we can be drawn to truth, goodness, and 
beauty. Similarly, Christian humanists think that humans are genuine agents in their own 
moral development. While grace is seen to be important for moral and spiritual growth, 
they regard human agency as cooperating with grace, rather than being displaced by it.  
I will take Aquinas to represent this trajectory since he has perhaps given this 
sort of theological perspective its most thorough and systematic articulation and is often 
looked to as a founding resource for contemporary theologians within this stream of 
thought (e.g., Bernard Lonergan, Henri de Lubac, and Karl Rahner, to name a few). As I 
will explain, Aquinas’s positions on human nature, sin, and grace make it possible for 
him to grant virtue to pagans and, likewise, to affirm the possibility of good, non-
prideful pagan self-love. In line with this orientation, Aquinas rehabilitates Aristotle’s 
account of magnanimity (a feature of Aristotle’s ethics about which many Christians 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Post-Darwinian theologians are of course apt to interpret the Fall metaphorically, as a myth that 
portrays our propensity towards selfishness and self-enclosure.   
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were wary because of its resemblance to pride) and aligns it with humility. It is clear, 
therefore, that while humility for Aquinas involves a proper recognition and acceptance 
of our limits, weaknesses, dependencies, and moral failings, it does not amount to self-
depreciation. Rather, he regards humility as important for individual as well as 
communal flourishing. Furthermore, although Aquinas, like Augustine, defines humility 
primarily with reference to God, I also show how he opens up space for a naturalistic 
account of humility, which likewise can be seen as indispensible to the human good—a 
crucial point that will allow for engagement with Hume’s perspective in Chapter Six.  
I then explain core features of the second theological trajectory, the hyper-
Augustinian tradition, in order to show why the religious humility with which Hume 
would have been acquainted looked primarily like self-negation. (This trajectory shares 
Augustine’s strong emphasis on sin, wariness of reason, and stress placed on the role of 
grace. But it is called hyper-Augustinianism because, as I explain in Chapter One, its 
rejection of eudaimonism and its affinity with theological voluntarism causes these 
positions to become exaggerated and intensified.) Theologians in this strand are united in 
their conviction that the Fall was so catastrophic as to render human nature wholly 
corrupt. This view tends to have two consequences. First, our rational capacities are seen 
to be so marred by sin that we cannot reliably identify the good by our own lights. 
(When hyper-Augustinianism is accompanied by theological voluntarism, as in the 
Protestant Reformers, this view is bolstered even further. If God’s will is what makes 
something good, then reason is not the appropriate route to discerning goodness in the 
first place. It is ultimately only through faith in divine revelation, wherein God expresses 
his commands, that we come to know what is good.) Second, we are so corrupted that 
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we cannot even make a successful attempt at goodness through our will but are wholly 
dependent upon divine grace, and, at least for the Protestant Reformers, this is 
understood in such a way as to make it seem that grace supersedes rather than cooperates 
with human agency.  
Thus for the hyper-Augustinians, pagans (as well as false Christians, who post-
Medieval theologians were more concerned to identify) are unable to achieve virtue or 
even to reason well about the good. On the contrary, they are perpetually guilty of pride 
and prideful self-love. In this framework humility thus comes to involve a thorough-
going awareness of the depths of our depravity and of our inability to be virtuous by our 
own power. Especially for the Protestant Reformers who embraced theological 
voluntarism, humility also comes to include submission to the (inscrutable) divine 
wisdom, over and against relying upon our own insight.  
In addition to showing the different conceptions of humility within Christian 
thought, presenting Aquinas’s account in this chapter will set the backdrop for later 
arguing in Chapter Three that Hume’s critique of Christian humility more accurately 
targets the hyper-Augustinian conception but that the Christian humanist conception of 
pride and humility represented by Aquinas largely (though not entirely) resists Hume’s 
critique. It will also lay the foundation for later setting Aquinas’s perspective in 
conversation with that of Hume’s in order to explore some critical issues that emerge 
with regard to their differing positions regarding the relationship between religion and 
human flourishing.  
 
 
 17 
Chapter Two: Hume’s Secular Ethic of Ordinary Life and His Critique of Religious 
Morality 
 
In Chapter Two, I pave the way for later looking at what is at stake in Hume’s 
secular transformation of pride and humility, and with it, his secularization of ethics, by 
presenting Hume’s objections to Christian morality. I show how the two theological 
trajectories described in Chapter One give rise to two different ways of conceiving of the 
relationship between religion and morality as seen in 1) the natural law tradition, which 
is prominent among Christian humanists, and 2) divine command theory, prominent 
among voluntarist hyper-Augustinians, such as the Scottish Calvinists of Hume’s day. I 
offer Hume’s epistemological critiques of both accounts by explaining why he thinks 
that neither ‘natural’ nor ‘revealed’ religion is a philosophically legitimate basis for 
morality, is necessary to ground morality, or is needed to motivate morality. I then detail 
the practical reasons for Hume’s rejection of Christian morality that were mentioned 
above—namely, its tendency to fuel faction and its stifling, unnatural vision of life.    
In this chapter I also summarize the main features of Hume’s alternative account, 
i.e., his ethic of common life rooted in social praise and blame, which is made possible 
by our capacity for sympathy. I show why he thinks that his secular moral philosophy is 
better able to explain the nature of morality, the way we come to identify goodness, and 
why we should be (and to varying degrees already are) motivated to pursue a life of 
virtue. I also show why he would take his account to have the additional benefit of 
countering that which he finds to be harmful in Christian morality.  
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Chapter Three: Hume’s Rehabilitation of Pride as a Virtue and His Critique of Christian 
Humility 
 
In Chapter Three I present Hume’s rehabilitation of pride as a virtue and show 
how it is of a piece with, and indeed integral to, his secular ethic of ordinary life. I first 
explain how Hume conceives of pride as a virtue, showing how it is distinct from but 
related to what Hume calls the passion of pride and distinguishing it from what Hume 
regards as vicious forms of pride. I then show how pride is essential to Hume’s moral 
philosophy by explaining its role in Hume’s account of moral epistemology and of moral 
motivation. More specifically, I describe how pride is important for moral knowledge 
because the security provided by a stable self-esteem enables the development of 
extensive sympathy, which Hume regards as the condition for the possibility of making 
moral judgments. I also show how pride functions in Hume’s moral philosophy as the 
ultimate source of motivation—namely, how the desire for positive self-survey becomes 
central to his account of why we should desire to be good, even in cases when we would 
appear to benefit through vice. Since I explain in Chapter Two that Hume’s accounts of 
extensive sympathy and virtuous pride replace the roles traditionally ascribed to God in 
religious accounts of morality, it thus becomes visible in Chapter Three just how crucial 
the virtue of pride is to Hume’s secularization of morality.  
I next put forward Hume’s account of the vice of humility, explaining its relation 
to the passion of humility. I also distinguish it from modesty, which Hume regards as an 
important mark of good breeding that serves to mitigate the offense caused by open 
displays of pride. I show that Hume understands humility as habitual self-denigration, 
and regards it as a ‘monkish virtue’ because he thinks that it is believed to be good only 
when viewed through the distorting lenses of religious superstition. I then explore the 
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ways in which Hume sees humility as a particularly damaging vice. Not only does it 
contribute to the personal misery of those who seek to inculcate it, but it also clouds 
one’s moral acuity by disrupting the normal operations of the passions, which for Hume, 
form the basis of our capacity for sympathy and of our awareness of what contributes to 
the happiness and well-being of others. The detrimental ramifications of humility are 
thus social as well as individual.  
Finally, I assess Hume’s critiques of humility in light of how humility is actually 
understood within the Christian tradition. I argue that Hume is right to see certain 
conceptions of Christian humility (most especially in the hyper-Augustinian, voluntarist 
trajectory) as harmful. I also contend, however, that Hume’s portrayal of humility 
conceals the ways in which many Christian thinkers (particularly in the Christian 
humanist tradition) would, in fact, agree with Hume in condemning self-deprecation and 
approving of proper self-love. At the end of this chapter, I therefore seek to locate the 
real points of agreement and contention between Hume and Aquinas with respect to the 
phenomena underlying their different ways of understanding the terms pride and 
humility. Indeed, despite substantial agreement with respect the moral significance of 
security of selfhood and positive self-assessment, they crucially differ with respect to 1) 
whether the self is best conceived ‘immanently,’ i.e., solely in relation to other human 
persons or whether the self also stands in relation to God, 2) whether attempting to find 
one’s security in God is an immature and illusory way of dealing with fear and suffering 
or whether God is the deepest ground for the self, and 3) whether going beyond the 
human or closing the window to a transcendent moral source primarily contributes to or 
undermines flourishing. I address these crucial differences in the final three chapters.  
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Chapter Four: The Passion of Pride and Problems for Flourishing 
 
  Insofar as Chapters Two and Three discuss Hume’s critiques of religious 
morality and Christian morality in particular, the focus prior to Chapter Four is to 
identify some of the genuine dangers that religion (specifically Christianity) can pose to 
flourishing and the corresponding contributions of Hume’s secularization of ethics for 
human life. What is lost in Hume’s rejection of Christian humility and, relatedly, in his 
immanentized ethic and conception of the self, however, becomes clearer upon a deeper 
exploration of his account of the passions of pride and humility in Book II of the 
Treatise. Thus, in Chapter Four I consider Hume’s account of pride more fully in order 
to examine some of the problems for flourishing that can arise due to the natural desire 
for pride that is rooted in our human nature. This will lay the foundation for 
appreciating, in Chapter Five, some of the limitations of Hume’s secular ethic precisely 
because he insists that we remain within the confines of so-called “common life.” 
In order to see the problems that our desire for pride can pose for flourishing, I 
devote the first section of this chapter to presenting and developing upon Hume’s 
account of the passions of pride and humility. Hume understands the passion of pride to 
be a pleasurable (and humility to be a painful) impression of the self that arises when we 
stand in relation to some pleasurable (or painful) quality or object. (For example, if we 
take pleasure in virtue, beauty, or wealth, and we are virtuous, beautiful, or wealthy, we 
feel a corresponding pleasure (i.e., pride) in ourselves.) Hume furthermore contends that 
these passions are not only pervasive in human life but that they acutely matter for us. 
Pride and humility arise not only in relation to the objects that support these passions, 
however. Hume also observes that due to the natural sympathy we have with others, our 
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sentiment-informed self-assessments are strongly influenced by the perceptions of 
others. Moreover, the passions of pride and humility are motivationally significant since 
we naturally desire to feel positive about ourselves and wish to avoid shame. Hume’s 
account thus rightly implies that pride and humility, as well as social approval and 
disapproval, are very important for understanding human identity-formation and human 
action. 
In light of our natural desire for a stable pride before others, I then consider some 
of the ways in which the passions of pride and humility can lead to three interrelated 
problems for flourishing. First, I look at the desire for pride in relation to moral 
epistemology. For Hume the desire for pride can inhibit moral insight, insofar as it can 
prompt those sorts of comparisons with others that in turn displace the extensive 
sympathy needed for sound moral judgments. Second, I look at the way in which the 
desire for pride can play a role in hampered individual flourishing, as when a person 
suffers from crippling shame and social rejection. I also look at vicious ways of seeking 
to bolster insufficient pride, which further contributes to social dysfunction and to 
psychological unrest in the individual. Third, I explore Hume’s account of how the 
desire for pride tends to excite those passions which can be especially detrimental to 
social flourishing: passions such as envy and malice, as well as undue hatred, anger, and 
contempt. I show also how Hume’s account of our natural sympathy can explain how 
these problems caused by the desire for pride can become socially inscribed, as for 
example, when moral blindness becomes widespread, when an individual’s self-worth is 
negatively and unjustly impaired because the class to which they belong is culturally 
undervalued, or when maintaining collective pride is at work in perpetuating social 
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faction. Chapters Five and Six will explore the degrees to which Hume’s secular ethic 
(and a virtuous pride in one’s character) and a Christian humanist ethic (and its 
affirmation of a magnanimous humility) have the resources for addressing these 
problems.  
 
Chapter Five: The Limitations of Hume’s Account of Pride as a Virtue 
 
As I show in Chapter Four, these three problems for flourishing that arise due to 
our natural desire for the passion of pride (i.e., our need for a stable security before 
others), stem from our propensity to engage in sympathy-displacing comparisons with 
others, a propensity that Hume notes is pervasive in our social life (T 2.1.6.4, 191). A 
key question I therefore consider in Chapter Five is: To what extent does Hume’s secular 
perspective have the conceptual tools for motivating a wider, more extensive sympathy, 
particularly in light of our tendency to attempt to secure our pride through vicious 
comparisons with others?  
Since prideful concern for character functions as the ultimate source of moral 
motivation in Hume’s secular ethic, I focus on the degree to which virtuous pride, as 
Hume understands it, can motivate this wider sympathy. I argue that Hume’s attempt to 
account for the moral life through giving a ‘science of man’ (a move that allows him to 
avoid giving answers to the larger metaphysical questions), deprives him of the means of 
defending the moral objectivity that I argue is needed to make adequate sense of why we 
should seek to extend our sympathy in the first place. Moreover, I contend that Hume 
must smuggle in concepts that go beyond what his “scientific” approach allows him to 
say in order to explain how prideful concern for character can serve as the ultimate 
source of moral motivation and, hence, as a source that could motivate an extensive 
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sympathy over our tendency to secure unjust pride through comparison. I, furthermore, 
show that even if Hume’s framework could philosophically support these key features of 
his moral philosophy, there in fact remain deep ambiguities in Hume’s notion of virtuous 
pride itself, due precisely to his separation of ethics from the larger metaphysical 
worldview that could inform it. These ambiguities, I show, make it unclear how far 
prideful concern for character should require us to extend our sympathy on Hume’s 
account. For these reasons I therefore maintain that Hume has quite limited resources for 
responding to the significant problems for flourishing (indeed, the very problems he 
sought to address with his secular ethic) that arise from our desire for the passion of 
pride.  
 
Chapter Six: The Significance of Christian Humanist Humility 
 
The limitations of Hume’s secular ethic, however, become clearer when 
compared with the resources that the Christian humanist tradition has for responding to 
the problems that our natural desire for the passion of pride poses for flourishing. 
Despite the philosophical lacunas in Hume’s immanent framework, I argue in Chapter 
Five that his account of human nature can explain psychologically how we might come 
to judge that we ought to extend our sympathy over and against temptations to vicious 
forms of pride, as well as how prideful concern for character can serve to motivate a 
wider, more extensive sympathy. In Chapter Six, therefore, I need to show that Hume’s 
inability to articulate the grounds for a genuine normative demand for widening our 
sympathy and to give a clear account of noble pride both have important (though often 
subtle) practical consequences.  
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A comparison between Hume and Aquinas’s Christian humanism brings this out. 
I show that teleological accounts of the cosmos and of virtue as constitutive of achieving 
the human telos, such as Aquinas’s, can explain moral objectivity and moral motivation 
in a way that Hume’s reductively scientific, non-teleological account cannot. 
Additionally, Aquinas’s teleological picture is situated within a Christian understanding 
of reality, which sees love as central to God’s nature as well as to human fulfillment—a 
view that shapes the believer’s understanding of the aims of the moral life and what true 
flourishing consists in. I contend that this Christian framework, if it can be believed in, 
can better inspire the sort of wider sympathy needed to cope with the problems for 
flourishing that arise due to our natural desire for the passion of pride by, for instance, 
directing our attention to the value of others, informing our moral imagination, providing 
resources for persisting in virtue when it is difficult to do so, and encouraging a higher 
moral aspiration.  
As part of this comparison between Hume’s secular and Aquinas’s Christian 
humanist moral perspectives, I look at how Aquinas’s account of humility (as well as his 
account of magnanimity) is especially suited for countering the destructive potential that 
our desire for the passion of pride carries with it than is Hume’s much thinner 
conception of the virtue of modesty (and his ambiguous conception of noble pride). I do 
show, however, that Hume’s secular framework does allow for a more robust account of 
virtuous modesty (or humility, as I prefer to call it) and a modified account of virtuous 
pride that could, if cultivated, go further in mitigating the problems caused by improper 
pride than could Hume’s account of these virtues. I thus argue that Hume’s conceptions 
of pride and modesty stand in need of some correction and that a secular account of 
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virtuous humility is very important for promoting human flourishing. I also argue, 
however, that a Christian humanist moral perspective and the conception of humility that 
it supports has deeper resources for encouraging a wider sympathy than does this 
modified, richer account of secular humility. I conclude, then, that that just as Hume 
criticizes the Christian tradition for the way in which humility can undermine individual 
and social flourishing, his own secular moral philosophy carries its own unique threats to 
flourishing in both respects. 
 
Conclusion: Humility, Religion, and Human Flourishing 
I conclude by briefly considering where this study leaves us. I summarize 
Hume’s critiques of religious morality, and I highlight what I see to be of great value in 
those concerns as well as ways in which I think Hume’s position lacks appropriate and 
crucial nuance. I emphasize how Hume’s worries better target hyper-Augustinianism 
rather than Christian humanism, and in so doing, I review why I think that Christian 
humanism offers a better way of conceiving of the relationship between faith and reason, 
religion and morality. (I also suggest that there are broader implications of these 
theological categories for thinking about religion and morality more generally, i.e., 
beyond the Christian tradition.) I nevertheless show why I think Hume’s insight into the 
nature of the passion of pride and its significance in human life can help to explain the 
dangerous potential of religion as such (even its better forms) and indeed of any high 
ideal or perspective that could engender religious-like fervor. I argue, though, that 
Hume’s lower-aspiring, secular ethic, while able to offer needed and enduring critiques 
of religious and high-aspiring secular moral visions, carries its own threats to 
flourishing. I furthermore contend that in light of the dangers to which Hume’s lower-
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aspiring, secular ethic is prey, his secular moral tradition stands in need of the kind of 
critiques that a religious perspective, such as Christian humanism, can offer. I therefore 
conclude that appreciative and enduring dialogue between religious and secular moral 
perspectives are needed for human flourishing, and that we must work toward 
articulating and cultivating virtuous humility to make such dialogue possible.  
 
The Need for This Study: 
 Although some philosophers have argued for the significance of religion for 
human flourishing,16 there is a dominant sense in much scholarship and among 
academics in general that religion is rightly seen as peripheral to the moral life and 
human well-being. Many also hold that religion positively impedes flourishing and thus 
that human progress involves getting beyond it. These latter two views seem to be quite 
widespread among many important Hume scholars. Accordingly, while the value of 
Hume’s secularization of ethics has, I think, been rightly appreciated in the secondary 
literature, its dangers have not been adequately noted.  
 The insufficient critical assessment of Hume’s attempt to render larger 
metaphysical questions irrelevant to our moral life, surfaces in the very way in which 
Hume scholars tend to discuss Hume’s account of pride and humility. Many Hume 
scholars have indeed noticed that Hume inverts and redefines the traditional Christian 
moral categories of pride and humility.17 There has not, however, been a thorough study 
of Hume’s modification of pride and humility and of the issues that surround this shift. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Charles Taylor, who deeply shapes the sort of argument I am making in this dissertation, is 
noteworthy in this regard (see his Sources of the Self and, especially, A Secular Age). 
17 See, for example, Annette Baier (1991, 207); Páll Árdal (1989b, 390-91); Christopher Brooke 
(2012, 178); Robert Manzer (1996, 338-39); Craig Beam (1996, 311); Gabriele Taylor (1981, 394), to 
name a few. 
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Moreover, almost without exception when the religious implications of Hume’s 
inversion are mentioned, there is no sense given that Hume’s critique of humility as a 
monkish virtue seriously misconstrues a dominant Christian understanding of that 
character trait,18 or that humility (as understood in a Christian humanist framework) 
helps to facilitate a wider, more extensive sympathy—i.e., the sort of sympathy upon 
which a Humean account of the moral life depends. Second, although some scholars 
have noted the difficulties that our desire for social approval (i.e., a pride supported by 
the perceptions of others) can pose for human flourishing and have questioned the 
degree to which Hume can address these problems from within his ethical framework, to 
my knowledge there has been no serious attempt to consider how the very religious 
tradition and key virtue that Hume (understandably) rejects might be able to speak to 
precisely these problems. 
 The lack of sufficiently critical commentary on Hume’s secular moral philosophy 
among Hume scholars also becomes apparent in the ways in which Hume’s objections to 
religious morality are sometimes discussed. This in large part stems, I think, from 
insufficient awareness of the differences between hyper-Augustinian conceptions of 
Christian morality and Christian humanist conceptions and a sense that if the former is 
shown to be untenable, then Christian morality (or, more generally, the notion that 
morality is to some degree dependent on religion, whether natural or revealed) can be 
rejected wholesale.19 We see this, for example, when David Fate Norton offers only the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Gabriele Taylor, however, does mention in passing that Hume’s jab at the religious or traditional 
conceptions of pride and humility in the Treatise 3.3.2.13 “is mistaken in assimilating pride the passion to 
pride the sin” (1981, 394).  
19 Since hyper-Augustinianism was dominant in Hume’s social and academic context, the 
conceptual possibilities that a Christian humanist perspective can offer are sometimes missed, I think, in 
the debates in which Hume was engaged as well. 
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objections posed to Hume’s attempt to establish the autonomy of morality from religion 
by those who embrace divine command theory (which, as noted, was widely accepted by 
followers of the (hyper-Augustinian) Protestant Reformers) (1991, 47-58). Norton fails 
to engage, however, the sorts of answers to how and why religion is important for 
morality as articulated within the Christian humanist tradition, and it is these, I think, 
that present the more formidable and interesting challenges to Hume’s secular moral 
philosophy.  
Commentators also show inadequate acquaintance with the conceptual 
possibilities that a Christian humanist perspective offers when they indicate that the 
belief that atheists (or non-Christians) can acquire genuine virtue and can come to 
identify virtue through their own resources signals a fundamental break with 
Christianity,20 when in fact this view is endorsed, with certain qualifications, by 
Christian humanists. These mistakes are really two sides of the same coin: if Christian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For example, at a key moment in a chapter entitled “Morality without Religion,” Paul Russell 
says, “Religious philosophers are mistaken, therefore, when they claim that the autonomy of morals can be 
secured only by embracing skeptical and pessimistic views about human nature and morality [i.e., as the 
views of Hobbes and Mandeville who conceive of morality is mere convention]. In this way, Hume’s 
‘science of man’ serves to vindicate the possibility and reality of (genuine) virtuous atheism” (2008, 255). 
As will be more apparent in Chapter One, hyper-Augustinians rather than Christian humanists, take a 
pessimistic view of human nature and because of this, they are skeptical of genuine virtue among atheists; 
grace is necessary, they think, for true virtue, and what may look like virtue in an atheist is really a 
glittering mask that is worn in ultimate service of pride or self-interest. Christian humanists, who grant that 
morality has partial-autonomy from religion, do not deny that atheists can be virtuous and indeed more 
virtuous than many religious believers. But the affirmation that atheists can be virtuous does not 
conceptually commit one to the view that ethics is not ultimately dependent upon, for example, God or a 
teleologically-ordered cosmos (as I will discuss in Chapters Five and Six). 
Michael Gill 2008 also seems to regard the belief that atheists can be virtuous as pushing a 
heterodox view. See his treatment of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, which he summarizes on p. 207. Even if 
Gill is right that such views historically paved the way for secular ethics, I find that he does not seem to 
adequately comprehend the theological possibilities that a Christian humanist ethical perspective can 
provide. He is too apt, I think, to suggest that a secular ethic is the logical outworking of what he calls the 
Positive Answer to the human nature question, in part, I think, because he seems to lack sufficient 
awareness of how the belief that we can identify and pursue the good by our own power can (with the right 
qualifications) be genuinely reconciled with a Christian moral perspective (see, for example, his 
discussion of the Cambridge Platonists in his chapter entitled “The Emergence of Non-Christian Ethics” 
(pp. 58-74)).  
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morality is equated with divine command theory or in general understood with hyper-
Augustinian categories, the view that humans by nature have the capacity to identify the 
good and to progress virtue will be wrongly seen as posing a fundamental affront to a 
Christian moral perspective. Since it is very evident to most of us now that genuine 
virtue can be had regardless of one’s beliefs about God, it is easy to reject a Christian 
moral perspective (implicitly understood in hyper-Augustinian terms) as obviously false 
without noticing that there is an alternate Christian position that can be fruitfully 
explored.21  
Finally, many scholars seem to follow Hume (and many of Hume’s 
contemporaries) in assuming that the primary way God would be motivationally 
important is that it motivate moral action by its promise of an eternal reward and its 
threat of eternal punishment.22 Because this seems to instrumentalize the moral life by 
making it a means to a seemingly external reward and because he thinks such remote 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 What is fundamentally at odds with Christianity is the view that we can wholly identify all the 
virtues needed for flourishing apart from faith (e.g., faith is needed to recognize the theological virtues of 
faith, hope, and charity, as genuine virtues) and wholly attain virtue apart from grace. (Note that the 
conviction that a full conception of the virtues depend upon faith as well as reason and that grace plays a 
role in virtue does not entail that Christians are morally superior to atheists.) Whether we can fully discern 
all virtues by use of reason alone and, also, whether God or a teleological conception of the cosmos is 
ultimately needed to make sense of our moral phenomenology to begin with are, I think, the more 
interesting questions that become lost by identifying Christianity with hyper-Augustinianism and 
subsequently rejecting it. 
22 This, too, may be because of the dominance of the hyper-Augustinian tradition in eighteenth-
century English-speaking Europe. See Jennifer Herdt’s account of how Augustine’s eudaimonism enables 
him to avoid the charge that the notion of heaven entails that our “actions have no intrinsic connection to 
eternal life but are a means to a goal external to themselves” (2008, 53; see 53-46). She points out, 
however, that, starting with Scotus and continuing in the hyper-Augustinian line, heaven comes to seem 
more like an external reward (l04-6). This occurs, she argues, because Scotus’s break with eudaimonism 
makes happiness irrelevant to right action. When happiness and morality come apart, then the happiness of 
eternal life looks more like an external reward than the continuation and culmination of the longing for 
and joy in goodness (for God) begun in this life.  
For literature that suggests that the primary or only way religion could be thought to be significant 
for moral motivation is by ensuring eternal reward and punishment, see Norton (2006, 157-58; 1991, 49-
50) and Russell (2008, 259). Gaskin does mention how, “since the theist lives with his god in a reciprocal 
relationship of love, he is strongly and personally obligated to do good and avoid evil” (1979, 149), but 
instead of exploring what the loss of this conception might mean, he focuses on eternal reward and 
punishment (1979, 150) and explains why Hume would deny its importance (1979, 153-55).  
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promises are not necessary and, in any case, fail to motivate virtuous action, Hume 
believes that there is no significant motivational loss in shifting to a secular approach to 
ethics.23 I will show, however, that Hume misconstrues the primary way in which 
religion factors into moral motivation, and ironically as a consequence, he is not 
appropriately aware of the shortcomings in his own account of moral motivation. Again, 
however, Hume’s commentators so often miss these issues because they fail to note the 
ways in which religion can inspire moral formation and action beyond arousing concern 
about how we will fare in the final judgment. Through this study I thus hope to 
contribute an appreciative yet critical perspective that provides what I think is a needed 
counter-voice to some of these discussions.  
 
A Preliminary Note on the Terms Pride and Humility: 
 
 Finally, before beginning a study on Hume’s secular transformation of pride and 
humility, it will be helpful to bring some clarity to the terms themselves.24 Unlike terms 
for other character traits that unambiguously denote virtues or vices (e.g., courage and 
justice always refer to virtue, whereas rashness and greed to vice), the terms pride and 
humility can each be used to designate virtue or vice. Calling a person prideful may 
express disapprobation, as when we regard them to be arrogant, haughty, pompous, vain, 
and the like. On the other hand, we speak of pride approvingly when we say, for 
example, “Have you no pride?!”; here pride refers to an important sense of dignity and 
integrity, the lack of which is vicious. Likewise, we speak approvingly of the humility of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Norton for why Hume’s position would lead him to regard the prospect of eternal reward or 
punishment as instrumentalizing the virtues (2006, 157-58; 1991, 49-50); on this point, see also Gaskin 
1979, p. 150. For Hume’s arguments for why eternal life is neither necessary, nor has the motivational 
benefit that it is purported to have, see the Dialogues XII, pp. 122-24, and the Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, XI, pp. 140, 146-47. I interpret these passages in Chapter Two.  
24 Here I have in mind these terms as they refer to character traits rather than to passions.  
 31 
a great human being who joyfully and earnestly acknowledges her indebtedness to others 
and who does not call attention to her greatness but treats others with genuine respect 
and interest. But the term humility can also have negative connotations as when we say 
that a self-effacing, servile person has too much humility. 
 This variation in language reveals not only the obvious point that there are 
different conceptions of what counts as the virtuous and vicious stances we can take 
towards ourselves—a point I will discuss in a moment. It also shows that we sometimes 
can use the same word to refer to the virtue and its vicious excess. In what follows, I 
want to offer a basic framework for thinking about virtuous pride and virtuous humility 
(twin virtues that I think necessarily hang together) as well as their vicious extremes. 
While the content of virtuous and vicious ways of relating to oneself is deeply contested, 
providing this framework will help bring out what is at stake in the moral phenomena 
that underlie the various ways the terms pride and humility are used. Doing so will also 
set the stage for a sketch of secular humility I want briefly to develop in Chapter Six. 
I suggest that pride, whether proper or excessive, pertains to the phenomena of 
greatness, dignity, strength, importance, and the ways in which we are independent or 
self-determining or self-sufficient. The person who has virtuous pride rightly recognizes 
and has the proper affective responses to these features of herself, whereas the person 
with excessive pride overestimates and places too much affective attention on her merits, 
perceived importance, or independence. By contrast, humility, whether proper or 
excessive, pertains to our smallness, weakness, limitations, powerlessness, vulnerability, 
dependency, and mistakes and moral failings. The person with virtuous humility rightly 
recognizes and has the proper affective acceptance of these features of herself, whereas a 
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person with vicious humility underestimates her worth and capacity and feels 
excessively dejected by her failings.  
Since successes and failures, self-reliance and dependence, and so on are 
unavoidably part of the human condition to which we must somehow stand in relation, it 
becomes clear that an adequate account of virtuous self-assessment must give some 
account of both the phenomena of virtuous pride and virtuous humility, even if these 
phenomena are given different names by various thinkers. Aquinas, for example, 
specifies that what he means by ‘pride’ is the vicious extreme, whereby we have an 
inordinate desire for our own excellence in a manner opposed to right reason (ST II-
II:161.1; II-II:162.4) and speaks of magnanimity as possessing greatness of soul, striving 
to do that which is deserving of honor, and regarding great honors as something of 
which one is worthy, if one is in fact worthy of them (ST II-II:129.1; II-II:129.1.r3; see 
also a2, aa.; II-II:129.2.r3). Hume understands humility as a character trait to be the 
tendency to underrate our worth and thus condemns it as a vice, but he does regard 
modesty—which he defines as a “just sense of our weakness” (T 3.3.2.1)—to be a 
virtue. While both have significantly different accounts of what is involved in what they 
respectively call magnanimity/pride and humility/modesty, and while they use different 
terms to denote the relevant virtues and vices, both have an account proper and improper 
ways of standing in relation to our strengths and weaknesses.  
Not only must an adequate account of proper self-assessment include an account 
of virtuous forms of both pride and humility, but it also becomes clear that these virtues 
are inseparably linked. If pride is to be proportionate to our merits and strengths, it must 
be accompanied by proper humility. Pride is excessive if, for example, it fails to 
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recognize the contributions of others for one’s successes or that regards those successes 
to be more important than they, in the grand scheme of things, in fact are. Likewise, if 
humility is to be proportionate to our smallness, vulnerabilities, and failings, it must be 
accompanied by virtuous pride. A humility that, for instance, fails to appreciate one’s 
worth in spite of failings or one’s potential in spite of real limitations is excessive rather 
than virtuous. Virtuous pride and humility are bound together, each guiding and 
informing the other.25  
Another feature of pride and humility is that our conceptions of what counts as 
their virtuous and vicious manifestations are inherently informed by our larger 
metaphysical commitments. On the one hand, any religious tradition or spirituality that 
holds some notion of the sacred, and proper humility in those traditions will include 
proper reverence towards that which is seen as sacred or holy. For example, because 
central to Christianity is the view that God is the source of all goodness and the highest 
object of love, Christians see submission to God as central to virtuous humility. 
Followers of Confucius give reference to one’s ancestors. The deep ecologists advocate 
seeing oneself within the web of nature and paying due reverence to the natural world of 
which we are a tiny part by not pridefully overstepping our bounds and upsetting the 
ecological balance. On the other hand, if one conceives of the cosmos as a godless, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Some may use one word to refer to proper self-assessment, rather than give two words for its two 
different faces. For example, for Augustine humility refers to a proper self-assessment in the order of 
things, and so a right assessment of our greatness and worth (had through God and ultimately to be 
referred to God) could be seen as an aspect of humility. For Hume, it could be argued, virtuous pride, as a 
due sense of our self-worth, already includes within it an appropriate sense of our limitations and 
weaknesses, for otherwise our pride would be unjustly excessive (Hume does discuss modesty, but as I 
show in Chapter Five, Hume’s account of modesty arguably has more to do with an outward social grace 
than it does with an inward stance towards oneself). Moreover, using one term to refer to proper self-
assessment may be importantly revelatory (e.g., Augustine’s emphasis on humility and Hume’s on pride 
do hit upon core differences in outlook and attitude that reflect their respective religious and secular 
stances). Nevertheless, I do think it is also clarifying to articulate the two different sides of proper self-
assessment, and I continue to do so throughout this dissertation. 
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merely material universe devoid of objective value or meaning, submission to God or 
some notion of the sacred may well be seen as vicious humility, a stance that does not 
rightly recognize and glory in the fact that we create our own values, have the power to 
shape our lives as we wish, and are not bound by, for example, religious conceptions of 
morality. We can think of Nietzsche in this vein. Instead, proper pride would be seen to 
involve embracing and exercising one’s power. Hume, who thinks there is good reason 
to doubt the claims of revealed religion similarly sees humility before God to be a 
denigration of the human person rather than a virtue (see NHR X, 163-64, and II. of 
Chapter Three). 
What we take to be involved in virtuous pride and humility pertains also to our 
stances towards ourselves as we stand in relation to others. We understand our strengths 
and weakness in large part in light of our social place, and in many cases feeling superior 
to others may lie at the base of our sense of pride. Whether and to what extent feeling 
superior (or inferior) to others is seen as belonging to proper pride is also influenced by 
one’s cosmic outlook. In the Christian tradition, for example, while it is important to 
recognize one’s strengths, there is a sense that all persons are significant, being made in 
the image of God, that even the strengths one has are in part the gifts of God to be used 
for the common good rather than for self-aggrandizement, and that it is part of love and 
of recognizing the dignity of others to put others first rather than grasp at recognition. 
For Nietzsche, by contrast, a certain appeal to some mysterious notion of human dignity 
that is not phenomenally manifest is a tactic the weak and degenerate use to secure 
recognition that they do not deserve.  
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Our conceptions of pride and humility can also be shaped by differing 
conceptions of human nature, even within the same general cosmic picture. For example, 
I have already mentioned how within the Christian tradition, hyper-Augustinians, who 
see humans as utterly depraved, and Christian humanists, who think that human nature is 
partially though not wholly marred by sin, have correspondingly different conceptions of 
the depth of self-mourning that virtuous humility requires. Similarly, although 
Mandeville and Hume are both secularists, because Mandeville holds a bleak picture of 
human nature, he sees pride as morally unwarranted and thus vicious, while Hume, who 
maintains that we have natural sympathy and genuine other-regarding concern, argues 
that we can take a virtuous pride in our real virtue.   
Conceptions of virtuous pride and virtuous humility therefore will vary widely 
depending upon one’s convictions regarding the nature of the human person and our 
place in the cosmos. Above I suggested that humility has been a neglected virtue since 
the secularization of ethics because its importance becomes somewhat less intelligible 
when it is divested of its religious meaning. Perhaps a deeper reason for its neglect, 
however, is that because conceptions of the nature of proper and excessive pride and 
humility are especially bound up with how one answers larger metaphysical and 
religious questions, its content is particularly contestable.26 Nevertheless, some fruitful 
(though inherently limited) discourse on the nature of humility can be had on naturalistic 
grounds, and in Chapter Six I will suggest a secular conception of humility that deepens 
and modifies Humean modesty (as well as enriches and in some ways corrects his 
account of virtuous pride) using the resources available from within the confines of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Leaving larger metaphysical and religious questions aside does not give Hume neutral ground for 
his conceptions of pride and humility. As will become clear especially in Chapter Six, they are inevitably 
shaped by the presuppositions involved in his attempt to remain within the scope of “common life.” 
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“common life” as he understands it.27 It suffices for my purposes here, however, to point 
to the underlying phenomena pertaining to pride and humility (i.e., our strengths, 
weaknesses, and so on, and ways of relating to them), while also stressing that just what 
counts as virtuous and vicious ways of relating to these phenomena can be quite 
radically different given how one answers a range of questions about the fundamental 
nature of reality.  
I hope to show, though, that the very reason clear and productive discussions of 
pride and humility can be difficult—namely, the relationship between our sense of the 
nature of reality as a whole and our conception of proper self-assessment—is precisely 
what makes it a fascinating lens for looking at religious and secularity and their impact 
on human flourishing.28 I will contend that the content of religious (and specifically 
Christian humanist) humility carries with it important resources for flourishing that are 
lost within Hume’s ethics of common life but also that Hume’s account of the passion of 
pride helps make intelligible some of what can be so destructive about religion. It is 
through dialogue between these competing perspectives, I argue, that we can become 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 A complete account of virtuous pride and virtuous humility, however, will depend upon what 
actually is the case with respect to the nature of the cosmos and our place within it, and we of course 
cannot work towards our best account of our situation if such questions are precluded from our ethical 
discourse. 
28 I should mention that one’s stance on larger religious and metaphysical questions need not be 
definitive with respect to whether there is or is not a God. Although Hume quite clearly rejected revealed 
religion and with it the Christian conception of God, he may well have maintained a level of agnosticism 
(see, e.g., Gaskin 1979, 151, who interprets Hume as denying the existence of deity with moral attributes 
but does not deny the existence of “all gods whatsoever”). Nevertheless, his definitive conviction that we 
ultimately cannot be certain about our answers to larger metaphysical questions itself informs his 
conceptions of pride and humility. (For example, he sees religious certainty to be a viciously prideful for 
failing to appreciate the limitations of our knowledge on these matters. See, for instance, his remark in “Of 
Miracles” X.1, where Hume says that his argument “must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and 
superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations” (EHU X.1, 110, second emphasis mine).) 
Moreover, even if we embrace an agnostic position, we cannot get away from some form of what Charles 
Taylor calls ‘cosmic imaginaries’ (2007, 323); that is, we cannot help but have some backdrop picture of 
reality within which we (often implicitly) attempt to make sense of our lives. Such background pictures, 
whether certain or uncertain, whether religiously affirmative, negative, or agnostic, all can shape our sense 
of virtuous and vicious forms of pride and humility. 
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better attuned to the pitfalls of both ‘immanent’ and ‘transcendent’ moral perspectives 
and, thus, make ourselves more equipped to avoid them.  
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CHAPTER ONE: PRIDE AND HUMILITY IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION  
 
 
“Take my yoke upon you and learn from me, for I am gentle and humble of heart, and 
you will find rest for your souls.” Matthew 12:29 
 
“Now that I, your Lord and Teacher, have washed your feet, you also should wash one 
another’s feet.” John 13:14 
 
 “You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their high officials 
exercise authority over them. Not so with you. Instead, whoever wants to become great 
among you must be your servant, and whoever wants to be first must be your slave—Just 
as the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom 
for many.” Matthew 21:17 
 
“I tell you the truth, unless you change and become like little children, you will never 
enter the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, whoever humbles himself like this child is the 
greatest in the kingdom of heaven.” Matthew 18:3-4 
  
 In order to see what is at stake in Hume’s reversal of the traditional Christian 
categories of pride and humility, it is necessary to begin with an overview of how 
Christians in the West have broadly understood these character traits. The goal of this 
chapter is to show how pride and humility are differently understood within the two 
dominant theological trajectories in Western Christianity: 1) the ‘Christian humanist’ 
strand, which holds that, despite our tendencies to sin and self-enclosure, humans are also 
by nature oriented to God as manifest in our draw to goodness, truth, and beauty, and 2) 
the ‘hyper-Augustinian’ strand, which sees human nature as utterly depraved.1 Doing so 
will lay the requisite foundation for later showing in Chapter Three that although Hume 
means to attack Christian humility in general, his critique largely applies only to hyper-
Augustinian humility. While Hume’s critique is, I argue, important and very much 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The term hyper-Augustinian is coined by Charles Taylor (1989, 246-47). I find it to be a helpful 
term because, as I will show in III., these thinkers exaggerate and intensify certain key positions in 
Augustine, which has a direct bearing upon how pride and humility become understood within this 
trajectory. Jennifer Herdt employs Taylor’s term in her book Putting On Virtue: the Legacy of the Splendid 
Vices, a book which has been an indispensible resource for this chapter. 
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needed, it is incomplete insofar as it fails adequately to engage Christian humanist 
conceptions of humility. This chapter will thus also provide the necessary background for 
showing in Chapter Six that it is only when we set Hume’s position in conversation with 
Christian humanist conceptions of humility that the more interesting and difficult issues 
emerge with respect to religion, selfhood, and human flourishing. Moreover, it will be 
through this sort of deeper engagement between these rival perspectives that the 
weaknesses and strengths in both positions will stand out more clearly.  
 Since my aim in this dissertation is not merely to assess Humean and Christian 
conceptions of pride and humility but to use these as a vantage point for looking at 
broader issues pertaining to the relationship among religion, morality, and human 
flourishing, I will need to explain the background theological positions that undergird and 
find expression in these divergent conceptions of pride and humility. It will later be clear 
that Hume’s objections to hyper-Augustinian humility are far-reaching in that they also 
have a bearing on the typical hyper-Augustinian positions on these larger topics. To 
demonstrate this, however, I need not give a complete treatment of pride and humility in 
the Christian tradition or even in any Christian thinker’s account. Rather, I intend only to 
summarize how pride and humility come to be differently understood within the two 
dominant theological frameworks that emerge in the Christian West and to emphasize 
only those aspects that will be salient to future discussions.  
 
I. Pride and Humility in Augustine 
 
Because an adequate appreciation of the two theological traditions under 
consideration depends upon a prior understanding of Augustine, whose account of pride 
and humility has been of decisive importance for the subsequent Christian thinkers, it will 
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be important to begin by explaining how Augustine makes humility fundamental to his 
Christian eudaimonistic conception of morality. In the following two sections I show that 
it is precisely the disputes surrounding the theological implications entailed by 
Augustine’s account of pride and humility that, in part, lead to the emergence of these 
two theological streams with their different stances on faith and reason, nature and grace, 
religion and morality, and, accordingly, the nature of pride and humility.  
In order to grasp just how central the virtue of humility is for Augustine, and why 
it became a point of contention for later thinkers, I will first lay out Augustine’s Christian 
eudaimonism in order later to show how humility is situated within it.2 Augustine 
conceives of ethics as the investigation into the Summum Bonum, the supreme good, 
which is chosen for its own sake and provides the beatitude or happiness for which we all 
strive (see CG VIII.3-4, 301-4). Augustine understands this supreme good to be the 
Christian God, a God who has invited the human race to participate in his divine life and 
love. Since God has made us for friendship with himself, we remain restless and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Much of contemporary ethics (the revival of virtue ethics being an exception) has been action-
centered rather than character-centered, focusing on what it right to do rather than what leads to a good, 
flourishing life. By contrast, the ethical approach prevalent in ancient and medieval philosophy focuses on 
the latter of these, making their primary question: What gives true happiness or well-being and what are the 
traits of character that are constitutive of such happiness? For eudaimonists, happiness is not understood 
purely in terms of subjective feelings of pleasure but as genuine flourishing, and while flourishing will be 
pleasurable, it is not reducible to pleasure. (For example, the glutton has sensations of pleasure but he is not 
living well (is not happy, in the eudaimonist sense) with respect to food. However, the temperate person 
who knows how to enjoy food in the right measure is objectively thriving or flourishing in this respect and 
also has the subjective pleasure experience of right eating; he has eudiamonia with regard to food.) A 
eudaimonist approach to ethics requires that one give an account of human nature, for claims about what it 
is for the human being to flourish as a human must be grounded in an account of what a human person is, 
and this is usually articulated in terms of our telos or end (i.e., the answer to the question: What is the 
purpose of human life?). And our telos, among ancient and medieval eudaimonists, was understood in light 
of a particular conception of the nature of the cosmos and our place within it. Augustine’s account of 
eudaimonia, for example, depends fundamentally on seeing the human being as a soul made for friendship 
with God. For him, thus, the moral life (i.e., the good life) consists primarily in virtues that are constitutive 
of that friendship. Hume, I will later suggest, has something of an ethic of flourishing rooted in an account 
of human nature. Because, however, he rejects teleology and seeks to account for ethics independent of 
answers to larger metaphysical questions, I will show in Chapter Five that he faces special problems for 
accounting for moral motivation—challenges that are relevant to his account of virtuous pride—that do not 
afflict more traditional eudiamonist ethics.    
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dissatisfied, alienated from our true home, until we rest in him (C I.i.1, 3).3 The moral 
life, Augustine thus thinks, involves a transformation of our loves so that we come to 
love God above all things. 
How, then, does the love of other things factor into Augustine’s account of the 
happy life? While created beings are insufficient for giving us lasting happiness, 
everything that exists is made by God and is therefore good (see C VII.xi.17-xii.18) and 
worthy of love. Moreover, to love God entails loving what God has made.4 It is 
appropriate, however, to love things in the right order, in the right way, to the right 
extent. God is the Good, and is rightly loved above all things. Human persons are made 
in the image and likeness of God and are to be loved more than animals, plants, and 
inanimate objects, who respectively participate less fully in the being and goodness of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See also where Augustine says, “Therefore the correct reply to the question, ‘Why are the one sort 
happy?’ is ‘Because they cling to God’; and to ‘Why are those others wretched?’ the reply is, ‘Because they 
do not cleave to him.’ It follows that there is only one Good which will bring happiness to a rational or 
intellectual creature; and that Good is God. And so although felicity is not possible for all creatures…, yet 
those creatures which are capable of it, do not attain it by themselves, being created out of nothing, but 
receive it from him who created them. In attaining this Good they find their happiness; in losing it they are 
sunk in misery” (CG XII.1, 471-72). 
4 Augustine does of course insist that we should not love created beings with the kind of love that we 
owe to God. In On Christian Teaching he maintains we should cling to God and seek all our happiness in 
him (we should love God with the love of frui, i.e., enjoyment), and we should love created beings as signs 
pointing to God, as stepping stones on our journey to God (we should love creation with the love of uti, i.e., 
use). (Augustine qualifies this distinction of loves by explaining the sense in which human persons should 
be both enjoyed and used. It is worth mentioning here that ‘use’ is a technical term that should not be 
equated with the Kantian sense of using something as a means to our own ends. Augustine cannot fully 
admit that humans can be enjoyed rather than also used, precisely because he has already defined enjoying 
something as “hold[ing] fast to it in love for its own sake” as our “homeland,” as the final resting place of 
our journey (9), and this could only be God. Augustine does not want to say, however, that other humans 
should merely be used, even though he does specify that the wrong use of something (such as the Kantian 
sense of using another solely as a means to our ends) is “better termed abuse” (9). What Augustine needs is 
a way to speak of loving things for themselves while also referring them to God. (Herdt, in fact, argues that 
the later Augustine is finally able to articulate this by employing the distinction between relative and final 
ends (2008, 54).) Augustine draws heavily from Plato’s notion of the ladder of love given in the Symposium 
and thus emphasizes our love for created things as vehicles that point us upward to their Source, but his 
concern with our tendency to become wrongly attached to lower things, I think, prevents him from 
adequately emphasizing that we should seek to participate with God’s own love for created things “for their 
own sake” as it were. It is this latter sort of love that I will discuss in Chapter Six as being one of the ways 
that a transcendent perspective has something important to offer with respect to its connection to humility 
and human flourishing.  
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God (see CG XI.16, 447). As Augustine says, “This is true of everything created; though 
it is good, it can be loved in the right way or in the wrong way—in the right way, that is, 
when the proper order is kept, in the wrong way when the order is upset” (CG XV.22, 
636). This is why Augustine says that “a brief and true definition of virtue is ‘rightly 
ordered love’” (CG XV.22, 637), and as I will soon show, humility is integral to attaining 
this right order.  
A dominant way in which we tend to upset the proper order of loves is to confuse 
the utility value something has for us with the intrinsic worth of created beings. While 
reason can grasp the values that things have in themselves according to the hierarchy of 
creation, we are often driven by our desires and needs to regard things as valuable insofar 
as they serve our own narrow purposes (CG XI.16, 447-48). We see this, for example, 
when a father whose preoccupation with success causes him to neglect his children, with 
our willingness to buy clothing made by exploited workers, or with the child’s taunting of 
the classroom misfit in order to gain social approval. Thus, while virtue is defined in 
terms of rightly-ordered loves, sin or human evil is correspondingly defined as a disorder 
of the will, wherein we lack appropriate love for what is most worthy of it and are 
inordinately attached to things of lesser value.5 (The notion of rightly-ordered loves will 
later become relevant to issues in Hume’s moral philosophy.) 
 Augustine thinks that we have a propensity to be disordered in our loves; though 
we may make progress towards proper love, wrongly-ordered love marks the human 
condition in our earthly existence. This is not only because we tend to privilege utility 
values over intrinsic ones. No matter what the value, we frequently cling to what we love 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Bonnie Kent has a helpful discussion of rightly-ordered loves in Augustine’s ethics (2001, 213-
217).   
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with a disordered attachment. Augustine maintains that it is the tendency of love to seek 
to rest securely in what it loves, and he therefore thinks that unless we love God above all 
things, we will inevitably seek final security and happiness in lower things (C IV.10.15, 
61-62; see Di Lorenzo 358)—be it social prestige, material possessions, amusements, or 
even other persons. This leads to lack of freedom within ourselves as we become 
enslaved to our attachments,6 as well as to social disorder as our inner enslavements 
cause us to impose our wills upon others in order to satisfy our disordered desires. In 
other words, disordered loves thwarts both individual and social flourishing.  
 On Augustine’s account, loving God above all things is not only constitutive of 
true fulfillment. God is also important for our coming to develop rightly-ordered loves all 
the way down the scale of goods. Augustine thinks this is so, first, because God serves as 
a transcendent source of goodness in light of which we assess our character, desires, and 
behaviors.7 A theme throughout the Confessions is that we seek to imitate what we love; 
from Augustine’s specifically Christian standpoint, when we love God, we therefore 
strive to pattern ourselves after God Incarnate—i.e., Christ—who perfectly manifests 
rightly-ordered loves in human existence.8 Second, when we find the ultimate security 
and fulfillment of resting in the love of God, God becomes the anchor or ground of our 
being, enabling us to loosen our over-attachments to those things which give us a false 
sense of significance or a superficial and ephemeral sense of happiness. Third, God’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Augustine recounts his own struggle to overcome his sexual habit in Book VIII of Confessions. 
7 As I will soon show, Augustinian humility is the posture by which we seek to align ourselves with 
God’s will (which involves learning rightly to love that which is truly valuable and to be unencumbered by 
that which is insignificant). I present this aspect of Augustine’s ethics here because later in the dissertation 
I will explore whether Hume’s immanent ethic and his account of the centrality of virtuous pride in 
motivating the moral life has similar resources for helping us to develop ‘rightly-ordered loves.’   
8 Augustine understood imitating Christ, the perfect exemplar of virtue, as simultaneously involving 
the aspiration and effort of the individual Christian as well as divine grace in bringing Christians in 
conformity to Christ (Herdt 2008, 12).  
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grace helps us rightly to love what is truly worthy of love. Augustine understands grace, 
in part, as God’s revelation to the soul of the beauty of goodness (see O’Connell, 100). 
When we catch sight of the beauty of some higher value, our attachments to lower things 
weaken by way of feeling the relative dimness of their glitter in comparison to the 
splendor of more noble goods.9  Because we cannot, by sheer force of will, command our 
loves to be made right, Augustine therefore thought that the happiness that comes with 
forming rightly-ordered loves was not wholly or primarily in our own power but was the 
gift of God’s grace helping to heal our inner division (see C VIII).  
It is within this Christian eudaimonistic framework that Augustine understood 
pride to be the chief vice and humility to be a central virtue, for these two stances 
fundamentally shape the order of our loves as well as mark the distinction between the 
heavenly and earthly cities.10 They play such a crucial role precisely because Augustine 
defines them first and foremost in relation to God: humility designates the posture of 
loving receptivity to God,11 whereas pride denotes the refusal to submit to him and of 
making oneself the center of one’s loves (CG XIV.13, 571-73). In what follows, I will 
elaborate upon what is involved in the virtue of humility and the vice of pride, and I will 
show why Augustine sees them as so morally significant.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See this aspect of Augustine’s account of grace (God’s beauty revealed to the soul) in Book VIII of 
Confessions, wherein Augustine tells of a crucial moment in his own transformation.  
10 See, for example, where Augustine says, “That is why humility is highly prized in the City of God 
and especially enjoined on the City of God during the time of its pilgrimage in this world; and it receives 
particular emphasis in the character of Christ, the king of that City (cf. Phil 2, 8-11). We are also taught by 
the sacred Scriptures that the fault of exaltation [i.e., pride], the contrary of humility, exercises supreme 
dominion in Christ’s adversary, the Devil. This is assuredly the great difference that sunders the two cities 
of which we are speaking: the one is a community of devout men, the other a company of the irreligious, 
and each has its own angels attached to it. In one city love of God has been given first place, in the other, 
love of self” (CG XIV.13, 573). 
11 As Augustine says, “devout humility makes the mind subject to what is superior. Nothing is 
superior to God; and that is why humility exalts the mind by making it subject to God” (CG XIV.13, 572). 
He similarly says, “Now it is good to ‘lift up your heart’, and to exalt your thoughts, yet not in the self-
worship of pride, but in the worship of God. This is a sign of obedience, and obedience can belong only to 
the humble” (CG XIV.13, 572). 
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Augustine regards pride, i.e., the rejection of our creaturely status and the attempt 
to make ourselves our final resting place, to be the first sin. It was the desire to be like 
God—not in holy imitation but to possess God’s characteristics as one’s own—that 
motivated the sin of Adam and Eve (see CG XIV.13, 571-73) as well as Lucifer’s 
rebellion (CG XIV.11, 569).12 This first sin dramatically illustrates the cataclysmic 
character of pride for the human soul, since Augustine understands pride to be the first 
disorder of the will,13 disrupting the scale of value by elevating the self and denigrating 
God. As Augustine says, 
And what is pride except a longing for a perverse kind of exaltation? For it is a 
perverse kind of exaltation to abandon the basis on which the mind should be 
firmly fixed, and to become, as it were, based on oneself, and so remain. This 
happens when a man is too pleased with himself: and a man is self-complacent 
when he deserts that changeless Good in which, rather than in himself, he ought to 
have found his satisfaction. (CG XIV.13, 571-72)14 
 
This first disorder, in turn, leads to further disorder and misery, for Augustine 
thinks that as we abandon God and give rein to our desires, we eventually become 
enslaved to them. He says, 
…he who in his pride had pleased himself was by God’s justice handed over to 
himself. But the result of this was not that he was in every way under his own 
control, but that he was at odds with himself, and lived a life of harsh and pitiable 
slavery, instead of the freedom he so ardently desired, a slavery under him with 
whom he entered into agreement in his sinning. (CG XIV.15, 575) 
 
In short, from Augustine’s Christian eudaimonist perspective, no stance is more opposed 
both to morality as well as to genuine happiness as is pride; for turning from the author of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 “But after that, the arrogant angel came, envious because of that pride of his, who had for the same 
reason turned away from God to follow his own leading. With the proud disdain of a tyrant he chose to 
rejoice over his subjects rather than to be a subject himself; and so he fell from the spiritual paradise” (CG 
XIV.11, 569). 
13 “Now, could anything but pride have been the start of the evil will? For ‘pride is the start of every 
kind of sin’ (Ecclus. 10:13)” (CG XIV.13, 571).  
14 Or again, “This then is the original evil: man regards himself as his own light, and turns away 
from that light which would make man himself a light if he would set his heart on it” (CG XIV.13, 573). 
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our being is the ultimate disorder of love, one that underscores further disorder. It is a 
turn by which we reject our deepest source of fulfillment (God), and since through pride 
we give priority to our own wayward desires, it is leads us to form detrimental habits that 
in turn bind up the will, preventing us from rightly loving and pursuing what will truly 
make us happy and free.15 
This internal disorder caused by pride is not only constitutive of personal misery; 
pride also leads to social factions, as its self-oriented stance prompts us to dominate 
others in order to satisfy our own desires (CG XII.1, 471-72).16 This may be through 
vying for the most esteemed positions, seeking self-importance through gaining power 
over others, unjustly taking more than our share out of a self-centered inattention to the 
needs of others, and so on. The social ramifications of pride are explored in City of God, 
and indeed, pride, i.e., the rejection of God and the corresponding elevation of self, is the 
posture that renders us members of the earthly city rather than the heavenly (CG XIV.13, 
573). It is precisely because the prideful self, rather than God, reigns in the earthly city 
that this city can never have true or lasting peace among its members, Augustine argues.  
Humility, by contrast, is fundamental to Augustine’s whole account of how we 
pursue goodness and happiness, for it is the posture by which we rest in and seek to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Augustine’s account of his own divided will in Book VIII of Confessions, and see the role that 
pride and self-orientation in his youth play in his coming to form disordered habits that then make him 
miserably unfree.  
16 See CG XIX.14, 874 where Augustine links pride to lust for domination. And although Augustine 
is discussing the demons in the following passage, his account of their fall holds true for the effects of pride 
in the earthly city as well:  
The contrasted aims of the good and evil angels…had its origin in their wills and desires, the one 
sort persisting resolutely in that Good which is common to all—which for them is God himself—and 
in his eternity, truth, and love, while the others were delighted rather with their own power, as 
though they themselves were their own Good. Thus they have fallen away from that Supreme Good 
which is common to all, which brings felicity, and they have devoted themselves to their own ends. 
They have chosen pride in their own elevation in exchange for the certainty of truth; the spirit of 
faction instead of unity in love; and so they have become arrogant, deceitful, and envious. The cause 
of the bliss of the others is their adherence to God; and so the cause of the misery of the apostates 
must be taken to be the exact contrary, their failure to adhere to him. (CG XII.1, 471-72)  
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guided by God, who is our true home (CG XIV.13, 572-73). Furthermore, as explained 
above, God is necessary for acquiring rightly ordered loves all the way down the scale of 
goods, and humility just is the mode by which we seek to align ourselves to the will of 
God and acknowledge our dependence on him for moral and spiritual growth. 
Correspondingly, in contrast to the inner division caused by pride’s part in forming 
disordered loves, humility’s role in our forming rightly-ordered loves leads to internal 
wholeness and freedom. Humility is also bound up with facilitating social peace, for to 
have properly ordered loves involves treating others as bearers of God’s image who are 
worthy of love, not as beings upon which to impose one’s will or to neglect out of pursuit 
of a lower good. This is why humility is a defining characteristic of the members of the 
heavenly city (CG XIV.13, 573), for the heavenly city is ruled by God and likewise 
knows the true peace that comes from its members seeking to serve each other out of 
love. (Note, therefore, that in contrast to Hume, Augustine sees humility as necessary for 
individual and social flourishing, and pride as the surest route to misery and conflict, both 
within the person and among persons.)  
For Augustine, therefore, humility is foundational to the life of virtue and to 
flourishing: it is important for right relations to God and to others, as well as for true 
fulfillment and wholeness within ourselves. But the implications of his account of 
humility leave in its wake a history of theological contention, surfacing in the two 
previously mentioned theological trajectories and their respective positions on the 
relationship between faith and reason as well as religion and morality, which in turn 
influence their divergent conceptions of pride and humility.  
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The consequence of Augustine’s account of pride and humility that led to 
subsequent theological ferment is his famous conclusion that, in the end, pagan virtue is 
merely glittering vice.17 Although Augustine’s inability to grant pagans true virtue 
primarily stems from the fact that he characterizes virtue in such a way that makes loving 
God essential to it, the connection Augustine draws between loving God and the upward 
turn of humility therefore ties humility to virtue in a necessary way as well. To be more 
specific, the relationship between humility and Augustine’s stance on pagan virtue is as 
follows: Augustine, as we have seen, defines virtue as rightly-ordered love. Since, 
however, he regards loving God above all else (and the corresponding posture of humility 
before God) to be fundamental to right order, the actions and intentions of pagans show 
up as inherently disordered, and disordered, moreover, at the most important level. For 
Augustine, nothing can be rightly loved apart from recognizing that all goods are 
dependent upon and ordered to the true (i.e., Christian) God. Thus, apparent pagan virtue 
is, and can only ever be, splendid vice. 
Augustine does acknowledge that the best pagan Romans genuinely acted for the 
sake of the common good and, as John Rist notes, Augustine “seems to wish to assert 
that, if a choice must be made, such acts must be classed as vices rather than virtues, but 
to recoil from condemning them outright as vicious” (172).18 In Book V of the City of 
God, for example, Augustine approves of those Romans who “took no account of their 
own material interests compared with the common good; … resisted the temptations of 
avarice; … acted for their country’s well-being with disinterested concern; … were guilty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Jennifer Herdt traces the legacy of the “splendid vices” in her book Putting on Virtue, and her 
treatment of Augustine’s position on pagan virtue is excellent. From this point to the end of the section I 
draw heavily from her her discussion of it (see pp. 45-50).  
18 Quoted in Herdt 2008, p. 46. 
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of no offence against the law; [and] succumbed to no sensual indulgence” (CG V.15, 
204-5), and he even holds them up as models for Christians (CG V.16-17, 205-6). 
Augustine also affirms that pagans can develop in virtue insofar as they progress from the 
desire to impose their will upon others to the desire for human praise, and then from 
desiring to attain human praise by whatever means to desiring to be praised by the 
virtuous for genuine merit (CG V.19, 212-13). In these ways Augustine suggests that 
pagans can possess virtues in a qualified sense,19 and he does, moreover, refer to certain 
deeds performed by pagans as virtuous (CG V.17.6, 206; V.18, 211).  
Even so, Augustine also asserts that “no one can have true virtue without true 
piety, that is without the true worship of the true God” (CG V.19, 213). This is not only 
because love for the common good is, on Augustine’s view, perverted if such love is not 
ordered to God. Augustine also suspects that when we fail to make God our final resting 
place, the love, which is properly owed him inevitably collapses in on ourselves, making 
the self one’s final object of love. Augustine thereby sets up a dichotomy between the 
possible direction of our loves, a dichotomy which bears immense weight, for, as we saw, 
it defines the heavenly and earthly cities, and it implies humility or pride as their 
respective stances: either we love and are humbly submissive to God or, in the absence of 
it, we set ourselves up as “gods,” manifesting pride by tacitly or overtly seeking self-
exaltation. He says, for example, 
Thus the virtues which the mind imagines it possesses, by means of which it rules 
the body and the vicious elements, are themselves vices rather than virtues, if the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Augustine often signals such qualification by referring to the “moral qualities” of pagans (CG 
V.12, 199, scare quotes are included in the text) or by mentioning “qualities that approach more nearly to 
the true ideal of virtue” (CG V.12, 200). He also grants that although “the virtue which is employed in the 
service of human glory is not true virtue; still, those who are not citizens of the Eternal City…are of more 
service to the earthly city when they possess even that sort of virtue than if they are without it” (CG V.19, 
213).  
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mind does not bring them into relation with God in order to achieve anything 
whatsoever and to maintain that achievement. For although the virtues are 
reckoned by some people to be genuine and honourable when they are related 
only to themselves and are sought for no other end, even then they are puffed up 
and proud, and so are to be accounted vices rather than virtues. (CG XIX.25, 891)  
 
It is therefore no surprise that Augustine criticizes even the pagans he praises for their 
prideful concern for their own glory (CG V.12-20, 196-215). Augustine’s final analysis, 
then, is that all pagans, even in their apparent virtue that is based on genuine (if still 
ultimately disordered) love of the common good, are guilty of acting also for the sake of 
praise and positive self-image rather than for God’s sake (see CG V.15, V.17, 204, 
206).20 The pride and vicious self-orientation of wanting to possess glory for oneself and 
the failure to recognize our dependency on God, for Augustine, contaminate even the 
greatest of pagan virtue (see CG V.19, 214). 
 
II. Pride and Humility in the Christian Humanist Tradition as Represented by Aquinas 
 
The theologians after Augustine that I wish to discuss in this dissertation retain in 
their sense of humility its primary definition as submission to God as well as its 
acknowledgement of our finitude, moral failings, and dependency on God for grace. 
Likewise, various Christian theologians continue to be united with Augustine in 
understanding pride to be a kind of “perverse exaltation,” which, when expressed as 
blatant and thorough-going rebellion against God, is, as Aquinas says, the “queen and 
mother of all vices” (ST II-II:132.4.r1; see also I-II:84.2).21 Beyond this, the conceptions 
of humility and pride undergo substantial transformations depending upon how they are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For literature dealing with the complexity of Augustine’s position on pagan virtue, see Robert 
Markus 1970, T. H. Irwin 1999, and Brett Gaul 2009.  
21 Calvin is the only partial-exception among the theologians discussed in this chapter. He says that 
although Augustine’s claim that pride was the first sin was nearly right, the first sin was actually impiety. I 
find it strange, though, that Calvin does not see impiety as an aspect of pride, since it would have been in 
the traditional Christian view, just as true piety would have been seen as an aspect of humility.  
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articulated within the respective theological frameworks of the Christian humanist and 
hyper-Augustinian streams of thought and how they are bound up with the ways that 
these two traditions respond to the possibility of pagan virtue.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the core feature of Christian humanism is the 
conviction that, despite our tendencies to sin, humans by nature have an orientation 
towards God as evidenced by our draw to goodness, truth, and beauty, that human reason 
has the capacity to make true moral judgments, and that human initiative plays an active 
role in growth in virtue. In this section I will be exploring specifically how Aquinas’s 
Christian humanist theological framework allows him to affirm the possibility of pagan 
virtue, and in turn, how his position on this issue shapes his understanding of pride and 
humility. I will be using Aquinas as the primary spokesperson for the Christian humanist 
tradition not only because he gives perhaps the most thorough discussion of pride and 
humility of those in this stream but also because he significantly influenced how later 
Christian humanist thinkers tended to think about the larger theological issues (e.g., the 
relationship between faith and reason and between God and morality) that will come to 
the fore in later sections of this dissertation.  
Aquinas is able to grant true virtue to pagans by drawing a distinction between 
natural and theological virtue and between proximate and final ends.22 Natural virtues, 
such as the cardinal virtues of justice, prudence, temperance, and courage, are those 
virtues directed toward the common good of an earthly society or to the perfection of the 
individual (ST I-II:61.1). All humans, whether pagan or Christian, have natural 
inclinations that direct us to our natural good and have the capacity to reason about those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I am deeply indebted to Herdt’s 2008 helpful comparison of Augustine and Aquinas on the issue 
of pagan virtue (see Chapter Three, especially pp. 72-76). 
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character traits that are constitutive of natural flourishing and the moral laws that guide us 
to it. Furthermore, we can set about acquiring virtue through habituation, in a manner 
similar to Aristotle’s account of how to develop good character. The theological, infused 
virtues of faith, hope, and charity are directed towards our ultimate end of the enjoyment 
of God (ST I-II:65.1; II-II:23.7). While faith in divine revelation is needed to affirm that 
these are in fact virtues, theological virtues are not at odds with reason or with natural 
virtues, Aquinas thinks, but fulfill the natural virtues, leading us to a deeper sort of 
flourishing than do the natural virtues alone.23  
Thus, although Aquinas, like Augustine, regards charity, i.e., friendship with God, 
to be the crown of the moral life and the form of all virtue (ST II-II:23.8), unlike 
Augustine, he contends that it is possible to possess natural virtue apart from charity (ST 
II-II:23.7).24 Since, however, Aquinas thinks that the acquired natural, moral virtues 
direct us only to a “proximate and particular good,” the imperfect happiness of this life, 
they are imperfect and relative virtues, i.e., “virtues in a restricted sense.” Theological, 
infused virtues, on the other hand, are “perfect” and “virtues simply” because they are 
constitutive of our ultimate end, the perfect happiness of beatitude (ST I-II:65.2; II-
II:23.7). Therefore, while Augustine thinks that pagans are ultimately incapable of perfect 
virtue since they lack the charity which is constitutive of it, Aquinas contends that pagans 
can acquire true virtue so long as the proximate ends to which those virtues are directed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For example, the virtue of justice, when informed by the crowning virtue of charity or friendship 
with God, is enriched by the sort of love that enables one to see all persons, even enemies, as neighbors, as 
fellow persons loved by God. See Jean Porter 2005, pp. 378-400 for a discussion of how the theological 
virtues stand in relation to the natural ones in general and also for a an exposition of how justice informs 
charity in Aquinas and, as Porter argues on the basis of Aquinas’s theory, charity informs and transforms 
justice as well. 
24 “If…we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end, then we may speak of virtue being 
where there is no charity, in so far as it is directed to some particular good” (ST II-II:23.7). See Brian 
Shanley (1999, 562) on this point. 
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are not opposed to charity.25 For Aquinas, while pagan virtue remains imperfect if it is 
not actually ordered to God, the fact that it is capable of being so ordered nevertheless 
renders it true, genuine virtue. Also unlike Augustine, Aquinas does not think that pagan 
virtue is bound to be accompanied by concern for one’s own glory. Pagan virtue does not 
invariably amount to cleverly disguised expressions of pride that bear the self-serving 
stamp of members of the earthly city, for the failure to refer a proximate end to God does 
not necessitate that pursuit of such an end constitutes a problematic self-orientation.  
Furthermore, Aquinas’s moral philosophy lacks Augustine’s pervading anxiety 
about the prevalence of pride. Throughout Augustine’s corpus we find perpetual concern 
for purity of intention and with it, a heightened awareness of the subtle ways in which we 
fail, especially with respect to our tendency to self-exaltation and our imperfect 
acknowledgment of our dependency on God. Aquinas, by contrast, is more disposed to 
affirm moral aspiration, even if it is imperfect, than to highlight impurity of intention. 
While Aquinas does think that “it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes occasion even 
from good deeds,” he maintains that “no very great gravity attaches to the movement of 
pride while creeping in secretly” (ST II-II:162.6.r1). Moreover, he thinks that once such 
pride is identified, it is “easily avoided, both by considering one’s own infirmity…and by 
considering God’s greatness” (ST II-II:162.6.r1). Aquinas thinks that it is impossible to 
achieve and sustain perfect awareness of our dependency on God in this life (ST I-
II:109.4), and he does not make such awareness a prerequisite to virtue.  
Not only does Aquinas’s distinction between natural and theological virtues 
enable him to acknowledge pagan virtue, but it also leads to certain key shifts in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 “Man’s secondary and, as it were, particular good may be twofold: one is truly good, because, 
considered in itself, it can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while the other is good 
apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from the final good” (ST II-II:23.7).   
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Aquinas’s very conceptions of humility and pride. While humility for Augustine is the 
posture of those in the heavenly city, Aquinas classifies humility as a natural virtue and 
therefore presumably regards it as a virtue that pagans can truly (if imperfectly) acquire. 
But just as Aquinas widens the domain of humility, so, too, he narrows the scope of 
pride. Despite the fact that many Christians tended to think that the pagan virtue of 
magnanimity involves the vice of pride at its core, Aquinas rehabilitates magnanimity as 
a virtue. What is more, although Aristotle’s magnanimous man was seen by many 
Christians as prideful in his preoccupation with his own moral worth and desire for self-
sufficiency, Aquinas revises Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in such a way as to 
connect it with true humility, regarding the two as twin virtues (duplex virtus).26 In what 
follows, I will present Aquinas’s modified account of humility and pride in relation to his 
stance on pagan virtue.27 The significance of Aquinas’s position on these topics will 
become especially clear in the next section when contrasted with hyper-Augustinian 
humility and pride.  
The way in which humility is a natural virtue, a virtue available to pagans and 
Christians alike, can be seen in Aquinas’s initial description of humility. He understands 
humility to be a restraining virtue, a virtue that curbs our propensity to pride. Aquinas 
defines the vice of pride as the inordinate desire for one’s own excellence in a manner 
opposed to right reason (ST II-II:161.1; II-II:162.4). As such, humility entails knowledge 
of one’s deficiencies, since restraining pride requires a true understanding of what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See Mary Keys 2003 for an excellent analysis of how Aquinas departs from Aristotle’s account of 
magnanimity by connecting it with humility. She argues, persuasively I think, that Aquinas’s modifications 
of Aristotle are correctives.  
27 For the most thorough discussion and analysis of Aquinas’s account of humility that I have found, 
see Fullam 2009. She emphasizes the Christological aspects of Thomistic humility, which I unfortunately 
cannot take up in this dissertation. For more on the centrality of Christology in Christian accounts of 
humility, see also Studer 1993 (see section III.2), Wengst 1987, Daley 1995, Doss 1987, Evans 1992, and 
Roberts 2009.  
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surpasses one’s capacities (ST II-II:161.2). While humility involves self-knowledge, 
however, it is a virtue that falls under temperance and thus fundamentally pertains to the 
appetite (ST II-II:161.2).28 Just as the person who possesses temperance with respect to 
food and drink, desires and enjoys the proper amount, so the humble person willingly 
accepts the limitations and dependency that is part of the human condition and does not 
desire to ascribe to herself excellences that she does not possess. Likewise the humble 
person is aware of her moral failings and does not have a false sense of her moral 
worth.29    
It is worth noting that although the humble person is marked by her awareness of 
her weaknesses, limitations, and moral failings, Aquinas is careful to communicate that 
humility does not involve thinking less of oneself than is truthful, nor does it require 
having a diminished sense of one’s capacities. This is made clear, in part, by the fact that 
Aquinas argues on multiple occasions that magnanimity and humility are not opposed, 
and in fact are mutually reinforcing virtues (ST II-II:129.3.r4; II-II:162.1; II-II:162.1. r3; 
II-II:162. 2.r2; II-II:162.4.r3). On Aquinas’s account, therefore, humility must be fully 
compatible with possessing greatness of soul, striving to do that which is deserving of 
honor, and regarding great honors as something of which one is worthy, if one is in fact 
worthy of them (ST II-II:129.1; II-II:129.1.r3; see also II-II:129.2.r3). Humility is 
opposed to having an untruthfully inflated sense of one’s excellence (pride), but it is in no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Here is Aquinas’s most complete statement of the nature of humility: “humility has essentially to 
do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuousity of his soul, from tending inordinately to 
great things: yet its rule is in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what 
we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward 
disposition of humility leads to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that 
which is hidden within” (ST II-II:161.6). I will address the aspect of humility pertaining to reverence 
toward God later, in the body of the text.   
29 It seems that for Aquinas, humility is less self-referential than pride. Although humility includes 
awareness of weakness and moral failure, Aquinas defines it negatively, as curbing the tendency to pride. 
Pride, however, is inherently self-oriented.  
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way contrary to recognizing one’s genuine worth and capacity for greatness 
(magnanimity). Sometimes we refer to this sort of self-affirmation of one’s excellence as 
pride, but Aquinas is careful to point out that if by pride one means “super-abundance,” 
then pride is good and is not to be confused with what Aquinas has in mind when he 
discusses the vice of pride (ST II-II:162.1.r1). Proper self-affirmation, far from being 
contrary to humility, is actually virtuous, and, moreover, Aquinas thinks that knowing 
and approving of one’s virtue and good works is important for the kind of self-knowledge 
needed for sound practical judgment (see ST II-II:132.1 and II-II:132.1.r3). 
For Aquinas, then, true humility does not undermine self-esteem.30 In fact, he 
distinguishes humility from magnanimity’s vicious contrary, pusillanimity. Pusillanimity 
denotes smallness of soul (ST II-II:133.2) and involves the refusal to cultivate or utilize 
one’s talents (ST II-II:133.1). While the magnanimous person has confidence in her 
abilities (ST II-II:129.6), firmness of mind with respect to what is truly honorable (ST II-
II:129.5), and security of self (ST II-II:129.7), the pusillanimous person shrinks from 
great works out of fear (ST II-II:133.2). Interestingly, Aquinas says that pusillanimity 
may even stem from pride, as when a person staunchly clings to his own opinion that he 
is incompetent for that of which he is truly competent (ST II-II:133.1. r3). Aquinas’s 
conception of humility is therefore as free from the self-doubt, petty anxiety, 
shallowness, and false depreciation of oneself characteristic of pusillanimity as it is from 
the self-aggrandizement characteristic of pride.31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Aquinas, for example, says that “humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true 
self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems himself greater than he is: 
and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own excellence” (ST II-II:162. 3.r2). 
31 See ST II-II:162.1. r3, where Aquinas distinguishes between pride, magnanimity, pusillanimity, 
and humility. 
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Thus far I have emphasized the natural, non-theological aspects of Aquinas’s 
discussion of humility in accord with his placement of humility as a species of 
temperance, a natural virtue. I want to discuss the prospects for humility as a natural 
virtue later in this section as well as in Chapter Six. Now, however, I wish to stress that 
although Aquinas regards humility as a natural, rather than theological virtue, he does 
discuss humility (and pride) in relation to God. Like Augustine, Aquinas says that he 
understands humility to be “…chiefly the subjection of man to God” (ST II-II:161.1.r5, 
emphasis mine). This humility before God involves reverence (ST II-II: 161.2.r3), and it 
also involves receptivity to God and to his grace (ST II-II:161.5.r2). Correspondingly, he 
retains Augustine’s sense of pride: “pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so 
far as man raises himself above that which is appointed to him according to the Divine 
rule or measure” (II-II:162.5). Pride in its most extreme and harmful form involves a 
willful rebellion against God, and it is this sort of pride that is the “queen and mother of 
all vices” (ST II-II: 132.4.r1; see also I-II:84.2) because it is most opposed to charity and 
leads to further vice.  
Magnanimity, also a natural virtue, is likewise understood by Aquinas with 
reference to God. While in Aristotle, the magnanimous person strives for self-sufficiency, 
which is imitative of the Unmoved Mover, in Aquinas the magnanimous person “deem[s] 
himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God” (ST II-
II:129.3.r4). In this way Aquinas builds accepting our dependency on God, which is 
characteristic of humility, into his account of magnanimity. Aquinas thinks that every 
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person needs God’s grace for perfection in virtue,32 and he says that it belongs to 
magnanimity to be confident in God’s assistance (ST II-II:129.6.r1).33 (This then is one 
of the ways that Aquinas weds magnanimity and humility: in humility we recognize our 
weaknesses and our need for the assistance of God (and of others), and our confidence in 
the goodness of God and in his help (as well as in the help of others) enables us to aspire 
to magnanimity.)  
Humility (and magnanimity and their opposite vices) involves not only our 
relation to God, however, but also our relation to others. Nevertheless, Aquinas’s account 
of that manner by which humility shapes our stance towards others is informed by his 
primary sense of this virtue involving a proper relation to God. For example, Aquinas 
observes that the reverence we have for God (an aspect of humility, on Aquinas’s 
account) entails our reverence for what is of God in all others (ST II-II: 161.3.r1).34 Aside 
from the fact, for Aquinas, that each person deserves reverence as the bearer of God’s 
image (the Imago Dei), Aquinas also thinks that we are to have an attitude of humility 
towards all others with respect to the specific gifts they have from God.35 And when these 
gifts are not readily apparent, we can still cultivate a just attitude of humility towards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 It should be emphasized that the need for grace is not only because, as Aquinas thinks, one’s will 
is weakened by original sin and unable of attaining moral perfection by one’s own efforts but also because 
eudaimonia for Aquinas consists in sharing in the divine life.  
33  Aquinas also maintains that appropriate confidence in others and in oneself is a part of 
magnanimity: “For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since 
man is naturally a social animal, for he is insufficient by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, 
in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others… And in so far 
as his own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself” (ST II-II:129.6.r1). 
34 “We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not 
with the same measure of reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with 
humility to all our neighbors for God’s sake” (ST II-II:161.3.r1). 
35 In Chapter Six I will discuss reverence as an aspect of proper humility, and I will consider whether 
Hume has adequate resources for articulating a secular account of reverence for all persons. 
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everyone by considering that they may in truth have gifts from God that are not 
immediately visible to us.36 As Aquinas says, 
If we set what our neighbor has of God’s above that which we have of our own, 
we cannot incur falsehood [by having humility before all others]. Wherefore a 
gloss on Philip. Ii. 3, Esteem others better than themselves, says: We must not 
esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for 
another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better 
than we are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be 
not hidden. (ST II-II:161.3.r2)37 
 
It may seem that Aquinas, by grounding humility before all others in what is 
“hidden” is losing traction with what is or may be the truth of the matter in order to pay 
his due to Scripture and to the monastic tradition, both of which teach the importance of 
having humility before all. Whether it is indeed right to assume a stance of humility 
before everyone will be a point of contention between Aquinas and Hume that I will 
discuss in Chapter Six. Here I wish to suggest that, along with the sense of reverence 
towards others that Aquinas advocates in his discussion of humility, he additionally 
regards humility to include a readiness to see and to be open to the gifts of others, a 
willingness to grow from others, and an expectation that others can enrich us. Such 
attitudes are inseparable, as Aquinas’s statements suggest, from being reverent to God 
and seeking God’s presence in the goodness of others. These are attitudes that, 
correspondingly, stand in contrast to the attitudes that Aquinas observes to be 
characteristic of pride, which makes us “presume inordinately on [our] superiority over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This does not mean that we should always be deferential to all others, however. Aquinas thinks 
that “humility resides chiefly inwardly in the soul,” and a person can bear this reverence to another without 
outwardly subjecting oneself to another when doing so would be detrimental to that other’s welfare; 
outward acts of humility require moderation (ST II-II:161.3.r3). A teacher, for example, may bear a kind of 
humility or reverence before her student, even a recalcitrant one, believing that the student has dignity and, 
indeed, gifts that the teacher does not see. Yet this humility does not require that the teacher outwardly 
subject herself to her student. 
37 See also where Aquinas says, “Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than 
ourselves, in so far as we see some of God’s gifts in them” (ST II-II:129.3.r4). 
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others” (ST II-II:162.3.r4) and can lead us to despise others or to overlook others in a 
self-preoccupied desire to be conspicuous (ST II-II:162.3.r4). (In Chapter Six I will thus 
also explore the relationship between this de-centering posture of humility and cultivating 
a wider, more extensive sympathy.)  
In what sense, then, can humility be said to be a natural virtue if it is constituted 
in part by right relation to (the Christian) God for Aquinas? Correspondingly, in what 
sense is the virtue of humility available to pagans? These are complicated questions that I 
am not theologically equipped to answer. For the purpose of this dissertation, however, 
what I wish to emphasize is that Aquinas at least opens up the possibility for the virtue of 
humility to be articulated with reference to individual and communal flourishing and to 
be a true, if imperfect, virtue when it is referred to the common good and capable of 
being referred to our final end. Certainly there are many features of Aquinas’s conception 
of humility that are separable from their explicit relation to God. The need for humility 
(i.e., restraint from our tendency to have an untruthfully high view of ourselves) is surely 
apparent in human relationships. As Aquinas points out, pride can make us fail in loving 
others (ST II-II:162.5.r2), can make us ungrateful and unwilling to acknowledge our 
indebtedness (ST II-II:162.5.r2), and can make us focus on the faults of others so as to 
elevate ourselves (ST II-II:162.3.r2), to name but a few possible effects of pride that are 
immediately seen to be destructive to the common good.  
Furthermore, while Aquinas advocates humility before others on account of the 
visible or hidden gifts they have from God, it is possible to reverence others for their 
humanity and for their abilities and, also, to maintain a sense of reverence on the basis of 
acknowledging that there is always more to people, always hidden strengths and struggles 
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to appreciate, that are not readily apparent to the mere acquaintance or sometimes even to 
the lifelong friend. To be sure, humility is needed even to acknowledge the limitations of 
our judgments of others and also to acknowledge the ways in which our own strengths 
depend to a large extent on factors beyond our control such as our biological 
predispositions, our cultural and moral environment, and the care that others have shown 
us. (I will develop these points in Chapter Six, where I discuss ways in which Hume 
could go further in developing an account of a virtue pertaining to dealing with human 
weakness and dependency along these lines.)  
 The possibility and value of secular humility will be a topic of discussion in 
Chapter Six when I compare Aquinas and Hume on pride and humility and discuss their 
conceptions with reference to their respective transcendent or immanent perspectives. 
What will become apparent is that because Aquinas allows for pagan virtue, this sort of 
discussion is not only possible but, I think, highly fruitful. In the remainder of this 
chapter, however, I want to discuss what happens to conceptions of Christian humility in 
the trajectory that intensifies Augustine’s concerns with respect to the splendid vices—
i.e., in the hyper-Augustinian stream of Christian thought. As I will later show, it was the 
hyper-Augustinian strand to which Hume was responding, and his reaction to it arguably 
played quite a large role in his project of secularizing moral philosophy. 
 
III. Pride and Humility in the Hyper-Augustinian Tradition 
 
As we saw, core theological commitments characteristic of the Christian humanist 
tradition (represented here by Aquinas) make possible a greater generosity to pagan 
virtue, an affirmation of magnanimity as a virtue, and a conception of humility that is 
aligned with a healthy self-esteem. In this section I will explore how central theological 
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positions in the hyper-Augustinian tradition lead to an amplification of Augustine’s 
stance with respect to pagan virtue and further shape their conceptions of pride and 
humility in directions that go beyond what Augustine would have endorsed. I aim here to 
outline some of those theological changes and to show how they led to a conception of 
humility that, from the perspective of Hume, looks quite like self-deprecation and, 
particularly for the Protestant Reformers, takes on undertones of passivity and servility as 
well.  
As previously stated, it is hyper-Augustinian forms of Christianity and its versions 
of humility with which Hume was most familiar. Hume’s contact with hyper-Augustinian 
theology comes from two sub-traditions: 1) the Protestant strand of Luther and Calvin, 
whose thought left a deep imprint upon the religious culture in Scotland during Hume’s 
lifetime and whose theology undergirds the spiritual instruction given in The Whole Duty 
of Man, which Hume read as a boy, and 2) the Jansenist strand, represented here by 
Pierre Nicole and Pascal,38 the former of whom inadvertently paves the way for Hume’s 
secularization of ethics (and, arguably, for Hume’s rehabilitation of pride as well) and the 
latter of whom Hume critiques precisely for his humility.39 In this section I will discuss 
the characteristic theological positions of the Protestant Reformers and the Jansenists that 
have a bearing on how humility comes to be understood. Doing so will facilitate a deeper 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Pierre Nicole (1625-1695) was a French Jansenist who studied and taught at Port-Royal abbey.  
He collaborated with Pascal on the Provincial Letters (1656-57) and with Antoine Arnauld on the Port-
Royal Logic (1662). In 1675, he began to publish editions of Moral Essays, which were a collection of 
writings dealing with our relations to God and to one another. In his work Of Charity and Self-Love he 
provides a “moral anatomy” of worldly virtue, which he thinks can be shown to arise out of self-love. He 
seeks to show that, though self-love and charity are radically different in their underlying motivations, the 
former can perfectly mimic the latter in observable human behavior. This is because since charity is 
pleasing to others, enlightened self-love seeks to imitate it so as to garner others’ approval. To present his 
account of pride and humility, I will be drawing from both works.   
39 See “A Dialogue,” an appendix to the EPM. Mossner argues that it is likely that Hume first read 
Nicole in the library of the Jesuit college of La Flèche when he was writing The Treatise of Human Nature 
(1980, 102). Herdt argues that Hume would have read Pascal at that time as well (1997, 182). 
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appreciation of Hume’s negative evaluation of humility and the theological frameworks 
which make this conception of humility possible.  
Before beginning it is worth noting that I will not be giving the same detailed 
account of humility in each of the figures of this section as that I did with Augustine and 
Aquinas. I went to some length explaining Augustine because he is foundational for 
understanding the Christian developments thereafter. I described Aquinas’s account of 
humility with greater detail, first, because he is more systematic and thorough on the 
topic than are the hyper-Augustinian figures in this section. Second, and more 
importantly, I did so because in the sixth chapter I will be setting Aquinas’s and Hume’s 
accounts of pride in humility in the sort of conversation that would only be possible on 
the basis of a more thorough explanation of Aquinas’s view.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, however, I need not present a meticulous 
account of each hyper-Augustinian thinker’s conception of humility. It suffices to show 
broadly how hyper-Augustinians tend to conceive of humility in order to establish in 
Chapter Three that Hume seems to conceive of Christian humility in a manner akin to the 
hyper-Augustinian conception and that Hume’s adamant objections to it are applicable to 
this theological stream. It is also important to mention that while Hume directly critiques 
Pascal’s humility in the appendix to the Second Enquiry entitled “A Dialogue” and 
nowhere specifically mentions Protestant theologians when he condemns humility as a 
monkish virtue,40 it is arguably Calvinist humility that has most greatly formed Hume’s 
sense of Christian humility. Jennifer Herdt, I think rightly, remarks that since Pascal’s 
emphasis on renouncing worldly happiness is akin to the Evangelical Presbyterianism in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Besides Pascal, he does mention certain Christian monastic figures (specifically, Dominic, 
Francis, Anthony, and Benedict) in connection with the monkish virtue of humility (NH X, 164). 
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which Hume was raised, Hume can be understood as leveling objections against Scottish 
Calvinism in and through his critique of Pascal, who would have been a safer target for 
Hume’s critiques given the religious climate at home (1997, 182). Accordingly, in what 
follows, it is the Protestant trajectory, especially as found in Calvin and The Whole Duty 
of Man, that I take to be the most pertinent to Hume’s rejection of humility, the topic that 
will be discussed in Chapter Three.    
 
a. Humility as Self-Depreciation 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the key feature of the hyper-Augustinian 
stream, and which resides at the heart of the theology of both the Protestant Reformers 
and the Jansenists, is a strongly pessimistic view of human nature.41 In contrast to the 
Christian humanists who acknowledge sin but nevertheless see humans as having a 
natural orientation towards goodness as well, hyper-Augustinians think that the Fall was 
so catastrophic as to render human nature wholly corrupt. In this way hyper-Augustinians 
share Augustine’s conviction regarding the deep pervasiveness of sin in human life. 
Since, however, hyper-Augustinians tended to be anti-eudaimonistic in their explicitly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 To give but a few examples: Nicole claims that a “tyrannical disposition, being firmly implanted 
deep in the hearts of all men, makes them violent, unjust, cruel, ambitious, obsequious, envious, insolent, 
and quarrelsome” (CS I, 371). Pascal writes that the “nature of self-love and of this human self is to love 
only self and consider only self” (P 978). Luther says that  
The ungodly [i.e., the false Christian or the non-Christian], as we have said, is like Satan his prince 
in being wholly intent on himself and his own affairs; he does not seek after God or care about the 
things that are God’s, but he seeks his own wealth, his own glories, works, wisdom, power, and in 
short his own kingdom, and these he wishes to enjoy in peace. But if anyone resists him or attempts 
to encroach upon any of these things, then by the same aversion from God that leads him to seek 
them, he is moved to indignation and rage against his adversary, and is as incapable of not being 
angry as of not desiring and seeking…(LW 33, 177) 
Calvin maintains that “…man has no remaining good in himself, and is beset on every side by the most 
miserable destitution” (ICR II.2.1, 157) Similar statements from these thinkers can be found at various 
points in this section. 
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avowed moral psychology, Augustine’s attention to human sinfulness becomes 
exacerbated.42  
For the Protestant Reformers anti-eudaimonism led to a more extreme view of 
human depravity because, unlike in Augustine, the pursuit of happiness (including the 
pursuit of God as our final end) came to be seen as competing with virtue rather than 
constitutive of it, as expressing selfish self-love rather than pure love of the good. While 
Augustine thought that by nature we longed for the happiness or beatitude of resting in 
God, the Reformers were inclined to articulate proper love of God as fundamentally 
selfless in nature.43 In other words, for Luther and Calvin, seeking happiness in God 
could call into question whether God was the real object of love or whether one was 
instead using God to gratify one’s self-interest.44 Viewed from this interpretive lens, 
humans appear more profoundly and intractably wretched than Augustine thought, for 
even the desire for God and goodness, if it is also inseparable from the desire for one’s 
fulfillment, tended to be seen as sinful and as further evidence of our utter depravity and 
prideful self-orientation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 I am indebted to Herdt 2008 for this observation, which she first mentions on p. 2 but reiterates in 
her discussions of hyper-Augustinian thinkers. She traces the anti-eudaimonism in the hyper-Augustinian 
stream back to Scotus. She points out that while Augustine thinks that God fulfills us through transforming 
our desires and Aquinas says that charity involves loving God for God’s own sake, Scotus requires a more 
demanding sort of disinterested love insofar as he saw concern for self-fulfillment to tarnish the person’s 
love of God (2008, 105). The move away from classical Christian eudaimonism is eventually taken up in 
different ways by Protestant and Jansenist theology and bears an important stamp on both traditions’ 
conceptions of virtue, vice, and moral psychology. 
43 Peura is especially astute on this theme in Luther. He observes that for Luther human love of God 
is always “directed toward the good that God is able to give us and not toward the triune God himself” 
(1998, 77; quoted in Herdt 2008, 188).  
44 The Swedish Lutheran theologian Andres Nygren’s critique of Augustine for his so-called egoism 
in his classic Eros and Agape is an example of how, as I see it, a failure to appreciate eudaimonism can 
lead one to interpret the pursuit of fulfillment in and through loving God as a form of selfishness that stands 
opposed to Christian agape.   
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As with the Protestant Reformers, the Jansenists’ rejection of eudiamonism also 
led to an intensified view of human depravity.45 Although they, in contrast to the 
Reformers, more deeply questioned whether pure love of God was possible and came to 
various subtle positions on the limits of human disinterestedness, their anti-eudaimonism 
disposes them to be more suspicious of the presence of self-interest in moral motivation 
than a eudaimonist would be. For example, Pascal’s claim that the “nature of self-love 
and of this human self is to love only self and consider only self” (P 978) is a view quite 
different from that of Aquinas, and even Augustine would, given his eudaimonism, have 
better resources for articulating an account of good self-love and appropriate self-interest. 
Without a framework that readily allows for a way to identify proper and improper forms 
of self-interest, the Jansenists had a greater tendency to interpret arguably good forms of 
self-interest as problematic and indicative of human sinfulness, even if they did not 
always do so. 
This darker view of human nature espoused by hyper-Augustinians consequently 
gives new shape to humility and pride. As we saw, for Augustine, humility has more to 
do with accepting our status as creatures, as rightly turning to God in loving receptivity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Some qualification is in order, however, since all the hyper-Augustinian theologians under 
discussion here would affirm that ultimately union with God through Christ is what brings true well-being. 
As Pascal says, “in him [i.e., Christ] is all our virtue and all our happiness” (P 416). The typical departure 
from traditional eudaimonism that we see in these thinkers is their tendency to oppose self-love and virtue 
or the love of God in a way that is quite different from anything we see in Augustine or Aquinas, for 
example. For instance, Pascal says, “We must love God alone and hate ourselves alone” (P 373). Nicole 
says that “[charity] does not love itself” (CS VI, 377) and that “every man’s heart [is] turned entirely 
toward himself” (CS V, 375). While Augustine uses the language of self-love to describe the earthly city, it 
is clear from his work as a whole that he is there using ‘self-love’ to indicate selfish self-love. In other 
places he affirms that this is not true self-love, however. See O’Donovan 2006 for an extended analysis of 
Augustine’s full account of self-love. Kent has a concise and valuable discussion of self-love in Augustine 
(2001, 217-18). She helpfully observes that Augustine objects not to self-love per se but to pride, “a 
perverse and highly specific kind of self-love that leads one to arrogate to oneself a place that properly 
belongs to God alone” (218). 
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than it does with inculcating a negative view of the self.46 With the hyper-Augustinian 
conviction regarding the depth of human wickedness, however, humility comes to be 
primarily understood as possessing self-knowledge of the full extent of one’s moral 
bankruptcy and being grieved by and repentant of one’s spiritual waywardness.47 We see 
this in the thought of John Calvin, for example, who connects humility with true self-
knowledge of our wickedness (ICR II.1.1, summary, 146), affirming that “he who is most 
deeply abased and alarmed, by the consciousness of his disgrace, nakedness, want, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 John Burnaby makes this point in his study of Augustine on the love of God. He says 
“[Augustinian humility] has nothing to do with self-deprecation. It is the humility of the believer as such, 
the inward aspect of faith in God as the source of all good, the necessary implication of acceptance of the 
doctrine of grace” (1947, 73). While Augustine will refer to pride as the self-love of the earthly city, he 
takes pains to point out that pride is false self-love and that true self-love is only attained in humility. In 
humility the self not only finds fulfillment, but the self is raised up through being subject to God, thereby 
accepting our proper place in the order of goods. Augustine’s following statement on humility shows no 
hint of self-depreciation: 
Thus, in a surprising way, there is something in humility to exalt the mind, and something in 
exaltation to abase it. It certainly appears somewhat paradoxical that exaltation abases and humility 
exalts. But devout humility makes the mind subject to what is superior. Nothing is superior to God; 
and that is why humility exalts the mind by making it subject to God. Exaltation, in contrast, derives 
from a fault in character, and spurns subjection for that very reason. Hence it falls away from him 
who has no superior, and falls lower in consequence. Thus the scriptural saying is fulfilled, ‘You 
have thrown them down when they were being lifted up’ (Ps. 73, 118). It does not say, ‘When they 
had been lifted up’, that is, that they were first lifted up and then thrown down; they were thrown 
down in the very act of being exalted. The exaltation itself is in fact already an overthrow. (CG 
XIV.13, 572-73) 
See also where Augustine says, 
We can see then that the Devil would not have entrapped man by the obvious and open sin of doing 
what God had forbidden, had not man already started to please himself. That is why he was 
delighted also with the statement, ‘You will be like gods’ (Gen. 3, 5). In fact they would have been 
better able to be like gods if they had in obedience adhered to the supreme and real ground of their 
being, if they had not in pride made themselves their own ground. For created gods are gods not in 
their own true nature but by participation in the true God. By aiming at more, a man is diminished, 
when he elects to be self-sufficient and defects from the one who is really sufficient for him. (CG 
XIV.13, 573)  
47 In emphasizing the centrality of sin-consciousness to hyper-Augustinian humility, there is a sense 
in which the Christian tradition, humanist strand included, affirms the importance of having a profound 
awareness of our imperfection before God. John Cottingham helpfully brings out that in Biblical 
descriptions of encounters with God by means of the natural world (he discusses Isaiah 6:1-4, Psalms 
96[95]:11-13, Psalms 29[28]:5-9, and Exodus 3:5 (see pp. 114-15 and 120)) the person is “overwhelmed by 
the power and beauty of nature in a way that is somehow intertwined with awareness of one’s own 
weakness and imperfection, and a sense of confrontation with inexorable demands of justice and 
righteousness” (2015, 115-16). Nevertheless, this deeply felt sense of one’s imperfection in an experience 
of the sacred need not include a conviction that one literally has no good whatsoever. 
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misery, has made the greatest progress in the knowledge of himself” (ICR II.2.10, 163).48 
While hyper-Augustinians nevertheless will, in their various ways, affirm that we are 
capable of greatness through God’s grace,49 there is a new emphasis placed on humility 
as involving a thorough-going habit of self-reflection by which we identify our 
weaknesses and sins rather than its primary reference denoting an upward turn of the soul 
to God as it was in Augustine. In what follows, I show how humility takes on this self-
abnegating character in hyper-Augustinian descriptions of what this virtue entails. 
We see a central place given to humility, understood as cultivating an awareness 
of our sinfulness, in the Jansenists. Pascal sought to show that “we are nothing but lies, 
duplicity, contradiction, and we hide and disguise ourselves from ourselves” (P 655). We 
are not only fallen, but because we carry a “deadly hatred for the truth which rebukes [us] 
and convinces [us] of [our] faults,” we deceive ourselves such that we willfully fail to see 
our own fallenness (P 978). In Pensées Pascal aims to help his readers to true self-
knowledge, which involves knowledge of original sin: it is an “astounding thing that the 
mystery furthest from our ken, that of the transmission of sin, should be something 
without which we can have no knowledge of ourselves” (P 131). This knowledge is not 
attained through “the proud activity of our reason but through simple submission” (P 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Luther likewise stresses sin-consciousness as being central to self-knowledge. He says, for 
example, that God’s commandments “are intended to teach man to know himself, that through them he may 
recognize his inability to do good and may despair of his own ability,” leading him to become “truly 
humbled and reduced to nothing in his own eyes” (LW 31, 348). Becoming aware that “that all things in 
you are altogether blameworthy, sinful, and damnable” (LW 31, 346-47) is crucial for relinquishing the 
project of attaining salvation through works and for receiving the promises of God through faith (see LW 
31, 349).  
49 The Jansenists tended to be more balanced in their attention to greatness as well as depravity.  
Pascal, for example, stresses that these dual potentialities are central to the human condition. He writes, 
“Christianity is strange. It bids man to recognize that he is vile, and even abominable, and bids him want to 
be like God. Without such a counterweight his exaltation would make him horribly vain or his abasement 
horribly abject” (P 351). (Pascal’s stress on our greatness, however, has less to do with moral greatness and 
more to do with our capacity for self-reflection.) Similarly in Nicole’s treatise entitled “Of the Weakness of 
Man” in the Moral Essays he counsels that we must truthfully consider our greatness as well as our 
weakness (ME I.X, 5). 
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131). Hence, we see that for Pascal it is an expression of pride to resist the notion of 
original sin (which he understands to be thorough corruption), and correspondingly 
humility involves accepting it as our true condition. 
Nicole signals humility’s importance in that the topic of the first treatise of the 
first volume of his Moral Essays is “Of the Weakness of Man.” He opens by saying, 
“Pride is a swelling of the heart, by which man dilates and magnifies himself in his own 
imaginations, and the Idea, or conceit of our selves it imprints in us, is an Idea of 
strength, of greatness, and of excellence” (ME I, 1). And shortly thereafter he writes,  
If therefore our Pride proceed from the Idea we have of our own strength and our 
own excellence, the best means we have of establishing the contrary virtue of 
humility, will be to convince us of our own weakness. The tumour must be lanc’d 
to give vent to the wind that swells it up, We must undeceive and free our selves 
from those false lights by which we appear in our own Eyes Great; by placing 
before them our own littleness and infirmaries. (ME VII, 3) 
 
That humility involves having a negative view of oneself for Nicole is especially made 
clear when he discusses the true humility that flows from charity versus the false 
semblance of humility that is motivated by pride. The charitable love justice, and since 
being “brought low and humbled” is, according to the eternal law, our just desert for our 
many sins, “charity not only accepts this law but loves it and, because of this love, 
joyfully embraces every humiliation and every abasement” (CS V, 375). The truly 
humble, moreover, condemn themselves for their faults, confess them openly, and gladly 
receive bitter reprimands since they serve to weaken self-love (CS VII, 377-78).  
In the Jansenists there is not, I soon suggest, the same insistence upon our 
wretchedness as is found in the Protestant Reformers. Nevertheless, in the Jansenists 
there is a subtle shift away from Augustine insofar as humility comes to refer more to the 
practice of self-reflective awareness of our wretchedness even if it also involves 
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receptivity to God and appreciating our need for divine assistance. Augustine stressed our 
dependency on God in all things, but Jansenist humility seems to emphasize our 
selfishness and inability to do good first and foremost. In other words, for the Jansenists 
the (wicked) self seems to become humility’s primary object of focus.  
While Jansenists’ accounts of humility correspond to their convictions regarding 
human fallenness, however, the stress on humility involving knowledge of the depth of 
one’s sinfulness takes on an even stronger character in the Protestant tradition. On the 
Jansenists’ account of Christian formation, a humble awareness of our sinfulness 
develops over time through the process of spiritual maturation. For Luther and Calvin, 
however, a heightened consciousness of our depravity and dependency on God—the 
stance of humility—becomes a prerequisite for genuine spiritual growth at all. This 
difference stems from to the fact the Jansenists do not separate justification (i.e., being 
made right with God) from sanctification (i.e., spiritual maturation) in the way that the 
Protestant Reformers do but see them, rather, as a unified process (see Herdt 2008, 225, 
236). The Jansenists thought, in concert with the Christian tradition before them, that the 
grace-enabled process of becoming more like Christ makes possible a culminating union 
with God, a union based on the real oneness of heart that God and the transformed person 
share. On this model, one is increasingly made right with God (justified) as one actually 
becomes more like Christ (sanctified). Luther and Calvin, by contrast, regard justification 
as foundational to sanctification, i.e., true (grace-assisted) moral and spiritual growth is 
only possible if the person is justified before God.50 Both thought that being made right 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Herdt points out that similar to the Jansenists, Luther affirms that we cannot be justified apart from 
the indwelling of Christ in the believer. But for Luther union with Christ is understood not as founded upon 
likeness achieved through time by the gradual transformation of the person but as God accepting us as the 
sinners that we are and choosing to dwell in us. This union with Christ justifies us because in this marriage 
 71 
with God—and thereby attaining salvation—involves self-awareness of one’s depravity 
and subsequent repentance (i.e., the features of humility). Humility, as the prerequisite to 
salvation and the genuine Christian life, must therefore be complete at a founding 
moment in time (see Herdt 2008, 183). Thus in the early Protestant tradition (especially 
in Calvin as we will see) there is perhaps an even greater urgency placed on the necessity 
of our coming to full self-knowledge of our iniquity, for without it we are barred from 
salvation as well as from making any real spiritual progress. 
Luther, for example, thinks that we, being utterly sinful and incapable of 
goodness, cannot hope to please God by trying to be good by our own power (LW 31, 
348). Aspiring to virtue in this way only serves to embed ourselves more deeply in the sin 
of pride,51 which for Luther is manifested in the very thought that we can grow in virtue 
by our own efforts (see LW 26, 286-87; LW 11, 469). Attempting to be good merely 
amounts to ‘works righteousness,’ which has no genuine moral merit. Since, according to 
Luther, human acts are stained by self-love and pride, we justly incur God’s wrath. 
However, honest confession of our sinfulness and moral incapacity before God allows for 
Christ to dwell within and to be unified to the believer such that God sees Christ’s 
righteousness and does not impute to us our sins (LW 26, 284; 26, 288; LW 31, 351). 
Humility is therefore essential to our being justified by Christ, which, in Luther’s 
theology is the necessary condition not only for salvation but also for genuine moral and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
between believer and Christ, God sees not our sins but Christ’s righteousness (LW 26, 284; 26, 288; 31, 
351). This union also makes possible life in the Spirit, where God works in us to bear good fruit. Acting on 
our own accord, apart from Christ, results, at best, in ‘works righteousness,’ which are manifestations of 
sin. Thus, the indwelling of Christ at once justifies us and makes possible sanctification, since for Luther 
Christ’s indwelling (and only Christ’s indwelling) brings forth true virtue (2008, 178). See Paul Althaus for 
a detailed exposition of how, for Luther, “justification by faith determines Christian ethics because, for the 
Christian, justification is both the presupposition and the source of the ethical life” (1972, 3).    
51 Luther says, for example, “Nature, moreover, inwardly and necessarily glories and takes pride in 
every work which is apparently and outwardly good” (LW 31, 11). 
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spiritual growth (LW 31, 348-49; LW 44, 72; Althaus, 3; Herdt 2008, 176), as I 
mentioned above. A dim sense of our failings is not sufficient for Christ’s indwelling, 
however. What is needed is awareness that we are thoroughly sinful and entirely unable 
to do good by our own initiative (LW 26, 264). For Luther, pride lurks where such 
awareness is lacking. The proper humble stance is, it seems, to see oneself from one 
aspect of the supposed divine perspective—that is, as deserving eternal condemnation—
in order to appropriately appreciate the need for Christ’s sacrifice and depth of God’s 
mercy.52  
Calvin, who was the greatest influence on the religious culture of Scotland in 
Hume’s lifetime, was also uncompromising about the importance of humbly coming to 
know the depth of our iniquity.53 The following passage summarizes Calvin’s position:    
But what means is there of humbling us if we do not make way for the mercy of 
God by our utter indigence and destitution? For I call it not humility, so long as 
we think there is any good remaining in us. Those who have joined together the 
two things, to think humbly of ourselves before God and yet hold our own 
righteousness in some estimation, have hitherto taught a pernicious hypocrisy. For 
if we confess to God contrary to what we feel, we wickedly lie to him; but we 
cannot feel as we ought without seeing that everything like a ground of boasting is 
completely crushed. Therefore, when you hear from the prophet, “thou wilt save 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This view of humility is detectable even in Luther’s earlier thought. See, for example, the 
following points he makes in the Heidelberg Disputation:  
16. The person who believes that he can obtain grace by doing what is in him adds sin to sin so that 
he becomes doubly guilty. 
17. Nor does speaking in this manner give cause for despair, but for arousing the desire to humble 
oneself and seek the grace of Christ. 
18. It is certain that man must utterly despair of his own ability before he is prepared to receive the 
grace of Christ. (LW 31, 40) 
See also where Luther says, “As it is written, ‘Blessed are they who observe justice, who do righteousness 
at all times’ (Ps. 106:3). Judgment is nothing else than a man’s knowing and judging and condemning 
himself, and this is true humility and self-abasement. Righteousness is nothing else than a man’s knowing 
himself and praying to God for the mercy and help through which God raises him up again.” (LW 51, 98, 
emphasis mine). 
53 See Calvin’s summary description of Section 1 of Chapter One of Book II of Institutes of the 
Christian Religion, which reads as follows: “The knowledge of ourselves is most necessary. To use it 
properly we must be divested of pride, and clothed with true humility, which will dispose us to consider our 
fall, and embrace the mercy of God in Christ” (II.1, 146). It is not insignificant that a discussion of humility 
is directly at the beginning of Book II, which is entitled “Through the Fall and Revolt of Adam, the Whole 
Human Race Made Accursed and Degenerate. Of Original Sin.” 
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the afflicted people; but wilt bring down high looks” (Ps 18:27), consider, first, 
that there is no access to salvation unless all pride is laid aside and true humility 
embraced; secondly, that that humility is not a kind of moderation by which you 
yield to God some article of your right (thus men are called humble in regard to 
each other when they neither conduct themselves haughtily nor insult over other, 
though they may still entertain some consciousness of their own excellence), but 
that it is the unfeigned submission of a mind overwhelmed by a serious conviction 
of its want and misery. (ICR III.12.6, 496, emphases mine) 
 
We see here that Calvin, like Luther, regards humility to be necessary for salvation and 
that it must be complete from the inception of the Christian life. “All pride [must be] laid 
aside,” the “mind [must be] overwhelmed by a serious conviction of its want,” otherwise 
“there is no access to salvation.”  Not only, then, is humility understood as full 
recognition of our dire sinfulness, but the need for such awareness is absolutely pressing, 
since one’s eternal destiny hinges upon it.   
 This emphasis on the necessity of having a complete appreciation for our 
thorough corruption is characteristic of early Protestantism, and it is reflected in The 
Whole Duty of Man, that spiritual instruction manual Hume read when he was young. It 
says, for example, that in order to be obedient to God’s will  
humility is exceedingly necessary; for … [i]f we are not thoroughly persuaded 
that God is infinitely above us, that we are vileness and nothing in comparison of 
him, we shall never pay our due obedience. Therefore, if ever you mean to obey 
entirely (as you must, if ever you mean to be saved) get your hearts possessed with 
the sense of that great unspeakable distance that is between God and you. 
Consider him as he is, a God of infinite majesty and glory, and we poor worms of 
the earth. … He of infinite purity and holiness, and we polluted and defiled, 
wallowing in all kind of sin and uncleanness…” (II.2-3, 34-35, emphases mine).54 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The following passage in The Whole Duty of Man also reveal the link between humility and self-
condemnation: “you must quicken your humility, by considering your many and great sins…” (III.17, p. 
81). It also says regarding petitions that “…in humility, we must acknowledge ourselves utterly unworthy 
of any of those good things we beg for…” (V.19, p. 119).  
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Another passage from the Whole Duty which gives further evidence to the view of 
humility inspired by hyper-Augustinian theology can be found in the concluding section 
on private devotions. The prayer given in order to practice humility says,  
Lord, convince me powerfully of my own wretchedness, make me to see that I am 
miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked, and not only dust, but sin; that so in all 
thy dispensations towards me, I may lay my hand upon my mouth, and heartily 
acknowledge that I am less than the least of thy mercies, and greater than the 
greatest of thy judgments. (p. 402) 
 
Strikingly, this prayer petitions God not to help us acknowledge our wretchedness as God 
sees it, but to see our sinfulness as greater than God judges it to be.  
 
b. The Nature/Grace Divide and Implications for Pagan Virtue 
 
We see then how hyper-Augustinian humility, rooted in its profoundly negative 
view of human nature, can look quite like self-deprecation or even self-hatred, or could 
appear so to Hume as he broke from his religious upbringing. As I will later argue, 
however, humility was unpalatable to Hume for more than its self-negating stance. 
Hyper-Augustinianism’s emphasis on the depths of human sin has a number of 
interrelated implications, each of which have further bearing on how pride and humility 
come to be understood in this tradition. As I will show in Chapter Three, these additional 
modifications of how humility becomes conceived increase Hume’s objections to it.  
The first implication of the extreme view on human fallenness, which in turn 
shapes accounts of pride and humility in this tradition, is that for hyper-Augustinians the 
realm of ‘nature’ and the realm of ‘grace’ come to look more opposed than standing in a 
cooperative relationship to one another. If human nature is wholly corrupt, then normal 
human passions tended to be seen as inherently disordered to the self and incapable of 
motivating moral action and incapable of pointing us to goodness, to God. By sharp 
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contrast, God is understood to love with a selfless agape, as do those who are moved by 
his grace.55 The divine order of things is thus seen to be something entirely different than, 
and indeed foreign to, the egoistic mode of living characteristic of human nature.  
 This conception of the relationship between nature and grace is visible, for 
instance, in our representative Jansenists. Pascal depicts true Christian virtue as opposing 
our natural mode of being: Christian virtue involves “disenthrall[ing] the soul from the 
love of the world—tear[ing] it from what it holds most dear—[making] it die to itself—
[lifting] it up and bind[ing] it wholly, only, and forever to God.” And he affirms that this 
“can be the work of none but an all-powerful hand” (OC 376-77).56 Or again, Pascal says 
that “the whole of morality [consists in] concupiscence and grace” (P 226). We also see 
this picture of nature and grace in Nicole’s description of self-love, which he thinks rules 
us all unless God’s grace intervenes. He claims that 
corrupt man not only loves himself but loves himself beyond measure, loves only 
himself, and relates everything to himself. He wants every kind of property, 
honor, and pleasure, and he wants them only for himself. Placing himself at the 
center of everything, he would like to rule over everything and wishes that all 
creatures were occupied with nothing but pleasing him, praising him, and 
admiring him. This tyrannical disposition, being firmly implanted deep in the 
hearts of all men, makes them violent, unjust, cruel, ambitious, obsequious, 
envious, insolent, and quarrelsome. … This is the monster we carry in our bosom; 
it lives and reigns absolutely within us, unless God has destroyed its reign by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The drastic difference between the self-love that operates in unredeemed human nature and the 
selfless charity that is at work in the recipients of God’s (effectual) grace can be seen, for example, in 
Nicole’s description of the two: “Nothing is more different from charity, which relates everything to God, 
than self-love, which relates everything to itself” (CS I, 370). (Nicole distinguishes between general and 
effectual grace and thinks that the latter is needed for genuine Christian virtue.) Luther thinks that apart 
from divine assistance our love is always impure and self-directed but that the “believer receives through 
faith a pure, unselfish love from God, who is himself this love and who gives it to the believer who desires 
to receive him” (Peura 78-79). 
56 (This passage, which is from Provincial Letters, is quoted and translated in Herdt 2008, 237.) The 
hyper-Augustinian tendency to oppose nature and grace—and then to affirm the “mystical” realm of grace 
over and above nature—is, I will argue in Chapter Three, the primary target of Hume’s critique of Pascal’s 
humility and his claim that this humility is indicative of ‘artificial living.’ 
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filling our hearts with a different kind of love [i.e., charity]. It is the principle of 
all actions that are untouched by anything but corrupt nature… (CS I, 371)57 
 
Indeed, Nicole’s project of showing how enlightened self-love mimics charity can 
generally be interpreted as articulating human motivation and action in the realm of 
unredeemed human nature (Herdt 2008, 247).58   
The hyper-Augustinian way of construing the relationship between nature and 
grace can be contrasted with the Christian humanist construal where grace is understood 
as elevating nature or, as Aquinas put it, as perfecting nature, not destroying it (ST I-
I:1.8.r2). As we saw earlier, Aquinas maintains that we have natural inclinations directing 
us to the perfection of the polis and of the individual and that we can, through habit, 
develop true, if imperfect, virtues that pertain to the fulfillment of these proximate ends. 
In this way, we already have a natural orientation toward goodness (even if we also have 
tendencies to sin and self-enclosure as well) that disposes us to further receptivity to 
grace (see Shanley 563). In other words, in the Christian humanist model grace is 
continuous with, not contrary to nature. To love God does not require that we annihilate 
the self as Pascal put it (OC 1006, 641);59 it does not require that we utterly break from 
our nature. Rather, Christian humanists think that we can find in human beings natural 
movements towards goodness on which to build. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Nicole does argue that God gives ‘general grace’ to everyone, and that gives us the power to act 
virtuously should we choose to do so. He also maintains, however, that we do not in fact choose to act 
virtuously unless we are one of the few who are also given ‘efficacious grace’ (Herdt 2008, 252-54). See 
E.D. James’s work on Nicole for a thorough presentation of Nicole’s account of grace (1972, 7-44). It is 
efficacious grace to which Nicole refers in the passage above. 
58 To avoid repetition, examples of a nature/grace dichotomy in Luther and Calvin will be given 
when I discuss the related second implication of the extreme fallenness view below, i.e., the hyper-
Augustinian tendency to see human agency and divine agency disjunctively. Roughly speaking, in this 
theological framework ungraced human power (which inevitably chooses sin) falls under the realm of 
nature and human goodness is only possible when divine assistance enables us to operate in the realm of 
grace.  
59 There Pascal says, “La piété chrétienne anéantit le moi humain…” (translation: Christian piety 
annihilates the human self). 
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As we saw previously, because of the Christian humanist conviction that, in spite 
of the corrupting effects of the Fall, human nature retains something of its orientation 
towards the good, they are able to ascribe genuine virtue to pagans. By contrast, the 
hyper-Augustinian juxtaposition of nature and grace led to an even greater intensification 
of Augustine’s stance on pagan virtue. We saw that in Augustine’s account, the direction 
of our loves ultimately runs along one of two possible paths: to God or to self. He 
accordingly, though somewhat reluctantly when it came to certain pagan exemplars, 
thought that apparent pagan virtue was in the end splendid vice because on his model 
pagan attempts at virtue could not ultimately escape self-orientation. While Aquinas 
spoke of true but imperfect pagan virtue, virtue capable of being directed to our final end, 
Augustine was always suspicious that what he thought to be the inescapable self-
reference involved in the pagan pursuit of virtue rendered their actions tacitly or overtly 
motivated by pride. Similarly, we saw that the hyper-Augustinian stance on human 
depravity, coupled with its rejection of eudaimonism and its tendency to dichotomize 
nature and grace, creates an either/or that makes pagan (and hypocritically Christian) 
virtue impossible: either the Christian is capable of genuine virtue through God’s grace or 
the person is stuck with her own dark nature and at best can produce only (false) worldly 
virtue, which has little or no spiritual value.60 (The difference between the Christian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Pascal’s critique of the Jesuits reveals his gloomy stance with respect the possibility of pagan 
virtue (see Herdt 2008, 235-38). The following aphorism from Pensées sums up his view quite well: 
“Nature is corrupt. Without Christ man can only be vicious and wretched. With Christ man is free from 
vice and wretchedness. … Apart from him there is only vice, wretchedness, error, darkness, death, despair” 
(P 416). In Nicole, apparent charity, if in the pagan or would-be Christian, is merely an enlightened form of 
self-love, of that “monster that we carry in our bosom” (CS I, 371). Luther maintains “it is evident that in 
theology the work does not amount to anything without faith, but that faith must precede before you can do 
[genuinely good] works. For ‘without faith it is impossible to please God,…’ (Heb. 11:6)” (LW 26, 264). 
Calvin claims that the non-elect who pursue virtue do so out of the impure motives of self-interest or 
prideful desire to avoid shame and to rise above others in dignity (ICR II.3.3, 179-180). He therefore 
concludes that “the virtues which deceive us by an empty show may have their praise in civil society and 
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humanists and hyper-Augustinians on the issue of pagan virtue is visible in their 
respective attitudes towards the ancients. Aquinas had the deepest respect for Aristotle, 
calling him “The Philosopher” and adopting much of his ethics; Erasmus writes in one of 
his Colloquia “Saint Socrates, pray for us!” (155, 158). Luther, by contrast, claims that 
Aristotle’s “book on ethics is the worst of all books,” since “it flatly opposes divine grace 
and all Christian virtue” (LW 44, 201).)  
This hyper-Augustinian stance on pagan virtue led to important differences in 
their conceptions of pride and humility when compared to Christian humanist 
conceptions. First of all, hyper-Augustinians seem to regard pride as being more 
prevalent, for it is pride (and self-love) that hyper-Augustinians saw as reigning in the 
human heart and standing behind human action in the un-graced realm of nature, whether 
those actions are overtly evil or bear a seeming resemblance to the good.61 I will soon 
explain how the Protestant Reformers were especially keen to emphasize our thorough 
moral incapacity, so much so that the thought that we contribute in some way to our 
moral progress is itself seen as an assertion of pride. For reasons that I will soon explain, 
the Jansenists tended not to stress our moral ineptitude in the same way. Still, they saw 
pride as dominating in the sphere of unredeemed human nature, and with the Protestant 
Reformers, they worried that aspiration to virtue through habituation could in fact further 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the common intercourse of life, but before the judgment seat of God they will be of no value to establish a 
claim of righteousness” (ICR II.3.4, 180). 
61 To give but one example, Nicole says that “Christian virtue destroys and annihilates self-love and 
that human honnêteté hides and suppresses it. This honnêteté, then, which the pagan sages idolized, is 
actually just a more intelligent and more adroit self-love than that of the world at large” (CS IV, 375). In 
other words, while worldly virtue may appear to be true virtue, it in fact has the mere veneer of virtue, for 
underneath it is motivated by vicious self-love. (Nicole regards pride to be an aspect of self-love. In his 
description of the core characteristics of self-love, we find the following: “Placing himself at the center of 
everything, he would like to rule over everything and wishes that all creatures were occupied with nothing 
but pleasing him, praising him, and admiring him” (CS I, 371). These are characteristics of pride as he 
describes it in vol. I, essay I of the Moral Essays. Thus, for Nicole the pride, which he says is ever with us 
(CS V, 376), is a form of self-love that motivates much of worldly virtue.) 
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entrench pride and self-love, rather than, as the Christian humanists were apt to think, 
constitute moral development and openness to God. So, for Luther, the person who 
attempts to cultivate virtue by her own efforts not only fails to form true virtue but in fact 
allows pride to root itself more deeply within her, as she habituates herself to think she 
can attain goodness (see Herdt 2008, 14-15). Pascal critiqued the Jesuits (including 
Gracián, who made the pursuit of greatness morally central), as merely cultivating a 
pagan virtue, which was in fact only pleasantly disguised vice (see Herdt 2008, 235-37). 
With such phenomena counting as pride, and with the corresponding resistance to admit 
good forms of pride (such as magnanimity), then pride appears, as Nicole says of the 
natural man, never to leave us (CS V, 376).  
Second, not only do hyper-Augustinians see pride as more rampant; they also 
regard true humility to be impossible for pagans and inauthentic Christians. We saw that 
Aquinas opens up the possibility for pagans to cultivate true, if imperfect, humility. I 
briefly suggested that this sort of humility would involve awareness of our weaknesses 
and failings but also an appreciation for the ways that our strengths are dependent upon 
the help of others, environmental factors, and moral luck. It would furthermore include 
receptivity to others, reverence for their humanity, and awareness that they may have 
strengths of which we stand in need, even if those strengths are not immediately apparent 
to us. Such humility in turn would be capable of being directed to a fuller humility before 
God, but it has an intelligible connection to the natural human good apart from specific 
theological commitments. For hyper-Augustinians, however, genuine humility is not to 
be found among the unredeemed.  
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In Nicole’s account, for example, although the self-love that rules in the realm of 
nature succeeds in imitating humility perfectly, this so-called humility is in fact nothing 
more than a “finer and more delicate sentiment of that pride which is born with man and 
which does not forsake him at all” (CS V, 376). Truly enlightened self-love sees that we 
will better gain the love of others not by hiding all of our faults but by admitting them, 
for by doing so we seem more humanly imperfect (CS VII, 378). In contrast to Aquinas, 
Nicole does not see the possibility for genuine secular humility. Such humility is a mere 
mask for pride. 
Indeed, for the Jansenists, true contrition (an aspect of humility) is a divine gift 
(see Herdt 2008, 236). Luther likewise affirms that humility is also given by God. The 
early Luther held that humility, the recognition of our need for grace, was the sole human 
act regarded by God as meritorious and which fulfills the covenant condition for 
justification (McGrath 1999, 106; Herdt 2008, 177). After Luther’s breakthrough, 
however, he held that we were incapable even of coming to this awareness on our own. 
Since we are powerless to humble ourselves (for trying to do so would, Luther thinks, be 
attempting to earn God’s favor by our own power), God must humble us. God does so 
through his opus alienum, his alien work, of threatening us with Hell. This forces us to 
recognize our sinfulness and to be humbled by Christ bearing the wrath of God on our 
behalf. It is God who humbles us not we who humble ourselves, the mature Luther 
maintains (Herdt 2008, 177).  
 
c. The Passivity of Human Agency 
 
Thus far we have seen that hyper-Augustinian humility centrally involves 
recognizing our depravity and that it is unavailable to non-Christians. We have also seen 
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that hyper-Augustinian pride is thought to be a pervasive vice and that there is little or no 
sense among hyper-Augustinians that there are good forms of pride.62 I next want to 
discuss a second implication of the utter fallenness view—namely, the tendency to speak 
of human and divine agency (i.e., grace) disjunctively—and to show how this leads to 
shifts in how the dependency aspect of humility is understood, particularly for the 
Protestant Reformers. Hyper-Augustinians tended to think that one consequence of our 
total corruption is that we are incapable of goodness through our own power. As such, 
theologians of this perspective (again, especially Protestant Reformers) were inclined to 
speak of divine and human agency in competitive terms: either the human being acts on 
her own initiative and inevitably mires herself in sin or she assumes a posture of passivity 
while the grace of God operates within her to act with selfless love, with true virtue.63  
This can be contrasted with Christian humanism, where human agency and divine 
agency are seen as cooperative. Aquinas insists, for example, that even the theological 
virtues are infused in such a way as to join with rather than to displace human agency.64 
Erasmus’s famous analogy of the child reaching for the apple with the father’s loving 
guidance similarly suggests that grace enables rather than supersedes human agency 
(CFW 87).65 The hyper-Augustinians, however, are more likely to speak of grace as an 
alien force, wresting us from our own depravity. Thus, although Christian humanists and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 While the Jansenists affirm that we are made for greatness through God’s strength (see footnote 
49), and while the Protestant Reformers would advocate glorying in what God has done through us, neither 
could affirm that genuine non-Christian magnanimity is possible, and to my knowledge there is no account 
of Christian magnanimity among these thinkers.  
63 I am indebted, once again, to Herdt 2008. Her analysis of this point, as it is one of the primary 
themes of her book. See page 2 for her initial discussion of this issue.  
64 Aquinas saw grace as elevating nature rather than destroying it. See especially where Aquinas 
denies that the Holy Spirit acts upon a human being as one who has no agency but instead says that when 
given divine grace the human being “is so acted upon by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far 
as he has a free will” (ST I-II:68.3.r2). 
65 See Herdt’s discussion of Erasmus’s account of grace (2008, 112-15). 
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hyper-Augustinians together affirm dependency on God’s grace and include a glad 
acceptance of this dependency in their conceptions of humility, for the Protestant 
Reformers in particular, this dependency aspect involves taking a passive stance in which 
human agency is (thought to be) deserted, letting God’s grace transform the person from 
within.66 
Since Pascal and Nicole, unlike Luther and Calvin, saw justification and 
sanctification as a joint process, their conception of humility does not include the same 
emphasis on passivity. On the Jansenists’ account (and for Catholic theologians in 
general), we make use of the graces that we have been given when acting with charity, 
and God gives further graces that we again use in the process of becoming more deeply 
charitable (see Herdt 2008, 236). Although the Jansenists thought that we were wholly 
incapable of true repentance (an aspect of humility) apart from grace, their conception of 
justification and sanctification, as a unified, slow process of healing in which the agent is 
involved, prevents them from stressing passivity to the degree that the Reformers did 
(Herdt 2008, 236).67 Again, a key difference here is that Luther and Calvin see 
justification as distinct from sanctification and regard a perfect awareness of our 
incapacity to be present in order for justification (and hence for salvation and for the 
ensuing sanctifying growth into the likeness of Christ) to occur, whereas the Jansenists 
allow for an ever-growing awareness of our incapacity and dependency on God’s grace 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 McGrath explicitly describes Luther’s stance on justification as involving passivity on the part of 
the human being. For Luther, he says, “In justification, God is active and humans are passive” (1999, 113).  
67 Jansenists agreed that efficacious grace was irresistible (i.e., the person who was offered grace 
could not but be responsive to it) but they also insisted that we accept that grace voluntarily, freely (Herdt 
2008, 236). The idea is that human agency is involved in true Christian virtue but that it is graced agency 
(Herdt 2008, 237). We accept the grace we have been given and thereby become capable of responding to 
further graces. (I do not know the Jansenist position on divine and human agency well enough to assess 
whether this position is coherent. My aim is merely to show that the component of passivity in Jansenist 
humility is weaker than in Protestant humility.)  
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over time.68 Pascal hopes that his descriptions of our self-deception in the Pensées will 
help us to realize that “we are incapable of attaining the good by our own efforts” (P 148) 
and that “without Christ man can only be vicious and wretched” (P 416). Nicole 
concludes his meditation on pride and humility by saying: “Let us therefore not seek for 
strength in the Nature of Man. On which side soever we look on it, we shall find naught 
but weakness and impotency. In God only, and his Grace we ought to seek for it” (ME 
I.I.LXV, 34). But the assertion that we cannot trust solely in our own power does not 
mean that human agency plays no role responding to grace,69 even if, in contrast to 
Christian humanists, the Jansenists affirm that human nature is so damaged that it utterly 
lacks orientation toward the good apart from grace.70 The Jansenists were perhaps more 
liable than Christian humanists to speak in the language of passivity—that of 
relinquishing our will to God instead of seeking to align our will to God’s through 
cooperative process of transformation. Nevertheless, for the Jansenists such recognition 
of our utter dependency on grace—such humility—can dawn on one gradually in and 
through Christian practice (see Herdt 2008, 240-47 for this point in Pascal). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Additionally, while the Jansenists sought to distinguish themselves from what they thought was 
the Jesuit tendency to over-emphasize the power of human agency, so too did they criticize the Quietists’ 
false renunciation of human agency (Herdt 2008, 238).  
69 Indeed, in the Pensées Pascal advocates engaging in Christian practices as if one believed (e.g., 
going to mass, taking holy water, etc.) in order to acquire genuine belief over time (P 418)—a view Herdt 
interprets as indicating that God’s grace can be given in and through human aspiration and habituation (see 
Herdt 2008, 239). 
70 Michael Moriarty explains Pascal’s position well on this point (2003, 146-150): Pascal 
understands efficacious grace as God causing us to delight in the law of God (it is ‘efficacious’ grace 
because it brings about the effect). Pascal therefore insists that human agency is preserved when we 
(necessarily) respond to efficacious grace because we are acting in the manner in which we now (because 
of grace) most want to act. In this way Pascal tries to distance himself from Luther and Calvin, who tended 
to minimize human agency. But since Pascal thinks that original sin has left us in a thoroughly corrupt 
state, we are not capable of wanting to fulfill the commandments of God without efficacious grace (150). 
Nicole takes a similar position, while granting that God gives ‘general grace’ to all (see Herdt 2008, 250-
53; James 7-21).   
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The Protestant Reformers, by contrast, who were concerned to protect the idea 
that we in no way earn salvation, made awareness of our utter incapacity foundational to 
the Christian life. Salvation, they argued, is a gift that we receive solely through faith by 
God’s merciful grace, for, as Luther famously put it, justification is by faith alone; it is 
not merited by our works.71 The Catholic tradition thought that we are justified before 
God (and likewise merit salvation) to the extent that we are sanctified (i.e., have grown in 
Christ-likeness), even if God’s grace is needed for us to become the kinds of persons that 
merit salvation. But to the Reformers, because the cooperative model of divine and 
human agency that was dominant in Catholic theology suggests that we must do 
something of merit by partnering with divine help, this model was rejected.72 Over and 
against this, Luther and Calvin insisted that we are justified not by our character or works 
but by receiving God’s gift of mercy, whereby Christ’s righteousness is imputed to us. 
They were therefore especially eager to show that we have no grounds for claiming credit 
for our salvation or for our moral and spiritual growth, for anything we do to contribute 
to our own goodness could serve as a basis for boasting of our own merit. Furthermore, 
once justification is separated from and made foundational to sanctification, their 
insistence upon our full recognition of our inability to do good or to merit salvation 
becomes necessary from the inception of the Christian life. Otherwise stated, it becomes 
necessary humbly to affirm our utter incapacity in order to be justified/saved (see Herdt 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See the following passage for Calvin’s affirmation that salvation is wholly due to God’s grace: 
“When the will is enchained as the slave of sin [which he argues in this section and in ICR II.2 is 
necessarily the case in the non-elect], it cannot make a movement toward goodness, far less steadily pursue 
it. Every such movement is the first step in that conversion to God, which in Scripture is entirely ascribed 
to divine grace” (ICR II.3.5, 180). Additionally, Calvin interprets the psalmist in Psalm 100:3 as follows: 
“Not contented with simply giving God the praise of our salvation, he distinctly excludes us from all share 
in it, just as if he had said that not one particle remains to man as a ground of boasting. The whole is of 
God” (ICR II.3.6, 183). 
72 Calvin expressly denies such a cooperative model of divine and human agency (ICR II.2.6, 161 
and especially II.3.12, 187-88). 
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2008, 183, 199-200), for failure to take this stance, they thought, just shows that we are 
still operating under the idea that we can in some way earn salvation.  
More specifically, according to Luther, since humans are utterly fallen, and since 
we have no way of crossing the divide between fallen human nature and true Christian 
righteousness through our own initiative, we must begin by recognizing this incapacity 
and relinquishing our attempts to make ourselves righteous by our works.73 Luther 
thought that the spiritual practices advocated by the Catholic Church as well as the 
classical idea that virtues develop through habituation as is seen in Aristotle, falsely 
depend upon thinking that we can contribute to our own righteousness. As such, he 
regards seeking to produce good works in ourselves as an expression of pride, which 
merely serves to entrench in us a sinful confidence in our own capacities and a tendency 
to think that we can claim credit for our character (Herdt 2008, 14-15). Above we saw 
that for Luther (and Calvin) humbly recognizing our utter sinfulness and need for God’s 
mercy is a starting point for beginning in Christian virtue. Now we see that additionally 
this humility involves being aware of one’s moral inability and, moreover, taking a stance 
of pure passivity, abandoning human agency and letting God work to transform oneself 
inwardly (LW 44, 72).74 Even God’s law, for Luther, does not exist primarily to guide us 
morally. First and foremost, it functions to lead us to humility by revealing to us our utter 
inability to fulfill it and thereby to drive us to despair of ourselves (see LW 31, 348) so 
that we cease striving and “let God alone work in us” (LW 44, 72).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Herdt develops this point (2008, 174-75). 
74 See also where Luther says that “our accursed hypocrisy refuses to be merely passive matter but 
wants to accomplish the things that it should patiently permit God to accomplish in it” (LW 26, 159). Simo 
Peura shows how for Luther confidence in one’s own powers not only constitutes disobedience but is a 
form of idolatry as well (1998, 79-84).   
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Calvin likewise sees any assertion of human effort to be manifestations of self-
love and of prideful boasting. He says, for instance, 
Owing to the innate self-love by which all are blinded, we most willingly 
persuade ourselves that we do not possess a single quality which is deserving of 
hatred; and hence, independent of any countenance from without, general credit is 
given to the very foolish idea, that man is perfectly sufficient of himself for all the 
purposes of a good and happy life. If any are disposed to think more modestly, 
and concede somewhat to God, that they may not seem to arrogate every thing as 
their own, still, in making the division, they apportion matters so, that the chief 
ground of confidence and boasting always remains with themselves. Then, if a 
discourse is pronounced which flatters the pride spontaneously springing up in 
man’s inmost heart, nothing seems more delightful. (ICR II.1.2, 148)75 
 
Calvin thus renounces the idea that we contribute in any way to our character.76 Indeed, 
he takes it that he has shown it to be “beyond dispute, that free will does not enable any 
man to perform good works, unless he is assisted by grace; indeed, the special grace 
which the elect alone receive through regeneration” (ICR II.2.6, 161). He moreover 
thinks that failure to accept our utter inability to do good is a failure to have due 
confidence in God. He says,  
Never shall we have sufficient confidence in him unless utterly distrustful of 
ourselves; never shall we take courage in him until we first despond of ourselves; 
never shall we have full consolation in him until we cease to have any in 
ourselves. (ICR III.12.8, 497)  
 
Like Luther, then, the sort of self-knowledge constitutive of humility for Calvin 
therefore involves not only awareness that we are “utterly destitute” (ICR II.1.1, 147), but 
it also “indispose[s] us to every thing like confidence in our own powers, leave[s] us 
devoid of all means of boasting, and so incline[s] us to submission” (ICR II.1.2, 147). 
Moreover, Calvin, with Luther, suggests that human passivity is constitutive of the kind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 He also says, “The philosophers who have contended most strongly that virtue is to be desired on 
her own account, were so inflated with arrogance as to make it apparent that they sought virtue for no other 
reason than as a ground for indulging in pride” (ICR III.7.2, 450). 
76 See also ICR II.2.1-3, pp. 157-159 for a discussion of our moral impotence.   
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of humility that is important for justification/salvation and hence for the Christian life 
that is founded upon it. It is entirely God’s grace that does the work of salvation; to think 
human effort plays a role is to boast. Catherine Pickstock goes so far as to say that Calvin 
reduces salvation to “simply accepting a transaction carried out by God on our behalf” 
(1998, 156-57).77  It seems that what is lost with the cooperation model is a sense of 
communion between Creator and creature whereby that person’s will is transformed to 
love as Christ loves. Calvin’s insistence on our incapacity makes it seem as though divine 
assistance annihilates the person’s will, rather than preserving and transforming it.   
Recognition not only of our wretchedness but also of our of our utter inability to 
reform our condition is present in the conception of humility given in the Whole Duty of 
Man as well: 
And even when this humility has brought us to obedience, it is not then to be cast 
off, as if we had no further use of it; for there is still great use, nay necessity of it, 
to keep us from high conceits of our performances, which if we once entertain, it 
will blast the best of them, and make them utterly unacceptable to God… The best 
of our works are so full of infirmary and pollution, that if we compare them with 
that perfection and purity which is in God, we may truly say with the prophet, All 
our righteousnesses are as filthy rags, Isaiah 64.6. and therefore to pride 
ourselves in them, is the same madness, that it would be in a beggar to brag of his 
apparel, when it is nothing but vile rags and tatters… If, when we have done all, 
we must give ourselves no better a title, what are we then to esteem ourselves, 
that are so far from doing any considerable part of what we are commanded? 
Surely that worker name of slothful and wicked servant, Matt. 25.26. we have no 
reason to think too bad for us. (II.4, 35-36) 
 
This passage indicates that whatever we do of our own efforts is defiled. It is prideful 
conceit, this passage suggests, to approve of our actions or to think that we had some 
hand in whatever is good in us.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Note how impossible it is to avoid language of human agency altogether (revealing, I think, the 
incoherence of the Reformers’ position on divine and human agency). Here we “accept” the transaction.  
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In sum, then, this tendency to see human and divine agency disjunctively led to 
important changes in how pride and humility are conceived. If we in truth can contribute 
nothing to our own moral improvement, it becomes prideful to think that we can and to 
strive to make an effort at it. Also, it is a mark of pride to be pleased with ourselves for 
any goodness we possess, since we are in no way responsible for such goodness. While 
Augustine stressed acknowledging our dependency on God for our goodness, hyper-
Augustinians were more prone to focus on our utterly inability as the mode by which we 
appropriately appreciate divine assistance. But with this shift, humility, at least in the 
Protestant Reformers, takes on an air of passivity. The only thing we can “do” is to 
relinquish all striving and receive the gift of God’s grace. 
 
d. Mistrust of Reason and Theological Voluntarism 
 
I will argue in Chapter Three that Hume’s critique of humility for involving 
servility and meanness targets, in part, this emphasis on passivity that emerges in the 
Protestant Reformers’ accounts of humility. This note of servility takes on a stronger 
tone, however, when passivity is combined with the third implication of hyper-
Augustinianism, namely, a greater mistrust of reason. Reason becomes less reliable for 
hyper-Augustinians because it, too, being part of our nature, suffered the deeply 
corrupting effects of the Fall. Also, the Fall left the heart so depraved that it often leads 
reason to justify its own desires rather than to seek truth, especially pertaining to moral or 
spiritual matters. We are prone to self-deception, all of our representative hyper-
Augustinians affirm. This leads to yet another alteration in how pride and humility is 
understood: too much trust in one’s own reason comes to be regarded as prideful, while 
humility can even involve denigrating reason.  
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Luther is, at points, especially strong in his depreciation of reason. In his last 
sermon in Wittenburg he calls reason “the devil’s bride” (LW 51, 374) and a “mangy, 
leprous whore” (LW 51, 376). He says that “reason mocks and affronts God in spiritual 
things and has in it more hideous harlotry than any harlot” (LW 51, 374), that “reason is 
by nature a harmful whore” (LW 51, 376, emphasis mine), and that “Reason is and 
should be drowned in baptism” (LW 51, 376). He urges us to “[t]hrow dirt in her face and 
make her ugly” (LW 51, 376) and to “trample reason and its wisdom under foot and say, 
‘You cursed whore, shut up! Are you trying to seduce me into committing fornication 
with the devil?” (LW 51, 376-77).78 He similarly says in his Commentary on Galatians, 
that every Christian “offers and slaughters his reason” and ought “daily and perpetually” 
engage in the practice of “kill[ing] the reason” and glorifying God (LW 26, 233).  
Luther’s more extreme statements against reason arise in the context of his 
discussions about our tendency to use reason as part of our perpetual project of relying on 
ourselves rather than trusting in the promises of God,79 and Luther thus should by no 
means be interpreted as rejecting reason wholesale. Still, however, Luther’s position on 
reason is a far cry from the view of Aquinas, who thinks that humans by nature, Christian 
or pagan, have the ability to reason about the human good, that doing so is part of what is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 In this sermon Luther is condemning reason’s tendency to arrive at theological conclusions that 
are different from what he regards to be clearly communicated in Scripture (here he mentions Roman 
Catholics who endorse praying to saints and the Anabaptists who see baptism as a mere symbol). He under-
appreciates the extent to which there can be legitimate hermeneutical disagreement, however. He, like 
many hyper-Augustinians, is too quick and emphatic in diagnosing alternative interpretations as stemming 
from “self-love” and “a passion for [one’s] own wisdom” (LW 51, 377), rather than seeing them as 
possibly honest attempts to understand a difficult text.  
79 Luther tends to denounce (in a polemical manner) whatever threatens to prevent people from 
receiving and holding fast to what he believes to be the greatest good for human beings—i.e., the promises 
of the Gospel. See, for example, LW 28, 63-75 for a sermon that gives clear expression to Luther’s worries 
about reason’s potential for interfering with salvation by introducing doubt.   
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involved developing practical wisdom (which is needed for genuine virtue), and that faith 
is the fulfillment of reason.80 
Though Pascal did not denigrate reason to the extent of the Protestant Reformers, 
he did think that there was no neutral standpoint of reason upon which to view the human 
situation. He argued instead that we can only truly know ourselves and our condition 
through knowing Christ (P 417). As we saw above, Pascal admits that the doctrine of 
original sin, which constitutes a deep truth about ourselves, is “shocking to our reason.” 
He therefore says that “it is not through the proud activity of our reason but through its 
simple submission that we can really know ourselves” (P 131).81 Pascal likewise hopes 
that when we truly see that we are inheritors of original sin and that “we are incapable of 
attaining the good by our own efforts” (P 148), we will see that virtue is not within our 
grasp apart from faith. For without faith, we “know neither true good nor justice” (P 
148).82 From Pascal’s perspective, however, accepting our wretchedness and our need for 
faith is not ultimately opposed to reason; on the contrary, Pascal thinks that when pride 
dominates our rational activities, we are prevented from seeing how Christian truths 
illuminate the human condition.83 But unlike Aquinas, he has no confidence one can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Luther, in contrast to Aquinas, stresses that faith in the promises of God is an offense to reason 
(LW 26, 231).  
81 Pascal furthermore says that God uses hiddenness, incomprehensibility, and obscurity to blind the 
reprobate (P 236) and to humble the pride of those who are open to God (P 234, 236). Pascal says, for 
example, “God wishes to move the will rather than the mind. Perfect clarity would help the mind and harm 
the will. Humble their pride” (P 334). 
82 Nicole was perhaps unique among the Jansenists for implying that there is a neutral standpoint of 
reason that persists in spite of the corrupting effects of the Fall (James 44; Herdt 2008, 248). However, as I 
will later explain, once worldly virtue can be articulated from a neutral standpoint of reason, the realm of 
true, graced, Christian virtue can seem to become increasingly mysterious, incomprehensible, and 
irrelevant. Ironically, the way that Nicole affirms reason’s role in moral matters serves to open up space for 
critique of his affirmation of the selfless stance of charity as the proper mode of human existence. 
83 Pascal says, “Men despise religion. They hate it and are afraid it may be true. The cure for this is 
first to show that religion is not contrary to reason, but worthy of reverence and respect. … Worthy of 
reverence because it really understands human nature” (P 12). For a helpful exposition on Pascal’s account 
of the place of reason and the heart in his account of knowledge, see Jean Khalfa 2003. 
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reason well about the moral life or can have significant insight into the human condition 
apart from the Christian faith. 
The Protestant Reformers, whose depreciation of reason’s place in the moral life 
is more extreme than Pascal’s, is so in part because they embrace theological 
voluntarism.84 Theological voluntarism is the view that God’s will is what makes 
something good. That is, there is no standard of goodness external to the will of God by 
which reason can judge God’s actions to be good or evil; rather, God’s will just is the 
standard of goodness. Accordingly, for theological voluntarists, humans ultimately know 
what is good, not by reason but by faith in divine revelation, wherein God communicates 
his will for us, especially in the form of divine commands. On this view, then, even if 
human reason were not corrupted by the Fall, we still could not fundamentally rely on 
reason for moral discernment, for it is not our reason but God’s self-revelation through 
Scripture that gives us access to God’s will. Calvin additionally insists that it is sinful to 
seek knowledge of the causes of the divine will, since the very demand for such 
knowledge impiously implies that there is something greater than God’s will itself (ICR 
III.23.2, 626).    
Generally the more that reason is seen to be limited, the more assertions that go 
beyond such limits will be seen as expressing pride. Pascal’s view requires that reason be 
submissive to faith on precisely those points of traditional Christian doctrine that admit 
reasonable doubt and that failure to do so (perhaps out of earnest struggle) constitutes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Calvin’s voluntarism is clear in his statements like the following: “God’s will is the supreme rule 
of righteousness, so that everything which he wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of his 
willing it. Therefore, when it is asked why the Lord did so, we must answer, Because he pleased. But if you 
proceed farther to ask why he pleased, you ask for something greater and more sublime than the will of 
God, and nothing such can be found” (ICR III.23.2, 626).   
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pride.85 Similarly, when a dark view of human nature is connected to theological 
voluntarism as it was by the Protestant Reformers, the restrictive role given to reason 
leads them to regard questioning Scripture or God’s commands, or even relying on one’s 
moral insight instead of divine revelation, to be pridefully extending beyond the bounds 
of proper humility before God. Humility, by contrast, involves putting aside reason and 
trusting God’s Word if there is a seeming conflict between the two. Luther says, for 
instance, that “[Christians] have regard for God’s Word, and, now humbled, have learned 
that they should not rely on their own wisdom and reason, or upon human help and 
comfort.”86 And again Luther says, “the highest and first work of God in us and the best 
training is that we let our own works go and let our reason and will lie dormant, resting 
and commending ourselves to God in all things” (LW 44, 74, emphasis mine).  
While Calvin is slightly more optimistic about reason than Luther, his hyper-
Augustinian and theological voluntarist convictions still lead him to maintain that  
…we are not to seek our own, but the Lord’s will, and act with a view to promote 
his glory. Great is our proficiency, when, almost forgetting ourselves, certainly 
postponing our own reason, we faithfully make it our study to obey God and his 
commandments. … We have not yet sufficiently explained how great and 
numerous are the obstacles by which a man is impeded in the pursuit of rectitude, 
so long as he has not renounced himself. The old saying is true, There is a world 
of iniquity treasured up in the human soul. Nor can you find any other remedy for 
this than to deny yourself, renounce your own reason, and direct your whole mind 
to the pursuit of those things which the Lord requires of you, and which you are to 
seek only because they are pleasing to him. (ICR III.7.2, 450, emphases mine) 
 
We not only see here that seeking to follow God’s will (fulfilling the submission aspect 
of humility) involves self-denial, articulated in a way that is characteristic of the anti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 See P 168, for example, where Pascal calls it foolishness not to believe in the Eucharist. But why 
should reasonable doubt be branded a moral failing?  
86 This quote is from p. 74 of Luther’s sermon entitled “The Reward of Humility,” given on the 
Third Sunday After Trinity and found in Vol. 8 of Sermons of Martin Luther (see Past Masters, electronic 
edition).  
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eudaimonism and nature/grace dichotomy typically expressed in hyper-Augustinianism. 
We also see that this obedient self-forgetfulness involves “postponing” or “renouncing” 
our own reason in deference to God’s will. (Again, the difference between the Protestant 
Reformers and Aquinas on this point is readily apparent, for Aquinas thinks that the self 
and one’s rational capacities are fulfilled, not renounced, through seeking obedience to 
God’s will.)   
We see the connection between humility and renunciation of reason in The Whole 
Duty of Man as well: 
But I told you, humility contained in it not only a submission to his will, but also 
to his wisdom; that is, to acknowledge him infinitely wise, and therefore that 
whatever he doth is best and fittest to be done. And this we are to confess both in 
his commands, and in his disposing and ordering of things. First, whatsoever he 
commands us either to believe or do, we are to submit to his wisdom in both, to 
believe whatsoever he bids us believe, how impossible soever it seems to our 
shallow understandings, and to do whatever he commands us to do, how contrary 
soever it be to our fleshly reason or humour, and in both to conclude, that his 
commands are most fit and reasonable, however they appear to us. (II.1.9, 40-41) 
 
It seems from this passage that it does not matter at all if the (supposed) actions or 
commands of God run counter to any (possibly very deep) conviction into the good that 
we might have. Humility requires us to deny our own insight (our “fleshly reason”) and 
to believe whatever God seems to bid. I will show in Chapter Two how damaging Hume 
saw such a view to be insofar as it not only stifles intellectual maturation (a problem that 
has psychologically as well as socially harmful ramifications) but, what is more, it 
becomes morally and spiritually imperative that one cease questioning and do whatever 
one perceives God’s will to be. This could put great pressure on the earnest individual for 
whom raising reasonable questions could be condemned as manifesting a sin as damnable 
as pride. I will also argue in Chapter Three that the denigration of reason involved in 
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hyper-Augustinian (particularly Calvinist) humility led Hume to critique it as involving 
servility and meanness, characteristics that Hume saw to be especially vicious. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 Despite the arguably admirable sensitivity to spiritual struggle, longing for purity 
of love, and willingness to grapple seriously with human darkness that we find in hyper-
Augustinianism, it is not hard to imagine how the sort of Christian humility to which 
Hume was exposed would have seemed to him to be quite dangerous, especially when 
humility as it is perceived in popular religious culture can lack some of the important 
qualifications that trained theologians may have given it. The Whole Duty of Man, as we 
saw above, first describes humility as “unfeigned submission” (II.1, 34), and a sort of 
submission that involves denial of human desire, of reason, and of will/agency, 
fundamentally depreciates humanity and earthly existence. Hume’s attempt to establish 
an ethic that affirms ordinary life and basic human happiness stands in opposition to such 
a view. I will show in Chapter Three how, against the backdrop of Hume’s secular ethics 
rooted in human happiness, his objections to Christian humility are deep and carry 
implications for the ways in which religion can be significantly destructive with respect 
to individual and social flourishing.  
 Prior to considering Hume’s critiques of Christian humility, however, I will first 
need, in the next chapter, to offer Hume’s critiques of Christian morality in general and to 
summarize Hume’s ethics of ordinary life. Ironically, many have argued that the hyper-
Augustinian trajectory paved the way for Hume’s secularization of ethics.87 On the one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See, for example, Charles Taylor 1989 (see especially chp. 13, 16, 19, 20) and 2007 (see 
especially chp. 6-7), Michael Gill 2006, Alasdair MacIntyre 1988 (especially chp. XV), and Jennifer Herdt 
2008.  
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hand, the gloomy picture of human nature and denunciation of much of ordinary human 
desire provided impetus away from the theological outlook that undergirded such views. 
On the other hand, the sharp dichotomizing of the realms of nature and grace ended up 
making the realm of nature appear increasingly intelligible on its own terms and the 
realm of grace increasingly mysterious and unnecessary.  
Herdt has argued that in fact Nicole’s project of providing a “moral anatomy” of 
worldly virtue plays such a secularizing role (2008, 221-22, 261). As mentioned above, 
Nicole’s articulation of worldly virtue from the standpoint of neutral reason gives 
morality a kind of independence from religion that it had not previously enjoyed in the 
other Jansenist thinkers who provided moral anatomies or indeed in many thinkers in the 
Christianized West. Additionally, Nicole admits, in contrast to Pascal, that worldly 
happiness can be genuine, not simply a diversion from underlying despair (Herdt 2008, 
253). In this context, however, Nicole’s discussion of the graced life of charity becomes 
increasingly opaque whereas his account of worldly virtue and happiness shows human 
behavior in the sphere of nature to be comprehensible without reference to religion (see 
Herdt 2008, 16-17, 222, 261).  
Like Nicole, Hume’s account of ethics involves providing a moral anatomy—
specifically, an anatomy of our moral sentiments and language. Unlike Nicole, he drops 
what he regards to be an epistemologically unfounded appeal to the realm of grace. 
Moreover, we will see that Hume’s moral anatomy opposes Nicole’s claim that all 
worldly virtue stems from self-love insofar as it shows how natural sympathy is a 
dominant principle in human nature and is the condition for the possibility of our 
common language of moral praise and blame. In this way, Hume finds a principle in the 
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realm of nature that allows him to deny its utter depravity. For Hume, any so-called 
“redemptive” forces for human life spring from within human nature itself, not from 
some external, transcendent source.88  
Not only does Hume insist that sympathy and benevolence are natural, thus 
denying that the hyper-Augustinian view that human nature is profoundly selfish. He also 
approves of certain forms of self-love and worldly desire that the hyper-Augustinians 
would have condemned as sinful. In other words, much of what hyper-Augustinians took 
to be indicative of wretchedness, Hume accepts as simply and even unproblematically 
human. Pride is just one of those passions to which we are prone that, in opposition to the 
hyper-Augustinian view, Hume accepts and, with certain qualifications, elevates. As will 
become apparent in Chapter Four, Hume, like Nicole, sees pride as a dominant motivator 
in human life. But because, unlike Nicole, he distinguishes between good and bad forms 
of pride, he is able to show how virtuous pride is central to moral motivation, a point I 
explore most fully in Chapter Three. Before we can appreciate Hume’s account of pride 
and humility and his critique of their opposite placements in the traditional Christian 
catalogue of virtues and vices, however, we will need to look more at Hume’s ethic of 
ordinary life and his reasons for rejecting the dominant forms of Christian morality in 
which Christian accounts of pride and humility find their place. This is the topic to which 
I will turn in the next chapter. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Although Hume undoubtedly read Nicole (Mossner 1980, 102), Nicole was likely more of an 
indirect influence on Hume by way of the imprint that Nicole left upon Mandeville and Smith. Nicole’s 
contention that (enlightened) self-love perfectly mimics charity carries with it the idea that we can benefit 
others while pursuing our selfish ends (see Schneewind 2003, 370). This bears obvious influence on 
Mandeville’s confidence that private vice will lead to public benefit and, in turn, on Hume’s friend Adam 
Smith’s notion of the invisible hand.  
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CHAPTER TWO: HUME’S CRITIQUE OF RELIGIOUS MORALITY AND HIS 
SECULAR ETHIC OF ORDINARY LIFE 
 
 
“Upon the whole, I desire to take my Catalogue of Virtues from Cicero’s Offices, not 
from the Whole Duty of Man. I had, indeed, the former Book in my Eye in all my 
Reasonings” (LDH #13, letter to Hutcheson Sept. 17, 1739) 
 
“The Church is my Aversion.” (NL #10, letter to Henry Home, end of June, 1747) 
 
“The worst speculative Sceptic ever I knew, was a much better Man than the best 
superstitious Devotee and Bigot.” (LDH #72, letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, March 10, 
1751) 
 
“I believe I shall write no more History; but proceed directly to attack the Lord’s Prayer 
& the ten Commandments & the single Cat[echism]; and to recommend Suicide & 
Adultery: And so persist, till it shall please the Lord to take me to himself.” (NL #25, 
letter to Captain James Edmonstoune of Newton, Sept. 29, 1757) 
 
 
 The previous chapter discussed the two dominant theological trajectories in the 
Western Christian tradition—Christian humanism and hyper-Augustinianism—and 
showed how pride and humility is differently understood within their respective 
theological frameworks. Despite the crucial differences in their conceptions of pride and 
humility and the theological commitments that shape these conceptions, both traditions 
regard pride and humility as morally central categories where humility is seen as a key 
virtue and pride the chief vice. I will argue in the next chapter that Hume’s opposite 
evaluation of pride and humility contains a critique of Christian morality that runs quite 
deep. In order to show adequately the significance of Hume’s objections to Christian 
humility and his rehabilitation of pride as a virtue, however, it will be necessary in this 
chapter to look at some of the larger moral and religious issues at stake in this shift. 
Thus, my aim here is provide an overview of Hume’s critique of religious morality (and 
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specifically to Christian morality when relevant) and his attempt arguably to replace it 
by developing a purely secular ethic of common life rooted in social praise and blame.1  
Hume’s secular account of ethics was quite radical in his time insofar as it rejects 
the claim that a transcendent moral source—i.e., God—is in any way necessary to 
ground or to motivate morality. We can appreciate the controversial nature of Hume’s 
position when we look at how it opposes the two distinct ways of conceiving of the 
dependence of ethics on religion based on the eighteenth century distinction between 
natural and revealed religion. Natural religion, a term for what we now tend to call 
natural theology, refers to conclusions that can be drawn about the existence and nature 
of God (or the gods) on the basis of evidence and reasons available to any intelligent 
person without having recourse to an alleged source of divine revelation such as the 
Bible or the Koran. Invoking philosophical proofs for the existence of God would thus 
be indicative of the approach taken by natural religion. Revealed religion, by contrast, 
appeals to supposed truths about the divine that are obtained from a source that is 
thought to be divinely inspired. Belief in the Trinity or the divinity of Christ would be 
examples of beliefs held by those who accept revealed religion, in this case Christianity 
(see Gaskin 1993a, 314).  
When Hume refers to and critiques religious morality, he is primarily speaking of 
morality grounded, whether in whole or in part, in revealed religion and which includes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 While Hume provides an account of the origins of our common moral language, the claim that by 
it he means actively to replace religious morality is a further interpretive claim. It is not, though, a terribly 
controversial one. For example, Gaskin observes that, “Hume never explicitly says it [i.e., his secular 
account of ethics] is superior to and can replace religious morality, but his account makes no reference 
whatever to divine sanctions or fiats, and the implication is clear” (1993b, xvii). Furthermore, Hume 
appeals to his experience-based account of ethics as the standard by which he critiques certain injunctions 
of religious morality (see EPM IX.1, 270, 341-43; NHR XIV, 179-83; D XII, 122-25). (On this point see 
also Yandell’s discussion (1990, 27-30).) The claim that Hume meant to undermine the foundations of 
religious morality and to erect a secular one in its place will be more fully considered in I.  
 99 
the accompanying forms of religious practice that arise in religious traditions (e.g., 
rituals, spiritual practices, venerations, specific codes of conduct and prohibitions).2 
When Hume speaks of superstition, it is revealed religion to which he refers.3 I will 
speak more about the dominant ways in which Christian morality has been understood to 
be dependent upon revealed religion in II. Here it suffices to point out that Hume’s 
attempt to establish the autonomy of morality from revealed religion would have been 
alarming to many Christian readers.  
Given, however, that the moral philosophers with whom Hume engaged tended 
to be Deists who were also to varying degrees critical of revealed religion, what was 
especially controversial about Hume’s moral philosophy was that it asserted 
independence from natural religion as well. Deists, like Hume, wanted to focus instead 
not on the religious accompaniments (rituals, etc.) but on moral practice that was evident 
to us through natural means (e.g., reason, moral sense, etc., depending upon the account 
given). Nevertheless, most accounts maintained in different ways that God was 
necessary to ground and ultimately to motivate morality. Hobbes and Mandeville are 
noteworthy figures who rejected both claims, but they also both saw morality as mere 
artifice, i.e., as social convention that developed out of enlightened self-interest to 
facilitate common life. Thus the prominent “atheist” options on offer were at bottom 
versions of moral skepticism, and thus atheism was often seen as a threat to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 When I speak of religious morality in this chapter, I usually follow Hume in referring to morality 
informed in some way by revealed religion. If I use religious morality to refer to a moral philosophy that 
appeals to natural religion, the context should cue the reader into this momentary shift. It is important to 
hold these two versions of religious morality distinct. As I will later discuss, although Hume thinks that 
neither revealed nor natural religion is necessary to ground or to motivate morality, he is deeply concerned 
about the practical effects of revealed religion whereas he seems to think that natural religion can have 
some social benefit (however much he regards his thoroughly secular account to be superior). See footnote 
8.  
3 Gaskin points out that Hume tends to use the phrase “vulgar superstition” to refer to “what on 
examination turns out to be religion as ordinarily understood in the world” (1993a, 209). 
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possibility of positive moral vision.4 Although Hume does maintain, with Mandeville, 
that some virtues, such as justice and chastity for women, are artificial (i.e., developed 
through convention),5 his moral philosophy was unique in that it offers an account of 
what genuine virtue is and how we are motivated to acquire it without depending upon a 
transcendent moral source.    
As I will discuss in IV., Hume was particularly concerned that morality informed 
by revealed religion had pernicious effects. Indeed, I believe that undermining “vulgar 
religion” (and Christianity was the chief target in Hume’s context) and what Hume saw 
as its unnatural vision of life and potential for spawning social factions was one of his 
enduring philosophical aims. The fact that Hume concludes most of his major works 
after A Treatise of Human Nature with critiques of religious morality attests to the 
centrality of Hume’s concern to subdue the harmful practical consequences of 
“superstitious” religious belief. His objections to religious morality can be found in 
Section XI of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section IX of An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (as well as in the appended essay, “A Dialogue”), 
Sections X, XIV-XV of The Natural History of Religion, and Part XII of Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion. The harmful impact of religious beliefs is also a dominant 
theme in Hume’s History of England.6 And although most scholars have regarded the 
Treatise of Human Nature to be largely unconcerned with religion, Paul Russell has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See David Fate Norton’s discussion of Hume’s desire to combat the moral skepticism of Hobbes 
(1982, 150-1). 
5 Michael Gill moreover points out that even with respect to Hume’s account of artificial virtues 
such as justice he crucially differs from Mandeville, who thought that for most people the supposed 
concern for justice in fact masked self-interest, i.e., was merely counterfeit virtue. Hume, by contrast, 
maintains that the self-interest that gives rise to justice eventually can, by an associative “progress of 
sentiments” (THN 3.2.2.25, 321) be transcended so that the just person is genuinely committed to justice, 
even when it runs “contrary to private interest” (T 3.2.1.11, 309) (2006, 235-40). 
6 See Siebert (1990, Chapter Two) and Herdt (1997, Chapter Five) for excellent discussions of this 
theme in the History of England.  
 101 
cogently argued that when the historical debates surrounding religion are appreciated 
and important textual cues are duly noted, it becomes clear that the Treatise deeply and 
systematically aims to undermine religion and to offer a secular moral alternative.7 (I 
discuss Russell’s work in detail in I.) Moreover, Jennifer Herdt convincingly makes the 
case that the unity of Hume’s corpus as a whole only comes into clear focus when we 
appreciate Hume’s dominant concern to subdue the harmful, faction-inducing effects of 
revealed religion and to provide a secular, non-sectarian account of morality that cuts 
across religious divides that were hindering the progress of his native Scotland (1997, 
10-16). Although Hume seems to have thought that natural religion could have morally 
beneficial effects,8 the way in which he argues for the independence of morality from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Furthermore, there is reason to think that the original draft of the Treatise contained more explicit 
critiques of religious belief and religious morality but that Hume had removed those passages that could 
overtly offend religious believers in hopes that the work might be more widely received. Evidence for this 
can be found, for example, in Hume’s letter to Henry Home (December 2nd, 1737) where he says, “I am at 
present castrating my work, that is, cutting off its nobler parts; that is, endeavouring it shall give as little 
offense as possible” (LDH #7). Hume is perhaps suggesting his essay on miracles which was discussed 
previously in the letter (and which was later published in the first Enquiry) but may be referring to other 
critiques of religious belief and practice as well. See also Hume’s exchanges with Francis Hutcheson 
regarding Book III (“Of Morals”) of the Treatise (see the letter written on Sept. 17th, 1739 and Mar. 4th, 
1740 in LDH #13 and #36). For further discussions on this point, see Mossner 1978, 654-656; Gay 1968, 
404-405; Norton 1986, fn. 23; Wootton 1990, 199. While there does seem to be evidence that Hume’s 
more explicit critiques of religion were extracted before its publication, nevertheless Paul Russell 
convincingly shows that we are not therefore to conclude that the Treatise was not dominantly concerned 
with religion (2008, 267-278).  
8 Hume does occasionally mention some beneficial consequences of religion. For example, he says 
“The proper Office of Religion is to reform Men’s Lives, to purify their Hearts, to inforce all moral 
Duties, & to secure Obedience to the Laws & civil Magistrate” (quoted in Mossner 1980, 306). In the 
context of the full quotation, however, it is important to note that this is a pragmatic, secular conception of 
the function of religion in the commonwealth, not a conception that many religious believers would hold 
(Mossner 1978, 658). This general idea is also expressed by Cleanthes (a Deist, a proponent of natural 
religion) in the Dialogues (XII, 122)—though to this Philo replies: 1) that religion as it is commonly found 
(i.e., vulgar religion) prompts much immoral action (D XII, 123-26) and 2) is relatively superfluous for 
those philosophers who “stand less in need of such [religious] motives to keep them under the restraint of 
morals” (D XII, 123-24). Because Hume prudentially does not always express his religious views 
straightforwardly, it is difficult to know whether and, if so, to what extent Hume would have thought 
natural religion to be morally helpful. It is nevertheless clear that he does not think that natural religion is 
needed in order to account for or to motivate morality.  
Hume’s stance towards morality based in revealed religion, however, seems to be almost wholly 
critical. Yandell in fact argues that according to Hume the religious motives and duties that religious 
morality will add to ethics are “inherently negative” (1990, 29). While this unqualified claim may be a bit 
too strong, Herdt similarly but more cautiously notes that Hume rarely attributes beneficial actions to 
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even natural religion serves to further discredit the legitimacy of religious morality 
(again, Christianity would be dominant in his mind) insofar as many religious thinkers 
use the arguments of natural religion as a support for belief in divine revelation. Hume’s 
attack on both natural and revealed religion and his positive account of morality that 
renders larger metaphysical questions irrelevant thus hang together as a way to combat 
the harm of “superstition” and the conceptions of morality that it shapes.  
In this chapter I will discuss Hume’s epistemological objections to religion (both 
revealed and natural) that have a particular relevance to Christian morality. I will then 
present Hume’s moral philosophy, distinctive in its time for its thorough-going 
autonomy from religion.9  Finally, I will discuss some of Hume’s practical or moral 
objections to religious (and in some ways specifically Christian) morality, which he 
levels on the basis of his secular ethic of common life. First, however, I want to situate 
Hume’s moral philosophy, his skeptical critiques of religion, and his concerns with 
religious practice more broadly within his overall philosophical aims. Throughout the 
discussions of Christian morality I will, when necessary, distinguish between divine 
command theory (embraced by the hyper-Augustinian Protestant Reformers) and natural 
law theory (articulated most thoroughly and influentially by Aquinas, who represents 
Christian humanism). Showing the different ways in which Hume’s critiques apply to 
these two forms will further set the context for appreciating and critically engaging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
religious motivation or expresses much esteem for religious characters. She points out, for example, that 
even in his discussion of the admirable Thomas More, “Hume does not…allow that More’s religious 
dedication might be the source of his sustained gentleness and joy, but suggests that these must be basic 
personality traits which not even his religion could obliterate” (1997, 214). 
9 As I say above and discuss further in I., Hobbes and Mandeville also provide a secular account of 
ethics, but Hume’s is unique from theirs insofar as Hume argues that most virtues are natural (and real), 
not artificial (rooted in convention). See Gill (2006, 226-40), Russell (2008, 239-63), Herdt (2008, 308-
12), and Norton (2006, 149-62) for helpful discussions.  
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Hume’s critique of humility and of religiously-informed accounts of ethics in the third 
and sixth chapters.  
 
I. Skepticism, Naturalism, and Religion in Hume’s Philosophy 
 
Before addressing Hume’s views of morality and religion, I want to look first at 
his two dominant philosophical approaches (skepticism and naturalism), their 
problematic relationship to each other, and their relationship to his views on religion. 
Doing so is important for setting up the central themes of the dissertation because these 
issues pertain to Hume’s general view of the relationship between religion and human 
flourishing as well as to why he seeks to direct our attention away from larger 
metaphysical or what I will call “cosmic” questions. Furthermore, these issues have a 
bearing upon the specific topics of this chapter, namely, how to interpret the nature of 
Hume’s skeptical critiques of religion that are relevant to Christian morality as well as 
how to understand his own naturalistic account of ethics.10 
Hume employs skepticism—what he calls ‘extreme’ or ‘Pyrrhonian’ 
skepticism—primarily in Book I of the Treatise and in his reworking of Book I in the 
first Enquiry.11 Hume’s skeptical arguments in the first two works call into question the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 These issues surrounding Hume’s skepticism and naturalism are germane to the themes in this 
chapter insofar as I seek to understand the character of and relationship between 1) Hume’s 
epistemological critiques of religion that are relevant to Christian morality (see II.), which come out of 
Hume’s skeptical project and 2) Hume’s secular account of morality (see III.), which is a facet of Hume’s 
naturalism. For example, are Hume’s skeptical critiques pertaining to Christian morality meant to clear the 
way for his secular morality, with the latter intended to replace the former? Or are his epistemological 
critiques of religion primarily one piece of his skeptical project, motivated largely by a philosophical 
concern to get clear on the limits of human reason independent of religious concerns? Is Hume’s secular 
morality itself a minimalist description of our language of praise and blame—a very modest naturalistic 
account strongly restrained by skepticism—or it is meant to be a more robust, normative ethic that 
emerges when greater interpretative stress is placed on the constructive, naturalistic elements of Hume’s 
work? Finally, to what extent, if any, do Hume’s concerns with the harms caused by religion (the topic of 
IV.) play a role in understanding his skeptical critiques of religion and his naturalistic account of morality? 
11 See Hume’s “My Own Life,” where he recounts that the content his first and second Enquiry 
were parts of the Treatise that he “cast anew” (ESY xxxv).  
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very foundations of human knowledge by challenging our rational justification for such 
fundamental beliefs as the existence of the external world, causality, the self, etc. and 
aim to show the limits of human reason. In Hume’s naturalistic approach to philosophy, 
as primarily found in Book II and III of the Treatise, in the second Enquiry (a reworking 
primarily of Book III), and in the Natural History, he seeks to apply the experimental 
method of Newton to human nature and so to construct a positive body of knowledge 
grounded in common life.  
A vexing question for Hume scholars has been how to reconcile these two sides 
of his thought. Since Hume’s skepticism undercuts all of our most basic commonsense 
beliefs about the world, it is difficult to see how his naturalistic projects can be 
philosophically justified. Paul Russell states the problem particularly well when he says, 
“Hume ‘the skeptic’ appears to saw off the branch that Hume ‘the Newton of the moral 
sciences’ is sitting on” (2008, 268). While Hume is clearly committed both to skepticism 
and naturalism, scholarship is deeply divided over how to understand the extent and 
coherence of these commitments and thus to understand the character of Hume’s work as 
a whole.12  
Hume’s explanation as to why he moves from extreme skepticism to naturalism 
is found in his Treatise 1.4.7 and in XII of the first Enquiry. Hume maintains that 
although extreme skeptical arguments cannot be rationally defeated (T 1.4.7.9, 175; see 
also EHU XII.2, 160), we do not remain in a state of universal doubt for two reasons. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For some scholars who emphasize Hume’s skeptical commitments, see Leslie Stephen 1962; 
Robert Fogelin 1985. For some scholars that emphasize Hume’s naturalistic commitments, see Norman 
Kemp Smith 1941; Barry Stroud 1977; Annette Baier 1991; Donald Livingston 1990. For a scholar who 
denies that the skeptical and naturalistic aims of the Treatise are unified, see David Fate Norton 1982. For 
a helpful survey of some of the dominant interpretive strategies for dealing with Hume’s skepticism and 
naturalism and for the difficulties that arise for each interpretation, see Broughton’s “Hume’s Naturalism 
and His Skepticism” (2008, 432-36).  
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First, the conclusions of Pyrrhonism are unlivable; they cannot have any persistent or 
lasting influence on the mind. Human nature draws even the most determined skeptic 
back to the common affairs of ordinary life where she must believe and act among other 
humans (see EHU XII.2, 159-60).13 Second, even if it were possible to sustain 
Pyrrhonism (which it is not), it would not be beneficial to do so (EHU XII.2, 159-60; T 
1.4.7.10, 175).  
Nevertheless, Hume maintains that Pyrrhonism is importantly instructive for two 
reasons. First, it curbs our natural tendency to be dogmatic in all our opinions (EHU 
XII.3, 161; see also T 1.4.7.15, 178). Second, it restrains the tendency of our imagination 
to run unbridled to whatever is remote, extraordinary, and sublime (EHU XII.3, 162), be 
it to religious superstition or to the abstruse and exalted metaphysical claims of 
ambitious philosophers (T 1.4.7.13, 176). (Hume regards religious superstition as 
significantly more problematic than speculative metaphysics, however, since he 
maintains that “the errors of religion are dangerous [whereas] those in philosophy only 
ridiculous” (T 1.4.7.13, 177).14) Pyrrhonism teaches us instead to limit “our enquiries to 
such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding” (EHU 
XII.3, 162)—i.e., to restrict our philosophical investigations to common life and to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See where Hume says, “Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may 
throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first 
and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every 
point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never 
concerned themselves in any philosophical researches” (EHU 12.23, 160).  
14 This view is repeated in “A Dialogue” wherein Hume characterizes the life of Pascal (whose 
passions are formed by religious superstition) and Diogenes (whose passions are informed by his 
“extravagant” philosophical views). While Hume seems to present both as “depart[ing] from the maxims 
of common reasons, and affect[ing] these artificial lives” (EPM 343), Hume clearly represents Pascal’s 
perspective as more seriously distorted and harmful. 
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refrain from speculating beyond this domain (EHU XII.3, 162).15 Hume thus advocates a 
“more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy” (EHU XII.3, 161), one that takes 
to heart these lessons by avoiding dogmatism and flights of fancy but addresses the 
subjects that necessarily concern us when the “current of nature” (T 1.4.7.12, 175) calls 
us back from extreme skepticism to common life—subjects such as morality, politics, art 
criticism, the sciences, etc. (EHU XII.3, 163-65; see T 1.4.7.12, 176). It is from this 
standpoint of mitigated skepticism that Hume undertakes his project of providing a 
“science of man” (T 1.4.7.14-15, 177-78). 
This, then, is generally how Hume links the skeptical and naturalistic sides of his 
work. It does not, however, clearly resolve the tensions between them. We are still left to 
wonder about the extent to which Hume’s naturalism can be philosophically justified, 
about the extent of his commitments to his skeptical and naturalistic enterprises, and 
about which side of his thought should receive greater emphasis. Among Hume scholars, 
Paul Russell’s proposed solution to this puzzle stands out as an especially important 
work with which to engage in light of the central topics of this dissertation, since he 
uniquely gives thorough and sustained attention not only to the nature of and relationship 
between Hume’s skepticism and naturalism, but also to the role that Hume’s irreligious 
aims play in understanding their relationship.16 Russell cogently argues that Hume’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 When our judgments are tempered by Pyrrhonism, they “[avoid] all distant and high enquiries, 
[confine themselves] to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience; 
leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and 
politicians” (EHU XII.3, 162). 
16 Russell favors the label “irreligious” to that of “agnostic” or “religious skeptic” because the latter 
two labels “fail to identify properly and highlight the wholly hostile and critical character of Hume’s 
general attitude toward religious doctrine and dogma” (2008, 284). Moreover, the latter two labels could 
mistakenly suggest that Hume’s thinks that the proper response to all religious judgments is merely to 
suspend judgment, when in fact he seems to think that thicker conceptions of theism (held, for example, by 
Christians) are highly doubtful and probably false (2008, 284).  
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anti-religious goals not only pervade the Treatise (which scholars had previously 
regarded as largely unconcerned with religion).17 Moreover, he contends that they are 
the key to reconciling and unifying the skeptical and naturalistic aspects of the Treatise, 
as well as the varying themes in his corpus as a whole. In what follows I present 
Russell’s reasons for his view and this will serve as a springboard for my assessment of 
Hume’s skepticism and naturalism in relation to issues pertaining to religion and 
morality in this chapter and throughout the dissertation. 
Russell argues, first, that appreciating Hume’s irreligious aims clarifies the way 
in which the skeptical and naturalistic components of Hume’s work are deeply related. 
He writes that  
in order to clear the ground to build the edifice of secular morality [which is the 
main task of Hume’s naturalism], Hume had to undertake a systematic skeptical 
attack on those theological doctrines and principles that threatened such a 
project. The varied and seemingly unrelated skeptical arguments Hume advances 
in the Treatise are in fact held together by his overarching concern to discredit 
and refute Christian metaphysics and morals. … (2008, 269)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 It is worth mentioning that although there is widespread scholarly consensus that Hume was 
hostile to religion, a few scholars read Hume as being more favorable to religion (at least to natural 
religion). Charles Hendel (1925), for example, thinks that Hume’s position on religion is similar to that of 
Berkeley, Butler, and “Cleanthes” from the Dialogues. See also Timothy Yoder’s 2008 arguments for 
Hume’s ‘amoral theism.’ I do not think, however, that these offer the most natural interpretation of 
Hume’s texts as a whole, especially once Hume’s anti-religious sentiments in his letters and as expressed 
in his History of England are taken into consideration.  
17 Russell shows that once we appreciate the Treatise in its historical context, we see that it is 
deeply an irreligious work, to which the responses of his contemporaries attest (see chapter two for 
Russell’s discussion of the early reception of the Treatise). Here I name just some of the observations that 
Russell lays out with great care. First, there are important parallels between Hobbes’s work (one of the 
notorious “atheists” of the modern period) and Hume’s structure and content of the Treatise, which would 
signal to readers that Hume shares Hobbes’s aim “to develop a secular, scientific account of the 
foundation of the moral and social life” (2008, 269). Second, if we view Hume’s arguments in Book I in 
light of the central debates between theist philosophers (particularly Samuel Clarke) and atheistic 
“freethinkers” of the period, we will see that even Hume’s arguments apparently unrelated to religion in 
fact are part of a thorough and systematic attack on the positions fundamental to many theistic 
commitments (Russell discusses in detail Hume’s arguments regarding empiricism and the idea of God, 
space, induction, matter, the human soul, freedom and necessity, and the external world). Third, by 
recasting some of the well-known debates in moral philosophy in light of how they stand in relation to 
religion, Russell shows how blaring and controversial the absence of God in Hume’s moral philosophy 
would have been for his readers. Russell indeed offers a powerful battery of arguments that, I think, leaves 
little room for doubting that the Treatise is a work of irreligion.  
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Indeed, Hume’s central goal in his skeptical enterprise, Russell shows, was to contest 
“the most current and influential arguments presented by various ‘religious 
philosophers’ who sought to prove (demonstratively) the fundamental articles of the 
Christian religion” (2008, 270). Even more fundamentally, Hume sought to render 
religion philosophically irrelevant, for what remains after human nature pulls us out of 
Pyrrhonism back to ordinary life is a philosophy that has been shorn of its orientation to 
ultimate, religiously-related questions and is poised instead to take up the project of 
providing a (Hobbist-inspired) “science of man.” Because a straightforward reading of 
the Treatise leaves one mystified as to why Hume would initiate his project to provide a 
science of man with a rigorous skepticism that would seem to destroy such aspirations, 
Russell argues that the coherence of Hume’s project in the Treatise (and in the skeptical 
and naturalistic aspects of his later work) only becomes fully intelligible when viewed in 
light of Hume’s irreligious concerns. Russell thereby shows, convincingly I think, that 
appreciating the way in which Hume’s irreligion is at work in the Treatise provides an 
interpretive solution to the apparent mismatch between the skeptical and naturalistic 
components.  
Russell less convincingly contends, however, that his irreligious interpretation of 
the Treatise provides a philosophical solution to the difficulties posed by Hume’s 
attempt to wed skepticism and naturalism (2008, 270). His argument comes in two parts. 
First, he argues that the two sides of Hume’s thought cannot be adequately characterized 
or understood apart from the overarching irreligious reading, nor can Hume’s 
philosophical motivations and commitments be appropriately grasped (2008, 271). 
Hume’s skepticism is not fully appreciated unless we see that by it he attempts to 
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undermine philosophical grounds for religious belief and morals,18 and Hume’s 
naturalism is not rightly appreciated unless we see that it is meant to offer an intellectual 
and practical secular alternative to a religious worldview (2008, 269-70). In this way, the 
Treatise offers a complete system of irreligion or secular philosophy, and is unique 
among Hume’s works for doing so (2008, 275). While, however, I agree that Hume’s 
irreligious aims are necessary for making sense of his project as a whole and for seeing 
how these two elements fit together in Hume’s thought, this appears to be yet another 
interpretative rather than philosophical solution to the tension inherent between 
advocating skepticism and embracing naturalism. Furthermore, it seems that if Hume’s 
naturalism is to be philosophically justified over and against his skepticism, it must be 
able to be understood independently of his irreligious motivations. Thus, although I am 
persuaded by Russell’s account of how Hume’s irreligion helps to explain what he was 
doing and why he was doing it, Hume’s irreligion, I think, is not and cannot be sufficient 
for explaining why his skepticism does not pull the rug out from under his naturalism.  
 Russell’s second component of his argument for the philosophical solution to the 
riddle rests in pointing to the “dynamic nature of Hume’s skeptical commitments” (2008, 
270). Russell thinks that interpretive problems arise when scholars read the options as 
being static, for then we are asked to decide where Hume’s commitments most lie, with 
skepticism (where naturalism is undermined) or naturalism (where skepticism seems not 
to be taken seriously). Russell emphasizes, however, that the skeptical and naturalistic 
sides of Hume’s work inseparably hang together. The extreme skeptic needs a kind of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Russell does make clear that Hume’s skepticism is subject-neutral and undermines the rational 
basis for most of our beliefs. It is not insignificant, however, that most of our commonsense beliefs are 
seen as legitimate grounds for inquiry into human life (albeit understood less dogmatically) when the draw 
of nature carries us out of our skeptical doubts whereas religious beliefs with any significant content 
remain unjustified insofar as they are seen as too remote for our limited reason.  
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skeptically-informed naturalism, since even the most extravagant skeptic cannot fully 
live according to, nor be benefitted by, universal doubt. Likewise, an adequate 
naturalism needs skepticism in order to proceed with due caution (especially insofar as it 
helps to remind us of the weakness of human reason and the futility of speculating 
beyond the bounds of common life).  
Russell rightly notes, however, that this does not suffice as a response to those 
who nevertheless object that Pyrrhonism really does undermine the foundations of 
Hume’s naturalism and that the naturalness and usefulness of succumbing to the current 
of nature does not philosophically justify naturalism (2008, 221). To deal with this, 
Russell appeals to Hume’s comment that “a true skeptic will be diffident of his 
philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction” (T 1.4.7.14, 177; 
Russell 2008, 221, 271), suggesting that for Hume, if extreme skepticism is to be 
consistent, it must turn in on itself and doubt its very conclusions. Russell thus indicates 
that by Hume’s account (and Russell states no objection to this notion) when Pyrrhonism 
itself comes under philosophical doubt it is not only the pull of nature that returns us to 
common life “but also the force of skeptical reflection itself” (2008, 221). Russell 
concludes therefore that it  
is within this philosophical dynamic that Hume undertakes to pursue his 
(Hobbist) project of a “science of man.” From this perspective, there is no 
conflict between the principles of the “true skeptic” and the aims of the “science 
of man.” (2008, 221-22)   
 
Russell’s claim is, thus, that Hume has philosophical justification for his naturalistic 
project.19  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Regardless of whether one finds this to be a satisfactory reconciliation of Hume’s skepticism and 
naturalism—and even if it is, more needs to be said about it from both Hume and Russell—it is worth 
noting that although Russell claims that his irreligious interpretation of Hume solves the central 
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In a moment I will take issue with Russell’s treatment of the philosophical 
tension in Hume’s work, as it has important implications for some of the larger topics I 
raise in this dissertation. At this juncture, however, I first want to discuss the ways in 
which Russell’s convincing interpretive account of how Hume’s irreligious aims 
illuminate the relationship between his skepticism and naturalism inform how I read 
Hume’s stance toward religious and specifically Christian morality in this chapter. In 
particular, given Russell’s thorough arguments that Hume’s skeptical project was 
carefully crafted so as to undermine the conclusions of leading defenders of Christianity 
(most especially Samuel Clarke),20 I think it is quite unlikely that Hume’s skeptical 
critiques of those positions pertinent to Christian morality (which I later discuss in II.) 
were carried out merely to discern the limits of human knowledge and not also to topple 
the conceptual pillars upon which Christian morality is understood and defended.  
As already mentioned, we know from the concluding sections in the second 
Enquiry (XI), the Natural History (X, XIV-XV), and the Dialogues (XII) that Hume 
regarded religious morality (and Christian morality would have been particularly in his 
mind) to be damaging in various ways, and thus we know that he has practical 
motivation for attacking its foundations. (I discuss some of the ways in which Hume sees 
religious morality to be harmful in IV.) Indeed, it is only a deep conviction that religion 
causes harm—and that a primary way it does so is by shaping our conceptions of moral 
practice—that can make sense of why Hume would be so concerned throughout his work 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
philosophical problem that is posed by Hume’s skepticism and naturalism, Hume’s irreligion plays no role 
in Russell’s proposed solution to it. 
20 Hume’s irreligious aims were apparent to his close philosophical successors as well as to his 
contemporaries. For example, in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant says of Hume: “[H]e desired, as is 
well known, nothing more than that a merely subjectively necessary concept of cause, i.e. habit, be 
assumed in place of all objective meaning of necessity in the causal concept; he did this in order to deny to 
reason any judgment concerning God, freedom, and immortality; and he knew very well how to draw 
conclusions with complete cogency when once the principles were conceded” (5.13, 146-47).  
 112 
to discredit it and why it is more his target than those abstruse metaphysical systems that 
equally come under his skeptical attack (see T 1.4.7.13, 177). Moreover, as I will argue, 
there are specific Christian doctrines that were held to have moral implications (namely, 
eternal life, which I discuss in this chapter, and original sin and dependency on grace, 
which I briefly reference in the next) that Hume tacitly critiques because of their harmful 
effects on the individual’s psyche or society at large. When Hume’s concerns about the 
corrupting effects of religious, and indeed specifically Christian, morality are 
appreciated, it seems most likely that Hume’s skeptical arguments, which bear relevance 
to Christian morality, were made in part to contribute to the loosening of its grip on 
Western culture.  
Additionally, I, with Russell, read Hume’s ethics as primarily a positive, 
naturalistic account of morality, rather than largely expressing skepticism with respect to 
morality. Russell points out that two of the most prominent “atheist” moral philosophers, 
Hobbes and Mandeville, both defend a skeptical account of morality, regarding moral 
distinctions to be primarily artificial—i.e., brought about through social convention. 
Both also accept a thoroughly negative view of human nature, regarding humans as 
fundamentally selfish and ultimately motivated to follow the conventional moral norms 
endorsed by society out of enlightened self-interest or desire for praise (Russell 2008, 
242, 251; see also Herdt 1997, 27).21 For them, then, there is no moral reality beyond 
what we have contrived in order to live together, nor is there genuine pursuit of (what we 
call) virtue for its own sake. Many thinkers in Hume’s day thought atheism or irreligion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 It is worth noting that both hold secular versions of hyper-Augustinianism insofar as they regard 
human nature to be fundamentally egoistic (akin to the hyper-Augustinian view that humans are 
thoroughly corrupt) and regard human “virtue” to be motivated by nothing other than self-interest (akin to 
the hyper-Augustinian interpretation of un-graced human action). 
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entailed this sort of moral skepticism (Russell 2008, 244, 251),22 and indeed some of 
Hume’s contemporaries accused him of holding such a view (see LG, 18).23  
While Hume certainly holds that some virtues were artificial (e.g., justice and 
chastity), he also maintains, in contrast to Hobbes and Mandeville, that most virtues are 
natural and, correspondingly, that there is a real not merely artificial distinction between 
vice and virtue. Unlike Hobbes and Mandeville, Hume also argues that in addition to 
being naturally selfish, humans are also sympathetic by nature and that sympathy cannot 
be reduced to self-interest. Accordingly, Hume’s secular ethic allows for the possibility 
of genuine virtue (and, what is more, genuine virtue among atheists), even while 
remaining agnostic with respect to the ultimate questions, in a way that the two most 
prominent secular moral theorists in this period do not.  
Now, although Hume is not a moral skeptic in the sense that Hobbes and 
Mandeville were, it still needs to be asked whether Hume was some type of moral 
skeptic by making moral distinctions a matter of feeling and perhaps therefore of 
subjective states.24 This question will be taken up to some degree in Chapter Five. 
Regardless, however, of the metaethical status of Hume’s moral philosophy and whether 
it is best characterized as skeptical of morality (at least as it was traditionally 
understood), Hume treats his naturalistic ethic as a positive and central development of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For instance, see Clarke’s Discourse in which he argues that the attempt to make morality 
autonomous from religion ends up leading to a skepticism towards ethics and a pessimistic view of human 
nature (Russell 251).  
23 Hume was specifically charged with “sapping the foundations of morality, by denying the natural 
and essential difference betwixt right and wrong, good and evil, justice and injustice; making the 
difference only artificial, and to arise from human conventions and compacts” (LG, 18). 
24 Hume’s contemporary and early critic Thomas Reid interprets him in this way in (see chapter 5 of 
Essay 5 in Active Powers of the Human Mind). He claims that for Hume moral approbation “is not an Act 
of the Judgment, which, like all acts of judgment, must be true or false, it is only a certain Feeling, which, 
from the constitution of human nature, arises upon contemplating certain characters, or qualities of mind, 
coolly and impartially” (2:651).  
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his Newtonian project and sees it as a sufficient account of the moral life.25 Moreover he 
regards it to be not only epistemologically but also morally superior to accounts of 
religious morality, as I show in II. and IV. This suggests that Hume was actively 
attempting to replace religious morality with a secular one, especially when viewed in 
light Russell’s impressive series of arguments that point towards Hume’s irreligious 
intent as a whole.  
Although in this chapter and throughout this dissertation I endorse Russell’s 
interpretation of Hume as seeking to undermine religious morality and to offer a secular 
morality in its place, this interpretation is nevertheless not essential to the overall 
arguments I want to make regarding religion and human flourishing. Regardless of 
whether Hume pointedly attempted to dethrone Christian morality with his skeptical 
arguments and whether he meant for his secular ethic to be more robust than a mere 
descriptive account of our moral language, the following uncontroversial claims suffice 
for my purposes: 1) Hume makes religion conspicuously absent from his moral 
philosophy and unnecessary to account for morality, and 2) he clearly sees (revealed) 
religion as largely hindering rather than contributing to moral development as well as 
social concord (a point I will discuss in IV.). 
However much Russell’s irreligious interpretation has shaped my view of 
Hume’s skeptical and naturalistic aims with respect to religious and secular ethics, the 
fact that I am less convinced by his account of how it resolves the philosophical tension 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Gill argues that while many have worried that Hume’s moral philosophy actually undermines 
morality, he thinks that this is due to our attachment to old conceptions of ‘objective’ morality rather than 
accepting Hume’s “Copernican revolution,” which roots morality in human nature itself (2006, 265-69). 
See especially his important and lengthy footnotes #6 on pp. 333-35 and #9 on p. 337-39. I will argue in 
Chapters Five and Six that, like Gill, I think accepting Hume’s version of sentimentalism would not likely 
spark a dramatic change in our conduct, but, unlike Gill, I think that the more subtle differences in our 
moral reflection and behavior are significant and can have larger social and cultural ramifications over 
time.  
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between these two sides of his work leads me to be critical, in a way that Russell is not, 
of Hume’s claim that the mitigated skeptic “will never be tempted to go beyond common 
life” (ECU XII.3, 162).26 And this, too, has implications for how I understand Hume’s 
secular account of ethics, his conception of human flourishing, and his critique of 
Christian morality. It is thus to the philosophical issue that I now turn.  
As we saw, to bring coherence to Hume’s two approaches, Russell picks up on 
Hume’s remark that the true skeptic must doubt his own conclusions, and he claims that 
Hume, therefore, has intellectual (and not just practical) grounds for embracing the 
mitigated skepticism of common life and for basing a science of human nature upon it 
(2008, 221-22). It is not sufficient, however, for Hume to assert that skepticism itself 
must be doubted without offering clear philosophical grounds for such doubt, 
particularly if it is meant to lend credibility to his migration to naturalism. Thus, we 
should expect that Russell, who is attempting to defend the philosophical coherence of 
Hume’s work, should fill out what Hume could have said as a reason for doubting the 
skeptical enterprise and then assess whether it could convincingly justify his turn to 
naturalism. Since Russell does not do this, I will thus attempt to do so in his stead.   
What Hume could have said, and what he seems to suggest in the context of his 
claim about the true skeptic, is that the very strength of our commonsense beliefs to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Despite this claim, when discussing the subjects permitted from within mitigated skepticism 
Hume does say that “Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of 
souls…has a foundation in reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid 
foundation is faith and divine revelation” (EHU XII.3, 165). He had argued earlier, however, that reason 
and experience do not support belief in a benevolent, wise creator (EHU XI) or the immortality of souls 
(an implication of T 1.4.5, 152-64; see also ESY 590-8). He also argues in the Natural History, however, 
that it is not reason but other non-rational propensities of human nature such as fear of unknown causes 
that prompts religious belief (at least since the development of Western thought has made religious belief 
no longer credible). Finally, his ironic remark about faith in “Of Miracles” suggests that a foundation in 
faith is really no just foundation (EHU X.2, 129-30; I discuss this passage in II.). In other words, his nod 
to theology here is an insignificant one. 
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which we are naturally bound to return in common life counts as a significant reason for 
doubting Pyrrhonist conclusions. The view, when considering a specific skeptical 
conclusion, could go something like this: although we can doubt, for example, the 
existence of the external world, the force of my belief in its existence—indeed, the fact 
that I cannot live as though I am a mere conscious flow of perceptions that fail to 
correspond to anything—is a point in favor of the probability that my perceptions do in 
fact tell me something about the world. In other words, even if reason itself cannot tell 
us whether the external world exists, it is reasonable to trust our basic beliefs on this 
score. While skeptical arguments remove the possibility of judging it to be certainly true 
that the external world exists, it is still possible to judge that it is very probably true, and, 
in any case, more likely to be true than the skeptical alternative.  
This sort of explanation as to why it is epistemologically justifiable to embark on 
a naturalistic project implies that it is not certainty beyond any possible doubt (i.e., the 
ability to satisfy the skeptic) that is necessary for a claim to be philosophically justified. 
It implies, rather, that philosophical justification can be secured by a more modest quest 
for an account that best makes sense of our experience, one that takes into consideration 
the counter-arguments and does not admit greater certainty than the conclusion allows.27 
Now it seems to me that if Hume sees those beliefs to which nature bids us return as 
reasonable to accept (with awareness that certainty cannot be admitted), then it also 
seems to be a plausible way to resolve the skeptical and naturalistic aims of his work: 
skepticism succeeds in removing dogmatism from our commonsense beliefs, but it does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Broughton also notes that Hume may have other grounds for justification than defeating the 
skeptic. She points out that in Book I of the Treatise he seems to see causal beliefs as justified if they are 
clear and consistent, and he implicitly employs this standard of justification in his science of man (2008, 
429-30).  
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not succeed in undercutting them, since it is reasonable to suppose that there is likely 
credibility to our most persistent patterns of experience. (Indeed, Hume reasonably 
assumes that our persistent patterns of experience form the standard of credibility from 
within the standpoint of mitigated skepticism. For one example, see his argument in “Of 
Miracles,” which will be discussed in II.).28  
If Hume’s naturalism can be justified in this way, however, it is important to ask 
whether his manner of largely excluding religious questions from the philosophy of 
common life is also justified.29 The dominant way in which Hume does so is by pointing 
out that religious conclusions are more removed from and more uncertain than beliefs 
pertaining to our sense experience (ECU XII.3, 162).30 However, it would seem that this 
point is not sufficient to allow Hume to claim that the mitigated skeptic “will never be 
tempted to go beyond common life”; it only suffices to make us less epistemologically 
confident in our religious conclusions than we can be in our judgments based on our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Broughton argues, however, that the key problem Hume’s skeptical conclusions force him to face 
is not how to justify commonsense beliefs in light of skeptical counter-possibilities; rather, his skeptical 
arguments point to inconsistencies in our beliefs about causality and the existence of the external world 
such that both beliefs cannot be rationally accepted together (2008, 430-31). If Broughton is correct, then 
this would undercut the reasonability of accepting both our natural belief in causality and the external 
world (both of which Hume accepts in his naturalism). Accordingly, I do not see a route by which Hume’s 
skepticism and naturalism can be satisfactorily reconciled—unless, like Baier, we read Hume’s skeptical 
puzzles as pseudo-problems that result from treating ourselves as solipsistic, disembodied thinkers and 
instead give epistemic priority to those natural beliefs to which we inevitably return as embodied, social 
beings (1991, 138-42). (Baier’s interpretation, however, is open to the charge that it fails to give due place 
to Hume’s skepticism.) In any case, given that Hume’s naturalism, whether justified or not, does seem to 
proceed in the manner I suggested above—i.e., by assuming greater reliability of our natural beliefs 
grounded in our most persistent patterns of experience—the question that predominantly interests me is 
whether Hume can, on these grounds, consistently justify his claim that inquiry that takes us beyond 
common life is a “temptation” (EPU XII.3, 162) to be avoided. I take up this issue above. 
29 It may be countered that this just is what naturalism is and does. Naturalism, however, need not 
be construed in a way that makes it opposed to “super-naturalism.” Aristotle and Aquinas, for example, 
take a sort of naturalistic approach to questions of human nature and the world, but see this as offering 
data for considering larger metaphysical and theological questions. For some contemporary approaches to 
a more expansive naturalism, see Fiona Ellis 2014 and John Cottingham 2012.  
30 See, for example, Hume’s letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, March 10, 1751, where he writes, “I 
cou’d wish that Cleanthes’ Argument [from design] could be so analys’d, as to be render’d quite formal & 
regular. The Propensity of the Mind toward it, unless that Propensity were as strong & universal as that to 
believe in our Senses & Experience, will still, I am afraid, be esteem’d a suspicious Foundation” (LDH 
#72, 155).  
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most persistent patterns of sense experience. It still is open to argument whether or not 
religious conclusions can provide a best account of our experience, even while 
acknowledging that such conclusions are eminently doubtable.31  
Another way, however, in which Hume perhaps removes religion from his 
mitigated skepticism of common life is by suggesting that the “current of nature,” which 
returns us to the common life from which his naturalism is built, does not include the 
tendency toward religious belief. This is an interesting move on Hume’s part, not only 
because religious belief was so widespread in Hume’s lifetime, and all of human history 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 In a way I am putting forward Cleanthes’ challenge to Philo’s mitigated skepticism (which 
follows Hume’s account of mitigated skepticism in the Treatise and the second Enquiry (see Russell’s 
textual comparisons (2008, 210-13)). Cleanthes says, 
These [mitigated] sceptics, therefore, are obliged, in every question, to consider each particular 
evidence apart, and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs. This is 
their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and political science. And why not the same, I ask, 
in the theological and religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the 
general presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without any particular discussion of the 
evidence? (D 39) 
Interestingly and unfortunately, Philo does not seem to reply directly to this challenge. This is in part 
because Cleanthes goes on to maintain that the “arguments employed in all [sciences], if just, are of a 
similar nature, and contain the same force and evidence. Or if there be any difference among them, the 
advantage lies entirely on the side of theology and natural religion” (D 39-40, emphasis mine). Philo’s 
arguments thus proceed to target Cleanthes’ over-confidence in the kind of certainty we can have with 
respect to religious matters, particularly with regard to the design argument. Philo fails, however, to 
respond to Cleanthes’ previous suggestion that we can engage in serious religious inquiry so long as our 
conclusions are proportioned to the evidence (and hence, in light of Philo’s arguments, would be much 
weaker than Cleanthes supposes). This is an important point for the way that the arguments unfold in the 
Dialogues. Hume does not cast the debate in “best account” terms. That is, Philo is not arguing primarily 
that any of his skeptical alternatives to the design argument that Cleanthes endorses makes better sense of 
the totality of human experience than does an account from design. The crux of Philo’s arguments is, 
rather, that we just cannot know much at all about religious matters and that Cleanthes’ confidence is 
disproportionate to the evidence. But there is still much to be discussed as to whether some religious 
picture makes better sense of certain phenomena than do other cosmic pictures and whether our cosmic 
picture makes a significant difference (positively as well as negatively) to how we understand and engage 
in common life.  
That said, despite the fact that the mitigated skeptic seeks to remain in the confines of common life 
(as Hume understands it), Hume of course does explicitly engage in religious inquiry (EHU X, XI; D; 
NHR). Moreover he does argue, sometimes implicitly, that religious conclusions made by any religious 
tradition (Christianity being the primary religion in question) do not make the best sense of our 
experience. This serves to give further credence to his view that we should not waste much philosophical 
energy on these sorts of questions. Arguing that a religious conclusion does in fact make better sense of 
our experience would require engaging with Hume at this level, as many in contemporary philosophy of 
religion do. What concerns me here, though, is Hume’s more fundamental suggestion that religious 
inquiry primarily lies outside the scope of mitigated skepticism (and hence legitimate inquiry).    
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prior to it, nor only because cosmic questions arise for us not just as we engage in 
academic reflection but as we engage in the affairs of common life, but perhaps 
especially because Hume himself maintains that religious belief is rooted in our human 
nature. We thus need to consider how Hume would explain why the pull of human 
nature does not also return us to the religious beliefs of which we were skeptical just as it 
returns us to our other commonsense beliefs of which we were also skeptical. 
Additionally, we need to consider why Hume does not seem to think that a philosophy 
grounded in common life should take the prevalence of religion in human life as a 
suggestion that there might be a transcendent reference to which our religious impulses 
point, somewhat akin to his suggestion that the prevalence of certain patterns of 
experience render it is reasonable to believe in those conclusions founded upon them.  
There are three ways in which Hume seems to sift religion out in the process of 
returning from Pyrrhonism to common life. First, what is included in the pull of nature 
(as is relevant to his naturalism rooted in common life) is modeled on Hume’s account of 
experience as atomistic sense experience. Belief in a non-physical divine being or beings 
is necessarily severed from experience understood in this way. On Hume’s account, we 
can never have an experience of God, only a flow of sensations from which we can make 
religious inferences but which are always more explicable by psychological and 
sociological means (see NHR). Second, although Hume thinks that religious belief has 
its origins in human nature itself, he maintains that it is founded on propensities that are 
weaker than (and secondary to) the propensities to believe in sensory experience (see 
NHR XII, 172).32 Hume could thereby attempt to justify removing religion from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Yandell has a very helpful discussion of the various propensities that Hume discusses in the 
Natural History to account for religious belief. Among them are the propensities to believe in an invisible 
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common life by maintaining that a naturalism checked by mitigated skepticism can rest 
only on those most tenacious beliefs about which no one can sustain doubt, and on this 
ground religious belief is excluded. Third, Hume seems also to justify holding that 
common life is a sphere from which religion can be extracted by assuming, in way that 
he later attempts to vindicate through his naturalistic project, that the answers to cosmic 
questions are largely irrelevant to common life (and moreover that religious beliefs, in 
fact, are often destructive).  
Although there is much plausibility in all three of these moves, they are not, I 
think, sufficient to show that cosmic questions should be largely discounted from within 
the mitigated skepticism of common life. All of them—whether he has adequately 
characterized the nature of experience (and whether the religious implications of his 
account hold),33 whether he has adequately understood the way in which the religious 
impulse is rooted in human nature,34 and whether certain answers to cosmic questions 
are in fact largely irrelevant to human flourishing—leave room for serious debate. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and intelligent power, to anthropomorphize, to adulation, to fluctuate from idolatry to theism and back 
again, etc. (1990, 10-16). See also Russell’s discussion of Hume’s view that religious principles are 
secondary rather than original to human nature (2008, 291).  
33 We might think of Edmund Husserl who gives a very different account of experience by 
contending that adequate attention to the phenomena reveals that experience includes more than just 
sensation. This different conception of experience enabled some of his followers (e.g., Max Scheler, Edith 
Stein, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and others) to reflect philosophically upon religious experience in a non-
reductive manner. William James is another person who begins with a different conception of experience, 
which enables him to be more open to religious questions.   
34 Charles Taylor, for example, roots our religious nature in being ‘strong evaluators,’ i.e., beings 
who inevitably make qualitative distinctions of worth (see 1985 and 1898, 4, 14, 20). Indeed, I think that 
though we can be skeptical of our strong evaluations, the current of nature pulls us back not only to certain 
natural sense beliefs but also to strongly evaluative ones. (The notion of strong evaluation is very 
important, and I will take it up in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.) If Taylor is correct, and I think he is, then 
although Hume rightly notes that some (and indeed many, as is now historically clear) can live without 
religion, he misses the fact that we do not seem to be able to live without making strong evaluations. (See 
Yandell (1990, 23-25) and Russell (2008, 290-300) for helpful discussions on how Hume can see religion 
as rooted in human nature but nevertheless not regard religious belief to be inevitable.) Once this is 
admitted, the question arises as to which cosmic pictures are best able to support and make sense of our 
strong evaluations. I argue in Chapter Five that Hume smuggles in certain crucial strong evaluative claims 
that his secular moral philosophy cannot adequately justify.   
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Indeed the final claim will be centrally explored and in certain ways contested in this 
dissertation.35  
In sum then, Russell, who claims that the philosophical tension in Hume’s work 
is resolved by appreciating his irreligion, seems also to think that Hume is justified in 
largely excluding religious questions from the sphere of legitimate inquiry that can be 
pursued from a mitigated skepticism of common life. I, however, am not persuaded that 
Hume can justifiably leave aside cosmic questions if his naturalism is to be justified by 
suggesting that it is reasonable to give a certain degree of trust to what the current of 
nature induces us to believe. I think it is a philosophically live question whether a 
secular or religious account of the world can provide the best account of the totality of 
human experience. Although my main concern in this dissertation is to consider the 
practical question of how the notion of transcendence in religion (particularly in 
Christianity as one major religious form) pertains to flourishing, I hold open the 
possibility, despite Hume’s philosophical challenges, that robust religious belief can be 
in principle reasonable, and reasonable in a way that could underscore its practical 
importance.36  
With respect to the content of this chapter, then, I think that while Hume has 
significant skeptical arguments against some of the key tenets of Christian morality, I am 
not certain that he renders all versions of Christian morality unreasonable or that he 
closes the door to the possibility that some notion of the transcendent is important for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For different but complementary arguments that Hume illegitimately excludes (revealed) religion 
see Scott Yenor’s “Revealed Religion and the Politics of Humanity in Hume’s Philosophy of Common 
Life” (2006).  
36 Correspondingly, I want to resist the philosophical closure to cosmic questions that Hume played 
a hand in bringing about and suggest the need for greater openness and attention to them—if such 
openness is chastened by the important lessons modernity, and Hume himself, has taught us. 
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providing a better account of our specifically moral experience. Correspondingly, I am 
not persuaded that he successfully shows the sufficiency of his secular ethic for giving 
us what we want and need in an ethical theory. Finally, I am not convinced that religious 
morality has nothing very positive to contribute to the moral life. These are topics I will 
explore in Chapters Five and Six. In the remainder of this chapter, however, I want to 
look at Hume’s critiques of religious morality and his secular moral alternative. Even in 
light of my wariness toward the way in which he delegitimizes most religious belief by 
excluding it from the sphere of common life on which his constructive philosophy is 
founded, it nevertheless is a powerful perspective.  
 
II. Hume’s Epistemological Critique of Religious Morality as Pertaining to Christian 
Morality 
 
I begin with Hume’s epistemological reasons for rejecting religious and 
specifically Christian morality. In this chapter I will focus primarily on why Hume 
denies that morality is dependent upon revealed religion (see section II.a.), since 
traditional Christian morality necessarily relies upon the Bible as the authoritative 
revelatory source,37 and because Hume’s rehabilitation of pride and critique of humility 
targets revealed religion (specifically, Christianity) rather than natural. I will, however, 
explain why Hume rejects the view that natural religion is ultimately required to ground 
morality as well (see section II.b.). Hume’s objection to the alleged dependence of 
morality on natural religion will also be pertinent to Hume’s overall critique of Christian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Both Protestants and Catholics also think God reveals himself in and through the life of the 
Church. More emphasis is placed on tradition in Catholicism than in Protestantism, however, because of 
their different conceptions of the relationship between scripture and tradition. Their respective ways of 
understanding this relationship differently informs the moral traditions in both groups, but I need not 
develop such nuance in the body of the text as it does not influence the general shape of Hume’s critique. 
(Furthermore, in the eighteenth-century an appeal to revelation typically referred to the Bible, particularly 
the New Testament, and tended not to include an appeal to general revelation through the spiritual practice 
of the life of the Church (Gaskin 1993a, 318).) 
 123 
morality insofar as many Christian thinkers have sought to integrate the supposed truths 
of revelation with what can be ascertained about God through reason. (For example, this 
was common in eighteenth-century apologetics, where the reasons given for believing in 
God often consisted in appeals to arguments as well as to the self-verification that was 
thought to be contained within scripture (Gaskin 1993a, 318).) Although Hume’s 
discussions of revealed and natural religion are situated in an eighteenth-century context, 
I will show how they are applicable to the two dominant theological trajectories—
Christian humanism and hyper-Augustinianism—discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
a. Hume’s Epistemological Rejection of Morality Based in Revealed Religion 
 
I begin with some of Hume’s epistemological critiques of religion that would 
pertain to the view that morality, whether in whole or in part, is grounded in divine 
revelation (i.e., in revealed religion). One way of construing the relationship between 
revelation and morality can be seen in divine command theory, which was prevalent 
among hyper-Augustinian Protestant Reformers.38 According to divine command 
theorists, what makes something good is that God performs that activity or commands it 
of us. Divine command theory is aligned with theological voluntarism, the position that 
goodness is located in divine choice rather than divine intellect.39 On this view, God’s 
will, whatever that happens to be, is necessarily good; there is ultimately no standard of 
goodness separate from or higher than God’s will that the human mind can grasp and by 
which God’s own actions can be assessed. For the voluntarist/divine command theorist, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 David Fate Norton shows how Hume combats divine command theory in his rejection of 
Christian ethics, but he seems to treat divine command theory as the only way a Christian could conceive 
of the relationship between revelation and morality (1991, 47-58). The previous chapter should have made 
clear that this is false. 
39 William of Ockham expresses the logical upshot of voluntarism well when he says that God 
could command that he be hated instead of loved, and if he did so, then hatred of God would be a virtue 
(Schneewind 1998, 25). 
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therefore, our apprehension of the good at root depends upon our having access to divine 
revelation through which the commands and purposes of God are promulgated. In other 
words, from this perspective it is ultimately not through reason that we come to know 
what is right but through faith in revelation. (Calvin is, at bottom, a voluntarist and so 
Hume, who was raised as a Calvinist, would have been well acquainted with this version 
of Christian morality, both in theory and in its practical ramifications.40) As I will 
explain below, divine command theory tends to flourish within the hyper-Augustinian 
strand in Western Christianity, particularly in the Protestant trajectory, rather than in the 
Christian humanist strand. 
Another version of the dependence of morality on revelation can be seen in 
accounts of supernatural virtues which build upon and complete natural virtues, such as 
in Aquinas’s account of the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity (see ST II-
II.1-46). While Aquinas thinks that reason can discern the natural virtues and the natural 
law without having recourse to revelation, it is through Scripture that God reveals that he 
welcomes us to friendship with him and to participate in his love for the world (charity), 
and that faith and hope in God are virtues that facilitate such friendship. Belief that God 
has revealed himself in this way is in harmony with reason and human experience, 
Aquinas argues, but it is not derived from human reason. Nevertheless, if, as Aquinas 
thinks, our ultimate end is friendship with God, then the nature of the good life, human 
fulfillment, and virtue cannot be understood in full apart from divine revelation through 
which God extends the invitation to charity.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Calvin’s voluntarism is clear in his statements like the following: “God’s will is so much the 
highest rule of righteousness that whatever he wills, by the very fact that he wills it, must be considered 
righteous. When, therefore, one asks why God has so done, we must reply: because he has willed it. But if 
you proceed further to ask why he has so willed, you are seeking something greater and higher than God’s 
will, which cannot be found” (Institutes III.xxiii.2). 
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Notwithstanding the crucial differences between the ways that divine command 
theorists and Thomistic eudaimonists understand the relationship between revelation and 
morality, Hume would object to both accounts. Hume does not directly engage those 
who think morality is dependent upon or ultimately grounded in revealed religion as he 
does with proponents of natural religion, presumably in part because Hume did not see it 
as worth serious engagement, nor was it a view expressed by the major moral 
philosophers of his day. Nonetheless an overall critique of revealed religion as a basis 
for morality can be developed from his many criticisms of revealed religion in general, 
particularly from his famous essay “Of Miracles,” in Section X of the first Enquiry, 
which can be read as an attack on the credentials of Christian revelation.  
Although “Of Miracles” is an explicit assault on the reliability of testimony 
concerning miracles, its arguments implicitly call into question the legitimacy of divine 
revelation and, with it, appeals to revelation as the basis of morality. Hume’s arguments 
against believing in miracles entail that the wise person ought not to believe many of the 
core events of Christianity (e.g., the virgin birth, the resurrection of Christ, etc.), and, 
correspondingly, ought not to regard the scripture that testifies to them to be 
authoritative.41 Furthermore, divinely inspired texts are themselves miraculous and are, 
therefore, subject to the same criticism Hume levels at belief in all miracles.  
Hume’s general argument in X.1 proceeds as follows: 1) “A wise 
man…proportions his belief to the evidence” (EHU X.1, 110). 2) Some events occur 
regularly and consistently in our experience (e.g., objects fall when dropped), while 
others occur with less regularity (e.g., some people recover from leukemia, whereas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Hume prudently does not make these entailments explicit, but the scope of his critique of 
miracles would not have been missed by his more astute readers.  
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others do not). Events that occur with imperfect regularity admit to varying degrees of 
probability. Greater probability (i.e., more regular conformity to experience) generally 
amounts to weightier evidence. 3) We experience only a limited number of events first-
hand, and therefore our knowledge of a great deal of information depends upon the 
testimony of witnesses. 4) Our experience of the epistemologically-relevant character 
traits of a witness, as well as the extent to which the testimony conforms to the 
regularities of our experience, should inform the degree to which the wise person trusts 
the witness’s report. The utter incredibility of a report discredits an even an otherwise 
trustworthy witness. 5) A miracle is “a violation of the laws of nature” (EHU X.1, 114); 
in other words, by definition a miracle runs directly counter to the surest regularities 
afforded to us by experience. 6) Hence, the same criterion that renders an event 
miraculous simultaneously renders it not credible, since credibility can be secured only 
by how well a claim measures against the standard of uniform experience. 7) There is, 
thus, always weightier evidence that the miracle did not occur than that the witness is 
reliable. It is always more probable that the witness is mistaken, or lying, than that the 
invariable occurrences in our experience have been transgressed. 8) The testimony of a 
miracle is de facto never strong enough to command the belief of the wise person. (Note 
that Hume is not making the claim that miracles are impossible, however much he may 
have doubted this. Rather, he is claiming that we are never warranted in believing in 
miracles on the basis of testimony.42) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Since Hume is not arguing that miracles are impossible (and, indeed, since an a priori argument 
to this effect cannot be made), it seems he is not in a position to claim that a person is unjustified in 
believing a miracle that one has witnessed first-hand (though his argument may suggest that we should 
doubt the veracity of our own experience). We might think, for example, of Dialogues III where Cleanthes 
suggests that if “an articulate voice were heard in the clouds” that “convey[ed] some instruction altogether 
worthy of a benevolent Being” (D 54), we would be justified in inferring that the voice was God. As 
Cleanthes remarks, “Could you possibly hesitate a moment concerning the cause of this voice?” (D 54). In 
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Much in Hume’s argument here can and has been contested.43 Alasdair 
MacIntyre, for example, argues, I think rightly, that Hume depends upon assuming the 
absolute uniformity and regularity of nature, which he cannot justify on the basis of his 
epistemology and which a theist would not accept to begin with (MacIntyre 1994, 96-
99). John Earman maintains that Hume’s argument is epistemologically problematic 
insofar as it excludes from the outset the possibility that evidence for a miracle could be 
credible (2000, 3-4). Despite these and other criticisms, however, Hume’s case against 
belief in miracles has not only enduring plausibility, but it is also far-reaching. As he 
argues, “a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of 
religion” (EHU X.2, 127). Hume’s arguments amount to saying that it is never 
reasonable to believe in divine revelation (for God’s self-revelation to humans would be 
miraculous by Hume’s account) and in the specific miracles to which such revelation 
attests. At the very least they imply that it is always more reasonable to doubt revelation 
than to trust it.   
Hume’s attitude towards belief in miracles and, hence, that God reveals himself 
through scripture, is nicely captured in his ironic remark near the end of X.2: 
I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered, as I think it 
may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the 
Christian Religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human 
reason. Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Of Miracles,” however, Hume takes for granted that his readers have not experienced a miracle first-
hand. With this assumption in place, I interpret Hume to be arguing that even if a miracle did in fact occur, 
the wise person is never justified in believing it on the basis of testimony. In other words, if a voice did 
actually speak from the clouds and was heard by another person, we would not be justified in believing 
that person’s testimony to that miracle because from our epistemic vantage point it is nevertheless more 
likely that the person is mistaken than that such an event occurred.       
43 For commentary on “Of Miracles” see MacIntyre 1994, Earman 2000, Fogelin 2003, Flew 1961 
(chapter 8), and Gaskin 1988 (chapter 8). For a contemporary of Hume who engaged specifically with “Of 
Miracles,” see George Campbell’s A Dissertation on Miracles and Hume’s response to Campbell’s 
dissertation in his 1761 letter to Hugh Blair (LDH 1, 348-51). 
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method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to 
endure. (EHU X.2, 129-30) 
 
Notice that in contrast to certain Christian thinkers such as Aquinas who saw faith as 
completing reason, Hume here portrays faith as antithetical to reason, i.e., as irrational 
and necessarily fideistic, as belief which obtains without evidence or even in spite of 
strong counter-evidence.44 As such, his claim that Christianity is founded on faith is in 
no way an endorsement of faith; rather, it is a cynical insult that is meant to show its 
foolish intellectual bankruptcy. 
This view of faith bears more similarities to the hyper-Augustinian strand in the 
Christian West than to the Christian humanist strand. Recall that for the hyper-
Augustinian, human nature (including our rational capacities) is understood to be 
profoundly corrupted by the Fall. From this conception comes greater mistrust of reason 
and an emphasis on faith as the only sure pathway to moral and spiritual truth. It is 
unsurprising, then, that hyper-Augustinians were often divine command theorists, for 
there is an affinity between advocating faith over and against reason and the view that 
morality is known not through reason but through faith in divine revelation by which 
divine commands are expressed. (Calvinism, which is hyper-Augustinian and 
voluntaristic, likely informs Hume’s portrayal of faith in relation to reason here.45) 
Hume’s attack on belief in miracles and the irrational basis for faith that it implies thus 
would clearly extend to include a critique of the attempt to root morality in divine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 This would have been an affront to the view expressed by John Locke, Samuel Clarke, and many 
others around the beginning of the eighteenth century that it was reasonable to believe in the special 
revelation of the Bible, particularly the New Testament, primarily because certain miracles had 
authenticated New Testament doctrine (Gaskin 1993b, xi-xii).   
45 To be precise, however, Calvin was not quite as pessimistic about the effects of human fallenness 
on reason as was Luther. While Calvin thought that fallen human reason is completely unable to perceive 
spiritual truth, it is still able to recognize truth in social and political matters. Followers of Calvin, 
however, were more skeptical than Calvin himself about the operations of fallen human reason even in 
these areas (see Herdt 1997, 238 n14).  
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commands. Such a theory necessarily depends upon the kind of faith (in this case, faith 
in the miracle of divinely-inspired texts) that Hume regards as unreasonable and 
ultimately groundless.  
Hume’s moral philosophy poses a further challenge to divine command theory. 
Hume argues that our morality is made intelligible by reference to human experience; 
virtuous character traits are those advancing human happiness and utility (EPM 268, 
289, see also T 3.3.1.30, 377). By contrast, appealing to an ultimately arbitrary divine 
command does little to explain why specific qualities and actions are good. Not only, 
then, does Hume’s account have crucial explanatory power that divine theory lacks, but 
it provides a way to assess purported divine commands themselves. On Hume’s account 
those commands of God that are in fact good (e.g., do not murder, do not steal, etc.) can 
be known to be so by the way they further natural human flourishing. Those commands 
that cannot be rendered intelligible by experience, however, amount to little more than 
superstition and are not genuine moral obligations.   
Hume’s critique of miracles also applies to the specifically Christian elements of 
the Thomistic way of conceiving of Christian morality, despite the different construal of 
the relationship between faith and reason that is operative in the Christian humanist 
tradition that underlies this conception. While “Of Miracles” carries no implicit 
objection to the natural law component of Aquinas’s moral philosophy, its subtle critique 
of belief in the authority of scripture strikes at the very basis for Aquinas’s account of 
the theological virtues, which are regarded as the crowning virtues of the Christian life. 
If Hume is right that the wise person is unjustified in accepting the authority of scripture, 
it seems that she or he would thereby be unjustified in believing that scripture serves as 
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an epistemologically legitimate ground for accepting the so-called theological virtues as 
genuine virtues.  
A Christian humanist might reply, however, that the central message of love that 
unfolds in Scripture importantly illuminates human experience,46 and hence that it is at 
least reasonable to believe that Scripture was divinely inspired and has a bearing on the 
moral life. Aquinas generally takes an approach of this sort. He contends that through 
reason we can ascertain those natural moral laws that promote human flourishing by 
reflecting upon our experience of our natural inclinations towards such flourishing. 
Through faith we can come to believe that God is a person who has revealed himself to 
us and has invited us to participate in friendship with him (cf. the virtue of charity) and, 
by extension, in his love for the world. This sort of love requires transformation of our 
natural aversions to certain others and enables compassion for social outcasts and 
enemies. For Aquinas, however, faith that charity is, in fact, central to the moral life is 
not opposed to reason. It instead builds upon what reason discerns about natural human 
flourishing, but it raises us to a higher level of awareness of the depths of transformation 
we need to undergo to flourish most fully. Thus, Aquinas thinks that ‘revealed religion’ 
significantly informs the moral life, for if God exists and has truly revealed himself in 
this way, this would clearly influence how genuine human flourishing is conceived and 
what virtues are constitutive of such flourishing. For Aquinas, then, faith/trust in divine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Hume, however, would presumably take issue with this point. Perhaps he would argue that the 
demanding nature of Christian love is not compatible with the experience of the seemingly ineradicable 
“elements of the wolf and serpent” in our breasts (see EPM IX, 271); in other words, that it is an idealistic 
moral vision, deeply incongruent with aspects of human nature, rather than a realistic, attainable vision, 
appropriate to the kind of being that we actually are. The question of whether and to what extent the wolf 
and serpent can and should be transformed is a deeper dispute between Christian morality and Hume’s 
moral philosophy, which will be raised again (albeit indirectly) in Chapter Five and Six.  
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revelation is not in conflict with reason and experience; rather, faith itself, and by 
extension Christian morality, is seen as reasonable. 
While Aquinas’ understanding of the relationship between revelation and 
morality is more promising than the divine command approach, it is nevertheless not 
only Hume’s arguments in “Of Miracles” that would challenge the epistemic legitimacy 
of those specifically Christian elements (i.e., those elements that essentially depend upon 
revelation) in Aquinas’ account of morality. Throughout Hume’s corpus, he denies that 
there is a strong philosophical basis for belief in a deity resembling the Christian God 
(and thus for regarding faith in revelation as reasonable). The Treatise and the first 
Enquiry call into question whether a fully honest belief in God is even possible since no 
impression corresponds to the idea of God (let alone a personal God who in some way 
encounters human beings), and they argue against traditional Christian concepts such as 
the ‘soul’ and ‘final cause.’ In the Natural History of Religion Hume argues that theistic 
belief arose out of fear rather than reason. The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 
is a particularly devastating battery of arguments against traditional arguments for the 
existence and perfections of God. When Hume’s writings are taken in total, he does 
indeed seem to deny that there is adequate rational evidence for believing in a deity 
resembling the Christian God revealed in scripture, thereby questioning the 
reasonableness of Christian faith as a whole. While there is much to be debated 
regarding Hume’s arguments against Christian belief, my aim in this chapter is merely to 
present Hume’s critiques that would be applicable to Christian morality, not to evaluate 
the success of his critiques. It suffices to point out that Hume regards belief in divine 
revelation to be far from epistemologically justified, and this entails also that any 
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specifically Christian morality, i.e., a morality based in whole or in part on revelation, 
lacks sufficient epistemic credentials.  
 
b. Hume’s Critique of Morality Grounded in Natural Religion 
 
It is clear that Hume would find religious and specifically Christian morality 
understood either in terms of divine command or as including elements that go beyond 
morality ascertained by rational reflection upon common human experience (such as the 
theological virtues in Aquinas) to be epistemologically illegitimate. But so too does he 
object to those elements of moral philosophy defended by some Christians as being 
intelligible to all by virtue of our common human nature and ability to reason about the 
good, such as Aquinas’ account of natural law. While Aquinas’s account of natural law 
does not depend upon a specifically Christian notion of God, it nonetheless requires that 
the cosmos is teleologically ordered and is purposeful as such precisely because of the 
orientation of all being to God.47 Thus, the question can be raised: Does morality in 
some sense depend upon God, even if only a minimally-conceived God of philosophy 
and not necessarily the God of Christian revelation? A related question that could be 
raised: is there nothing morally at stake with respect to whether or not God exists, and 
whether or not the universe is ultimately purposeful or purposeless? Further, if there is 
good reason to think some sort of deity may exist and that this is morally significant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Whether there is any ultimate cosmic purpose and what is ethically at stake in this question is, I 
think, a crucial question for moral philosophy—though in many ways it has been treated as a peripheral 
issue in ethical debates over at least the last hundred years. Some nineteenth-century thinkers who were 
particularly sensitive to this question were, of course, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and, later, William James. 
Charles Taylor and Bernard Williams are two contemporary figures who have also seen deeply into why 
and how our answers to larger cosmic questions matter morally. 
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and/or better able to make sense of our moral experience, might this not serve as a partial 
ground for a reasonable faith?48 
These are particularly pertinent questions for Hume who was in conversation 
with key figures of the modern natural law tradition, such as Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, 
Carmichael, and especially Francis Hutcheson (see Forbes 1975, 3-90).49 Although in 
contrast to the classical natural law account given by Aquinas, for whom the natural law 
is very explicitly grounded in the eternal law of God and points to the perfection of 
human nature, modern natural law theorists sought to develop an account of morality 
from studying human nature as we find it without reference to our final end.50 
Furthermore, while the modern natural law theorists did not appeal directly to any 
specific conception of God in their moral philosophy, with the possible exception of 
Hobbes they themselves held, and their accounts of morality tacitly depend upon, 
particular understandings of God (even if only a minimalist deistic conception) (Forbes 
1975, 41). A central way in which God factors into conceptions of modern natural law is 
by ensuring some providential design or order, which (like Aquinas) was thought to be 
ultimately needed in order to make sense of morality.  
Against this view Hume argues that we cannot establish that there is a 
providential design, and, furthermore, he contends that such design is unnecessary for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See John Cottingham’s Why Believe? (2009) for interesting and insightful explorations of these 
kinds of questions.  
49 Hutcheson is not always recognized as a natural law theorist. Hutcheson’s most well-known 
works, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections and An Inquiry into the 
Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, employ the new experimental method in ethics to which Hume 
refers in the Treatise and do not look like treatises of natural law. However, Hutcheson’s other works, 
especially A System of Moral Philosophy, show him to be a student of Carmichael, who held that the 
natural law could be deduced from the nature and existence of God as known through natural religion. As 
we will see, and as Jennifer Herdt has shown, Hutcheson ultimately thinks that divine Providence is 
needed to explain our ‘moral sense,’ i.e., why we disinterestedly approve of virtues and actions that do not 
promote our private advantage (see Herdt 1997, 27-29, 50-60). See also Gill (2006, chap. 14). 
50 For a discussion of crucial shifts in the development of natural law as well as of Hume’s 
relationship to modern natural law theorists, see Chapter One of Herdt 1997.  
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grounding morality. One work in which Hume seeks to undermine the arguments of 
philosophers or theologians who maintain that a providential order is foundational for 
morality is Section XI of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, entitled “Of a 
particular Providence and of a future State.”51 Mossner points out that Hume’s attack on 
design in Section XI would have been an “even more hazardous enterprise” than his 
assault on the miraculous foundations of Christianity in Section X (1978, 657). The 
argument against belief in miracles would not have been that controversial to 
philosophers, many of whom tended to be Deists rather than theists. Moreover, Hume’s 
orthodox Christian readers may not have found problematic Hume’s claim that belief in 
miracles depends upon faith (however irrational faith is there portrayed). The argument 
for design, however, was “the then most widely accepted argument for the being of a 
God” (Mossner 1978, 657), and thus, opposing it would have been perceived as a 
significant challenge both to Christian theists and Deists alike. 
“Of a particular Providence and of a future State” is presented in the form of a 
dialogue between the narrator, who represents “the Athenian people” and the narrator’s 
friend, who assumes the role of “Epicurus.” In the dialogue, “Epicurus,” who is 
generally thought to represent Hume’s own position, defends himself against the charge 
that he “seems to loosen, in great measure, the ties of morality, and may be supposed, for 
that reason, pernicious to the peace of civil society” (EHU 133-34) by denying divine 
providence and an afterlife.52 “Epicurus” therefore aims to show that the answer to the 
questions regarding whether such a providence or future state exists is “entirely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Interestingly, Hume originally entitled Section XI, “Of the Practical Consequences of Natural 
Religion” (see Mossner 1978, 656). 
52 Epicurus is largely thought to represent Hume’s views, since Epicurus’ position is consistent with 
Hume’s avowed positions in EPM, T 3, and NHR.   
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indifferent to the peace of society and security of government” and hence that “when…I 
deny a providence and a future state, I undermine not the foundations of society, but 
advance principles, which they themselves, upon their own topics, if they are argue 
consistently, must allow to be solid and satisfactory” (EHU 135).  
“Epicurus,” therefore, must challenge the implicit arguments upon which the 
charge against him rests, namely, the argument from design and its claimed significance 
for morality. The line of reasoning against which he must defend himself generally runs 
as follows: we can infer that the natural order of the universe must have been caused by 
an intelligent and benevolent Creator, and we can also infer that from the attributes of 
the Creator as benevolent and wise that virtue will be rewarded and work out for good, 
while vice will be punished and end in ruin, either in this life or the next. Hume’s main 
line of attack, as I will soon explain in greater detail, is to have “Epicurus” argue that it 
is not rationally justifiable to infer a cause (i.e., an intelligent, benevolent Creator) from 
an effect (the order of the world) and then to make inferences from that cause to new 
effects (i.e., reward for virtue and punishment for vice).  
Francis Hutcheson, a thinker with whom Hume corresponded as he was writing 
his initial statement of his moral philosophy in the Treatise, appeals to a version of the 
design argument in his account of morality (see Herdt 1997, 50-60; see also Gill 185-
87). Hume, thus, would likely have had Hutcheson in mind when composing Section XI 
of the first Enquiry, and his argument there can be more fully appreciated by noticing its 
departures from Hutcheson’s moral philosophy. Hutcheson attempts to base morality 
upon the ‘moral sense’ we find in human nature. This moral sense, he thinks, enables us 
to disinterestedly approve of benevolent characters and actions. Hutcheson argues that, 
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“this very moral sense, implanted in rational agents, to delight in, and admire whatever 
actions flow from the study of the good of others, is one of the strongest evidences of 
goodness in the author of nature” (quoted in Herdt 1997, 56). Here Hutcheson states the 
relationship between effect and cause in such a way as to infer the latter from the former. 
He elsewhere suggests not only that a benevolent Creator is needed in order to ground 
and to explain why we have a moral sense, hence arguing from effect to cause, but also 
that we can make inferences from that cause to new effects. He says,  
It remains…that as the Author of Nature has determined us to receive, by our 
external senses, pleasant and disagreeable ideas of objects according as they are 
useful or hurtful to our bodies, and to receive from uniform objects the pleasures 
of beauty and harmony, to excite us to the pursuit of knowledge and to reward us 
for it, or to be an argument to us of his goodness, as the uniformity itself proves 
his existence, whether we had a sense of beauty in uniformity or not; in the same 
manner he has given us a moral sense to direct our actions, and to give us still 
nobler pleasures. So that while we are only intending the good of others, we 
undesignedly promote our own greatest private good. (Hutcheson 2003, 510)  
 
In sum, then, for Hutcheson, the design he regards as inherent in human nature (the 
effect), especially in our moral sense, points to a benevolent Creator (the cause) who 
providentially endowed us with such sense. From God’s benevolent nature he 
furthermore infers that we promote our own good in and through the disinterested 
promotion of the good of others (the new effect). The key point then in the relationship 
between design and morality for Hutcheson is that it is God’s providential design that 
makes intelligible why we have a moral sense that allows us to make disinterested moral 
judgments and why the disinterested promotion of others’ good contributes to our own 
good.53  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Bernard Mandeville (drawing on Pierre Nicole) and Adam Smith, other eighteenth-century 
thinkers, stand this account on its head. They begin with self-love rather than disinterested benevolence 
and argue that pursuing our individual self-interest in commercial activity will redound to the public 
benefit. In Wealth of Nations, IV.ii.9 and in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, IV.i.10 Smith speaks of an 
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 Hume, however, has two major objections to this kind of argument. First, he 
finds these inferences from effect to cause and then from cause to new effect to be 
unjustified. As “Epicurus” says,  
If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any 
qualities beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect: Nor can we, 
by any rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects 
from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us. … The cause must be 
proportioned to the effect; and if we exactly and precisely proportion it, we shall 
never find in it any qualities, that point farther, or afford an inference concerning 
any other design or performance. Such qualities must be somewhat beyond what 
is merely requisite for producing the effect, which we examine. (EHU 136-37) 
 
In other words, even if it were possible to establish the existence of an intelligent Creator 
(a possibility which Hume calls into question most forcefully in the Dialogues), it is not 
legitimate to attribute any more goodness and wisdom in this deity than we observe in 
the world (EHU 138-39, 144-45).  
Second, Hume thinks that if we adequately attend to our experience of the world, 
we must acknowledge that the cosmos does not have the kind of order that is often 
attributed to it in design arguments. Consistency requires that we take into account the 
“evil and disorder, with which the world so much abounds” as well as the goodness and 
order (EHU 138-39). A strict inference, then, from what we actually observe about the 
world would seem to lead to the conclusion that God is at least somewhat morally 
indifferent. While many theologians attempt to explain the compatibility between God’s 
benevolence and evil in the world by arguing that evil originates in human free will, the 
force of Hume’s argument is to point out that a benevolent conception of God is not in 
fact entirely derived from experience, and hence design arguments do not really start 
from an adequate description of the “effect” they are seeking to explain. Rather, they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“invisible hand” guiding our self-interested commercial activity towards public benefit. In The Fable of 
the Bees Mandeville argues that private vice (e.g., greed) results in public benefit. 
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smuggle in some previously formed idea of God that, in turn, tacitly informs which 
features of experience are highlighted and which are neglected.54 The cause that is 
purportedly proved (a benevolent wise God), then, is the very conception of God that 
shaped the inadequate way of construing the effect from the start (i.e., attending only to 
the order and goodness that is in the world).55 We depart from experience once again 
when we infer “new effects” from this pre-formed conception of God, namely that a 
benevolent God will reward virtue and punish vice. Hume therefore regards these 
inferences to and from divine providence to be “mere conjecture and hypothesis” (EHU 
145), insofar as they fly beyond the bounds of human experience.  
While Hume has not proven that the universe is not providentially ordered, he 
has shown that providential design cannot be known with any certainty and, furthermore, 
that there are strong reasons to doubt that the world is governed by a perfectly 
benevolent and wise Creator. It is still possible, however, for a theist (or Deist) to give 
an alternate account of the evil and disorder in the cosmos and to attempt to argue that 
divine providence still makes the best sense of the totality of our experience. 
Furthermore, it is open for one to contend that it does make a difference for how we 
understand the nature, content, and motivational sources for morality if the cosmos is or 
is not understood to be providentially ordered—even if it is granted that such an order 
cannot be philosophically proven. Therefore, Hume’s most important objection to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See, for instance where “Epicurus” says, “Let your gods, therefore, O philosophers, be suited to 
the present appearances of nature: and presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in 
order to suit them to the attributes, which you so fondly ascribe to your deities” (EHU 138).  
55 See, for example, where “Epicurus” says, “These attributes, then, are, it seems, beforehand, taken 
for granted in their greatest latitude. And upon that supposition, I own, that such conjectures may, perhaps, 
be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill phenomena. But still I ask; Why take these attributes for 
granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? Why torture your 
brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely 
imaginary, and which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature?” (EHU 139). 
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claim that natural religion (and, hence, God) is significant for morality is not that the 
notion of providential design is beyond philosophical proof; rather, it is that divine 
providence is wholly irrelevant to the grounding of morality and practically 
inconsequential for motivating virtue. For example, “Epicurus” says,  
I deny a providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, who guides the 
course of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment, and 
rewards the virtuous with honour and success, in all their undertakings. But 
surely, I deny not the course of events, which lies open to every one’s inquiry 
and examination. I acknowledge, that, in the present order of things, virtue is 
attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable 
reception from the world… You tell me, indeed, that this disposition of things 
proceeds from intelligence and design. But whatever it proceeds from, the 
disposition itself, on which depends our happiness or misery, and consequently 
our conduct and deportment in life is still the same. It is still open for me, as well 
as for you, to regulate my behavior, by my experience of past events. (EHU 140) 
 
In other words, our experience that virtue meets with the approval of others and is 
attended with internal satisfaction, and that vice meets with the opposite, is sufficient to 
explain and to motivate morality, “Epicurus” thinks. He concludes: 
All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the religion, which is nothing 
but a species of philosophy, will never be able to carry us beyond the usual 
course of experience, or give us measures of conduct and behaviour different 
from those which are furnished by reflections on common life. No new fact can 
ever be inferred from the religious hypothesis; no event foreseen or foretold; no 
reward or punishment expected or dreaded, beyond what is already known by 
practice and observation. (EHU 146)  
   
It is to a more detailed account of just how Hume attempts to develop a moral theory 
solely by “reflections on common life,” independent of providing any answers to larger 
cosmic questions that I now turn. As I will later show, Hume’s attempt to account for 
morality without depending upon answers to cosmic questions has certain advantages, 
particularly for facilitating moral discourse in a religiously pluralistic world by focusing 
our attention on the shared goods of human life and by correcting certain harmful 
 140 
tendencies to which religious moralities can tend. However, whether Hume is right that 
the possibility of a providentially-ordered cosmos makes no practically significant 
difference to morality will be a topic explored in Chapter Five and Six. Thus far it is 
clear that Hume would think that both the divine command and natural law conceptions 
of Christian morality are epistemologically without justification and that a solid 
epistemological basis for morality is to be sought not in the religious domain but within 
the limits of human experience itself. 
 
III. Hume’s Secular Morality of Common Life 
 
Against the backdrop of Hume’s skeptical arguments that are relevant to and so 
threaten to undermine religiously grounded morality, in Book III of the Treatise and in 
the second Enquiry, Hume develops his positive, naturalistic account of morality based 
solely on “reflections on common life” without depending upon metaphysical 
hypotheses and speculations that go beyond what he regards as the confines of human 
understanding and the bounds of human experience. In contrast to traditional moral 
theories, which typically begin from a particular metaphysical understanding of the 
human being and her place in the cosmos, Hume provides an empirically descriptive 
account of the kinds of character traits that we find “amiable or odious, praiseworthy or 
blameable” in the everyday affairs of ordinary life (EPM 172-74). In so doing, Hume 
attempts to shed light on why we share a common language of moral praise and blame 
and to explain how our moral practices have come to be what they are.  
Upon observing what we do in fact praise and blame, Hume concludes that a 
person experiences a “pleasing sentiment of approbation” when viewing qualities of 
character that are “useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others” (EPM 268, 
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289, see also T 3.3.1.30, 377). Such qualities we regard as virtues, and those which are 
disagreeable or run counter to utility we regard as vices (EPM 268, 289).56 For example, 
Hume argues that we regard benevolence and justice as virtues because they are useful to 
others, while we regard discretion, industry, and strength of mind as virtues primarily 
because they are useful to ourselves; we consider wit, eloquence, cleanliness, decency, 
and good manners to be virtues because they are agreeable to others, while we judge 
cheerfulness, serenity, magnanimity, and ‘a relish for pleasure, if accompanied by 
temperance and decency’ as virtues because they are agreeable to the person him or her 
self (see EPM, Sections II-III, VI-VIII for Hume’s account of these and other virtues, see 
also T 3.3.2-5). Thus, Hume’s moral philosophy is built around the observation that 
because happiness and well-being is a central concern for us, we naturally approve of 
that which promotes human flourishing.  
Hume, however, is careful to note that we do not regard the feeling of approval 
as such to be sufficient for moral evaluation; rather, he says, moral sentiments are of a 
“particular” or “peculiar” kind.57 For instance, we commonly distinguish between moral 
approval and approval of those things which merely gratify our narrow self-interest. One 
of the features of moral approval, Hume thinks, is that the feeling of approbation 
constitutive of moral judgment is a calm, impartial passion, rather than a violent or 
prejudiced one. What is needed in order to make distinctively moral evaluations, Hume 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 As Hume says, “An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because its 
view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind. In giving a reason, therefore, for the pleasure or 
uneasiness, we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a 
satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of character” (T 3.1.2.3, 303). Again, Hume 
“defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of 
approbation; and vice the contrary” (EPM 289). 
57 “We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after 
such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous” (T. 3.1.2.3, 303). In other words, not all 
feelings are constitutive of moral evaluation; moral evaluation requires unique sentiments, which Hume 
goes on to describe.  
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therefore argues, is to view character impartially, from what in the Treatise he calls the 
“general view or survey.”58 Hume remarks,  
‘Tis only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our  
particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it 
good or evil. ‘Tis true, those sentiments, from interest and morals, are apt to be 
confounded, and naturally run into one another. It seldom happens that we do not 
think an enemy vicious, and can distinguish betwixt his opposition to our interest 
and real villainy or baseness. But this hinders not, but that sentiments are, in 
themselves distinct; a man of temper and judgment may preserve himself from 
these illusions. (T 3.1.2.4, 303-304)59  
 
So, in Hume’s descriptive analysis, we do distinguish between moral evaluation and 
self-interested feeling, and the impartial perspective of the general view is Hume’s way 
of accounting for this difference. 
Hume trusts that when we overlook self-interest and take up this general point of 
view, our moral sentiments of praise and blame will be more or less universal.60 Hume’s 
confidence that there will be widespread agreement in our moral responses is built, in 
part, upon his argument that we observe there to be a consistent manner in which the 
passions arise among human beings; i.e., the same sorts of things that give one person 
pleasure or pain, will give others pleasure or pain as well. (I will discuss this further in 
Chapter Four.) It is also built upon his contention that moral evaluation is rooted in the 
natural sentiment of “humanity” or “sympathy,”61 which he thinks experience shows to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The language of the “general view” drops out in the second Enquiry, but impartiality (i.e., the 
same phenomenon to which the general view refers) is still required for moral evaluation in the latter 
work.   
59 Baier points out that Hume should not be understood to mean that our moral judgments issued 
from the general view necessarily express our actual occurrent sentiments; rather that they express what 
we judge we would feel if we make the appropriate corrections to our sentiments (1995, 179).   
60  I will discuss Hume’s attempt to account for rare exceptions to what he regards as our otherwise 
natural moral responses in the following chapter. 
61 In the Treatise Hume uses the term “sympathy” to explain the source of moral evaluation (see T 
3.3.6, 393-395), while in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals he tends to speak of the 
“sentiment of humanity” (i.e., “fellow-feeling”) (see EPM 219-220, fn. 1; 272-273). Although the 
significance of the shift in terminology is somewhat debated, for my purposes in this chapter I will take 
these terms as more or less synonymous. Hume suggests that sympathy and humanity are largely 
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exist in all human beings,62 and which is made possible only because we take a general 
pleasure or pain in the same sorts of things. Sympathy becomes crucial to Hume’s 
account of morality, because, according to Hume, it is sympathy that allows us to take 
up the general point of view, from which we are able to make moral judgments in the 
first place (see T 3.3.1.6-10, 368-69).  
Sympathy enables us to enter into the general view because it allows us to 
acquire multiple vantage points from which to survey actions and character traits. In this 
way we become aware of the pleasures, pains, hopes, and desires of others as well as our 
own. We also gain new perspective with which to view ourselves as we experience 
others respond to our characteristics and behaviors. Through building up sympathetic 
experiences over time, we learn that there is a steady core of traits and actions that we 
approve of in others and that others approve of in us and, by extension, that are morally 
laudable in general. In this way our capacity for sympathy therefore makes it possible for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
interchangeable, for example, in the footnote on p. 298 in EPM, Appendix II where he speaks of “general 
benevolence, or humanity, or sympathy” (there is, of course, more similarity between humanity and 
sympathy than between these and benevolence, since humanity and sympathy denote our capacity to feel 
the happiness and pain of others as though it were our own, which then provides a basis for our 
benevolence or “well-wishing” to them). Although Hume there seems to use sympathy and humanity as 
generally synonymous, there are differences between his use of ‘humanity’ in the second Enquiry and his 
initial account of sympathy given in Book II of the Treatise. In Hume’s Book II description of sympathy, 
our sympathetic tendencies are limited and biased towards one’s family and friends; sympathy, as he there 
describes it, helps to account for group bias and social faction more readily than it can account for 
impartial understanding. Hence, in Book III of the Treatise where Hume speaks of sympathy as the basis 
for the “general view,” he shifts to a more extensive, corrected conception of sympathy. The sentiment of 
humanity connotes this wider, more extensive sympathy, and perhaps was used in the second Enquiry to 
avoid confusion. (See Herdt 1997, 60-81 for an excellent discussion of the development of sympathy in 
Hume’s ethics, including a discussion of his preference for the language of humanity over sympathy in the 
second Enquiry.) In this chapter I will be assuming an extensive, corrected sympathy in my discussion of 
Hume’s ethics, but in later chapters I will consider the relationship between limited and extensive 
sympathy and whether Hume ultimately has the resources for motivating the kind of sympathy that is 
necessary for taking up the general view.  
62 “We are certain, that sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature. We find, that it has 
force sufficient to give us the strongest sentiments of approbation, when it operates alone, without the 
concurrences of any other principles… If we compare all these circumstances we shall not doubt, that 
sympathy is the chief sources of moral distinctions” (T 3.3.6.1, 393-94).   
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us to distinguish between private, self-interested preference and the disinterested moral 
evaluation that is taken from the general view.63  
Hume’s contention that sympathy is foundational to ethics is what enables him to 
develop a wholly secular moral philosophy—but one that does not, in comparison to 
secular moral philosophies of Hobbes and Mandeville, regard morality to be wholly built 
on human artifice—and this becomes clear when comparing his account of natural 
sympathy or humanity with Hutcheson’s account of the “moral sense.”64 These accounts 
are strikingly similar in that both sympathy and moral sense are human faculties through 
which we are concerned with the happiness of others and therefore both provide a basis 
for moral evaluation.65 However, while Hutcheson seeks to explain why we have this 
curious faculty called a moral sense by appealing to a providential design, Hume thinks 
sympathy is a natural enough phenomenon that we can avoid raising questions about its 
ultimate origins. In an important footnote in the second Enquiry he says,  
It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a 
fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a 
principle in human nature. We must stop somewhere in our examination of 
causes; and there are, in every science, some general principles, beyond which 
we cannot hope to find any principle more general. (EPM 219-20, fn. 1) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Baier stresses that the general view is not a “view from nowhere” (to use Nagel’s phrase) but 
rather is a common human viewpoint. As she says, “it aims not at detachment from human concerns but at 
impartiality, and interpersonal agreement” (1995, 182). Similarly Herdt argues that the general view is not 
equally distant from the real perspectives of actual persons. Hume suggests, she argues, that the spectator 
must take up the point of view of the person being evaluated and of those who are most affected by this 
person’s character or action. This implies that for Hume there is not a single ‘moral point of view’; rather, 
any moral judgment must take into account and negotiate between various perspectives. Hume, in fact, 
will speak in the plural of ‘some steady and general points of view’ (T 3.3.1.15, 372), views which are 
arrived at only through sympathetically understanding the various perspectives of other individuals (see 
Herdt 1997, 71-72). See also Russell (2008, 253) and Gill (2006, 252-54) for a particularized 
interpretation of the general view. 
64 Hume, in fact, uses the language of “moral sense” (T 3.1.2, 302-6) in the Treatise and appeals to 
sympathy in order to explain it.  
65 For important differences and for a synopsis of Hume’s interaction with Hutcheson, see Herdt 
(1997, 50-60) and Gill (2006, 216-25). 
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Hume, in other words, thinks that no deeper ontology is needed to ground what might be 
called his “phenomenology” of our practices of moral praise or blame. In Hume’s view, 
and in accord with his mitigated skepticism of common life, nothing is more 
epistemologically secure than common human experience; hence, appealing to dubitable 
ontology in order to explain further what is clearly evident in experience is unnecessary. 
As was said above, Hume’s approach to moral philosophy has the practical advantage of 
emphasizing what is common among all people and leaving out precisely what can lead 
to the most intractable sorts of disagreements—namely, disputes about our ultimate 
origins.66 (In the final chapters, I will explore what sorts of disadvantages emerge when 
attempting to isolate morality from answers to larger cosmic questions.)  
 
IV. Hume’s Moral Critique of Christian Morality 
 
While Hume regards much religious belief to be epistemologically unwarranted 
as well as unnecessary for grounding morality, his perhaps more important objections to 
religious morality (and Christian morality particularly concerns us here) are themselves 
practical and moral critiques. Indeed, it seems that his concern about the harm caused by 
morality informed by revealed religion stands principally behind his irreligious aims, 
which Russell and Herdt have argued are fundamental to his entire philosophical project. 
Specifically, Hume argues that religious morality undermines human well-being insofar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Certainly accounts of religious morality in the Christian humanist vein can also facilitate moral 
discourse across difference insofar is there is much shared domain of natural human flourishing that is 
seen to be identifiable by human beings as such, regardless of their religious or otherwise metaphysical 
commitments. Nevertheless, Hume worries that the religious “extras” of even those accounts of religious 
morality that end up being generous to those of different views can intrude upon and so impede moral 
discourse and attention to the shared natural goods of human life. A potential problem with Hume’s 
concern to promote shared moral discourse by offering a secular account of morality and rendering 
religious issues peripheral, however, is that it does not encourage people to bring their real and significant 
differences to the table. Some of the negative consequences on our public discourse of privatizing our 
deeper beliefs about religion have been well observed by Michael Sandel (see especially his Democracy’s 
Discontent, though this theme runs throughout his work) and Robert Bellah in his Habits of the Heart.  
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as it promotes faction, motivates intolerance, and distorts the very content of morality 
itself. These, I think, are his most interesting criticisms. They suggest that the religious 
impulse in human beings, although arising from human nature, should be checked, 
chastised, or deflected, if possible.67 We can contrast this view, for example, with 
Augustine who sees the longing for God to be an ineradicable and noble part of our 
nature and who thinks that the fulfillment of this impulse simultaneously satisfies the 
deepest aspect of ourselves and is inseparable from moral transformation and 
contributing to true social peace (cf. City of God). In this section I explore why Hume 
takes the polar opposite view and sees “popular” or revealed religion, and its alleged 
relationship to morality, as inhibiting psychological health, moral growth, and peace in 
society.    
 
a. The Dubious Origins of Christian Belief 
 
Part of what Hume sees as harmful in Christian morality lies in what he takes to 
be the original cause of religious belief. As has been shown above, Hume does not think 
that belief in divine revelation (nor even belief in the conclusions of natural religion) is 
based in adequate reflection upon experience. If people have little experiential and 
rational basis for belief in divine revelation—and hence for those elements of Christian 
morality that depend upon revelation—by Hume’s account why do adherents of 
“revealed religion” such as Christians believe and act as they do?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Siebert collects several passages in which Hume refers to religion as a disease, poison, etc. (1990, 
95).  
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Hume’s answer to this question is spelled out most fully in The Natural History 
of Religion, in which he gives a naturalistic account of the origin of religious belief.68 As 
the title of the work suggests, Hume does not consider the explicit reasons that agents 
hold for adopting a religious outlook; instead, in a proto-Nietzschean manner, he gives 
psychological and historical explanations for the reasons why religious belief and ritual 
arose in the first place. The feature of human nature that gives rise to religious belief, 
Hume thinks, is fear—namely, fear of those “unknown causes” that have the power to 
facilitate or to thwart human happiness.  
Polytheism, Hume thinks, arose quite naturally among primitive societies for 
whom the “true springs and causes” of events were unknown. Although these peoples 
had no direct experience (i.e., impressions) of the deities in which they believed, Hume 
indicates that it is reasonable that people would have sought to make sense of the 
capricious unfolding of events such as natural disasters, disease, famine, and the like by 
supposing that they are caused by various powerful beings who are in conflict with one 
another—however false these suppositions are. It is moreover understandable, Hume 
thinks, that if the intentions and actions of divine agents lie behind various occurrences 
in the world, humans would seek to court the favor of those deities in various ways (see 
NHR I-V).  
As intellectual history advanced, however, we became aware that certain sorts of 
events occur as part of the regular course of nature, and therefore polytheism no longer 
remained epistemologically viable. Polytheism thus gave rise to theism as the operations 
of events in the world came to be understood as the governance of a single power. Hume 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 In this section I draw heavily from Herdt’s interpretation of the Natural History (1997, Chapter 
Five).  
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does not think theism emerged merely as an attempt to make sense of the ultimate origin 
of cosmos, however—at least not among the “vulgar” (NHR VI, 153).69 Rather, it arises 
perhaps more fundamentally out of the human need for security, our tendency to regard 
ourselves as allied with the most powerful deity and to view our particular superstitious 
rituals as that which will most please him, and our susceptibility to be imaginatively 
carried away by emotional intensity. For example, Hume points out that among 
polytheistic nations, there is a propensity to regard the god of one’s nation as more 
powerful than the rest, and he then shows how this propensity leads to theism. 
Whether this god, therefore, be considered as their peculiar patron, or as the 
general sovereign of heaven, his votaries will endeavour, by every art, to 
insinuate themselves into his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like 
themselves, with praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration, which 
will be spared in their addresses to him. In proportion as men’s fears or distresses 
become more urgent, they still invent new strains of adulation; and even he who 
outdoes his predecessor in swelling up the titles of his divinity, is sure to be 
outdone by his successor in newer and more pompous epithets of praise. Thus 
they proceed until they arrive at infinity itself, beyond which there is no farther 
progress. … When they confine themselves to the notion of a perfect being, the 
creator of the world, they coincide, by chance, with the principles of reason and 
true philosophy; though they are guided to that notion, not by reason, of which 
they are in a great measure incapable, but by the adulation and fears of the most 
vulgar superstition. (NHR VI, 155) 
 
In other words, as Jennifer Herdt points out, for Hume “Theism, therefore, quite 
unlike philosophical Deism, is the end result of a practice of flattery spurred on by fear 
and anxiety” (1997, 174). What his account suggests is that while fear provided the 
stimulus for the kind of reflection that led primitive peoples to polytheistic conclusions, 
polytheism itself was a reasonable attempt to make sense of unknown causes prior to the 
development of philosophy and science (see NHR XI, 165). Hume’s account of theism, 
by contrast, suggests that in the context of our expanding knowledge of natural causes, at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Hume distinguishes between the “vulgar” and the “enlightened.” See Mossner’s discussion 
(1978, 659-661). 
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least the “vulgar” have no good reasons for arriving at theistic beliefs. As Hume says, 
“religionists, in all ages, have involved themselves in the greatest absurdities and 
contradictions” (NHR 156).70 Herdt points out that with respect to theism, then, Hume 
seems to believe that fear has become the cause of the belief itself (1997, 174).71  
Given this underlying cause of religious belief, Hume is therefore concerned that 
significantly harmful psychological and social consequences stem from it. This is 
especially the case in light of what Hume sees as the tendency of religious belief to 
depart from reason and the natural operation of our emotions as is found in common 
human experience. Indeed, Hume finds that religious belief de facto cannot enjoy the 
same strength of conviction as can our beliefs regarding the repeated impressions 
received in ordinary life, nor can it tolerate the same interrogation we take to be 
meritorious in establishing the truth of events in ordinary life. Religious belief has to be 
artificially produced and then maintained precisely by avoiding the demands of reason 
that we acknowledge to be important in everyday affairs. On this point, Hume says,   
The conviction of the religionists, in all ages, is more affected than real, and 
scarcely ever approaches, in any degree to that solid belief and persuasion, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 As Herdt observes, some of these “absurdities and contradictions” that Hume points out have to 
do with the contradictions in the traditionally ascribed attributes of God (1997, 174-76). She names a few: 
1) Religious believers sometimes regard God as wholly transcendent but explain his actions 
anthropomorphically. 2) They conceive of God as infinite but also as simple and so “run into inexplicable 
mystery, and destroy the intelligent nature of their deity, on which alone any rational worship or adoration 
can be founded” (NHR 155). 3) Demea denies that human sentiments can be attributed to a transcendent 
God (D 58), but then it is difficult to make sense of divine intentional action. 4) Cleanthes points out that 
divine simplicity conflicts with divine intelligence and action (D 61). The evil and disorder in the world 
puts strain on either the omnipotence or the benevolence of God (NHR 177). 5) It is difficult to understand 
why an infinite and transcendent God would be pleased by any number of absurd practices, such as 
circumcision (NHR VII, 157-58). (Hume certainly raises a number of significant challenges for theists and 
identifies contradictions in “vulgar” notions of God that need to be corrected. In my view, however, 
reasonable accounts can be given in support of theism, atheism, or agnosticism, and, moreover, all of these 
perspectives must confront difficult questions so as to avoid “absurdities and contradictions.” Though I 
cannot engage Hume’s critiques of religious belief here and notwithstanding his genuine insights, I think 
he is at times too polemical and hasty in the Natural History with respect to his assessment of theism.)    
71 Hume says, for example, “The primary religion of mankind arises chiefly from an anxious fear of 
future events…” (NHR XIII, 176). 
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governs us in the common affairs of life. Men dare not avow, even to their own 
hearts, the doubts which they entertain on such subjects: They make a merit of 
implicit faith; and disguise to themselves their real infidelity, by the strongest 
asseverations and most positive bigotry. (NHR XII, 172) 
 
Herdt argues that for Hume the inability genuinely to assent to religious beliefs is related 
to the fact that we do not have a direct impression of God (an important conclusion of 
the Treatise and the first Enquiry) as well as to what Hume saw as the contradictions 
within religious belief itself (discussed, e.g., in the Dialogues, The Natural History of 
Religion, and implied in the “monkish virtues” passage of the second Enquiry). In order 
to keep these inconsistencies from asserting themselves too strongly, religious beliefs 
murkily reside in those “shadowy regions” of the mind, shrouded in mysterious 
vagueness. The sense of mystery that emerges precisely from this vague muddle of 
exalted ideas produces the pleasurable feeling of awe and wonder, which, by strength of 
passion confers the feeling of conviction notwithstanding the lack of epistemic grounds 
for such confidence. And as we see from Hume’s quote above, the failure to examine 
these hidden contradictions is then praised as “faith,” whereas doubt, i.e., the reasonable 
state of uncertainty that arises when inconsistencies are detected, is regarded as a 
prideful attempt to challenge God’s inscrutable wisdom (Herdt 1997, 176).72  
 Religious belief not only contains masked contradictions, but Hume thinks that it 
cannot be consistently lived out. He continues, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 We saw in Chapter One that The Whole Duty of Man affirms renouncing reason in this way when 
it says,  
But I told you, humility contained in it not only a submission to his will, but also to his wisdom; 
that is, to acknowledge him infinitely wise, and therefore that whatever he doth is best and fittest to 
be done. And this we are to confess both in his commands, and in his disposing and ordering of 
things. First, whatsoever he commands us either to believe or do, we are to submit to his wisdom in 
both, to believe whatsoever he bids us believe, how impossible soever it seems to our shallow 
understandings, and to do whatever he commands us to do, how contrary soever it be to our fleshly 
reason or humour, and in both to conclude, that his commands are most fit and reasonable, however 
they appear to us. (II.1.9, 40-41) 
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But nature is too hard for all their endeavours, and suffers not the obscure, 
glimmering light, afforded in those shadowy regions, to equal the strong 
impressions, made by common sense and by experience. The usual course of 
men’s conduct belies their words, and shows, that their assent in these matters is 
some unaccountable operation of the mind between disbelief and conviction, but 
approaching much nearer to the former than to the latter. (NHR XII, 172) 
 
Thus, religious belief is a form not only of irrationality but of self-deception, concealing 
inconsistencies both within religious belief itself and between avowed religious belief 
and actual belief (see Herdt 1997, 176). 
 
b. The Dangers of Religious Morality 
 
As mentioned above, Hume thought that the irrational, fear-driven beliefs of the 
“religionists” had damaging psychological and social consequences. The vague and 
contradictory nature of religious belief coupled with the way it arises out of and seeks to 
calm human insecurity makes it particularly prone to the kind of zeal that incites factions 
and persecutions, disrupting social peace and hindering political advance. The antidote, 
Hume thinks, is to practice mitigated skepticism and remain within what he regards as 
the bounds of human experience, which of course is the entire direction of his 
epistemology.73  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 One example of where Hume’s practical concerns with respect to religion can be seen to motivate 
his epistemological argumentation is in “Of Miracles” X.1 where he says “Nothing is so convenient as a 
decisive argument of this kind, which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and 
free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like 
nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious 
delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures” (EHU X.1, 110).  
 I do not mean to suggest, however, that Hume sought or thought it was possible to eradicate 
“vulgar religion” from the world. Such a view would be inconsistent with his general anti-utopianism, 
which issues from his clear-sighted awareness of our human propensities (T 3.2.5.9, 334-35; EPM III, 
193-95). And although Hume thinks that our propensities to religious belief, being secondary not original, 
can be transcended, I do not think Hume would expect most people to be capable of doing so (see Yandell 
1990, 11-16; Russell 2008, 291). Nevertheless, Hume does seem to hope that improving the human 
condition by focusing our energies on areas in which we can genuinely advance in knowledge (i.e., by 
attending to the science of man and the subjects of common life (T 1.4.7.14, 147)), by promoting a secular 
ethic of humanity that is oriented toward this-worldly happiness, and by improving our material 
circumstances through engaging in commercial society, we can mitigate some of the fears and 
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How, then, do Hume’s epistemological critiques pertain specifically to His moral 
critiques of religious and specifically Christian morality, i.e., to those elements of 
Christian conceptions of how we ought to live that depend upon revelation and tradition 
yet go beyond what Hume thinks can be ascertained by common experience? Otherwise 
stated, although Hume thinks that popular religion such as Christianity arose out of and, 
especially by the “vulgar,” is maintained by superstition and enthusiasm,74 why are these 
not for the most part harmless when it comes to the moral life?75 Hume gives at least 
three reasons: 1) they preclude moral agreement across difference, 2) they divert 
attention from morality both by superstitious practices and by promoting a lack of 
concern for this-worldly happiness, and 3) they distort the content of morality. I will 
consider each in turn. 
First, as mentioned above, the specific ways in which Christianity (or revealed 
religion in general) goes beyond the proper limits of reason renders it especially difficult 
to resolve conflicts that arise in the moral life between different Christian sects or 
between Christians and others of different views. This is partly an epistemological issue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
vulnerabilities that prompt those more pernicious forms of religious belief (see Russell 2008, 290-300; 
Yenor 2006, 405-412). Hume, moreover, seems to think it possible that by emphasizing those shared 
goods of common life and by showing the insufficiency of reasoning beyond it, religion can become 
increasingly peripheral to political and social life (see Herdt 1997, 15), at least insofar as his message 
influences the more educated class of society and in turn slowly shapes European culture more widely 
(Russell 2008, 296).    
74 See Hume’s essay “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm” (ESY 73-79).  
75 I am not sure what Hume would have said about the thoughtful Christians he respected, such as 
Bishop Butler. As mentioned in footnote #8, Hume did think that religion (albeit his secular notion of the 
function of religion in the commonwealth) could have beneficial social consequences, though it is not 
clear whether Hume was being conciliatory in those remarks and, if not, whether he thought the benefits of 
religion could adequately offset its harms. In any case, his analysis of the negative effects of religion 
seems to focus on the “vulgar” majority rather than the educated few (though he still does critique the 
moral lives of certain Christian intellectuals such as Pascal, and this will be discussed in the following 
chapter). It is reasonable to suppose that Hume’s concern regarding the negative effects of religion rises in 
proportion to the epistemological carelessness of the believers—as well as to the extent to which he thinks 
their natural passions have been corrupted (this latter point will also be discussed in the subsequent 
chapter).   
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insofar as the disputes often arise with respect to disagreements that go beyond common 
experience, and therefore cannot be settled (see ESY 59). More significantly, however, 
when the need for security is ultimately driving our religious convictions, we are 
particularly prone to being combative, defensive, uncompromising, and unsympathetic. 
Hume remarks that 
For as each sect is positive that its own faith and worship are entirely acceptable 
to the deity, and as no one can conceive, that the same being should be pleased 
with different and opposite rites and principles; the several sects fall naturally 
into animosity, and mutually discharge on each other that sacred zeal and 
rancour, the most furious and implacable of all human passions. (NHR IX, 161) 
 
Hume’s The History of England catalogues a range of intolerance, violence, and 
persecution that Christians have used religion to justify (see Herdt 1997, 188-206; 
Siebert 1990, 62-135). Hume also discusses the harmful effects of religious belief on 
society in Section XVI (entitled “Bad Influence of Popular Religions on Morality”) of 
The Natural History of Religion. There he observes that 
the greatest crimes have been found, in many instances, compatible with a  
superstitious piety and devotion: Hence, it is justly regarded as unsafe to draw 
any certain inference in favour of a man's morals, from the fervor or strictness of 
his religious exercises, even though he himself believe them sincere. …Those 
who undertake the most criminal and most dangerous enterprises are commonly 
the most superstitious; as an ancient historian remarks on this occasion. Their 
devotion and spiritual faith rise with their fears. (NHR XVI, 182)   
 
Second, Hume thinks that religious superstition has the tendency to derail 
people’s attention from morality. It does so in at least two ways: 1) by making 
superstitious ritual the main focus of the moral life rather than cultivating what Hume 
regards to be true virtue and 2) by putting forward an other-worldly vision of life (as 
seen in the doctrine of a “future state”) that serves to dull our natural moral responses 
and to weaken our concern with improving this life. I will consider each in turn.  
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Regarding the propensity of religion to shift one’s attention away from what is 
morally important and to place too much emphasis on needless ritual, Hume says, 
It is certain, that, in every religion…many of the votaries, perhaps the greatest  
number, will still seek the divine favour, not by virtue and good morals, which 
alone can be acceptable to a perfect being, but either by frivolous observances, 
by intemperate zeal, by rapturous extasies, or by the belief of mysterious and 
absurd opinions. (NHR XIV, 179) 
 
He continues, 
 
…if we should suppose…that a popular religion were found, in which it was  
expressly declared, that nothing but morality could gain the divine favour; if an 
order of priests were instituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily sermons, and 
with all the arts of persuasion; yet so inveterate are the people’s prejudices, that, 
for want of some other superstition, they would make the very attendance on 
these sermons the essentials of religion, rather than place them in virtue and good 
morals. (NHR XIV, 180)  
 
Hume suggests, then, that religiosity tends to distract us from those virtues that are most 
worthy of cultivating, regardless of whether or not genuine virtue is promoted within the 
religious rituals themselves. It is not difficult to imagine, moreover, that when a religious 
code is emphasized as necessary to right living, sympathy with and benevolence to those 
who do not follow that code can be neglected.   
Hume also maintains that attention from morality was also often diverted by 
Christianity’s doctrine of a “future state” (i.e., an afterlife in which God rewards 
goodness and punishes evil). Hume’s critique here is particularly important because in 
his day many adherents of revealed and natural religion alike thought that belief in a 
future state was salutary to society for its role in motivating virtue, especially when our 
sympathetic awareness of others is stifled by our more selfish tendencies.76 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 The threat that our selfish tendencies pose to sympathy is a particular problem Hume has to deal 
with, since he grounds his account of morality in natural sympathy but acknowledges that our sympathy is 
limited and is often weaker than self-interest. I will be exploring this issue later in the dissertation. 
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The claim that human beings need the prospect of eternal reward or punishment 
in order to practice virtue and to avoid vice was a prominent idea in the Calvinist culture 
of England and Scotland during Hume’s lifetime. The Whole Duty of Man expresses this 
idea in its opening lines, where it states that its goal is to teach its readers how to 
“behave in this world” in order “that they may be happy forever in the next” (Preface, 
Section I). The prospect of a “future state” was also thought to have motivational impact 
among prominent philosophers as well. For example, in An Essay concerning Human 
Understanding, II, xxi John Locke states, “The rewards and punishments of another life, 
which the Almighty has established as the enforcements of his law, are of weight enough 
to determine the choice against whatever pleasure or pain this life can show, when the 
eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility.”77 In Characteristicks 2:60, 
Shaftesbury, despite his disapproval of what he saw as the implicit egoism of such a 
motive, confesses that “the Principle of Fear or future Punishment, and Hope of future 
Reward, how mercenary or servile soever it may be accounted, is yet, in many 
Circumstances, a great Advantage, Security, and Support to Virtue.”  
A version of the this view is also seen in Part XII of the Dialogues where 
Cleanthes (the representative of natural religion) argues that corrupt religion is better 
than no religion, since, as he says,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See also The Reasonableness of Christianity where Locke says, “Before our Saviour’s time the 
doctrine of a future state, though it were not wholly hid, yet it was not clearly known in the world. …How 
hath this one truth changed the nature of things in the world, and given advantage to piety over all that 
could tempt or deter men from it? The philosophers, indeed, showed the beauty of virtue; …but leaving 
her unendowed, very few were willing to espouse her. …But now there being put into the scales, on her 
side, an exceeding and immortal weight of glory, interest is come about to her, and virtue now is visible to 
most enriching purchase and by much the best bargain. …The view of heaven and hell will cast a slight 
upon the short pleasures and pains of the present state, and give attractions and encouragements to virtue 
which reason and interest and the care of ourselves cannot allow and prefer. Upon this foundation, and 
upon this only, morality stands firm and may defy all competition” (Locke 2003, 197). 
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The doctrine of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that 
we never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and temporary rewards and 
punishments have so great an effect, as we daily find: How much greater must be 
expected from such as are infinite and eternal? (D XII, 121)78 
  
Hume’s response to this claim can likely be seen in the rejoinder that Philo (who is 
regarded by the majority of scholars as most representative of Hume’s own views) gives 
to Cleanthes.   
Philo’s tactic is to question whether establishing morality on this “religious 
motive” in fact has the beneficial effect that is claimed for it. Philo says, for instance,    
How happens it then…if vulgar superstition be so salutary to society, that all 
history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious consequences on public 
affairs? Factions, civil wars, persecutions, subversions of government, 
oppression, slavery; these are the dismal consequences which always attend its 
prevalency over the minds of men. If the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any 
historical narration, we are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries 
which attend it. (D XII, 122) 
 
In other words, Philo thinks that the hope of future reward seems not to be effectual in 
motivating virtue, but instead religious belief motivates the kinds of conflicts that are so 
detrimental to flourishing. 
 It is unclear to what extent Philo’s bitingly polemical view here accurately 
represents Hume’s own perspective. Certainly it seems that religious belief (including 
hope of future reward) motivates both virtue and vice, and one wonders whether Hume 
would have been more ready to acknowledge this than Philo. Nevertheless, Philo’s 
position is consistent with what Hume does say in his own voice about the effects of 
revealed religion (also referred to as “false” or “vulgar” religion) in, for example, The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Hume also places a version of this view in the mouth of the narrator at the end of Section XI of 
the first Enquiry. There the narrator responds to “Epicurus” by contending that those who deny a future 
state “free men from one restraint upon their passions, and make the infringement of the laws of society, in 
one respect, more easy and secure” (EHU 147). Hume, however, does not have “Epicurus” respond to this 
point.  
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Natural History of Religion, The History of England, and certain letters. Moreover, the 
positive remarks about the effects of revealed religion within Hume’s corpus are quite 
sparse, and even then it is still debatable whether Hume is in earnest or is attempting to 
appease religious readers. Thus, it does seem that Philo is largely speaking for Hume on 
this point.       
 While Hume thought that the pernicious effects of religious belief were caused 
primarily by revealed religion, not natural religion (also referred to as true, philosophical 
religion),79 Philo is, nonetheless, still skeptical of Cleanthes’ assertion that the proper 
office of even true, natural religion is to “regulate the heart of men, humanize their 
conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience,” with an aim to the 
happiness of society (D XII, 122). “It is certain, from experience,” Philo says,  
…that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on 
men’s conduct, than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories 
and systems. A man’s natural inclination works incessantly upon him; it is for 
ever present to the mind; and mingles itself with every view and consideration: 
Whereas religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and 
bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether habitual to the 
mind. (D XII, 123)  
 
Given Hume’s own moral philosophy, his psychology as presented in Book II of the 
Treatise, and his discussion of moral motivation in IX of the second Enquiry (the latter 
two of which will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters), there is little doubt that 
Hume agrees with Philo here as well. For Hume, our more immediate natural 
inclinations to virtue that arise out of natural sympathy and our desire to be able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 This is so, first, because adherents of natural religion are centrally concerned with being 
epistemologically responsible in their belief-formation and are, therefore, less susceptible to superstition 
and enthusiastic zeal and to the conflicts and intolerance that arise from it. Second, they tend to regard the 
deity as largely aloof from the affairs of human life. Thus, they do not seek to court God’s favor through 
performing rituals but instead emphasize a reasonable, non-superstitious morality. 
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approve of our character are what actually provide the source of moral motivation. The 
“religious motive” is ultimately unnecessary.80  
Furthermore, Philo argues that, “we must treat of religion, as it has commonly 
been found in the world” (D XII, 125), and we see here that Philo not only thinks the 
“religious motive” is ineffectual for promoting virtue but in fact is itself a motive that 
can lead us to vice insofar as it can foster an other-worldly orientation that in turn 
neglects genuine human flourishing in this life, the only life we know. (Again, Philo’s 
view is consistent with Hume’s moral philosophy and can safely be assumed to express 
something of Hume’s own perspective.81) As Philo says,  
…the very diverting of the attention, the raising up a new and frivolous species 
of merit, the preposterous distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must 
have the most pernicious consequences, and weaken extremely men’s attachment 
to the natural motives of justice and humanity. (D XII, 124) 
 
I will discuss Philo’s claim about the “frivolous species of merit” shortly. For now, 
however, it is worth dwelling on Philo’s point that focusing on the “next life” loosens 
our natural orientation to morality (i.e., to promoting this-worldly flourishing) by 
lessening the force that our natural moral sentiments have for us. He maintains, 
The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation, 
is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, contracted 
selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it easily eludes all the 
general precepts of charity and benevolence. (D XII, 124-125) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Furthermore, from the standpoint of Hume’s moral philosophy, it seems he would affirm along 
with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson that acting morally for the sake of eternal reward, in fact, 
instrumentalizes the virtues and in essence makes one a religious egoist. Such a motive would hardly 
warrant a “pleasing sentiment of approbation” in a disinterested viewer. See Norton’s discussion of this 
issue (1986, 50-52). In contrast to Norton’s assessment (and to Hume’s treatment of religious motivation 
in his work), I have indicated in Chapter One and will show more fully in Chapter Six that the focus on 
eternal reward and punishment as the primary way in which God can factor into moral motivation for 
religious people seriously misconstrues what is often motivationally significant for sincere religious 
believers.      
81 See Seibert’s (1990) in-depth analysis of Hume’s affirmation of “this-worldliness” in Chapter 
Three, entitled “The Things of This World.”   
 159 
We can imagine that Philo has in mind the way in which focus on the next life can make 
this life seem insignificant and thereby lead to a dulled sensitivity towards human 
suffering. He might also be suggesting that there is a self-centered orientation implicit in 
a person’s concern over whether or not she will receive eternal reward or punishment. 
(Moreover, the Calvinist doctrine of double predestination, which maintains that the 
unsaved were predestined to damnation before the creation of the world, requires a 
blunted sympathy from its adherents (such as the Scottish Calvinists of Hume’s day) 
insofar as they are supposed to love and worship as just a God they believe to have pre-
ordained many to suffer eternal torment.)  
While there is plausibility to Philo’s point, it is quite a broad claim, and its truth 
depends upon many factors, such as whether eternal life is conceived as wholly an 
external reward or a fulfillment of the joy in goodness already begun in this life, as 
exclusive or inclusive, as individual or communal. Calvinism tends to answer 
affirmatively to the former part of each pair. It is therefore no surprise that Hume would 
be inclined to envision the relationship between the future state and morality to be the 
version he imbibed growing upon in Calvinist Scotland. In Chapter Six, however, I will 
argue that Hume’s failure to appreciate what I take to be better versions of the way that 
religion can factor into moral motivation in turn masks a danger in his own secular 
account. Nevertheless, it is clear that Christianity can divert attention from human 
flourishing here and now, as Marx and Nietzsche have shown particularly well, and 
Philo’s assessment of the dangers of the “religious motive” is, I think, very important. I 
will be exploring the significance of Philo’s (and Hume’s) critique in greater detail in 
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Chapter Three when I discuss Hume’s critique of Christian humility and draw out the 
broader objections to Christian morality that it implies.  
 A third way in which Hume thinks that religion is morally harmful is how it can 
distort the very content of morality itself. As Philo says, it promotes a “frivolous species 
of merit” whereby inconsequential and even harmful acts are regarded as good and 
sometimes even morally required or certain morally unproblematic and even good acts 
are prohibited.82 This point harkens to Hume’s famous critique of the “monkish virtues” 
in the second Enquiry. There he maintains that a host of Christian practices such as 
celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, and solitude are 
merely sham virtues. About them he asks, “are they everywhere rejected by men of 
sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man’s fortune 
in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for 
the entertainment of company; nor increase his power of self-enjoyment?” (EPM 270). 
Not only does Hume regard these practices to be frivolous, but he thinks that their very 
self-depriving, gloomy focus “sours the temper” and “hardens the heart” (EPM 270), 
thus making them positively harmful. They are neither useful nor agreeable to oneself or 
to others, and they, in fact, dampen our sentiment of humanity, from which moral 
distinctions arise in the first place. Therefore, Hume says that we are right to “transfer 
them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices” (EPM 270).  
As should be clear, there is a tight connection between Hume’s view that aspects 
of Christian morality are other-worldly and his claim that Christianity warps our 
conception of morality by making needless practices and vicious behavior seem 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Gaskin regards the prohibition against suicide and contraceptives to be examples of how a 
contemporary religious perspective (namely, Catholicism) distorts the content of morality by inventing 
crimes (in addition to praising self-deprecating behavior) (1979, 335).   
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virtuous. These critiques deserve more analysis than I can provide in this chapter, but 
they will receive full treatment in the next chapter insofar as they pertain specifically to 
pride and humility. There I will discuss the ramifications of his reversal and redefinition 
of the Christian categories of pride and humility insofar as he claims that humility is a 
“monkish virtue” and that pride is a chief virtue for the moral life.  
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CHAPTER THREE: HUME’S REHABILITATION OF PRIDE AS A VIRTUE AND 
HIS CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIAN HUMILITY 
 
 
“A certain degree of generous pride or self-value is so requisite, that the absence of it in 
the mind displeases, after the same manner as the want of a nose, eye, or any of the most 
material features of the face or members of the body” (EPM 253) 
 
“Where the deity is represented as infinitely superior to mankind, this belief…is apt, 
when joined with superstitious terrors, to sink the human mind into the lowest 
submission and abasement, and to represent the monkish virtues of mortification, 
penance, humility, and passive suffering, as the only qualities which are acceptable to 
him.” (NHR X, 163) 
 
“We never excuse the absolute want of spirit and dignity of character, or a proper sense 
of what is due to one’s self, in society and the common intercourse of life” (EPM 253). 
 
 
In the first chapter I showed how pride and humility are conceived within the two 
dominant theological traditions in Western Christianity. In the second chapter I 
presented Hume’s critiques of Christian morality and explained how he attempts to 
replace it with his secular conception of morality rooted in social praise and blame. In 
this chapter I will explore Hume’s reversal and redefinition of the traditional Christian 
concepts of pride and humility as part of his project to supplant the Christian moral 
vision with a secular one.1  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hume is of course not the first to redefine Christian accounts of pride. Hobbes, for example, 
precedes Hume in transferring it from its primary designation as rebellion against God to a purely social 
conception. In contrast to Hume, however, Hobbes sees pride as primarily a vicious, vainglorious attempt 
to dominate others or to have one’s superiority recognized by others (see Leviathan I.8.18-19). In this way 
pride for Hobbes is, as Christopher Brooke puts it, “[not] an offense against God…[but] against the 
equality of our fellow human beings” (2012, xv; see Leviathan I.15.21). And since Hobbes saw pride as 
one of the two passions (along with fear) that rules human nature, it is a key source of conflict and strife in 
social life. Hume, like Hobbes, defines pride socially, accepts that there are vicious forms of pride, and 
sees pride as accounting for much rivalry and faction in human community (a topic that I will explore in 
the next chapter). Unlike Hobbes, however, he distinguishes vicious pride from virtuous pride and argues 
for the latter’s importance.  
Mandeville also defines pride primarily in secular terms. Like Hobbes, Mandeville sees pride as a 
vice that inevitably motivates much of human action. Mandeville, however, stresses and more fully 
explores the positive potential of pride for social life, drawing from Pierre Nicole to show how our 
concern for honor and approval for others motivates us to act in accord with moral convention (see Brooke 
2012, 155-59). (Hobbes does acknowledge that pride can be motivationally beneficial to the polis (see 
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To this end, I will first show how Hume conceives of pride as a character trait 
and why he sees it as an especially significant virtue. I will then explain how he 
understands humility and why he regards it as a “monkish virtue”—that is, as a useless 
and even harmful character trait that falsely bears the appearance of virtue only when 
one’s moral outlook is malformed by religious superstition. Finally, I will briefly assess 
the adequacy of Hume’s critique of Christian humility in light of the way humility is 
actually understood by Christian thinkers. Specifically, I will argue that Hume’s portrait 
of Christian humility does rightly call attention to ways in which Christian humility can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Leviathan I.14.31; II.28.27), but he places more emphasis on the motivational benefits of fear). Hume, like 
Mandeville, gives great attention to the ways in which pride inevitably makes us concerned with the 
perspective of others and therefore becomes a significant component of moral motivation. He nevertheless 
differs from Mandeville by emphasizing pride’s genuine moral value, rather than seeing it as a vice that 
nevertheless redounds to social benefit.  
Thus, while Hume’s account of pride draws upon the secular accounts of pride found in Hobbes and 
Mandeville, he goes beyond these accounts, articulating and defending the importance of good forms of 
pride. Although Hobbes and Mandeville provide resources for secular reformulations of pride, their dark 
view of human nature led them to suspect that apparent virtue is a veneer that hides its sordid motivational 
roots in (vicious) pride or other self-interested passions. (In this way Hobbes and Mandeville bear 
similarities to the hyper-Augustinians who saw nature as wholly corrupt and un-graced natural “virtue” to 
mask our deeper selfishness and pride.) The positive aspects of Hume’s account of pride are informed, 
rather, by certain Christian or Deist thinkers who held a more positive view of human nature and heartily 
affirm the possibility of genuine virtue—e.g., Cudworth, Whichcote, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler. 
These thinkers stress the moral importance of self-respect and positive self-survey (Gill 2006, 14-15), 
concepts that become central to Hume’s articulation of virtuous pride. Hume thus relies upon various 
traditions to develop his distinctively secular rehabilitation of virtuous pride. 
 It is also worth noting that Spinoza—that fellow philosopher who deeply challenged religious 
orthodoxy—may have also influenced Hume’s account of pride. Although there is no evidence that Hume 
read Spinoza directly, Annette Baier has points to abundant circumstantial evidence suggesting that he did 
(Baier 1993, 238; see also Russell 2008, 72). (See also Russell 2008, 37-39, 46 for evidence that Spinoza’s 
ideas were discussed in Scottish intellectual circles in the first half of the eighteenth century). Baier 
moreover argues that, not withstanding important differences, Hume’s work bears important similarities to 
Spinoza’s (1993). Furthermore, Paul Russell has argued that Hume seems to look favorably upon key 
aspects of Spinoza as he responds negatively to Samuel Clarke’s criticisms of Spinoza (for Clarke’s 
concern to combat Spinoza see 2008, 21, 29-30, 52-53, 227, 229, also 41; for Hume’s implicit arguments 
against Clarke and his alliance with Spinoza, see 33, 41, 46, 53-54, 72-73, 163, 289; see also p. 71 where 
Russell argues that Hume’s epigram on the title page of the Treatise is a clear affirmation of the central 
theme in Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise). More specifically, Lilli Ananen (2006; see also 2012, 
254n18) and Wim Klever (1993) note significant parallels between Spinoza’s and Hume’s account of the 
passions. In any case, coincidentally or not, Spinoza distinguishes between extreme pride (superbia) and 
proper pride (acquiescentia in se ipso), he sees proper pride as involving accurate self-knowledge whereas 
extreme pride overestimates its merits, he regards proper pride to be empowering while extreme pride and 
self-abasement (abjectio) denote weakness, and he understands humility to be a vice (Ananen 2012, 243-
45, 248). As will be soon clear, Hume’s account roughly agrees with these points.  
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go wrong, especially as it is conceived within the hyper-Augustinian tradition. 
Nevertheless, I will show that beneath the different ways of defining pride and humility, 
both Hume and many thinkers in the Christian tradition (particularly in the Christian 
humanist strand of Western Christianity) affirm the importance of developing a secure, 
stable selfhood that involves having a sense of one’s genuine worth as well as 
appropriate awareness of one’s weaknesses. Once this common ground is acknowledged, 
we can see that what is centrally at stake between these rival versions of pride and 
humility pertains to their differing stances of whether a transcendent moral source is 
important for or irrelevant (or even harmful) to developing the sort of security of self 
that is, as will be argued, fundamental to human flourishing. Additionally, their different 
accounts of pride and humility also are bound up with their rival positions on whether 
the notion of God is significant for or largely detrimental to moral formation and, by 
extension, for cultivating a healthy or divisive social body. These topics will be taken up 
in the remaining chapters.  
 
I. Pride and Humility as Passions 
 
Hume first discusses pride and humility at the beginning of his descriptive 
analysis of the passions found in Book II of the Treatise. The fact that Hume begins his 
examination of the passions with pride and humility, discusses them extensively, and 
highlights their influence on a range of other passions (e.g., love and hatred, envy, and 
so on), attests to how central Hume thinks they are for an adequate account of human 
psychology. While this chapter will primarily focus on the character traits rather than 
the passions of pride and humility, Hume’s account of the former depends upon his 
account of the latter. Accordingly, before discussing pride as a virtue and humility as a 
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vice, in this section I will briefly explain how Hume conceives of pride and humility as 
particular emotions.2  
Hume describes the passion of pride as a pleasurable impression of oneself,3 and 
it arises when—to use Hume’s terminology—the ‘quality’ of the ‘subject’ of pride (such 
as character traits, bodily features, external possessions) produces pleasure, and by an 
association of ideas and impressions, that subject and pleasure are related to oneself (T 
2.1.6.1, 190).4 For example, the pleasure that the pianist takes in her stunning 
performance produces a sense of pleasure in herself for her accomplishment. Hume 
thinks that pride always involves this double relation between oneself and the 
pleasurable subject of the pride. I may take delight in the beauty of a waterfall, but that 
joy does not transfer to pride because the waterfall is unconnected to me. However, “any 
thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, 
which is also agreeable, and has self for its object” (T 2.1.5.8, 189). If a person takes 
pleasure in kindness or wealth and if she is kind or wealthy, then she will likewise be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Hume’s account of the passions of pride and humility will be the primary topic of chapter four. 
Accordingly, it is there that I will engage more fully with the primary secondary literature on the topic, 
especially Donald Davidson, Páll Árdal, Annette Baier, Gabriele Taylor, and James King.   
3 This description is, at first glance, problematic since Hume has argued in Book I that there is no 
impression of the self (T I.4.6.4, 165). I find Páll Árdal’s way of reconciling I and II on this point to be 
persuasive. Árdal observes that in Book I, Hume is dealing with the question of personal identity and, in 
that context, denies that we have any uniformly identical impression of the self that underlies our changing 
impressions throughout time. But this does not, Árdal notes, commit Hume to claiming that we have no 
complex impression of ourselves whatsoever. Rather, if, as seems to be the case, we do have a (composite) 
impression of ourselves as distinct from what is not ourselves, which does change over time as our 
experiences change, then it is perfectly legitimate for Hume to appeal to such an impression in Book II 
(1989a, 44-45). Árdal suggests that this complex impression of the self is produced by our passions and 
concerns, creating a unity within our bundle of perceptions. I do not wish to give detailed textual analysis 
here, but it is worth pointing out that Jennifer Herdt has argued that Hume does himself distinguish 
between the two sorts of impressions of the self that Árdal proposes and that while Hume denies the 
former, he affirms the latter even in Book I (1997, 40-41, see T I.4.6.4, 165 for Hume’s explicit distinction 
between two senses of personal identity). For more on the apparent discrepancy between Hume’s account 
of the self in Book I and II, see: Baier 1991, pp. 129-31; Terrence Penelhum 1976, pp. 9-23, and Jane L. 
McIntyre, 2000. 
4 In Hume’s words, “all agreeable objects, related to ourselves, by an association of ideas and of 
impressions, produce pride, and disagreeable ones, humility” (T 2.1.6.1, 190). 
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glad about that aspect of herself.5 Humility, as Hume defines it, is the opposite of pride; 
it is an unpleasant impression of the self that arises when one perceives a relation 
between oneself and a subject that produces pain.6 A person may be pained by his 
appearance, his slowness of mind, his uncontrollable temper, his place of birth, and 
accordingly he feels a similar pain with respect to himself. 
Hume does not assign any positive or negative valuation to the passions of pride 
and humility as such. This is in part because Book II of the Treatise is devoted to a 
descriptive and value-neutral analysis of the passions and their operations, and it 
therefore does not consider whether these passions are morally admirable or 
blameworthy.7 It is also because no such value judgment could be given in general. 
According to Hume’s technical definitions of these passions, ‘pride’ can cover a range of 
affirmative emotional stances towards oneself such as a feeling of superiority, basic self-
esteem, or self-satisfaction, and ‘humility’ can refer to negative affective self-related 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Commentators debate about whether Humean pride depends upon pride’s object having value 
independent of its relation to its possessor. For example, Davidson (1976) and King (1999) argue that the 
cause of pride must be independently valuable (and therefore dependent on a disinterested social 
perspective) while Árdal (1989b) and Chazan (1992) argue that it does not. This debate is relevant to some 
of the issues I will be exploring in the following two chapters, but since I will be better able to deal with it 
adequately in my more thorough discussion of the passion of pride in chapter four, I will set it aside till 
then. 
6 Hume may have chosen the term ‘humility’ instead of ‘shame’ to designate this particular passion 
in order to subtly begin to invert the Christian categories of pride and humility. Despite the fact that he 
assigns neither approbation nor blame to these passions in Book II, that he chooses to call the painful 
impression of the self ‘humility’ prepares the ground for him later to disparage it as a character trait. He at 
least clearly sees in II that the terms pride and humility touch upon a religious nerve, as is indicated by the 
following passage:  
There may, perhaps, be some, who being accustom’d to the style of the schools and pulpit, and 
having never consider’d human nature in any other light, than that in which they place it, may here 
be surpriz’d to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look upon as a vice; and of vice 
as producing humility, which they have been taught to consider as a virtue. But not to dispute about 
words, I observe, that by pride I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, 
when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us staisfy’d with ourselves: And 
that by humility I mean the opposite impression. (T II.1.7.8, 194) 
7 Hume says that he seeks to “examine these impressions [i.e., pride and humility], consider’d in 
themselves; and enquire into their causes, whether plac’d on the mind or body, without troubling ourselves 
at present with that merit or blame, which may attend them” (T II.1.7.8, 194-95).  
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attitudes such as a feeling of inferiority, insecurity in one’s being, or shame in oneself. 
Whether these passions should be evaluated as morally admirable or vicious depends 
upon the context in which they arise and whether they proceed from admirable or odious 
states of character. For example, we think that the passion of pride warrants approval 
when it consists in feeling one’s genuine dignity but disapproval when it arises upon 
bullying another person. Likewise we think that the passion of humility warrants 
approval when one feels appropriate shame in vice but that it warrants disapproval, for 
instance, when it arises from fixating on minor flaws in one’s appearance.8 As Hume 
notes, “‘Tis evident [pride] is not always vicious, nor [humility] virtuous” (T II.2.1.8, 
194-5).  
Thus, when Hume speaks of the virtue of pride and the vice of humility, he is not 
speaking of passions but of ‘qualities of mind’ or character traits. Character traits, in 
contrast to passions, are stable dispositions to feel and to act in certain ways. It seems 
that character traits inevitably come under scrutiny from the general view, since we 
cannot help but judge whether qualities of character are useful or agreeable to oneself or 
to others. Indeed, Hume seems to regard character traits as the primary target of moral 
evaluation, for passions and actions can only be assessed as virtuous or vicious when 
they are judged to be appropriate to the situation or when they arise out of and so reveal 
the nature of a person’s character. With respect to action, Hume says,  
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of some quality or 
character. It must depend upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over 
the whole conduct, and enter into personal character. Actions themselves, not 
proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred ... 
and consequently are never consider'd in morality. (T III.3.1.4, 367) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Manzer’s discussion of the positive role shame/humility plays in Hume’s account of moral 
development (1996, 340-41).  
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As I will soon explain, virtuous pride as a character trait, for Hume, is the tendency to 
have due esteem for oneself (to feel appropriate passions of pride), whereas humility is 
the tendency to feel that one is less valuable than one is (to feel the passion of humility 
to excess). It is thus clear that while the passions of pride and humility are not in and of 
themselves virtuous or vicious, they are related to the virtue of pride and vice of humility 
insofar as they express these underlying qualities of mind. It is the character traits that 
will be the focus for the remainder of this chapter. Specifically, in what follows I will 
explore how Hume conceives of the character traits of pride and humility as well as why 
Hume thinks that pride is so important and humility so detrimental to a flourishing life.  
 
II. The Virtue of Pride 
 
a. Pride as a Virtue 
Hume discusses the virtue of pride in Book III of the Treatise in the second 
section entitled “Of greatness of mind” and in Book VII of the second Enquiry. He 
describes pride as merited self-value (T 3.3.2.8, 381), well-founded self-esteem (T 
3.3.2.11, 382), and a feeling of dignity or “dignity of character” (T 3.3.2.12, EPM VII, 
252).9 The significance of this character trait for Hume is immediately indicated by the 
fact that in the Treatise he places pride as the first of the ‘natural virtues’ (i.e., those 
virtues founded upon inherent features of human nature), a placement that signals his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although there is much overlap in Hume’s accounts of pride in the Treatise and the second 
Enquiry, and although the two accounts are wholly compatible, Jacqueline Taylor points out that Hume 
places a greater emphasis on dignity in the second Enquiry (2012, 38-47). While in the Treatise the virtue 
of pride can refer to appropriate pride in one’s beauty, social status, or material possessions as well as in 
one’s virtue, Taylor argues that Hume’s shift to the language of dignity in the Enquiry enables him more 
clearly to emphasize the praiseworthiness of pride in one’s personal merit over those other things of which 
a person might be proud. This is because pride in one’s character is able to safeguard one’s dignity 
whereas pride in wealth and other contingent goods cannot (2012, 44). I will explain why Hume is 
particularly concerned to stress that virtue is the deepest source of pride, and why it is central to his 
understanding of what is entailed in possessing pride as a virtue, in section II.c.      
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radical break from Christian morality and its condemnation of pride,10 as well as his 
sense of the importance of pride for human happiness. This placement also reflects, as I 
will argue, the primacy of pride for Hume’s secular moral system as a whole insofar as 
pride, for Hume, both enables the kind of extensive sympathy needed for moral 
discernment and serves as the ultimate source of moral motivation. In this section I will 
present Hume’s account of the virtue of pride, explain why he regards it as a virtue, and 
argue for its importance in Hume’s immanently-derived account of ethics.  
Before Hume discusses the virtue of pride, he takes pains to distinguish it from 
“an excessive pride or over-weaning conceit of ourselves,” which we often call pride but 
which “is always esteem’d vicious, and is universally hated” (T 3.3.2, 378). Excessive 
pride does not refer to too much pride so much as an unjustified pride that lacks due 
proportion to one’s true merit. Hume in fact uses “over-weaning conceit” and “ill-
grounded conceit” interchangeably, indicating that pride is excessive precisely when it is 
unmerited. If one merits much, however, Hume deems a high degree of pride to be 
warranted.  
Hume thinks that conceit invites disapprobation primarily because it offends the 
pride of others. Since “…we are, all of us, proud in some degree…” (T 3.3.2.7, 380), we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 On this point, Annette Baier remarks, “This is to some extent just part of Hume’s Christian-
baiting. He can’t resist the opportunity, not just to transfer the monkish vices to the column of the virtues, 
but to give the first of the natural virtues he treats in detail the name of the first cardinal sin” (1991, 207). 
Hume is explicit about countering the Christian tradition in the Treatise, though he remains somewhat 
veiled at the end of this passage:  
Accordingly we find, that many religious declaimers decry those [heroic] virtues [which essentially 
depend upon pride] as purely pagan and natural, and represent to us the excellency of the Christian 
religion, which places humility in the rank of virtues, and corrects the judgment of the world, and 
even of philosophers, who so generally admire all the efforts of pride and ambition. Whether this 
virtue of humility has been rightly understood, I shall not pretend to determine. I am content with 
the concession, that the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride, which secretly animates our 
conduct, without breaking out into such indecent expressions of vanity, as may offend the vanity of 
others. (T 3.3.2.13, 382-83) 
In the second Enquiry, however, Hume directly rebukes humility (and openly criticizes its religious 
connections) when he calls it a monkish virtue.  
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are prone to compare ourselves with others (T 3.3.2.4, 379).11 When we show up as 
inferior, however, we are liable to experience that disagreeable passion of humility. 
Although public expressions of any kind of pride, whether well-founded or excessive, 
can elicit humility in others by virtue of comparison, usually the humility caused by an 
awareness of another’s self-approval of her gifts evokes respect and esteem rather than 
envy or hatred (T.3.3.2.6, 380). By contrast, ill-founded pride invites only the 
disapproval of others. This is because the humility we may feel in the presence of 
another’s conceit does not transfer to respect when we judge that the pride lacks 
adequate grounds (see T.3.3.2.6, 380). Therefore if by pride one means an over-weaning 
conceit of ourselves, it “must be vicious; since it causes uneasiness in all men, and 
presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison” (T 3.3.2, 380).12 
While Hume observes that excessive pride receives disapprobation, he says that 
“nothing can be more laudable, than to have a value for ourselves, where we really have 
qualities that are valuable” (T 3.3.2.8, 381), so long as this self-approval is properly 
concealed and regulated by social grace (T 3.3.2.9, 381). Correspondingly, he maintains 
that “[w]e never excuse the absolute want of spirit and dignity of character, or a proper 
sense of what is due to one’s self, in society and the common intercourse of life” (EPM 
253). On Hume’s account, then, the virtue of pride is the tendency to feel the passion of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Hume says, “We judge more of objects by comparison, than by their intrinsic worth and value; 
and regard every thing as mean, when set in opposition to what is superior of the same kind. But no 
comparison is more obvious than that with ourselves; and hence it is that on all occasions it takes place, 
and mixes with most of our passions” (T 3.3.2.4, 379, emphasis mine). 
12 Hume also observes, “We have, all of us, a wonderful partiality for ourselves, and were we 
always to give vent to our sentiments in this particular, we shou’d mutually cause the greatest indignation 
in each other, not only by the immediate presence of so disagreeable a subject of comparison, but also by 
the contrariety of our judgments” (T 3.3.2.10, 381). Notice that in Hume’s assessment overweaning 
conceit is primarily vicious because of its effects on others, but, in contrast to the key Christian thinkers 
that were discussed in Chapter One, Hume seemingly does not take very seriously the harm that conceit 
has for the conceited person herself. In any case, he thinks that “’twou’d be more advantageous to over-
rate our merit, than to form ideas of it, below its just standard” (T 3.3.2.8, 381). 
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pride in proportion to genuine merit (T 3.3.2.1, 378; T 3.3.2.8, 381). The person with 
this virtue would therefore feel the passion of pride in the right things (i.e., to those 
aspects of oneself that are genuinely praiseworthy), in the right proportion to their value, 
and in the right context, as would be affirmed by the ‘general view.’13  
Later in this chapter and in the remaining chapters I will attempt to fill out more 
of what Hume suggests virtuous pride might look like. For now I will point out that we 
can assess whether a person’s passions of pride tend to be appropriate (and are, 
therefore, indicative of virtuous pride) by examining the component parts of their 
grounds: the subject, quality, and relation to the self. Although Hume does not develop 
this point explicitly, it is implicit in his account of how the passion of pride arises, and 
his later references to vicious sorts of pride depend upon pride going wrong in one or 
more of these ways.  
First, then, we may misconstrue the subject of our pride. Don Quixote does this 
when he takes pride in being dubbed knight (the subject of his pride) by the innkeeper 
whom he believes to be the lord of the castle. We likewise see this in the adolescent who 
takes pride in the remarkable artist that she supposes she will one day be, despite her 
minimal talent. In both of these cases the subject of the pride exists only in fantasy. The 
subject of pride can also be misconstrued when a person fails to grasp its true nature. 
Imagine, for example, someone taking pride in being a “free spirit” when the character 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 As I will later show in II.c., Hume regards due pride to be merited above all by virtue, and 
accordingly the virtuously proud take pride most especially in their strength of character above those 
others things (e.g., beauty, wealth, talents, and status) of which a person might be proud. While this much 
is clear with respect to Hume’s convictions about what most warrants pride, in Chapter Five I will discuss 
some of the difficulties of fleshing out what should count as merited pride when taking the “general view 
or survey.” 
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trait upon which the pride is (wrongly) based is, in fact, the undisciplined reign of her 
immediate impulses. 
More commonly, we may overrate the quality of the subject and thus take a 
disproportionate pride in it (e.g., a person may think that her athletic ability or her 
fashionable clothes to be of more value than they in fact are). Or we may mistake the 
quality altogether. The young Augustine does this when he feels pride in stealing pears 
(C II). In his case he falsely regards the subject of his pride (the action of stealing pears 
and the feeling of freedom from constraints that it implies) as having some sort of 
positive value that it in truth lacks.14  
Finally, we can feel a false or excessive pride on the basis of an inadequate 
relation between the subject and oneself. Hume offers two examples of this sort of 
insufficiently grounded pride. First, he considers the person who boasts of being present 
at a great feast (T 2.1.6.2, 190). Here the person’s relation to the feast is very small (let 
us assume that he is in no way was responsible for the feast or necessary for the merry-
making of the party). While Hume suggests that the master who hosted the feast may be 
justly proud of it, the guest’s pride exceeds its warranted bounds.15 Second, Hume 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Augustine would have had to regard stealing as bad in order to get the thrill and pride over having 
the gumption to do it. Perhaps then it is better to say that Augustine takes pride in the feeling of power 
rather than the stealing itself (i.e., stealing is the means to expressing power and is not valued for its own 
sake—especially since he admits that he did not want the pears). Since power is a good if appreciated and 
used rightly, perhaps Augustine’s example is best interpreted, like the other examples above, as a 
disordered value and hence a disordered pride. In any case, the point remains that much of improper pride 
will depend upon being mistaken in some way with respect to the quality of the subject of pride. (Hume 
suggests what rightly- and wrongly-ordered values might look like in the ‘sensible knave’ passage at the 
end of the second Enquiry. I will discuss this passage later in this section.)  
15 As Gabriele Taylor points out, Hume’s example in this case is problematically ambiguous as to 
whether the joy taken in the object (the feast) can cause pride and when it justifiably causes pride (1980, 
388). Taylor argues that Hume seems to want to account for the conditions for the latter (and not only in 
this example but in the examples given when he discusses other conditions for the arousal of pride (T 
2.1.6, 190-2)), since Hume acknowledges that a guest can take pride in the feast but clearly thinks he is 
very silly to do so. She argues, however, that Hume cannot actually make sense of when pride is warranted 
as long as he takes a “wholly external or objective view of the situation…[and] completely ignores the 
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mentions the person who feels pride in resembling the appearance, air, or some other 
trivial feature of a great man (T 2.1.9.3, 198). In this case there is a relation (the 
resemblance), but the resemblance, being irrelevant to what makes the great man 
praiseworthy, is not the sort that merits pride.   
Certainly there are other ways that our pride can be inadequately grounded and 
thus excessive. Indeed, in the next chapter I will develop further ways in which Hume 
suggests that we can manifest vicious pride, particularly in relation to social perception. 
(I will also be enriching Hume’s account by drawing from other sources, since there my 
concern will shift from articulating what Hume thinks about pride to examining the 
nature of pride and its relation to flourishing.) For now, however, I assume that enough 
has been said in order to give a sense of what Hume might regard as virtuous pride and 
pride that goes beyond its just bounds.  
Why specifically does Hume think merited pride warrants approbation and, 
hence, is virtuous? In the Treatise Hume stresses its usefulness to ourselves, asserting 
that “nothing is more useful to us in the conduct of life, than a due degree of pride” (T 
3.3.2.8, 381), therefore suggesting that its utility cannot be over-emphasized. This is so 
because by making “us sensible of our own merit, [it] gives us a confidence and 
assurances in all our projects and enterprises” (T 3.3.2.8, 381). A good opinion of 
ourselves empowers us to act boldly (T 3.3.2, 381) and to aspire to great things. 
Furthermore, the virtue of pride itself can motivate further virtue, insofar as the proud 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
relevant beliefs of the agent himself” (388). It does seem to me that Hume, when he is being consistent, 
does take an external view of things as part of his project of providing a science of human nature. One of 
the crucial ways this shows up is in the way he talks about the ‘pleasure’ we take in the subject of pride 
rather than saying that we regard the subject as valuable. I think that this is a crucial problem for Hume, as 
I will argue in the Chapter Four and Five. 
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person regards it as beneath her dignity to act viciously.16 Hume does observe that 
excessive pride can destroy utility by making us prejudicial (T 3.3.2.14, 383), and 
presumably it also weakens our ability to make sound practical judgments with respect 
to what we can realistically accomplish. Nonetheless, the general usefulness of pride 
leads him to assert that it is more advantageous to overrate rather than underestimate our 
merits (T 3.3.2.8, 381).  
More fundamental than its utility, however, Hume thinks that well-grounded 
pride is virtuous because when surveyed it “gives us immediate satisfaction” (T 3.3.2.14, 
383). In the second Enquiry Hume de-emphasizes pride’s usefulness and classifies pride 
under the section entitled “Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Ourselves.” The force 
of this classification is to insist that pride is worthy of esteem for its own sake and is not 
reducible to its instrumental value.17 To show this Hume asks, “Who is not struck with 
any signal instances of greatness of mind or dignity of character; with elevation of 
sentiment, disdain of slavery, and with that noble pride and spirit, which arises from 
conscious virtue?” (EPM 252). Even if pride counters utility, as when it leads a person 
into dangers and difficulties or prompts nations to destroy other nations, “when we fix 
our view on the person himself, who is the author of all this mischief, there is something 
so dazzling in his character, the mere contemplation of it so elevates the mind, that we 
cannot refuse it our admiration” (T 3.3.2.15, 383). Pride accounts for whatever “we call 
great in human affections” (T 3.3.3.1, 384; T 3.3.2.13, 382) and is immediately 
agreeable as such. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This will be explained in detail in II.c. 
17 See Marie Martin on this point (1992, 392-93).  
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By rehabilitating pride as a virtue Hume signals his departure from the Christian 
tradition, most particularly the hyper-Augustinian strand of which Scottish Calvinism is 
an expression. As was explained in the first chapter, hyper-Augustinians regard human 
nature to be wholly corrupt, and they therefore tend to view much of ordinary human 
desire—desire which comes out of our depraved nature—with suspicion. From this 
perspective, our natural desire for pride and esteem is itself sinful insofar as it is 
egocentric, unwarranted given our wretched state, and lacking in due gratitude to God’s 
grace for whatever good that we do have. Pride is, furthermore, not only problematic in 
itself, but it also contaminates virtue if we are too pleased with our goodness.18 In 
contrast to the hyper-Augustinian attitude towards pride, however, Hume sees our desire 
for esteem as both inescapable and even important for motivating moral growth (a point 
I will develop later in this chapter and in chapter five). Moreover, the pleasure of feeling 
merited pride is, Hume thinks, praiseworthy, not a condemnable worldly pleasure.19 
Hume’s appreciation of pride thus is consistent with the general tendency of his moral 
philosophy to be in accord with much of our strong desires and to promote ordinary 
human happiness that follows upon the fulfillment of them, over and against the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 As we saw in chapter one, this expressed in The Whole Duty of Man when it says that we need 
humility “to keep us from any high conceits of our performances, which if we once entertain, it will blast 
the best of them, and make them utterly unacceptable to God” (II.1.4, 35-36). This is because, “The best of 
our works are so full of infirmary and pollution, that if we compare them with that perfection and purity 
which is in God, we may truly say with the prophet, All our righteousnesses are as filthy rags, Isaiah 64.6. 
and therefore to pride ourselves in them, is the same madness, that it would be in a beggar to brag of his 
apparel, when it is nothing but vile rags and tatters…” (II.1.4, 36).    
19 As Baier puts it, Hume insists that “the qualities picked out as virtues be ones that human nature 
regularly does turn up. … One constraint that Hume imposes on the moral point of view is that it be non-
Utopian, that it find value in the available human material. It looks for what is better in us, and so any 
practicability its findings have will depend on appeal to those better actual tendencies” (1991, 187). 
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Calvinist tendency to express contempt for this world and to insist that humans are 
depraved and incapable of goodness apart from grace.20  
Another way in which Hume’s rehabilitation of pride breaks with the Christian 
tradition is in his emphasis on human self-sufficiency that is implied by making religion 
peripheral to his philosophy of common life. While Christian thinkers differ with respect 
to the specific ways in which we are dependent on God (e.g., the extent to which we are 
dependent on grace), they are united in affirming that our dependence is significant 
insofar as God is seen as the originator and sustainer of life, the fulfillment of our 
deepest longings, and the ultimate source of goodness, truth, and beauty. Thus, Hume’s 
attempt to render religion irrelevant to and unnecessary for common life and his 
description of our human capacity for virtue with no place given to a Providential 
bestowal of those capacities, or of grace cooperating with them, would have been seen as 
vicious pride, as a project that arrogantly overreaches its just bounds.21 Hume, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The following is perhaps Hume’s best statement on the centrality of happiness to his account of 
morality:  
But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society, than those here delivered, 
which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with 
ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off, with which many divines, and some 
philosophers, have covered her; and nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, 
affability; nay, even at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks not of useless austerities 
and rigours, suffering and self-denial. She declares that her sole purpose is to make her votaries and 
all mankind, during every instant of their existence, if possible, cheerful and happy; nor does she 
ever willingly part with any pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period of 
their lives… And if any austere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and pleasure, she either 
rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers; or, if she admit them in her train, they are ranked, 
however, among the least favoured of her votaries. (EPM IX.II, 279-80)  
21 Hume’s embrace of the human self-sufficiency for living a good and happy life is existentially 
manifest by the calm and cheerful manner in which he faced his own death and when he reviews, with 
satisfaction, his own life (see Hume’s “My Own Life” (ESY xxxi-xli), an essay he wrote within a year of 
his death, as well as the testimony of his friends James Boswell and Adam Smith and his doctor Joseph 
Black (see Baier 2008, 101-2)). This is noteworthy, as Donald Seibert (1990, 206-10), Mossner (1970, 
591), and others have pointed out, since many religious readers were curious as to how the great religious 
skeptic would die. Any who sought a sign of remorse, vulnerability, doubt in his religious antipathy, or 
expression of dissatisfaction with life so as to vindicate their religious worldview would have, however, 
been disappointed. Also relevant and worth mentioning here is Seibert’s sensitive analysis of how Hume 
manifests virtuous pride in “My Own Life” (1990, 197-200), Ryan Hanley’s discussion of the self-
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turns the table on the Christian tradition, indicating that it is the adherents of revealed 
religion who actually possess vicious pride insofar as they reach beyond the limits of 
human knowledge and assert far more than our meager human minds can genuinely 
understand.22 Nevertheless, although Hume implicitly charges the Christian tradition 
with lacking due humility in this respect, his emphasis is on pride, on attending to what 
humans can do and discover by our own lights and achieve through our own power. One 
feels Hume’s excitement at the potential of developing a science of man, where attention 
to the human rather than the divine takes center stage in thought and practical life.   
Since Hume places pride under the heading “Of greatness of mind” in the 
Treatise, emphasizes a “generous” and “noble” pride in the second Enquiry, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sufficiency that Hume expresses and holds up for his readers to emulate in his recounting of how he rose 
above adversity and acquired fame, wealth, and (as is implicit in the telling) virtue, and Baier’s reflection 
upon Hume’s reading of Lucian as he awaited death (see “Hume’s Deathbed Reading,” 2008, 100-10).    
We can compare Hume’s implicit affirmation of human self-sufficiency with the Calvinist religious 
culture of eighteenth century Scotland, which would have been informed by the following sorts of claims 
that Jean Calvin makes in the Institutes:  
Owing to the innate self-love by which all are blinded, we most willingly persuade ourselves that 
we do not possess a single quality which is deserving of hatred; and hence, independent of any 
countenance from without, general credit is given to the very foolish idea, that man is perfectly 
sufficient of himself for all the purposes of a good and happy life. If any are disposed to think more 
modestly, and concede somewhat to God, that they may not seem to arrogate every thing as their 
own, still, in making the division, they apportion matters so, that the chief ground of confidence and 
boasting always remains with themselves. Then, if a discourse is pronounced which flatters the 
pride spontaneously springing up in man’s inmost heart, nothing seems more delightful. (ICR II.1.2, 
148, emphasis mine) 
See also where Calvin says, “The philosophers who have contended most strongly that virtue is to be 
desired on her own account [as is implied by Hume’s account of the natural virtues], were so inflated with 
arrogance as to make it apparent that they sought virtue for no other reason than as a ground for indulging 
in pride” (ICR III.7.2, 450). The self-sufficiency that Hume takes to be part of virtuous pride is seen from 
Calvin’s perspective as vicious pride, a vice of particular gravity. 
22 That Hume indeed sees assertions, which reach beyond what he regards as the limits of human 
knowledge to manifest vicious or excessive pride is clear, for example, when he says,  
if any of the learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and obstinacy, a small 
tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by showing them, that the few advantages, which 
they may have attained over their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal 
perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature” (EHU XII.3, 161).  
It is also evident in “Of Miracles” X.1, where Hume says,  
Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least silence the most 
arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, 
that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, 
be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as 
long as the world endures” (EHU X.1, 110). 
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discusses pride in relation to the heroic virtues like “courage, intrepidity, ambition, love 
of glory, magnanimity, and all the other shining virtues of that kind” (T 3.3.2.13, 382),23 
we might wonder whether, for Hume, pride is genuinely merited by and hence only a 
virtue in truly great individuals. This supposition seems to gain further support in light of 
Hume’s claim in Book II of the Treatise that because of our tendency to compare 
ourselves with others, our ability to feel the passion of pride depends upon the rarity of 
pride’s object (T 2.1.6.4-5, 191; see also Baier 1991, 207 and Gill 2006, 244). If merited 
pride requires us to have qualities that few possess, then it would seem that the pride an 
average person takes in her more ordinary attributes would be inadequately grounded 
and hence vicious.  
There is further textual evidence, however, that supports interpreting Hume as 
considering pride to be a virtue that ordinary persons are capable of possessing, even if 
to a lesser degree. First, for Hume virtue is the “most obvious” cause of pride (T 2.1.7.2, 
193),24 and he is very generous in what he allows in his catalogue of virtues. Among his 
list of natural virtues are not only the virtues of greatness (T 3.3.2, 378-84) but also of 
goodness and benevolence (T 3.3.3, 384-86) and of natural abilities (T 3.3.4, 387-91), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Hume even suggests that pride may be equivalent to these heroic virtues, or, at the very least, is 
necessary to those virtues:  
In general we may observe, that whatever we call heroic virtue, and admire under the character of 
greatness and elevation of mind, is either nothing but a steady and well-establish’d pride and self-
esteem, or partakes largely of that passion. Courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, 
magnanimity, and all the other shining virtues of that kind, have plainly a strong mixture of self-
esteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from that origin. (T 3.3.2.13, 382)  
Hume reiterates this connection between pride and the heroic virtues in the second Enquiry, adding that 
“undisturbed philosophical tranquility, superior to pain, sorrow, anxiety, and each assault of adverse 
fortune” (EPM 256) to his list of virtues made possible by possessing dignity of spirit. 
24 Virtue is a standard example of causes of pride mentioned in the Treatise. See, for example, T 
2.1.2.5, 183; T 2.1.5.2-3, 187; T 2.1.7, 193-95; T 2.1.11.1, 206; T 2.2.2.9, 218. 
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many virtues of which are more commonplace.25 While Hume surely would think that 
those who manifest true nobility of spirit merit more pride than ordinary characters, still 
it seems that on Hume’s view common virtue merits its own just proportion of pride, and 
it is appropriate for the ordinary person to feel a due sense of self-dignity. Hume says 
that we never excuse utter lack of pride or dignity in a person and, indeed, that “a certain 
degree of generous pride or self-value is so requisite, that the absence of it in the mind 
displeases, after the same manner as the want of a nose, eye, or any of the most material 
features of the face or members of the body” (EPM 253), indicating that a proper sense 
of pride could, in principle, be possessed by all. Second, in the Treatise Hume first looks 
at pride as it is found in “common life” (T 3.3.2.11, 382) before moving onto historical 
examples and a discussion of pride’s role in the heroic virtues. Third, Hume discusses 
pride as is suitable to a person’s rank (T 3.3.2.11, 382), therefore suggesting that while 
different levels of pride are suitable to different stations, some form of pride is 
nevertheless fitting no matter what opportunities one has or has not been given.  
Moreover, although Book II emphasizes the rarity of the object for producing the 
passion of pride, Baier argues that this condition is dropped in Hume’s discussion of 
pride as a virtue (1991, 207), noting that in Book III Hume says that 
those, who have an ill-grounded conceit of themselves, are for ever making those 
comparisons, nor have they any other method of supporting their vanity. 
[Whereas a] man of sense and merit is pleas’d with himself, independent of all 
foreign considerations: But a fool must always find some person, that is more 
foolish, in order to keep himself in good humour with his own parts and 
understanding. (T 3.3.2.7, 380)  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Examples of virtues that Hume discusses, which are found in ordinary persons are gratitude and 
friendship (T 3.3.3.3, 385), good sense and humor (T. 608), patience and constancy (T. 610-11), to name 
but a few. 
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Baier interprets Hume to mean that virtuous pride is not based on having what others 
lack but on having “real and intrinsic merit” (T. 2.1.6.4, 191) regardless of how widely 
spread these merits are (1991, 207-8). Baier notes that these standards of worthiness that 
regulate our pride are dependent upon our participation in social life, for through it we 
come to discern what can be expected from different people and what are reasonable 
aims given the sorts of beings that we are (1991, 208). I take this to indicate that Baier 
does think that comparisons are still operative when acquiring virtuous pride, since it is 
largely through the comparisons we make in social life that we discern these sorts of 
standards that ought to govern our pride.  But nevertheless, these standards are not so 
rigid that only the best can feel their own value or that recognition of one’s weaknesses 
precludes a general sense of one’s worth or the proper appreciation of one’s relative 
strengths (1991, 206-7). (I discuss the role of comparison in vicious and virtuous forms 
of pride further in the next chapter.)26  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Michael Gill interprets Baier as claiming that Hume regards vicious pride to be comparative and 
virtuous pride to be non-comparative (2006, 327n15). Given Baier’s sensitivity to the crucial role that 
social life plays in informing our standards of what is worthy of pride in different contexts, I am not 
convinced that she would maintain that there is no comparison at work in virtuous pride. If she is arguing 
for such an interpretation, however, I part ways with Baier and side with Gill in thinking that all pride for 
Hume has a comparative element. In the next chapter I argue in fact that comparison is essential to 
virtuous pride insofar as virtuous pride must be proportionate to its mark, and thus is dependent upon 
knowing where one’s merits stand in relation to others—on knowing, for example, when one’s 
achievements are good (and worthy of a relative pride) but not excellent. 
I do think, however, that Gill gives too much weight to the rarity requirement in Book II and 
correspondingly seems not to allow for gradations of pride. Although I think Baier states it too strongly 
when she says that Hume “lifts” the rarity requirement on his “moralized form” of pride given in Book III 
(1991, 2007), Hume does indeed seem to soften it—a point that Gill does not sufficiently acknowledge. 
There are two reasons why I think that Hume was right to deemphasize the rarity criteria in his discussion 
of virtuous pride. First, it better fits the phenomena. For instance, the working mother’s pride in finishing 
her degree is proper even though she was not at the top of her class, nor was she the only adult student to 
finish a program without overcoming sufficient obstacles. Her pride would be excessive if, for instance, 
she regarded herself to be a genius or falsely saw her obstacles as being larger than those of the other 
adults in her cohort. But nevertheless a high degree of rarity is not necessary for her to have just pride in 
her accomplishment, provided her pride is proportionate to her merits. I do acknowledge that if it were 
commonplace for working parents to get their degrees, her pride would, though present, naturally be 
somewhat dimmed. Even here, though, a due degree pride in her work done would not be misplaced; she 
is not barred from pride because this sort of achievement is widespread. Second, I think that there is an 
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Baier’s point here suggests a further important facet of Hume’s account of 
pride—one that will be significant to the following two chapters—namely, that virtuous 
pride includes having a secure, stable selfhood, one that does not quickly feel worthless 
by comparisons with others. Because we all have a desire to approve of ourselves (to 
feel the passion of pride regularly and to have a persistent, underlying self-esteem), 
Hume notices that those without sufficient grounds for self-approval seek to generate 
pride by comparing themselves to others that they perceive as inferior. In this way, 
excessive or unwarranted pride arguably masks a basic insecurity of self.  
That unwarranted pride often hides insecurity is further suggested by the way 
Hume links excessive pride with vanity. Vanity, he says “seems to consist chiefly in 
such an intemperate display of our advantages, honours, and accomplishments; in such 
an inopportune and open demand of praise and admiration” (EPM 266). While vanity 
initially appears to involve thinking too highly of oneself insofar as the vain person 
deems her attributes to be worthy of being the constant object of others’ attention, Hume 
points out that it is in fact “a sure symptom of the want of true dignity and elevation of 
mind” (EPM 266). This is so because without a just basis for pride, the viciously proud 
or vain person needs to be better than others or to be inordinately affirmed in order to 
prop up her self-esteem. Hume observes that “a fool [referring to those with excessive 
pride] must always find some person, that is more foolish, in order to keep himself in 
good humour with his own parts and understanding” (T 3.3.2.7, 380). By contrast, for 
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important difference between the spirit and character of the comparisons made by the conceited and 
virtuously proud person, as I will argue in the next chapter. It thus will not be until there that my full 
account of how, on the one hand, comparisons are always at work in Humean pride but, on the other hand, 
that Hume (and Baier) point to something significant when they stress that the viciously proud are heavily 
dependent on comparisons in a way that the virtuously proud are not.  
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would not automatically undermine her sense of self-value, since her pride is founded on 
what she does merit and on the valuable contributions she makes to others, even if she is 
not the best or if her talents are not perpetually recognized by those around her.  
Thus far I have presented Hume’s account of virtuous pride and argued that he (I 
think rightly) regards due pride is available and appropriate to normal human beings, 
providing the basic security that allows us to relate well to others. I will next explain 
how pride plays a significant role in Hume’s moral philosophy in the following two 
respects: First, proper self-esteem is important for developing a wider, more extensive 
sympathy, which, as was explained in the last chapter, is the very source of moral 
distinctions. Since sympathy is essential for determining what is genuinely praiseworthy 
and blameworthy and for giving an account of why this is the case, then if proper pride is 
important for sympathy, it is also important for moral knowledge. Second, pride is 
critical to Hume’s secular account of moral motivation, and hence plays a crucial role in 
answering the question of why we should desire to be moral, especially in those 
instances where virtue is particularly difficult and seemingly unrewarding.  
 
b. Pride and Sympathy 
 
 I will begin by explaining the role that pride plays in sympathy. Hume’s initial 
account of sympathy is given in Book II of the Treatise, wherein he aims to explain the 
formation and operation of the passions as part of his project to provide a new science of 
human nature. Sympathy as he there describes it is passive and automatic, and, as I will 
make clear in the next chapter, it does more to illuminate the nature of group bias than it 
does to explain how sympathy is the source of our moral distinctions. Hume, however, 
further refines and develops his initial description of sympathy to account for variations 
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of sympathy throughout Book II,27 and by the time he argues that sympathy serves as the 
basis of common language of praise and blame in Book III, it is arguably a wider, more 
extensive sympathy that he has in mind. In this section I want to show just why virtuous 
pride is important for enabling this shift to a more active, extensive sympathy and, by 
extension, why pride is therefore important for our ability to make sound moral 
judgments in the first place. 
In Hume’s initial account of sympathy in Book II of the Treatise, he describes 
the process by which sentiments are transferred between persons as follows: First, 
external signs such as one’s countenance or verbal expressions communicate to the 
sympathizer an idea of her sentiments. Then, by an association of impressions and ideas, 
the idea of the other’s sentiment tacitly calls to mind the sympathizer’s own experiences 
of that sentiment. Finally, this idea is “converted into an impression” in the sympathizer 
and moreover “acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very 
passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection” (T 2.1.11.3, 
206).28 For example, if a person that we pass on the street cries out in distress of some 
sort, her cry evokes distress in us such that we feel something of what she feels. Notice 
that Hume’s account here implies that this sort of sympathy just happens to us. It does 
not actively involve agency; rather, receiving an impression of another sets sympathy in 
motion by the natural association of impressions and ideas. Hume uses this account of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Chapter Two of Herdt 1997, especially pp. 39-49, for a detailed discussion of the 
development of Hume’s account of sympathy in Book II of the Treatise. See also pp. 60-81 for the 
relationship between sympathy and moral approbation in Hume’s moral philosophy, as well as for the 
relationship between sympathy in the Treatise and the ‘sentiment of humanity’ in the second Enquiry.  
28 Pàll Árdal observes that “the whole process of sympathy is conceived of by Hume in very 
mechanical terms. …There is no suggestion that in sympathizing one imaginatively puts oneself into the 
other person’s place” (1989a, 45). Similarly Philip Mercer suggests, “this notion of sympathy seems more 
akin to the instinctive response which is emotional infection than to the exercise involving imagination 
and self-consciousness” (1972, 36). Both passages are quoted in Herdt 1997 (p. 42).  
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sympathy to explain a range of phenomena including the uniformity of national 
sentiment, the tendency to embrace the opinions of others, and the contagion of moods.  
This automatic, often subconscious process of sympathy is crucial to Hume’s 
claim that sympathy is natural. It is impossible, Hume insists, to be wholly unaware or 
unaffected by those around us. But though natural, Hume also discusses the forces that 
can hinder or limit our sympathy, and as many commentators have pointed out, it thus 
becomes clear that a more active, extensive sympathy is needed to serve as the source of 
moral distinctions.29 What is required for the general view is a kind of sympathy that 
imaginatively enters into the other’s viewpoint and apprehends her interests. The work 
of the imagination, of intentionally placing oneself in another’s shoes, however, is 
active. It is something we must do. Thus, if moral evaluation depends upon sympathetic 
understanding of others, it seems that we must actively seek to extend our sympathy and 
to identify and overcome the barriers to sympathy. Our openness to the perspectives and 
experiences of others, especially those sufficiently different from us or those who dislike 
us, requires cultivation on our part, and it is quite an achievement to be deeply attuned 
even to those with whom we are closest. It appears, then, that the kind of sympathy 
required to ground moral evaluation goes beyond the passive sympathy that is described 
in Book II, especially given that moral judgments are required in a wide range of 
concrete circumstances and that in many situations our degree of sympathy might be 
quite weak. Our capacity for stable and reliable moral judgments therefore requires that 
we develop an ability to sympathize extensively and become mindful of the hindrances 
that block our awareness of others.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See, for example, Herdt (1997, 71-81), Mercer (1972, 64-65, 69), Abramson (2000, 46), and 
Baier (1991, 179-83).  
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One of the central obstacles to developing a wider sympathy is the interference of 
the ‘principle of comparison,’ which Hume discusses in Book II of the Treatise (and 
which, we saw, can give rise to the disagreeable passion of humility if others openly 
display their pride). Ordinarily in sympathy “when our fancy considers directly the 
sentiments of others, and enters deep into them, it makes us sensible of all the passions it 
surveys” (T 2.2.9.1, 245). However, “when we compare the sentiments of others to our 
own, we feel a sensation directly opposite to the original one, viz. a joy from the grief of 
others, and a grief from their joy” (T 2.2.9.1, 245). In other words, when we compare 
ourselves to others our central focus shifts from those others to ourselves, preventing us 
from “entering deep” into their feelings and often giving rise to the opposite feelings that 
the other person is experiencing, e.g., a joy that we do not suffer as they do or an envious 
pain at their good fortune.30 An excellent example of this phenomenon can be seen in 
Mr. Casaubon’s relationship to Will Ladislaw in George Eliot’s Middlemarch. Mr. 
Casaubon compares himself to his vibrant, talented nephew Will, and as a result, his 
sympathy with Will is quite shallow. Furthermore, because Will’s talents highlight his 
own feelings of inadequacy, he is perpetually frustrated by Will’s success. 
When comparison blunts or even reverses our immediate sympathy in this way,31 
it also inhibits us from properly extending our sympathy—i.e., from sympathizing more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 I think Hume overstates the matter when, without qualification, he says that comparison causes us 
to “feel a sensation directly opposite to the original one.” We can think, for instance, of someone who 
compares another’s loss with her own, and, on the basis of her own lesser (but still significant) loss, is able 
to feel a deeper sympathy with the pain of the other person than she would have had she not made the 
comparison. Certainly if she were to dwell on herself in the comparison, she would likely feel at least a 
subtle relief that she does not currently face such painful circumstances (even if she is not glad that 
another is suffering). But it is possible to make a comparison so as to focus on and better appreciate the 
situation of the other, thereby enlivening one’s sympathy rather than curtailing it.  
31 I take it that the comparison of sentiments cannot entirely displace sympathy but assumes at least 
a very weak or limited sympathy for the comparison to get off the ground. The misery of another must 
somehow, however faintly, be disclosed to the person who, by comparison, goes on to take a pleasure in 
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fully with a person by considering the context of her life, imagining her future 
possibilities, and ultimately, being concerned with her well-being.32 As Hume says,  
the extending of our sympathy depends in a great measure upon our sense of his 
present condition. ‘Tis a great effort of imagination, to form such lively ideas 
even of the present sentiments of others as to feel these very sentiments; but ‘tis 
impossible we cou’d extend this sympathy to the future, without being aided by 
some circumstance in the present, which strikes upon us in a lively manner. 
When the present misery of another has any strong influence upon me, the 
vivacity of the conception is not confin’d merely to its immediate object, but 
infuses its influence over all the related ideas, and gives me a lively notion of all 
the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; possible, 
probable, or certain. By means of this lively notion I am interested in them; take 
part with them; and feel a sympathetic motion in my breast, conformable to 
whatever I imagine in his. If I diminish the vivacity of the first conception, I 
diminish that of the related ideas; as pipes can convey no more water than what 
arises at the fountain. (T 2.2.9.14, 248, emphasis mine)    
 
In other words, extensive sympathy depends upon first having a “lively notion” of 
another’s present condition; without it, our apprehension, interest, and ability to feel 
along with the other in her past, present, and potential circumstances is correspondingly 
dull. But, as was explained above, the very means by which we gain this lively idea 
characteristic of deep sympathy is very often curtailed or reversed by comparison. We 
see this again in Middlemarch where, because Mr. Casaubon continuously compares 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the fact that she is not miserable or maliciously proceeds to take pleasure in the misery of the person as 
such. That sympathy is to some degree present even in comparison is evident in Hume’s discussion of why 
the ill-grounded pride of others presents us with a disagreeable comparison. There he says that because 
“sympathy has such a powerful influence on the human mind, it causes [the] pride [of another] to have, in 
some measure, the same effect as merit; and by making us enter into those elevated sentiments, which the 
proud man entertains of himself, presents that comparison which is so mortifying and disagreeable.” He 
further explains that by sympathy we enter into his prideful self-conception, but “[o]ur judgment does not 
accompany him in the flattering conceit, in which he places himself.” Nevertheless, we are still “so shaken 
to as to receive the idea it presents” because “the firm perswasion he has of his own merit, takes hold of 
the imagination, and [by comparison,] diminishes us in our own eyes” (T 3.3.2.6, 380). Sympathy, albeit 
of a weak sort, is thus a prerequisite to comparison, for it makes present to us the proud person’s conceit in 
the first place. (To clarify, I do not mean to suggest that extensive sympathy here would be to agree with 
his judgments. Rather, a wider, more extensive sympathy in this case would make present our common 
humanity, seeking to appreciate the full context of the person, while nevertheless holding firm to the 
judgment that his conceit is vicious.)  
32 Hume mentions that failure to be concerned with another’s well-being, in turn, further inhibits the 
cultivation of extensive sympathy. “But as I am not so much interested as to concern myself in his good 
fortune, as well as his bad, I never feel the extensive sympathy, nor the passions related to it” (T 2.2.9.14, 
249).  
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himself to Will and feels deficient in the comparison, Casaubon fails to receive a “lively 
notion” of Will’s misfortune and likewise lacks a adequate appreciation of and 
corresponding concern for Will as a full person who is struggling to make his way 
despite the rough hand he has been dealt. Dorothea, on the other hand, who is (and 
actively strives to be) receptive to others, is strongly affected by the difficult 
circumstances surrounding Will’s birth and upbringing, and this both makes her further 
concerned with his well-being and forms her imagination about what present and future 
difficulties Will might have to face because of his past.    
Weak sympathy and vicious comparisons also tend to promote negative attitudes 
towards others, which then in turn block a wider sympathy even further. For example, 
Hume points out that while a deep or extensive sympathy is usually accompanied by 
benevolence, a weak sympathy with that which is painful or disagreeable in another 
tends to produce hatred and contempt (T 2.2.9.15, 249). Hume also thinks that 
comparison (which, as we saw, can prohibit a wider sympathy) accounts for the passions 
of malice and envy. Malice, according to Hume, is the “unprovok’d desire of producing 
evil to another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison” (T 2.2.8.12, 243). Envy 
“is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our 
idea of our own” (T 2.2.8.12, 243). All of these sentiments—hatred, contempt, malice, 
and envy—depend upon a weak sympathy and, in turn, preclude the development of a 
deeper, more extensive sympathy.33 Once again, these dynamics are illustrated in 
Middlemarch. Dorothea’s robust sympathy with Will, and with all the novel’s central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 It seems that there is a reciprocal relationship here as well. Once we begin to sympathize more 
fully with one we envy and therefore hate, the hatred and envy begins to dissipate; on the other hand, if 
our hatred is strong enough, we may be incapable of the kind of sympathy needed to diminish those 
negative sentiments. 
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characters, promotes her benevolence towards them. Casaubon’s weak sympathy and 
comparisons with Will are related to his envy and hatred of him, which intensifies as the 
novel progresses and which, in turn, spreads to coldness towards Dorothea because of 
her concern for Will. 
In sum, then, comparing others to ourselves often displaces extensive sympathy. 
Moreover, since extensive sympathy is required to form adequate moral judgments in 
concrete situations, comparisons founded on weak sympathy prevent us from developing 
in moral sensitivity. How, then, does the virtue of pride contribute to our ability to 
sympathize and diminish our tendency towards vicious comparisons? It is noteworthy 
that when Hume presents his account of virtuous pride in Book III of the Treatise, he 
again discusses the potentially contentious relationship between sympathy and the 
principle of comparison explored in II.34 But there, as was discussed above, it is those 
who lack virtuous pride who are constantly comparing themselves to others in an attempt 
to support their vanity (T 3.3.2.7, 380).35 This sort of comparison essentially involves 
sniffing out the (real or assumed) weaknesses of others and doing so in a way that 
prevents extensive or deeply felt sympathy with those weaknesses. By contrast, those 
with a stable, secure selfhood, which is constitutive of virtuous pride, need not 
fundamentally rely upon vicious comparisons to reinforce their sense of worth, and they 
are therefore more able to be sympathetically attuned to others. Herdt remarks in her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 It is also important to point out that in the “Of greatness of mind” passage Hume implicitly 
maintains the distinctions he made in T 2.2.8-9 between variations of sympathy (weak and deep or strong, 
limited and extensive). He, furthermore, explicitly refers back to these passages in T 3.3.2.4-5.  
35 See also the second Enquiry where Hume makes the connection between vanity and lack of due 
pride:  
For why that impatient desire of applause; as if you were not justly entitled to it, and might not 
reasonably expect that it would for ever attend you? Why so anxious to inform us of the great 
company which you have kept; the obliging things which were said to you; the honours, the 
distinctions which you met with; as if these were not things of course, and what we could readily of 
ourselves, have imagined, without being told them. (EPM 266) 
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assessment of Hume’s account of the relationship between pride and sympathy that what 
is needed is an 
ongoing background pride or self-awareness and esteem, which, rather than 
distracting us from the experiences of those around us, enables us to be more 
sensitive and open to those experiences. Just as the child with a secure and strong 
relationship with her mother is more friendly with strangers, while the insecure 
child clings to her mother, the person with healthy pride is able to sympathize 
with the sentiments and affections of others, while someone whose impression of 
self is in constant need of reinforcement is likely to be insensitive to those around 
her. (1997, 41-42)  
 
A healthy pride or sense of self-worth better enables us to consider the sentiments of 
others directly, which as was explained above, is the foundation for developing a more 
extensive sympathy and compassion towards others. A wavering self-esteem, on the 
other hand, makes us prone to support our sense of self-value by way of comparison, 
which as we saw, leads to a weak, limited sympathy and promotes malice, envy, hatred, 
and anger, which then limits sympathy even further. This phenomenon is all too familiar. 
(And it is no surprise for Eliot’s readers to learn that Casaubon’s comparison with Will, 
weak sympathy with him, and growing envy and hatred toward him all stem from the 
fact that Casaubon is deeply insecure about whether his academic labors have any real 
value—an insecurity that Will’s presence consistently elicits.) For the person with 
virtuous pride, though, comparisons in which she shows up inferior to others do not 
undermine her sense of self-value since, as was argued above, the self-approval of the 
virtuously proud is based not on being superior to others but on having attributes that 
have “real and intrinsic merit” (T. 2.1.6.4, 191), regardless of how rare or common these 
merits are. The assurance that we have value and can make valuable contributions to 
others even if we are quite ordinary helps us neither quickly to feel worthless or exalted 
by how we fare in comparisons with others. With this being the case, we likewise are 
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more disposed to acquire a wider sympathy, and with it, to develop greater moral acuity. 
It was Casaubon who, on the basis of his insecurity and weak sympathy, lacked moral 
insight, while Dorothea’s finely-tuned sympathy afforded her exceptional moral clarity.  
 
c. Pride and Moral Motivation 
 
 In addition to the role that virtuous pride plays in facilitating the development of 
extensive sympathy (and therefore in our ability to make insightful moral judgments), 
Hume thinks that pride also serves as the ultimate source of moral motivation. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, Hume’s account of moral motivation stands in contrast 
to proponents of both revealed and natural religion, who thought that desire for eternal 
reward and fear of eternal punishment was important for motivating morality. Indeed, as 
I will show, Hume’s rehabilitation of pride as a virtue is not only an attack on the 
Christian tradition for making pride the chief vice, it is integral to his wholly 
immanentized account of ethics.   
As discussed in section III. of the previous chapter, a prevalent view among 
intellectuals of Hume’s day was that the concept of God was ultimately necessary for 
giving an account of why we should be motivated to rise above whatever selfish 
tendencies still linger after our natural sympathy and benevolence fall short. In these 
cases we should be motivated to act rightly, so the argument goes, because if we do not, 
we risk incurring eternal punishment. Hume, however, contends that our natural desire to 
think well of ourselves (i.e., to excite the passion of pride) does the real work of moral 
motivation, for if we value ourselves we will want to acquire the virtues that are befitting 
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of dignity. Prideful concern for one’s character is, Hume thinks, a powerful motive to 
virtue.36  
It is clear that Hume regards our desire for the passion of pride (i.e., the desire to 
approve of ourselves) as central to the structure of human motivation in general, often 
playing a dominant role in our concern for external goods, for possessing various 
qualities of character, and for securing the praise of others. I will explore how the desire 
for the passion of pride can motivate vicious behavior in the following chapter. Here I 
wish to show how virtuous pride (or the desire to acquire it) is, for Hume, especially 
important for specifically moral motivation.  
Hume has spoken of virtuous pride alternately as possessing self-esteem/self-
value and as having due pride (i.e., pride which is truly merited). Hume suggests an 
inseparability of these two senses of pride by using them interchangeably. I want to 
discuss their relationship in order to highlight why both aspects of pride are 
motivationally significant for the moral life.  
The key to linking due pride with self-esteem, I think, is to emphasize what 
remains implicit in Hume—namely, that due pride is founded primarily on virtue rather 
than on possessing external goods such as wealth or beauty.37 It is difficult to imagine, 
for example, a person who is lacking in virtue but who is very proud of her possessions 
as displaying due pride rather than conceit, even though her possessions may well be 
considerable and impressive. Or perhaps it is better to say that while it is possible to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See EPM 276 on this point. I will elucidate this passage in the body of the text later in this 
section. 
37 In her article entitled “Hume on the Dignity of Pride,” Jacqueline Taylor points out that in the 
second Enquiry Hume rarely uses the mere term ‘pride’ to discuss the virtue. Rather, he tends to use the 
language of a noble or generous pride or of having dignity with respect to character, and he does, Taylor 
argues, so in order to stress that he regards pride in virtue that is primarily praiseworthy (2012, 44).  
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have merited pride in one’s possessions (if one’s possessions warrant approval), it would 
be excessive (i.e., vicious) pride to regard one’s possessions as conferring more worth to 
oneself than is appropriate or to behave as though riches supersede virtue when it comes 
to one’s value as a person. Pride seems most fitting, most laudable, when it is founded 
upon virtue, and this seems to be primarily what Hume has in mind when he speaks of 
due pride in the Treatise. To be sure, the discussion of due pride is under the heading 
“Of greatness of mind,” which refers to certain qualities of character rather than to 
external goods.   
This interpretation is supported by passages where Hume explicitly discusses the 
superior value of virtue over other things of which we might be proud. In the second 
Enquiry, for example, he speaks of the sinking value of animal conveniences and 
pleasures compared to inward beauty and moral grace (EPM IX.I, 276).38 He 
furthermore says, 
…what comparison between the unbought satisfaction of conversation, society, 
study, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful 
reflection on one’s own conduct [i.e., when we have conducted ourselves 
virtuously]; what comparison, I say, between these and the feverish, empty 
amusements of luxury and expense? (EPM IX.II, 283-84) 
 
In this passage Hume implicitly offers a roughly-sketched hierarchy of goods: luxury at 
the bottom of the scale, physical beauty, health, study, etc. at the middle, and virtue at 
the pinnacle. It seems reasonable to suppose that merited pride, in contrast to conceit, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 “The animal conveniences and pleasures sink gradually in their value; while every inward beauty 
and moral grace is studiously acquired, and the mind is accomplished in every perfection, which can adorn 
or embellish a rational creature” (EPM IX.I, 276). 
 Interestingly, we see here a secularized version of Augustine’s concern with the order of our 
loves. Unlike Augustine, Hume does not (and cannot) give a metaphysical account of scale of value that 
could ground a hierarchy of value. For Hume, a scale of value could only be determined from the 
perspective of the general view. I will consider some difficulties with this in Chapter Six. 
 193 
must appropriately correspond to the value of that in which one takes pride.39 Indeed, in 
ordinary experience we do tend to regard pride as excessive (and hence vicious) not only 
if a person’s pride exceeds her grounds for pride; we also do so if she exaggerates the 
worth of even her merited pride, as we just saw with the example of the wealthy person. 
In that case, the character of the person’s pride reveals that she places too much value on 
lesser goods and neglects the genuinely higher ones. By contrast, a person who pursues 
virtue and approves of herself for orienting her life in that way would be regarded as 
having the right kind of pride, even if she is poor or otherwise lacking in more external 
goods.  
 Due pride, especially pride in or approval of one’s virtue, is in turn related to 
self-esteem because if we are genuinely to esteem ourselves, we can only so do to the 
extent that we align ourselves with what we see as good. We cannot honestly approve of 
and take pride in those character traits that we earnestly judge to be vicious or base, and 
the difficulty of owning up to our failings attests to this. Therefore, so long we are able 
to recognize true virtue, developing in virtue supports and further strengthens self-
esteem, whereas vice undermines it.  
The connections that Hume draws between natural sympathy, the passion of 
pride, and the nature of virtue, however, make this link between due pride in virtue and 
self-esteem even more firm. As Hume observes, since we are sympathetically 
constituted, we cannot help but be concerned with others’ opinions of us or, as he puts it, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Other factors are relevant as well, however. While, as I have argued above, one might take pride 
in virtue even if that virtue is common, for other values the rarity of the object or the degree to which one 
is responsible for the object might be pertinent to the degree of pride that is due. For example, if one were 
a mediocre artist, it would be appropriate for her pride in her work to be tempered by the modest 
awareness that she is not an artist of remarkable talent. I discuss the role of comparison in developing due 
pride and due modesty in Chapter Four.  
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to “love fame” (T 2.1.11, 206-211; EPM  265, 276). The opinions of others, moreover, 
inevitably influence the extent to which we approve of ourselves. Indeed, Hume says 
that others’ opinions have “an equal influence on our affections” as the original causes 
of pride and humility, and that “our reputation, our character, our name are 
considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, 
beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and 
sentiments of others” (T 2.1.11.1, 206). Additionally, as was explained in the previous 
chapter, Hume thinks that our sympathetic nature enables us to approve those traits that 
are agreeable and useful to ourselves and to others (i.e., the virtues), and the sympathetic 
nature of others allows them to affirm those same traits.40 Thus, if we are to esteem 
ourselves before others, the best way to do so is to acquire those very character traits that 
cannot but command their approbation.41 In other words, love of fame or desire for due 
pride can and should, on Hume’s account, direct us to the virtues, for possessing a good 
character is the surest way to secure the approval of others.  
Now that I have shown the relationship between due pride/self-esteem and virtue 
in Hume, we can turn to the question of how pride is important for Hume’s secular 
account of moral motivation. As I have said above, this issue becomes crucial for Hume 
to contend with in his attempt to establish the autonomy of morality from religion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 On Hume’s account, a quality that is disinterestedly judged to be valuable causes pride when that 
quality belongs to oneself and causes love when it is found in another. This is especially the case for 
virtue, which causes pride in oneself and merits approbation (a form of love) from others. Hume, in fact, 
defines virtue in terms of its power to produce pride or love: 
Now since every quality in ourselves or others which gives pleasure, always causes pride or love, as 
every one, that produces uneasiness, excites humility or hatred: It follows, that these two particulars 
are to be consider’d as equivalent, with regard to our mental qualities, virtue and the power of 
producing love or pride, vice and the power of producing humility or hatred. In every case, 
therefore, we must judge the one by the other; and may pronounce any quality of the mind virtuous, 
which causes love or pride; and any one vicious which causes hatred and humility. (T 3.3.1.3, 367)  
41 See Manzer (1996, 342) for a discussion on this point. 
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because in his day it was often thought that God was ultimately needed to articulate why 
we should be motivated to be moral, especially in those instances where it seems 
possible to profit by unjust means. Also, as was previously mentioned, this tended to be 
explained in terms of divine reward or punishment in the afterlife. We should be 
motivated to be just even when we can otherwise get away with injustice in this life, 
proponents of this view thought, because we will face a final judgment wherein we will 
have to reckon for our misdeeds. Hume cannot have recourse to this kind of response, 
however, since a dominant goal of his moral philosophy is to give an account of ethics 
that does not depend upon particular answers to larger metaphysical and religious 
questions. For Hume, then, pride, specifically the desire to behave in a way that warrants 
self-approval with respect to one’s character, becomes the ultimate source of moral 
motivation.  
To see more clearly how pride functions in Hume’s secular account of moral 
motivation, we will have to look at how it serves as a response to the challenge of the 
‘sensible knave,’ which Hume famously discusses at the end of the second Enquiry. 
Hume’s sensible knave is someone who by and large plays the part of virtue but who 
seeks to benefit by acts of iniquity or infidelity in those exceptional cases where it 
appears that he can get away with doing so (see EPM 282-83). Hume has the burden of 
explaining why the sensible knave should, in these cases, be motivated to choose virtue 
over private advantage, even if there may be no afterlife and final day of reckoning of 
which to speak. Hume’s response to the challenge that the knave poses is to point to our 
natural desire for a positive self-survey, i.e., for merited pride. We should be motivated 
to be moral even in those cases where we might profit through vice, Hume thinks, 
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because the pleasure of self-approval, of due pride taken in one’s character, is higher 
than any “worthless toys and gewgaws” won by injustice (EPM 283). 
It is worth noting that although Hume does not explicitly use the word pride in 
this passage, it is clear that he describes core features of virtuous pride outlined above.42 
Choosing virtue awards us, Hume says, with “the peaceful reflection on [our] own 
conduct” and therefore with the “invaluable enjoyment of [our] character” (EPM 283-
84), which is another way of saying that it awards us with due pride, with merited self-
esteem. Moreover, the “noble pride” discussed in Section VII of the Enquiry as a 
component of greatness of mind refers to having a sense of dignity and self-valuing with 
respect to one’s character, which is made possible by the kind of peaceful self-reflection 
of which Hume speaks in the sensible knave passage.43 So, although Hume avoids the 
word pride, it is the phenomenon of virtuous pride (or the desire for it) as he previously 
described it that he points to in his reply to the knave’s challenge. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 That pride, on Hume’s account, serves as a motive for virtue is widely accepted in the scholarly 
literature as well. 
43 The following considerations also support understanding Hume as regarding the peaceful self-
survey mentioned in the sensible knave passage to be exchangeable with virtuous pride as the ultimate 
source of moral motivation: First, Hume had previously observed in the final chapter of the second 
Enquiry that the “love of fame” lends a considerable motive to virtue (EPM 276). But since the love of 
fame, which is a concern for having a character with others, is inseparable from pride, it is appropriate to 
understand Hume as claiming that pride is a motivational support for virtue. Second, Hume explicitly links 
love of fame to greatness of mind and to the practice of moral self-examination, the latter of which he 
emphasizes in his reply to the sensible knave. See the following passage:  
Another spring of our constitution, that brings a great addition of force to moral sentiment, is the 
love of fame; which rules, with such uncontrolled authority, in all generous minds, and is often the 
grand object of all their designs and undertakings. By our continual and earnest pursuit of a 
character, a name, a reputation in the world, we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently 
in review, and consider how they appear in the eyes of those who approach and regard us. This 
constant habit of surveying ourselves, as it were, in reflection, keeps alive all the sentiments of right 
and wrong, and begets, in noble natures, a certain reverence for themselves as well as others, which 
is the surest guardian of every virtue. …[O]ur regard to a character with others seems to arise only 
from a care of preserving a character with ourselves. (EPM 276) 
Thus, it is appropriate to interpret Hume’s response to the knave to be that of pointing to the motivational 
power of pride, since Hume had already suggested the inseparability of pride, love of fame, and moral 
self-reflection before discussing the latter in his answer to the knave.       
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It would seem, by Hume’s account, that pride is motivationally important for 
morality in two ways. First, for those who do not already possess the virtue of pride, 
simply the desire to think well of oneself (the desire to acquire merited and stable pride) 
can motivate virtue, since as was explained above it seems that in Hume’s assessment 
virtue is the surest way to secure self-esteem. This desire for pride is not a desire that 
some may just happen to have; pride is both inherently and highly desirable, and we are 
bound by human nature to seek it. Were that not the case, attempts at self-deception and 
secrecy would not be so prevalent when we fail to live as we think we ought, nor would 
shame be so painful and, even at times, crippling. Thus the human need for pride 
(perhaps especially as it pertains to our need for social approval) can motivate virtue for 
even those who are not virtuously proud. Second, and more significantly, the more we 
actually possess the virtue of pride in addition to having the mere desire for positive self-
assessment, the more we would be motivated to maintain a sense of moral dignity which 
would otherwise be tarnished by seeking to profit unjustly. In other words, the stronger 
our sense of moral dignity or noble pride, the more unwilling we are to do what goes 
against our sense of rightness. For the person who possesses the virtue of pride, the 
repulsiveness of securing private advantage by unjust means outweighs any allure that 
such advantage could offer.  
What can be said, however, to those sensible knaves who lack sufficient concern 
for their character in the first place or who, even worse, are proud of their cunning 
ability to gain at the expense of others? At first glance Hume indicates that nothing can 
be said, since if one feels “no reluctance to the thoughts of villainy or baseness” then it 
will be difficult for the knave to be persuaded by any reasons to give up knavery (EPM 
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283). Hume goes on to suggest, though, that the sensible knaves are not fully honest with 
themselves. He says, “But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and 
roguery is too strong to be counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary 
advantage” (EPM 283, emphasis mine), implying that we cannot be altogether 
unconcerned for our character or take unambiguous pride in what is, in fact, vicious.  
A deeper look into Hume’s moral psychology explains why. As Hume observes 
in his account of the passions in Book II of the Treatise, we naturally desire to feel 
pleasure with respect to ourselves (the passion of pride) and to avoid shame (the passion 
of humility). In Book III he explains how our sympathetic constitution causes us to 
approve of virtues (those traits and actions that are useful or agreeable to ourselves and 
others). Thus, although the sensible knave could be proud of his cleverness, he could not 
feel unambiguous pride with respect to his unjust or dishonest actions, for, as Hume’s 
moral psychology suggests, his sympathetic nature at some level leads him to regard as 
those characteristics as vicious when viewed impartially.  
The sensible knave therefore engages in self-deception; he is at least implicitly 
aware that he disapproves of his actions, even if it is not the position he explicitly avows. 
The pleasure of peaceful self-reflection is thus unavailable to him. The sensible knave 
should be motivated by the natural desire for fame and pride to act virtuously since 
virtue is the only way to ensure the approval of others and thereby to attain the sort of 
genuine self-approval that is requisite to a truly happy life. Hume suggests that human 
nature is constituted such that virtue gives a higher satisfaction than knavery, and if the 
knave fails to acknowledge this, he likewise fails honestly to take stock of his own 
nature. Whether this response to the challenge raised by the sensible knave is adequate 
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will be addressed more fully in the next two chapters. For my purposes now, it suffices 
to point out the role that Hume ascribes to pride for serving as the ultimate source of 
moral motivation in his secular moral philosophy. 
 
III. The Vice of Humility 
 
While Hume regards pride, the chief Christian vice, to be a virtue, and one that is 
arguably integral, if not central, to his secular account of morality, he sees the central 
Christian virtue of humility to be a considerable vice. Hume’s most extensive discussion 
of humility is in Book II of the Treatise, where he defines humility as that painful 
passion of the self and describes the conditions for its emergence without there 
considering it from the general view. What concerns us here, however, is Hume’s 
account and assessment of humility as a character trait. In this section, therefore, I will 
show that, although Hume’s comments on humility as a character trait are terse, the 
context in which they are made reveal quite a lot about how he understands it and why 
he regards it to be particularly harmful.  
Just as Hume distinguishes between excessive pride and virtuous pride, so too 
does he differentiate between the virtue of modesty and the vice of humility, and it is 
helpful to begin with Hume’s conception of modesty to clarify what he is not rebuking 
when he relegates humility to the column of vices.44 Hume defines the virtue of modesty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Hume does not always carefully distinguish between the character traits of modesty and humility. 
Nevertheless, a distinction can be made in light of what Hume means when he discusses them. If Hume 
discusses modesty as he initially defines it (i.e., as “a just sense of our weakness” (T 3.3.2.1., 378)), then, 
as he himself says, it is virtuous, presumably so long as it is also accompanied by a just appreciation of our 
strengths. When Hume discusses humility as a monkish virtue, he is clearly referring to a vice—a vice 
characterized by a tendency to feel the passion of humility to excess and to the neglect of our attributes, 
rather than simply to feel humility when appropriate. While occasionally Hume will seem to use modesty 
and humility interchangeably (see, for example, T 3.3.2.10-11, though a subtle difference between terms is 
arguably present even there, as I argue in footnote #48), he does differentiate between virtuous and vicious 
ways of relating to our weaknesses—a distinction that is generally, though not always consistently, 
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as “a just sense of our weakness” (T 3.3.2.1, 378) or as that virtue which is “opposed to 
impudence and arrogance, and expresses a diffidence of our own judgment, and a due 
attention and regard for others” (EPM VIII, 263). Moreover, in the Treatise he discusses 
modesty in close connection to due pride. Hume first advocates that we “carry a fair 
outside, and have the appearance of modesty” (T 3.3.2.10, 381, emphasis mine). This 
form of good manners whereby we refrain from open display of our merits serves to 
minimize the offense that expressing pride could cause in others precisely by its 
tendency to evoke uncomfortable comparisons. Perhaps more importantly, however, 
genuinely possessing the virtue of modesty (as opposed to its mere outward appearance) 
helps us to be open to and capable of learning from others, which incidentally is why 
Hume thinks that modesty is especially appropriate for the young (EPM VIII, 263).  
Furthermore, although Hume does not say as much and although he does not 
emphasize modesty as being a particularly important virtue, it would seem that modesty 
(understood more as having a just sense of our weakness than as an outward social 
grace) is a necessary condition for possessing the virtue of pride. Since, as Hume thinks, 
we almost all incline towards excessive pride,45 we need the virtue of modesty if we are 
to put ourselves in proper perspective and, thus, if we are to tether our pride to its just 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
semantically demarcated as modesty and humility. In insisting that for Hume modesty is not humility, I 
side with but give more thorough argumentation for Baier’s interpretation (1991, 206-7) and disagree with 
Manzer’s conflation of the two (1996, 352). I also disagree with Jacqueline Taylor’s way of distinguishing 
them. She claims that Hume regards modesty as (solely) a virtue of good social breeding that requires 
mutual deference in conduct and that he regards humility as “a natural sense of our own limitations” 
(2012, 43); this interpretation does not stay true to the relevant passages as should be clear from my 
analysis in the body of the text.   
45 See, for example, where Hume says, “Men have, in general, a much greater propensity to 
overvalue than undervalue themselves” (EPM 8, 264) or the Treatise where he refers to “[t]hat 
impertinent, and almost universal propensity of men, to over-value themselves” (T 3.3.2.10, 381).   
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domain.46 Likewise, those few that tend to undervalue themselves need true modesty 
(i.e., a just sense of their weakness) if they are to develop virtuous pride, since attaining 
due pride would require them to overcome their blindness to their strengths and their 
tendency to exaggerate their weaknesses. In this way, it seems that due pride and 
modesty are mutually reinforcing and that either virtue cannot be maintained apart from 
the other.  
Modesty, however, is arguably not the same as humility for Hume,47 though 
exactly how Hume understands humility as a character trait is difficult to determine. We 
know that in Hume’s descriptive account of the passion of humility in Book II of the 
Treatise that it is a disagreeable passion with respect to oneself. But while Hume 
develops an account of pride as a virtue as well as a passion, he only refers to humility as 
a vice in passing without filling out precisely what that vice entails. Accordingly, a bit of 
constructive work is needed to ascertain how Hume conceives of humility as a character 
trait distinct from modesty. 
The first mention of humility as a disposition is in the section on “Of greatness of 
mind” in the Treatise, where he is still somewhat measured and less explicit in his 
critique of the prime Christian virtue than he is in the second Enquiry. There Hume 
asserts that while the appearance of humility before others is part of good social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Baier also sees an important complementarity between due pride and modesty. She points out that 
“…in all but the omnipotent, due pride will be accompanied by due modesty” and that a modest sense of 
what one cannot do but that others can, of where one is weak while others are strong, need not cause 
uneasiness when it is coupled with a due sense of what strengths one does have (1991, 206-7). 
47 To clarify, the passion of humility would be a component of modesty, but I am arguing that 
modesty is not the same as humility as a character trait. 
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breeding and is useful for diffusing the offense to others caused by an unscrupulous 
display of pride, we have no real duty to humility as an inner reality.48 He writes,  
I believe no one, who has any practice of the world, and can penetrate into the 
inward sentiments of men, will assert, that the humility, which good-breeding 
and decency require of us, goes beyond the outside, or that a thorough sincerity 
in this particular is esteem’d a real part of our duty. On the contrary, we may 
observe, that a genuine and hearty pride or self-esteem, if well conceal’d and 
well founded, is essential to the character of a man of honour, and that there is no 
quality of the mind, which is more indispensibly requisite to procure the esteem 
and approbation of mankind. (T 3.3.2.11, 382)49  
 
By contrasting humility with self-esteem here, he seems to understand humility as a 
tendency to self-deprecation, an excessive dwelling on one’s weaknesses and an inability 
to appreciate one’s own genuine worth.50 If modesty is a just sense of our weakness, 
humility seems to be an excess of the passion of humility, one that is disproportionate to 
our failings and that manifests or is constitutive of a fundamentally insecure self. While 
modesty is compatible with due pride, humility is here portrayed as opposed to it. 
Hume’s analysis of Pascal in “A Dialogue” reinforces this interpretation of 
humility. There Pascal is charged with making the “constant profession of humility and 
abasement, of the contempt and hatred of himself” (EPM 342), thus, indicating that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Here Hume seems to use humility and modesty interchangeably insofar as he refers to the polite 
deference we pay to others as part of good manners. Modesty (i.e., a just sense of our weakness), however, 
should go beyond mere appearance; it is a genuine virtue discussed both in the Treatise and the second 
Enquiry. Humility however is, in the Treatise passage, not only not “a real part of our duty” (T 3.3.2.11, 
382), but it is portrayed as contrary to that ever-important virtue of pride. In the second Enquiry humility 
is explicitly mentioned as a vice, or rather as a fraudulent virtue pursued by those deluded by religious 
superstition.  
49 Similarly, in the second Enquiry Hume says, “He must be a very superficial thinker, who 
imagines that all instances of mutual deference are to be understood in earnest, and that a man would be 
more esteemable for being ignorant of his own merits and accomplishments” (EPM VIII, 264-65). 
50 Many scholars who have written on Hume’s conception of humility support this interpretation. 
For example, Manzer says that for Hume “…humility too closely resembles the vice of meanness, a vice 
which betrays a deficient ‘sense of what is due to one’s self’ and a lack of concern for the dignity of one’s 
character (EPM, p. 265)” (1996, 352). Baier says that humility is “that necessarily disagreeable, 
debilitating passion, that dejection of the spirits which Hume had, with significant brevity, discussed in 
Book Two. Humility is a painful dwelling on shameful features of oneself, features one would like to 
hide” (1991, 206-7).  
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Hume associates humility with self-hatred. The notion that humility involves self-
deprecation was common in the Calvinist religious culture of Scotland. As was 
explained in Chapter One, since Calvinism espouses a total depravity view of human 
beings, humility is understood in that tradition to demand the true recognition of our 
wretched condition. It is little wonder that Hume would conceive of humility as self-
hatred if the surrounding religious culture considered having a deepening sense of one’s 
depravity to be a fundamental virtue.51  
 Hume additionally seems to see the self-hatred of humility to be allied with 
meanness, particularly as he contrasts both with virtuous pride.52 He describes meanness 
as the “absolute want of spirit and dignity of character, or a proper sense of what is due 
to oneself,” as when “a man can submit to the basest slavery in order to gain his ends; 
fawn upon those who abuse him; and degrade himself by intimacies and familiarities 
with undeserving inferiors” (EPM 253). Indeed, there is a clear connection between 
seeing oneself as unworthy and letting oneself be treated as such by others.  
Just as Hume’s conception of humility as self-depreciation echoes the conception 
of humility in the religious mentality dominant in eighteenth-century Scotland, so too 
does this association of humility and meanness. This link is suggested, for example, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Michael Gill 2008 cites some passages from William Perkins’s catechism entitled “Foundation of 
Christian Religion Gathered into Six Principles,” which spell out the principles that would have been 
instilled in children of a seventeenth-century English Calvinist household. For example, to the second 
question, “What doest thou believe concerning man and concerning thine own self?” an English child was 
taught to respond, “All men are wholly corrupted with sin through Adam’s fall and so are become slaves 
of Satan and guilty of eternal damnation” (146) and that he himself “is by nature dead in sin as a 
loathsome carrion, or as a dead corpse [that] lieth rotting and stinking in the grave” (150), bearing 
corruption in “every part of both body and soul, like as a leprosy that runneth from the crown of the head 
to the sole of the foot” (151; quoted in Gill, p. 8). These sorts of sentiments, as we saw in Chapter One, 
were also expressed in the Whole Duty of Man, which Scottish Calvinists read in the eighteenth-century, 
the young Hume included. When raised in a culture like this, it would be difficult to escape associating 
humility with radical self-depreciation. 
52 See NHR X, 163-64 for Hume’s explicit association of humility and servility/meanness. I discuss 
the relevant passage in the body of the text in the paragraph that follows the next.  
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The Whole Duty of Man, that spiritual treatise Hume read as a boy, which says that 
humility as it concerns ourselves is “of two sorts; the first is having a mean and low 
opinion of ourselves, the second is being content that others should have so of us” (VI.3, 
135). That humility before God also involves meanness is suggested in The Whole Duty 
when it says, “A Sixth duty is humility, that is, such a sense of our own meanness and his 
excellency, as may work in us lowly and unfeigned submission to him” (II.1.1, 34). It 
continues, “If we are not thoroughly persuaded that God is infinitely above us, that we 
are vileness and nothing in comparison of him, we shall never pay our due obedience” 
(II.1.2, 34).  
However much The Whole Duty may have informed Hume’s conception of 
humility and its affinity to meanness, what it endorses is precisely what Hume rebukes.53 
In the following passage from the Natural History of Religion Hume writes: 
Where the deity is represented as infinitely superior to mankind, this belief, 
though altogether just, is apt, when joined with superstitious terrors, to sink the 
human mind into the lowest submission and abasement, and to represent the 
monkish virtues of mortification, penance, humility, and passive suffering, as the 
only qualities which are acceptable to him. (NHR X, 163, emphases mine) 
 
Shortly thereafter he again censures humility and mean servility: “…cowardice and 
humility, abject submission and slavish obedience, are become the means of obtaining 
celestial honors among mankind” (NHR X, 164). Hume clearly regards humility and 
meanness as degrading, condemnable traits that are fundamentally opposed to the 
characteristics that he acclaims in his account noble pride, as evidenced by contrasting 
them with the “activity, spirit, courage, magnanimity, love of liberty, and all the virtues 
which aggrandize a people” that are excited by emulating the Greek gods (NHR X, 163). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 But this is, more fundamentally, because Hume rejects the view that humans are totally depraved. 
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Hume therefore thinks that if we view humility with an unprejudiced mind, we 
will see that it is merely a “monkish virtue,” i.e., a vice that can only be approved when 
viewed from a vision distorted by superstition. Hume’s famous passage on the monkish 
virtues is worth quoting in full:  
And as every quality, which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others, is, in 
common life, allowed to be a part of personal merit; so no other will ever be 
received, where men judge of things by their natural, unprejudiced reason, 
without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion. Celibacy, fasting, 
penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole 
train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they every where rejected by men of 
sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's 
fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither 
qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-
enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; 
stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the 
temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to the opposite column, and place 
them in the catalogue of vices; nor has any superstition force sufficient among 
men of the world, to pervert entirely these natural sentiments. A gloomy, hair-
brained enthusiast, after his death, may have a place in the calendar; but will 
scarcely ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, except by those 
who are as delirious and dismal as himself. (EPM 270)54 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 It is worth noting that Hume paints monastic practices in their worse light, making them appear 
not only ridiculous but also destructive and issuing from psychological disturbance. His presentation 
suggests that these practices are chosen for their own sake, not ultimately to order one’s loves (as 
Augustine would put it) to the higher good of charity. For a defense of monastic practices, see Father 
Zosima of The Brothers Karamazov. He says,  
Fathers and teachers, what is a monk? In the enlightened world of today, this word is now uttered in  
mockery by some, and by others even as a term of abuse. …The world has proclaimed freedom, 
especially of late, but what do we see in this freedom of theirs: only slavery and suicide! For the 
world says: “You have needs, therefore satisfy them, for you have the same rights as the noblest and 
richest men. Do not be afraid to satisfy them, but even increase them”… Taking freedom to mean 
the increase of prompt satisfaction of needs, they distort their own nature, for they generate many 
meaningless and foolish desires, habits, and the most absurd fancies in themselves. They live only 
for mutual envy, for pleasure-seeking and self-display. …And no wonder that instead of freedom 
they have fallen into slavery, and instead of serving brotherly love and human unity, they have 
fallen, on the contrary, into disunity and isolation… And therefore the idea of serving mankind, of 
the brotherhood and oneness of people, is fading more and more in the world…, for how can one 
drop one’s habits, where will this slave go now that he is so accustomed to satisfying the 
innumerable needs he himself has invented?... Very different is the monastic way. Obedience, 
fasting, and prayer are laughed at, yet they alone constitute the way to real and true freedom: I cut 
away my superfluous and unnecessary needs, through obedience I humble and chasten my vain and 
proud will, and thereby, with God’s help, attain freedom of spirit, and with that, spiritual rejoicing! 
(313-14) 
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If humility, as Hume seems to understand it, is seen to be the tendency to self-loathing, 
surely he is right in claiming that it is neither useful nor agreeable when seen from the 
general view. Humility especially merits moral disapproval, however, for the positive 
harm it causes. Given that I have already explained why virtuous pride is important for 
an empowered, stable selfhood, it should be clear at least in broad strokes how humility 
has the opposite effect. Lacking positive self-value makes us tentative, self-doubting, 
and small-minded in our pursuits, and it renders us prone to invidious comparisons. In 
what follows, however, I will examine additional ways that humility crosses the 
desirable ends of utility and pleasure.  
First, not only is humility inherently painful, but because it is a pain most 
intimately related to the self, it is arguably the kind of pain most detrimental to a fulfilled 
life. While other monkish virtues produce pain by way of deprivation (e.g., of sex, food, 
company, etc.), humility, as understood by Hume, involves a pain pertaining to one’s 
very being. While other monkish virtues are interpreted by Hume to be repudiating 
various ordinary human desires and needs, humility censures the self for having those 
desires and needs in the first place.55 In this way humility thus conceived seems to 
denounce one’s existence for being what it is—human. This sort of humility, especially 
in its extreme forms of self-deprecation and servility, thus stands fundamentally opposed 
to the affirmation of ordinary, this-worldly flourishing that is central to Hume’s moral 
philosophy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See Chapter One for a discussion of how the hyper-Augustinian tradition in particular tends to 
regard human desires as deeply disordered due to the totalizing effect of the Fall on human nature. 
Humility (i.e., self-abasement) is the proper stance towards oneself precisely because one’s desires, even 
apparently good ones, at bottom issue from pride and vicious self-love.    
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 Another harmful tendency issues from humility so conceived, namely, its 
tendency to “harden the heart,” and therefore to curtail the development of a wider, more 
extensive sympathy. It is not uncommon to observe that those who dislike themselves 
are prone to dislike others and that the insecurity constitutive of humility may 
subconsciously lead one to seek a kind of relief through being excessively critical of 
others (we explored this latter point when analyzing Hume’s discussion of the principle 
of comparison). Hume may have witnessed the heart-hardening effect of humility in the 
Scottish Calvinist culture in which he was raised, especially since the type of humility 
endorsed by hyper-Augustinianism can foster mistrust of oneself and others by 
prompting one to seek out hidden selfish motives in even seemingly virtuous acts and to 
hate such motives when they are found. As mentioned in Chapter One, a core 
preoccupation in the hyper-Augustinian trajectory is with purity of intention, and any 
tincture of pride in oneself for acting virtuously taints the goodness of the act, rendering 
it a vice.56 Hume observes that pride (or a pleasing sentiment pertaining to the self) 
naturally follows upon recognizing that one possesses virtue, but because the hyper-
Augustinians are apt to see such pride as vicious, it will appear to them that the sin of 
pride lurks everywhere. Thus, while hyper-Augustinian humility involves habitual self-
depreciation on the basis of attending to one’s “wretchedness,” it could also lead to 
depreciation of others insofar as others are likewise understood to share a depraved 
nature. Cultivating this sort of critical, suspicious stance towards oneself and others, 
then, would seem to dampen rather than further awaken sympathy and the benevolence 
that flows from it. As Hume remarks,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See chapters six through nine of Herdt’s Putting On Virtue (2008) for a discussion of the why the 
hyper-Augustinian tradition makes pride and hypocrisy chief concerns.  
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What heart one must be possessed of who professes such principles [i.e., the 
view that all humans are depraved and that selfishness underlies even seemingly 
virtuous acts],…and also what degree of affection and benevolence he can bear 
to a species whom he represents under such odious colors… (EPM, App. II, 
295).57   
 
Perhaps more fundamentally for Hume, however, humility inhibits sympathy by 
the way it proceeds from and further entrenches what he calls ‘artificial lives’ (EPM 
341-43). Artificial lives are produced when abstruse philosophical or religious theories 
about the world—theories that are incongruent with common experience—form a 
person’s affective responses so that they do not operate in a normal manner. This is what 
has happened, Hume thinks, in those who regard humility as a virtue. The “delusive 
glosses” of religion cause one to approve of and even delight in humility, despite the fact 
that an impartial judge sees that humility is opposed to agreeableness and utility. 
 Hume charges Pascal, his example of a life made artificial by his Christian 
commitments, with displaying this emotionally distorted embrace of humility. Of Pascal 
he says,  
The aim of PASCAL was to keep a perpetual sense of his dependence before his 
eyes, and never to forget his numberless wants and infirmities. … The modern 
made constant profession of humility and abasement, of the contempt and hatred 
of himself; and endeavoured to attain these supposed virtues, as far as they are 
attainable. … Those [austerities] of the FRENCHMAN were embraced merely 
for their own sake, and in order to suffer as much as possible. … The saint 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 We could also speculate as to how Hume might think that humility contributes to a “stupefied 
understanding.” While Hume indicates that the “delusive glosses of superstition and false religion” are 
needed for humility even to be regarded as a virtue in the first place, it is reasonable to suppose that, for 
Hume, cultivating the self-depreciating and servile disposition of humility warps the mind even further. As 
we explored in the previous chapter, the Natural History implies that revealed religion is irrational. 
According to Hume it is accepted not because it commands intellectual assent; rather, it is human 
insecurity that secretly motivates one to adopt a religious view. “Whatever weakens or disorders the 
internal frame promotes the interests of superstition…” (NHR XIV, 182). Although Hume does not say as 
much, we might surmise that training oneself to be self-deprecating creates a false need for redemption 
from one’s depraved state. In this way, the insecurity created by inculcating within oneself a sense of 
one’s own contemptuousness generates a psychological need for a religious answer, a promise of salvation 
of some sort—an observation that Nietzsche was later to make. There may thus be a connection between 
the insecurity created by humility and the motive for adhering to what Hume sees as a mind-warping, 
irrational religious perspective, one that has lost traction with human experience. 
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refused himself the most innocent [pleasures], even in private. … The most 
ridiculous superstitions directed PASCAL'S faith and practice; and an extreme 
contempt of this life, in comparison of the future, was the chief foundation of his 
conduct. (EPM 342-43)  
 
On Hume’s interpretation, Pascal, by regulating himself according to a religious 
worldview that is out of touch with experience, embraces pain and forfeits pleasure. 
Hume suggests that to see Pascal from a vision free from the distortions caused by 
religious superstition, we will affirm that his behavior is unnecessary, without purpose, 
and destructive to his own happiness.  
More significantly, however, Hume worries that the disruption of the “natural 
and usual force of the passions” (T 3.2.2.18, 311) characteristic of artificial lives 
impedes the development of sympathetic understanding. The normal operation of the 
passions is the material out of which sympathetic understanding is built, for it provides 
the basis for shared appreciation of the goods of human life, of this-worldly human 
flourishing. But the depreciation of this life, of the normal human sources of pleasure, of 
one’s own selfhood—all involved in Hume’s portrayal of religious humility—undercuts 
the very basis for sympathy, and hence for making sound moral judgments.  
In turn, the incomprehensibility of artificial lives to ordinary persons impedes 
their ability to sympathize with those who order their lives by religious superstition. This 
is because, as Hume says, 
When men depart from the maxims of common reason, and affect these artificial 
lives… no one can answer for what will please or displease them. They are in a 
different element from the rest of mankind; and the natural principles of their 
mind play not with the same regularity, as if left to themselves, free from the 
illusions of religious superstition or philosophical enthusiasm. (EPM 343) 
 
While normal persons cannot “answer for what will please or displease” (i.e., 
sympathize with) those whose passions have been disrupted by religion, unlike the 
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religiously superstitious their capacity for moral discernment is not thereby dimmed. 
This is because normal persons have not lost connection with the typical sources of 
pleasure and pain, approval and disapproval, from which a common language of moral 
praise and blame is made possible. Their inability to sympathize in this case is not of 
their doing; it is the irrationality of lives artificially formed by religious superstition that 
makes those lives unintelligible to the general party of mankind. But the inability to 
sympathetically understand the absurd emotional responses of many religious believers 
leads to another issue of great concern to Hume: the social factions that such lack of 
sympathy perpetuates and entrenches. Herdt notices how the centrality of sympathy in 
Hume’s account of ethics is tied to his concern for social peace. She observes that  
[i]n entering into the situations of others, we are able to look beyond factional 
prejudices to the shared goods of human existence, rooting moral judgment 
firmly in this-worldly human flourishing. To utterly devalue this existence [as is 
implicit in the stance of Hume’s understanding of Christian humility], in contrast, 
is to lose the basis for understanding others, healing factional conflict, and living 
in peace. (1997, 5)58  
 
 Hume’s critique of Christian humility is thus quite far-reaching and vital to his 
project, for on many levels humility runs directly counter to his vision of a flourishing 
human life. Not only does the debilitating, self-abnegating stance of humility 
significantly harm those who practice it, it also diminishes their sympathy and hence 
their benevolent action towards others. It even distorts (and is itself a distortion of) the 
normal operation of the passions upon which morality as well as the capacity for 
sympathy with others is based. In this way humility, as one significant aspect of artificial 
lives, contributes to the formation of social factions, and it simultaneously removes the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 For more on Hume’s abiding concern with the way revealed religion limits sympathy and 
promotes faction, see Jennifer Herdt’s excellent book Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy. 
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means of healing those factions insofar as it is itself a disruption of the very grounds for 
sympathetic understanding and consequently for social peace. 
 
IV. Assessment of Hume’s Critique 
 
Thus far I have shown how Hume seeks to rehabilitate pride as a virtue and to 
expose humility as a vice. This move, I have argued, is integral to his project of 
developing a secular ethic that affirms pleasure and that replaces religious morality, 
which he regards as anti-natural, other-worldly in focus, and suspicious of joy. In this 
section I want briefly to assess Hume’s critiques of humility in light of how humility is 
actually understood within the Christian tradition in order to lay the groundwork for a 
more thorough-going assessment in the following chapters.  
Hume is correct, I think, to see self-hatred and meanness as serious vices. 
Accordingly, I will argue that Hume rightly points to harmful tendencies in certain 
conceptions of Christian humility (most especially in the hyper-Augustinian tradition). 
But I will also argue that Hume’s polemical portrayal of humility also conceals the ways 
in which certain Christian thinkers (particularly in the Christian humanist tradition, as 
represented by Aquinas) would, in fact, agree with Hume in censuring self-deprecation 
and approving of proper self-love. At the end of this chapter and throughout the 
remaining chapters, I will therefore try to locate precisely where Hume and Aquinas 
agree and where they diverge on the phenomena pertaining to their different definitions 
of pride and humility. I do so in order to work towards bringing out what is really at 
stake between them in their opposing conceptions of the relationship between religion 
and human flourishing and of their different understandings of the proper attitudes that 
we should take towards ourselves.  
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As should be clear from Chapter One, Hume’s portrait of humility is not exactly 
what Christian thinkers had in mind when they endorsed it, nor is his conception of pride 
as self-esteem quite what they denounced as the chief vice. Therefore, in order to assess 
the extent to which reversing the place of pride and humility as a part of Hume’s attack 
on Christianity is successful, we have to look at how well Hume meets his target. It may 
be helpful to begin by considering what it is in the Christian tradition that Hume 
condemns by his transposition of pride and humility in his catalogue of virtues and vices. 
As I have shown above, Hume’s approval of pride is connected to his affirmation of this-
worldly pleasure and his sense that morality goes with the grain of human nature, not 
against it. Correspondingly, his critique of humility and the monkish virtues in general 
implies that Christian morality involves inflicting needless misery on oneself and, as 
Nietzsche was later to say, is anti-nature.59 In this way, it appears that Hume’s dominant 
concern about Christian humility is that it is self-mutilating, insofar as it is both painful 
and unnatural. Moreover, Hume worries that the artificial lives expressed in this 
unnaturally forced mode of being further weaken our sympathetic capacity by disrupting 
the natural operation of the passions, which leads to moral blindness and intolerance.  
 
a. Hyper-Augustinian Humility 
 
How accurate are these critiques? To answer this question we must first consider 
the extent to which Hume truthfully characterizes Christian humility. Despite the fact 
that Hume implicitly levels his critique of humility against Christianity in general, it 
should be quite clear from Chapter One that Hume’s portrayal of humility bears more 
resemblance to the hyper-Augustinian strand of Christian thought than it does to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See Craig Beam 1996 for a valuable discussion of the similarities between Hume and Nietzsche.  
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Christian humanist strand. This is unsurprising given that the religious culture in which 
Hume was raised was deeply shaped by the hyper-Augustinian theology of John Calvin. 
In this section I will highlight three ways in which Hume’s depiction of humility does in 
fact look much like the hyper-Augustinian conception, and I will evaluate whether and 
to what extent Hume’s critiques of this sort of humility are aptly applied to this 
theological trajectory.  
First, as should be obvious from Chapter One, Hume’s conception of humility as 
self-deprecation is a fairly accurate depiction of the hyper-Augustinian conception. As 
mentioned above and explained more fully in the first chapter, hyper-Augustinians think 
that human nature is profoundly corrupted by the Fall, and thus they understand true 
humility to involve adequately recognizing this condition in oneself. For the hyper-
Augustinian, therefore, humility is attained by becoming more deeply mindful of and 
grieved by one’s abject state. The Whole Duty of Man, for instance, advocates this form 
of humility when it tells us to “get [our] hearts possessed with the sense” that we are 
“poor worms of the earth,…able to do nothing,…polluted and defiled, wallowing in all 
kind of sin and uncleanness” (II.1.3, 35), and we saw that each of the hyper-Augustinian 
thinkers that were considered in chapter one had a similar view of humility.  
Before assessing whether Hume’s moral objection to this form of humility is an 
appropriate critique of the hyper-Augustinian tradition, it is worth mentioning that his 
arguments against what he calls the ‘selfish hypothesis’ of human nature convincingly 
show that the thoroughly negative picture of human beings, which underlies the hyper-
Augustinian conception of humility, is itself inadequate. While Hume agrees that we 
carry within us “elements of the wolf and serpent,” he insists that when we attend to 
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experience we see that we have some humanity, “some particle of the dove” in us as well 
(EPM IX.I, 271). That is, alongside our tendencies towards selfishness and revenge we 
have a natural sympathy with or “sentiment of humanity” for others.60 Hume is surely 
correct, I think, that experience reveals human nature to be mixed, not altogether evil. 
While hyper-Augustinians rightly recognize the human capacity for evil and are in many 
ways more sensitive to this than is Hume, Hume rightly argues that this sort of stress on 
sinfulness is too strong (ESY 82), causing proponents of this view to ignore (or to 
misinterpret as ultimately selfish)61 our natural sympathy and the attitudes and actions 
that flow from it. Moreover, Hume helpfully points out in his essay “Of the Dignity or 
Meanness of Human Nature” that the negative view of human nature unfairly depends 
not only on a lopsided emphasis on human weakness but also on comparing human 
beings to exalted notions of the most perfect wisdom and virtue (ESY 82-83), i.e., God. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See Appendix II of the second Enquiry entitled “Of Self-Love” for Hume’s thorough argument 
against the selfish hypothesis. See also a different version of his argument in his essay “Of the Dignity or 
Meanness of Human Nature” (E 84-86). See EPM 215-232 as well. 
61 The tendency to read even our good desires as being ultimately selfish stems in part, I think, from 
accepting a false dichotomy between egoism and altruism. Within the hyper-Augustinian tradition, it 
stems also from a worry that the self-approval we feel in response to recognizing our moral success is 
vicious pride, corrupting whatever was good in our action/intention. Hume addresses these concerns in 
“Of the Dignity and Meanness of Human Nature” (ESY 85-86). There he observes that those who insist 
upon the selfishness of human beings tend to do so for two reasons. First, the “secret pleasure” that attends 
virtue and friendship is believed to reveal that even these goods are motivated by self-interest. But as 
Hume points out, this construal of the relationship between pleasure and virtue is motivationally 
backwards. Pleasure arises from the virtuous sentiment; we do not love virtue for the sake of the pleasure 
that follows from it. Likewise, the joy we feel in being good to our friends arises because we love them; 
we do not love them because of that pleasure. (Thus, it is a mistake to think that just because one takes 
pleasure in goodness that it is therefore egoistic. To conceive of morality as essentially altruistic and then 
to believe that pleasure in goodness reveals hidden egoism is to misunderstand the nature of morality and 
the way that the passions operate with respect to it.) Second, that we desire approval for our virtue (i.e., 
our “vanity” or “love of fame”) is also often taken to be evidence for the selfish view of human nature. On 
this view, the true colors of what appears to be virtue are revealed once we look at the murky depths of 
human motivation and see that pride is what really fuels seemingly moral action. Hume argues, however, 
that our desire for approval is wrongly demonized, for it is actually a close ally of virtue and “it is almost 
impossible” to be entirely free from it. I will not detail his argument to that effect here, though, since I will 
be discussing the love of fame extensively in the next chapter.  
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It is unjust, Hume suggests, to judge humans to be utterly contemptible only on the basis 
of such an inequitable comparison.  
In my view Hume is clearly right to conclude that there are good as well as 
selfish impulses in human nature and that a view which admits to only the latter fails to 
pay adequate attention to human experience. Indeed, the very fact that The Whole Duty 
demands that we impress upon ourselves a sense of the vileness within our hearts so as 
to appreciate our distance from God (II.1.3, 35) could suggest that this harsh view of 
human nature is not wholly true. We do not straight-forwardly see that we are 
thoroughly wretched; it is a stance that must be inculcated. Genuine virtue must be 
founded upon what is the case, and thus a true account of human nature has implications 
for what dispositions are in fact virtuous. Because Hume gives a more even-handed 
account of human nature, I think that he is correspondingly more persuasive that the 
virtuous stance to take towards ourselves is to be appropriately proud of our genuine 
merits and to have a just sense of modesty with respect to our weaknesses than it is to 
see ourselves as utterly wicked.62 Furthermore, I think that he successfully gestures 
towards the destructive personal effects of hyper-Augustinian humility, such as the 
needless pain it causes and the motivationally crippling effects it can have upon those 
who practice it.  
The second way in which there is a significant likeness between Hume’s 
characterization of humility and the hyper-Augustinian conception is that both see it as 
involving a discontinuity with the ordinary operation of the passions, a discontinuity 
which the hyper-Augustinians regard as elevating and which Hume sees as deforming. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 I will briefly develop a more nuanced account, however, of the proper and improper ways that we 
can be proud of our merits in Chapter Six. 
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We saw this in Hume’s characterization of humility as an expression of artificiality in 
the life of Pascal. There Hume sees humility as an attitude that can only develop when 
one accepts a picture of the world that is out of step with experience and then seeks to 
regulate one’s life according to this false theory. The suggestion is that the religious 
worldview of Pascal—and the various sorts of worldviews contained in and transmitted 
by ‘revealed’ religion—requires one senselessly to habituate one’s passions to respond 
in a manner out of keeping with natural human responses. It is this inauthentic formation 
of the passions that accounts for why the “monkish virtues,” including humility, are 
affirmed by the religious. For how, Hume suggests, could self-deprecation otherwise be 
judged to be virtuous?  
Like Hume, the hyper-Augustinians see humility (and Christian virtue in general) 
as requiring a break from the ordinary operation of the passions, but, as we saw in 
Chapter One, this is because they regard unredeemed human nature as profoundly 
disordered since the Fall. Human nature, they think, is so utterly sinful that we are 
incapable of even being directed toward goodness. Accordingly, they tended to think 
that apparent virtue among the non-elect in reality was merely a clever mask for the 
pride and selfishness that inevitably guides the action of fallen human beings acting on 
their own power. By contrast they regard true goodness, the goodness of God and of 
those whom God chooses to offer his grace, to be entirely different in kind; for the 
Protestant Reformers it is marked by a pure, wholly selfless sort of love, uncontaminated 
by self-interest or self-aggrandizement.63 While, to be sure, hyper-Augustinians agree 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The Jansenists debated and came to various subtle conclusions about the extent to which our 
disinterested love of God was possible, but as was noted in Chapter One, they were more suspicious of the 
potentially contaminating effects of self-interest than thinkers (e.g., Aquinas) who embraced a 
eudaimonistic framework. 
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with Hume that humans have a great propensity toward pride, they see this as evidence 
in support of their negative assessment of human nature. Moreover, although they would 
regard the self-condemnation and selflessness of humility to be unnatural to fallen 
human beings (and impossible apart from grace), it is precisely because of this that it 
marks a change in direction from sin to holiness.  
Hume and hyper-Augustinians agree, then, about the general character of 
humility and its “unnaturalness.” But is Hume’s critique of humility as a mode of 
artificial living convincing only if one already accepts his standpoint? In other words, 
does Hume’s critique here beg the question of whether his account of human nature and 
the virtues or a hyper-Augustinian’s account is ultimately true to experience and 
genuinely leads to flourishing? We see this problem in the very way that Hume and 
Pascal give rival interpretations of flourishing, of what experience teaches, and 
correspondingly, of each other’s way of life. Hume begins with a descriptive account of 
human nature as we find it and of what human happiness looks like within the patterned 
operations of the passions, and he thinks that attempting fundamentally to change or 
subvert this nature will only end in self-deception, artificiality, and false happiness. 
Pascal begins with the view that human nature is corrupt and that, as a result of the Fall, 
there is something deeply wrong with the ordinary way human passions operate. On this 
view, what is needed is to be sanctified by divine grace and so to discover our true 
spiritual nature, in which genuine freedom and joy is found.  Since the hyper-
Augustinian position accepts a somewhat sharp differentiation between “natural man” 
(referring to unsanctified human nature) and our nature as spiritual beings made for God 
(which we become more fully aware of in and through the process of sanctification), 
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Hume’s complaint that Christian virtue is ultimately unnatural would ring hollow to 
Pascal. This is because on Pascal’s account, Christian virtue is unnatural to fallen man 
but at home with our deeper, spiritual nature. It is sin and pride that, although in one 
sense “natural,” are in fact indicative of our alienation from our nature as made for God.  
We see Hume’s and Pascal’s views play out in their alternate interpretations of 
each other. In “A Dialogue” Hume charges Pascal with forsaking ordinary human 
happiness (the only happiness we know) for an artificially induced other-worldly 
happiness. Pascal’s embrace of humility, on Hume’s view, is thus part of and further 
contributes to his self-deceived posture to the world.64 Pascal, however, charges those 
who seek this-worldly happiness (as does Hume) with self-deceptively ignoring their 
desire for God, in whom true happiness is to be found, precisely by tacitly distracting 
themselves with worldly amusements.65 What is more, Hume’s account of human virtue 
and this-worldly flourishing, on Pascal’s view, leaves out a crucial and telling element of 
human experience—i.e., the despair and emptiness we feel in our search for worldly 
happiness. Hume’s condemnation of humility, from Pascal’s perspective, would thus 
represent his attachment to self and his refusal to accept his need for God.66  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 As Herdt points out, Hume’s criticism of the Catholic Jansenist would have equally applied to 
Scottish Calvinism and is arguably a discreet way in which he can safely object to the corrupting 
influences of the religious tradition that would have informed the views of many of his readers (1997, 
182). 
65 Consider Hume’s bout with “philosophical melancholy and delirium” prompted by questions 
such as “Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I 
return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread?…” (T 1.4.7.8, 175). He finds that the 
“cure” for his ailment to be entering into the pleasures of common life: “I dine, I play a game of back-
gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I 
wou’d return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in 
my heart to enter into them any farther” (T 1.4.7.9, 175). Pascal would see Hume’s philosophical 
depression to be importantly revelatory of the human condition and his attempt to gain freedom from these 
crucial questions of human existence through back-gammon and conversation as precisely the sort of 
distraction that he regarded as spiritually dishonest and harmful. 
66 See Herdt’s Religion and Faction for a more thorough comparison of Hume and Pascal (1997, 
181-188).  
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Although we have here two opposing conceptions of human nature and happiness 
and whether one accepts or rejects a given view of humility depends in part upon 
whether one accepts or rejects the worldview that informs it, I do think that Hume has 
the more powerful critique.67 To begin with, I think it can be shown that hyper-
Augustinians (and with it, their conception of humility) cannot really escape the natural 
operations of the passions that Hume describes. Indeed, although Hume thinks that some 
of our passions can be successfully warped by religious superstition and enthusiasm, he 
does not think that we can wholly alter our nature. As Hume remarks, “[no] superstition 
[has] force sufficient among men of the world, to pervert entirely these natural 
sentiments” (EPM 270). The hyper-Augustinian affirmation of humility is, I think, an 
example of a way in which a disruption to normal human passions cannot be sustained. 
As discussed above, Hume describes in Book II of the Treatise how the passion of pride 
just does follow upon recognizing those aspects of ourselves that are praiseworthy and 
humility follows upon becoming aware of our disagreeable characteristics. This being 
the case, it is, as Baier points out, self-defeating to approve of humility (1991, 216-18). 
Since pride is constitutive of the approval of virtue when found in oneself, the person 
who regards humility as a virtue finds herself in the contradictory position of taking 
pride in her humility. It seems to me that this is why the spiritual writings of hyper-
Augustinians commonly express an anxiety over pride. Moral progress naturally invites 
being pleased in oneself for such progress, but if this pleasure is seen as sinful pride, it 
appears that there is no way to overcome vice. Luther’s approach to finding relief from 
this predicament is to perpetually cast oneself upon the mercy of God. But Hume’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Pascal’s insights into the human condition that Hume arguably does not adequately explore can 
be articulated in a Christian humanist framework—a framework that allows for the place of transcendence 
in human life without succumbing to some of the pitfalls of hyper-Augustinianism.  
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description of the passions suggests a better interpretation. We cannot, on Hume’s 
account, escape pride in virtue, precisely because that is the natural operation of the 
passions. Furthermore, to feel humility as a response to virtue would be 
incomprehensible.68 Angst over appropriately-placed pride is thus unnecessary to begin 
with and Luther’s “solution” is a response to a pseudo-problem.69  
Another way in which Hume is more persuasive in seeing hyper-Augustinian 
humility as signaling a corruption of the human passions is suggested by his articulation 
of the natural operation of the passions and their relation to our language of moral praise 
and blame (i.e., his project of providing a moral anatomy). Hume’s descriptive project 
renders human emotions and behavior increasingly intelligible, and if Christian virtue is 
supposed to involve passions that are wholly different from their operation in the 
unredeemed (as is described by Hume, for example), a coherent account of moral 
psychology must be given to show how they are possible and how they make sense. But 
instead, as was suggested in Chapter One, the discussions of a moral psychology that 
could account for Christian virtue among hyper-Augustinians tends to be absent or 
opaque, which gives support to Hume’s contention that their ideas of true virtue are 
unfounded, lacking the real support provided by human experience.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 To be sure, the Protestant Reformers preserve the intelligibility of the passion of humility in 
Hume’s sense insofar as they insist that we should not feel humility in our virtue as such. Rather, they 
stress that it is because we are thoroughly sinful that we should feel utter humility. But they also hold that 
any virtue we do have is God’s doing, not our own; hence, it is inappropriate to feel pride for something 
that we were powerless to bring about. (This was discussed in chapter one.) Nevertheless, what contributes 
to a distorted response of the passions here is: 1) the tendency to identify more sin in oneself than is really 
there out of an attempt to be pious, 2) the denial that one’s will plays a central role in formation of 
character.   
69 Part of the negative reaction to our tendency to take pride in virtue undoubtedly stems from a 
concern that our self-approval can involve more self-gazing than seems virtuous. As I will discuss in 
chapter five, I do think that there is something important in this worry, but I also think that Christian 
humanist categories are better able to articulate the moral temptation implicit in too much pride over one’s 
virtue than are hyper-Augustinian ones.  
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In addition to these above two points, when Hume’s arguments against the selfish 
view of human beings as well as his arguments against the epistemological viability of 
revealed religion (as discussed in Chapter Two) are taken in total, Hume’s contention 
that humility is a forced, artificial mode of being rather than a genuine human ideal, 
seems to be correct when humility is understood as self-deprecation. I take his larger 
point in “A Dialogue” to be likewise persuasive—that if Christian virtue is seen to 
require a fundamental departure from the natural operation of the passions, then an 
attempt to aspire to it will be mangling rather than ennobling, the supposed virtues will 
lose intelligibility, and the capacity for sympathy between the those whose passions are 
under the influence of religious superstition and those whose are not will be impeded.  
The third way in which Hume’s conception of humility can be seen to resemble 
the hyper-Augustinian conception (particularly among the Protestant Reformers) is 
apparent in the connection Hume draws between humility and meanness or slavishness 
(see, e.g., EPM 253). Humility, as understood by the Protestant Reformers, can be 
regarded as involving servility for the following two reasons.  First, as we saw in 
Chapter One, Luther and Calvin tended see divine and human agency disjunctively. On 
their view human effort unaided by grace is doomed to carry the stain of selfishness and 
pride, and hence our only “work” is humbly to assume a posture of passivity, letting 
God’s grace work through us. Any good we have, Luther and Calvin affirm, is wholly 
God’s gift; we do nothing to merit it and, in fact, Hell would be the just desert for the 
attitudes and actions we bring about by our own power. It is therefore unsurprising that 
the Calvinist emphasis on passivity, in addition to a harsh view of human nature, would 
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lead Hume to portray humility as lacking proper self-reliance and a sense of what is due 
to oneself, as well as involving self-deprecation.   
The second and perhaps the most significant way in which Hume’s association of 
humility and meanness targets the humility of the Protestant Reformers, however, is the 
servility of mind implied by their commitment to theological voluntarism. As explained 
in chapter one theological voluntarists hold that ultimately what makes God’s commands 
good just is his willing them. Although all Christian conceptions of humility include the 
posture of submission to the will of God, voluntarism can make the submissive aspect of 
humility seem akin to slavish obedience to a divine dictator. This is because God’s 
decrees are understood to be morally binding ultimately by virtue of divine fiat rather 
than because those decrees point to what is good and do so in a way that can be 
recognized and affirmed by human understanding.70 The way in which theological 
voluntarism expresses meanness or servility is explicit in The Whole Duty of Man. It 
says:  
But I told you, humility contained in it not only a submission to his will, but also 
to his wisdom; that is, to acknowledge him infinitely wise, and therefore that 
whatever he doth is best and fittest to be done. And this we are to confess both in 
his commands, and in his disposing and ordering of things. First, whatsoever he 
commands us either to believe or do, we are to submit to his wisdom in both, to 
believe whatsoever he bids us believe, how impossible soever it seems to our 
shallow understandings, and to do whatever he commands us to do, how contrary 
soever it be to our fleshly reason or humour, and in both to conclude, that his 
commands are most fit and reasonable, however they appear to us. (II.1.9, 40-41) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 From within the hyper-Augustinian, voluntarist perspective, true obedience to God requires that 
our actions be motivated out of genuine love for God, and likewise loving submission to God would not be 
experienced as “slavish” or degrading as Hume implies. But it is still legitimate to ask whether there just is 
an element of slavishness present in following a command ultimately only because God commanded it 
(and could have just as well commanded otherwise), even if it is not constituted as demeaning by the 
believer.   
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This popular spiritual treatise gives expression to a common eighteenth-century Scottish 
Calvinist view that humbly submitting to God’s (supposed) commands involves 
believing and acting upon “whatsoever he bids us to believe,” even when doing so seems 
to contradict what strikes us as true or good. In other words, humility on this view 
requires that we suppress our own mental life when it would raise misgivings about 
apparent divine wisdom.71 Of course this sort of exhortation to obliterate our reason and 
to blindly obey would have been seen by Hume as a sure symptom of a worldview that is 
not grounded in experience. Such a worldview becomes especially dangerous when its 
anti-intellectualism is seen to be required by God, for then adherents of that worldview 
have theological precedent for being closed to reasonable dialogue and critique from the 
outside. For Hume, then, not only does hyper-Augustinian humility lead to a distorted 
emotional formation, which upsets the typically shared sources of pleasure and pain that 
make sympathy possible. It also, perhaps especially in the Protestant trajectory, leads to 
a dulled intellect, which undermines the basis for shared discourse, fruitful critique, and 
mutual understanding.  
In sum, with such basic human faculties—reason and emotion—stunted and 
malformed by humility, it seems right to say that Hume’s concern with humility is not 
only that it undermines individual flourishing by its unwarranted, self-induced contempt 
for oneself but that it also tears at the fabric of social life. It promotes faction because 
acting upon beliefs that are held out of piety, not for any deeply intelligible reasons, 
would surely cause social conflicts between different religious groups who have 
different convictions with respect to what divine wisdom consists in. Furthermore, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Doubting the divine wisdom would be a failure of faith. Note that on this model, in contrast to the 
tradition of Christian humanism, faith and reason can look more like enemies than companions. 
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curtails development of the very sympathy that can repair factional divides. Since there 
is sufficient similarity between Hume’s conception of humility and hyper-Augustinian 
conceptions, I think that there is sufficient strength to Hume’s critiques of it to conclude 
that the hyper-Augustinian form of Christian humility is problematic and harmful. In 
highlighting how hyper-Augustinian humility combines within it its characteristic 
theological positions with respect to human depravity, divine and human agency, and the 
relationship between faith and reason, I have also sought to suggest that Hume’s multi-
faceted critique of humility contains within it a critique of the hyper-Augustinian stances 
on these larger issues.   
What Hume’s rhetorical dismissal of humility neglects is that in the hyper-
Augustinian tradition we are not to wallow in self-hatred; instead we are to recognize 
our profound inadequacy largely as a means to affirming more deeply the greatness of 
God, to kindling a desire to obey God rather than to be enslaved to ourselves, and to 
evoke gratitude for God’s grace in helping us to be good. Thus hyper-Augustinian 
humility may not, in practice, be quite as damaging as Hume suggests.72 And, indeed, 
the aspect of humility that pertains to submitting to the will of God can promote virtue 
insofar as (purported) divine commands really are good. Nevertheless, Hume’s critique 
of it serves as an important corrective to a tendency towards remaining in self-hatred, 
and it rightly questions the value of developing an overblown sense of our unworthiness 
to begin with. More fundamentally, however, I think Hume rightly rebukes hyper-
Augustinian theology for its harsh view of human beings, a view which encourages its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 I also think that hyper-Augustinian humility does less harm than it otherwise might precisely 
because Hume is right that, by and large, we do live by the “natural and usual force of the passions,” and, 
thus, despite the fact that hyper-Augustinians esteem humility (understood as keeping before oneself a 
perpetual sense of one’s own vileness and utter need for grace), it is seldom practiced consistently. 
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adherents to cast an excessively suspicious eye towards ordinary human desire (and even 
towards reason), whether in oneself or in others.  
 
b. The Christian Humanist Humility of Aquinas 
 
As should be immediately clear in light of the account of Thomistic humility 
presented in chapter one, Hume’s portrayal of humility as self-deprecation is quite 
different from how Aquinas actually conceived of virtuous humility. First, because 
Aquinas does not regard human nature as wholly corrupted by the Fall but, rather, thinks 
we maintain an orientation to goodness, truth, and beauty, Aquinas does not regard us as 
utterly wretched. Thus, he does not espouse a view of humility that resembles self-
hatred, for human beings do not, on his view, truthfully warrant thorough self-
disapproval. On the contrary, Aquinas makes very clear that smallness of soul is not true 
humility but is a core feature of the vice of pusillanimity (ST II-II:133.2) and instead 
maintains that “humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-
esteem” (ST II-II:162. 3.r2). Even more tellingly, however, Aquinas sees magnanimity 
as a virtue and, in fact, links magnanimity to true humility (ST II-II:162.1.3). This is 
hardly the view of someone who endorses habitual self-depreciation.  
Second, as was also explained in Chapter One, because Aquinas thinks that 
humans by nature maintain an orientation towards goodness and are capable of making 
progress in virtue, he does not regard the sphere of unredeemed human nature to be 
wholly without virtue, nor does the he see the normal operation of the passions to be 
wholly disordered. Indeed, in contrast to the hyper-Augustinian suspicion of the ordinary 
operation of the passions, Aquinas thinks that all humans share natural inclinations 
toward the human good and that these inclinations form the basis of natural law. 
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Specifically Christian or ‘theological’ virtues are, Aquinas maintains, in harmony with 
and the deepest fulfillment of these natural inclinations, not opposed to them as the 
hyper-Augustinian way of conceiving of the relationship between nature and grace 
suggests. Thus, Aquinas would not see the pride that Hume observes to be so dominant 
in the operation of human emotions to be necessarily problematic, nor does he see 
humility to be something entirely discontinuous with the normal way that pride functions 
in the human heart.73 Aquinas is sensitive to the morally problematic ways in which we 
can take pride in our virtues (ST II-II:162.6.r1). Nevertheless, in contrast to the hyper-
Augustinian anxiety over the prevalence of pride, Aquinas does not think that pride (or 
self-interest) necessary tarnishes all pagan action, he does not interpret approval of one’s 
virtue to be pride (see ST II-II:129), nor does he think that a vicious sort of pride in 
virtue is terribly difficult to overcome once it is identified (ST II-II:162.6.r1). In fact as 
we saw in Chapter One, he regards humility and magnanimity to be natural virtues 
available to pagans and Christians alike. Therefore Hume’s critique that humility is an 
expression of artificial lives, i.e., lives out of touch with the natural operation of human 
passions, seems to fall flat when applied to Aquinas.74 
Third, since Aquinas is not a voluntarist, his conception of humility is free of the 
more extreme servile overtones that are prevalent in hyper-Augustinian modes of 
spirituality. While Aquinas’s conception of humility is embedded within his theistic 
worldview and as such includes the notion that we are to be willing servants of God, it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 I grant, however, that Hume and Aquinas would have different stances on how deeply and 
extensively we need to cultivate modesty/humility, on what it is right to take pride in, and in what respect 
such pride should be taken. These are deep issues that will be discussed in Chapter Five and Six.  
74 Hume’s critique of humility is also a critique of the stringencies of the monastic tradition of 
which Aquinas is a part. While Aquinas sees much good in our ordinary passions, his conception of 
humility is demanding and puts significant strain on our natural tendencies to pride. I will explore the 
ascetic element in Aquinas’s account of humility in the final chapter and discuss it in light of Hume’s 
repudiation of the monkish virtues.   
 227 
significant that Aquinas thinks we can understand why God’s commands are good 
through use of our intellect (as well as by faith that is informed by reason). In this way 
Thomistic humility before God cannot, I suggest, be regarded as a degrading form of 
submissiveness.75 Furthermore, Aquinas’s account of the humility we should bear 
towards others fails to resemble Hume’s description of meanness. As I will explain in 
Chapter Six and as I indicated in Chapter One, Thomistic humility before others can be 
made intelligible largely on the basis of ordinary human flourishing, without having 
recourse to faith in revelation; it would be something akin to but richer than Hume’s 
description of modesty—a just recognition of our dependency and weaknesses, a posture 
which makes us more receptive to learning from and properly relying upon others.76   
It seems, then, that Hume’s critique of humility is a bit of a straw man if it is 
meant as an objection to Christian humility in general, for his portrayal of humility 
roughly depicts only one of the major branches of Christian theology in the West, and he 
fails to engage what I think is a better version of Christianity and, accordingly, of 
Christian humility. When we move beyond semantic differences between Hume and 
Aquinas, we see that there is much agreement between them with respect to virtues and 
vices pertaining to the self. Both Aquinas and Hume regard having a sense of dignity as 
virtuous. Both affirm that it is right (i.e., not viciously prideful) to approve of goodness 
in oneself.77 Both think that having a stable, secure selfhood is morally significant.78 
Both also see the importance of having a true sense of our weaknesses as well (though as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Analogously the non-theistic moral realist finds it dignifying, not degrading, to practice 
“submitting” to the demands of morality as she seeks to grow in virtue.  
76 I will briefly develop a naturalistic account of humility in Chapter Six.  
77 See Aquinas’ discussion of magnanimity in ST II-II:129. 
78 See Aquinas’ discussion of the relation between magnanimity and security in ST II-II:129.7, in 
the question entitled “Whether Security Belongs to Magnanimity?”  
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I will explain in later chapters, Aquinas understands the significance of this attitude 
more than does Hume). While much of what Hume calls noble pride, Aquinas calls 
magnanimity, and much of what Hume calls modesty, Aquinas calls humility, there are 
many core phenomena pertaining to ways of relating to ourselves that they applaud and 
condemn in unison. 
There is a good deal still to elucidate, however, with respect to just what Hume 
and Aquinas take to be virtuous and vicious stances towards the self in our own self-
assessments, in relation to others, and in relation to God (or in Hume’s case, to the 
(incoherent) conception of God as portrayed by ‘revealed religion,’ specifically 
Christianity). I have tried very briefly to highlight areas in which they broadly agree so 
as to explore, in the remainder of the dissertation, what is really at stake in their 
conceptions of pride and humility. Indeed, despite widespread agreement, some 
significant and interesting differences remain, which, as I will show, follow from their 
respective secular and religious perspectives. In the chapters to come, then, I will 
explore just how their rival views regarding whether a transcendent moral source is 
irrelevant (and even harmful) or necessary to a flourishing human life factor into their 
accounts of pride and humility. I will also consider, in turn, what difference it might 
make to flourishing if the self is conceived solely ‘immanently’ in relation to other 
human persons or as also standing in relation to God.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PASSION OF PRIDE AND PROBLEMS FOR 
FLOURISHING 
 
 
“Our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and 
importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little 
influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others” (T 2.1.11.1, 206) 
 
“There are few persons, that are satisfy’d with their own character, or genius, or fortune, 
who are not desirous of showing themselves to the world, and of acquiring the love and 
approbation of mankind” (T 2.2.1.9, 215) 
 
“Upon comparing ourselves with others, as we are every moment apt to do, we find we 
are not in the least distinguish’d” (T 2.1.6.5, 191) 
 
“…being conscious of a great partiality in our own favour, we are peculiarly pleas’d 
with any thing, that confirms the good opinion we have of ourselves, and are easily 
shock’d with whatever opposes it” (T 2.1.11.9, 209) 
 
 The central interest in this dissertation is to consider what is at stake for human 
flourishing in Hume’s attempt to account for ethics without depending upon answers to 
any larger metaphysical and religious questions. Christian thinkers had insisted in various 
ways that since God is our final end, it is impossible for God to be ethically irrelevant or 
to make no crucial difference to human flourishing. On the Christian view, God is 
necessary to individual flourishing because, as Augustine put it, our ultimate rest and 
happiness is only found in God, and God is important for communal flourishing insofar 
as openness to God leads to love of neighbor. Hume, on the other hand, saw the potential 
of revealed religion—particularly Christianity—to undermine both individual and 
communal flourishing, and he arguably sought, in part, to mitigate those threats precisely 
by developing his secular account of ethics.      
I have been using Hume’s reversal and redefinition of the Christian categories of 
pride and humility as a lens through which to explore the relationship between religion, 
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morality, and human flourishing. Thus far I have shown how Hume’s reversal of the 
placement of pride and humility in the catalogue of the virtues and vices carries with it 
important insights into the harmful effects that religion (namely, Christianity) can have 
on human life. Correspondingly, I have emphasized some gains of Hume’s secular 
perspective. In the final chapters, however, I want to explore some of the losses that come 
with Hume’s attempt to bracket out religious questions, losses that ironically become 
evident upon a deeper exploration of Hume’s account of pride and humility.  
My focus in this chapter thus will be to examine Hume’s account of the passions 
of pride and humility and to show how the normal operation of these passions, as Hume 
correctly sees, accounts for much of what undermines flourishing, such as moral 
blindness, crippling shame, rivalries and factions. In the Chapters Five and Six I will then 
be in a position to consider the resources that a Humean and Christian humanist 
perspective has for dealing with these problems. As I will show, Hume’s account of 
virtuous pride and a Christian humanist account of humility are centrally bound up in the 
sorts of answers that they are able to give.  
 
I. The Passions of Pride and Humility 
 
In order to provide the necessary background for discussing the threats to 
flourishing that are rooted in our natural desire for a stable pride before others, I begin by 
presenting Hume’s account of the passions of pride and humility given in Book II of the 
Treatise. Although I considered Hume’s account of these passions in the previous 
chapter, because my aim there was to present Hume’s account of pride and humility as 
character traits, my presentation of the passions was accordingly brief. In order, 
however, to explore the sorts of problems for flourishing that arise due to our desire to 
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think well of ourselves (i.e., our desire for pride), in this chapter I will focus on Hume’s 
account of these passions, looking especially at the role of intersubjectivity in our own 
self-evaluations and the significance of these passions for human motivation. 
Additionally, while in the last chapter my aim was to present Hume’s account of pride 
and humility, here my concern is to articulate the nature of pride and humility as passions 
and the nature of their role in some of the problems for flourishing that I wish to explore 
in section II. I thus will be attempting to clarify, in some cases to correct, and also to 
further develop Hume’s analyses of these passions as is relevant to the sorts of issues I 
want to raise.  
 
a. The Nature of Pride and Humility as Passions 
 
Hume discusses the passions of pride and humility in Book II of the Treatise. The 
purpose of Book II is to identify the principles that account for the ordinary operation of 
the passions as part of his larger project to provide a science of human nature and, in 
Book III, to show how ethics is founded upon the passions.1 The significance of pride and 
humility in Hume’s account of the passions is indicated by the fact that they are the first 
passions that Hume discusses, they are discussed in great detail, and they play an 
important role in explaining other passions, such as envy and malice. In this section I 
want to present and expand upon Hume’s account, and I hope to do so in such a way as to 
convince the reader that Hume is right to see these passions as crucial to understanding 
human psychology and motivation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Árdal (1966) for an extensive treatment on the relationship of Hume’s account of the passions 
in Book II to his account of the ethics in Book III. See also Árdal’s response to Davidson’s (1976) article 
on pride where he observes that the differences between their interpretations of Humean pride are due to 
the fact that he attends to the relationship between the passions in II and Hume’s moral philosophy in III, 
whereas Davidson does not (1989, 389, 393).  
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i. The Basic Structure of Pride and Humility 
Recall from the previous chapter that Hume describes the passion of pride as a 
pleasurable impression of oneself.2 As part of his project to provide a science of human 
nature and thereby to identify the principles that can make sense of the numerous 
instances of pride (see T 2.1.3.1, 184-85), Hume observes that several components must 
be present for pride to occur. First, and most obviously, there must be a self who feels the 
pride; Hume calls the self the ‘object’ of pride (T 2.1.2.2, 182). Second, there must also 
be a ‘cause’ of pride; that is, there must be a basis or reason for pride to arise.3 The cause 
of pride includes the ‘subject’ of the pride and the ‘quality’ that inheres in the subject (T 
2.1.2.6, 183). The subject is that about which the person feels proud, such as her 
character traits, bodily appearance, or property and possessions.  For the subject to be an 
effective cause of pride, however, it must have some quality that gives the recipient of 
pride a pleasing sentiment, such as beauty, virtue, or usefulness. Third, there must be a 
significant relationship between the cause and the would-be recipient of pride in order for 
the passion of pride to arise. We may take pleasure in the intelligence of wit or in the 
beauty of a garden, but if we are not witty and the garden is in no way related to us, then 
neither does our pleasure transfer to pride.4 The passion of humility relies upon the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See the third footnote in chapter three where I discuss the apparent discrepancy between Hume’s 
claim in Book II that pride is an impression of the self with his claim in Book I that we have no impression 
of the self. 
3 Davidson interprets Hume’s claim that there must be a “cause” of pride as a reason for the pride; in 
other words, the cause makes the pride intelligible (1976, 744). Likewise, Árdal summarizes Hume’s 
account by saying, “Pride is to Hume a favourable evaluation of oneself for a reason” (1989b, 389). 
Although Hume favors the third-personal language of ‘cause’ in his attempt to give a science of human 
nature, he does speak of “reasons” for pride and humility in T 2.1.2.2, 182. I say more about issues 
surrounding the language of ‘cause’ versus ‘reason’ in footnote #6. 
4 Notice that when the subject of the pride is the characteristic of the agent, the relationship between 
the subject and object of pride is one of identity (as Davidson puts it, “the subject is the proud person 
himself” (1976, 746), as with pride over one’s wit). This can be contrasted with cases where the subject of 
pride is external to the object (e.g., pride in one’s garden). Davidson proposes that it is simpler to drop 
Hume’s distinction between the ‘subject’ and ‘object’ of pride altogether and to see all forms of pride as 
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components, except that it is a negative impression of the self, and it is caused by a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reflecting in some way upon a property of the self. He suggests that the structure of the person’s pride-
causing belief has the form “I…,” where the predicate that can stand in for the dots may or may not refer to 
some object external to the agent (1976, 746). He takes this form to be superior because it builds the 
relationship between the self and that of which self is proud into the central belief that is the cause of pride. 
Furthermore, Davidson thinks that his revision better captures that the belief needed to cause the pride is 
not a belief about the subject of the pride but about the self. That is, for Davidson, even in cases where the 
cause of pride is external to the self, it is something about the self that accounts for the pride: I am proud 
not of my beautiful house but of myself as a possessor of a beautiful house, he insists. Davidson observes 
that this modification of Hume’s account allows us to explain how someone could be proud of an ugly 
house, even while disliking ugliness. It would not make sense to say that he is proud of the house (qua 
ugly), but if, for example, he believes that it is virtuous to be unconcerned about one’s surroundings, it is 
clear that he is proud of the property he believes he has—in this case, a virtuous lack of concern for 
external goods as revealed by being the owner of the ugly house (see 1976, 746).  
Árdal thinks, contrary to Davidson, that Hume’s distinction between subject and object is an 
important one, and he therefore rejects Davidson’s revision of Hume, which makes the cause of pride 
always about the praiseworthiness of the self (1989b, 388-89). (Baier also defends Hume’s distinction 
against Davidson (1978, 31-32), but for my purposes, I need not recount her reasons here.) Árdal maintains 
that Hume’s distinction is especially helpful for two reasons. First, it seems to have greater power for 
articulating a range of phenomena of pride. Namely, there seems to be something importantly different 
between one’s pride in her own characteristics versus a Canadian’s pride in her hockey team (1989b, 391) 
or an Icelander’s pride in her country (1989b, 393), since the former pride rests more on our own initiative, 
whereas the latter two causes of pride depend upon the worthiness of something external to the self (the 
team and the country’s land and culture). Second, because Hume’s distinction is better able to capture this 
difference, it is helpful for identifying when pride is justified. For pride to be justified the subject must 
actually have the value that it is believed to have and the relation between the subject and self must be such 
that the pride is warranted (see 1989, 391). In many cases when the subject of pride is external to rather 
than a characteristic of the self, one’s pride is justified if it rightly recognizes that the praiseworthiness of 
the pride is indeed not of one’s own making. For example, he says that when Canadians are proud of their 
hockey team or Icelanders are proud of their country, their pride, though just, is rightly about the 
praiseworthiness of the team or country, not themselves. Davidson builds the (believed) praiseworthiness of 
the self into his revised Humean account of pride, whereas as Árdal argues that “what constitutes a reason 
for pride differs from reasons that justify praise” (1989b, 393), maintaining that in certain cases a person 
may rightly take pride in something without for that reason being herself praiseworthy.  
I follow Árdal in upholding Hume’s distinction and in thinking both that it better captures the 
variable instances of pride and that it is useful for assessing the adequacy of pride. It does seem, for 
example, that when a father is appropriately proud of his daughter, he is primarily proud of her, not of 
himself as her father (as Davidson’s revision would require us to say). If he were to feel pride in his 
daughter’s accomplishments as though they were primarily his doing, it would seem that his pride in her 
would be misdirected and viciously excessive (though, of course, parents do usually play some role in their 
children’s success and may feel a proper satisfaction with respect to being a good parent). On the other 
hand, a father who feels no pride in his daughter’s accomplishments is also blameworthy for failing to have 
the appropriate bonds of love with his daughter such that he, through the expanded identity of love, shares 
in her success. While I thus do think that Davidson is wrong to insist that pride is always about the 
praiseworthiness of the self, I nevertheless think that Davidson’s attempt to simplify Hume touches upon 
something that I think is important about pride—namely, that there is an identification of oneself with that 
of which one takes pride, and in that sense pride, even when its cause is external, always reveals something 
about oneself and what one values. Accordingly, I think that Árdal is not quite correct to say that an 
individual Icelander who is proud of Iceland should not feel praiseworthy herself for her country (1989b, 
393). It seems to me that because of her expanded identity, which encompasses participation in her 
country’s heritage, she can justifiably take pride in herself qua Icelander, so long as she recognizes that the 
praiseworthiness of being Icelandic depends on the praiseworthiness of her heritage. (I talk briefly about 
pride and identity in I.a.ii.) The way in which pride arises with a view to our collective identities plays an 
important role in the formation of social faction, as I will explain in II.   
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painful quality of some subject that stands in relation to the self. For instance, we feel 
pained by ugliness and cowardice and, thus, if we regard ourselves as unattractive or 
cowardly, we will feel a similar pain with respect to ourselves.5    
Although Hume perhaps does not stress this point enough insofar as he takes a 
third-personal, scientific perspective in his description of the passions, it is clear that 
pride and humility can only arise if the beliefs and sentiments of the agent are engaged.6 
A person’s house may in fact be beautiful and even more beautiful than his neighbors’, 
but that person will not feel pride in his house unless he sees it as beautiful. Regardless of 
how a subject would be evaluated from the general view, it is ultimately the agent’s own 
evaluation of the related subject that will be decisive for whether and the extent to which 
pride or humility emerges for him. 
It is the way in which the agent’s evaluations may differ from the would-be 
evaluations issued from the general survey that allows for the possibility of ill-founded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I follow Davidson (1976, 750) and Árdal (1989b, 388) in rejecting Hume’s atomistic psychological 
account of pride whereby the self-approval of pride seems to involve two “atoms” of experience (namely, 
the reference to the self and the pleasurable impression of pride). I nevertheless also agree with both that 
the basic structure of pride can be separated from Hume’s atomism and, when done so, provides an 
accurate and insightful account of the dynamics of pride and humility in human life.  
6 All major commentators (e.g., Davidson 1976, Árdal 1989b, Baier 1978, Gabriele Taylor 1980, and 
King 1999) agree that pride depends upon the beliefs of the agent (though King, I think wrongly, de-
emphasizes belief more than others, as can be seen in his critique of Taylor on p. 130). Indeed, how could it 
not? Nevertheless, as mentioned in footnote #3, Hume tends to avoid the language of “reasons” when 
discussing the causes of pride, and I think Hume’s preference for the third-personal language of ‘cause’ is 
connected to Gabriele Taylor’s charge that Hume neglects the first-personal perspective (i.e., the beliefs of 
the agent) in his account of pride. She points out that Hume gives us examples of cases in which we would 
expect a person to feel pride or humility but, in fact, variable cases could be imagined where the person, 
given his or her first-personal perspective, would experience these passions differently than Hume 
describes. While I do think that Taylor overstates this problem when she claims that Hume “takes a wholly 
external or objective view of the situation [in his account of pride]; that is, he completely ignores the 
relevant beliefs of the agent himself” (1980, 388), I also think that Taylor has put her finger on a crucial 
lack in Hume’s account of the passions, which, as I will argue in the next chapter, leads him to be overly 
optimistic about the extent to which we can derive ethics from the passions while bracketing out the 
variable metaphysical views that inform our beliefs and values.  
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and often vicious (i.e., excessive) pride and humility.7 As discussed in the previous 
chapter, mistakes in relevant beliefs and sentiments that are disproportionate to subject’s 
value both contribute to inadequately grounded pride or humility.8 Hume suggests this 
difference between well-grounded and ill-founded pride in his contrast between a 
master’s pride in the feast that he hosts and a guest’s pride in being present at it. While 
Hume implies that the master is justifiably proud for throwing a successful feast, he 
indicates that the guest’s pride in attending it exceeds its just bounds insofar as it is 
generated by “so small a relation” between himself and the cause of pride (T 2.1.6.2, 
190). Just as our love can be biased and our sympathy narrow, so too can our pride issue 
from partiality, lacking the breadth, refinement, and clarity needed for grounding a well-
founded pride. Indeed, I later argue that our desire for pride is especially vulnerable to 
bias and underlies our tendency for bias in our love and sympathy as well. 
 
ii. Modifications to Hume’s Account 
 
I have been speaking of pride and humility as involving evaluations, but it is 
worth noting that this is not the language Hume tends to employ.9 Again, given Hume’s 
aim to provide a science of human nature, he takes the third-personal approach, 
emphasizing the role of pleasure and pain in pride and humility rather than that of valuing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 To qualify, not all ill-founded pride is thereby vicious. For instance, if a person receives faulty 
news of winning an award and feels pride on account of it, her pride is not blameworthy, even though it is 
based on a mistaken belief. If, however, the source of this false information was reputably unreliable but 
she, out of a vain desire to believe the news, quickly took it to be true without investigation, then her 
passion of pride in this instance could be said to express an underlying vicious pride (i.e., a tendency for 
pride to spring beyond its just bounds).  
8 As explored in the previous chapter, the beliefs relevant to pride and humility could pertain to the 
cause of the passion or to the strength of the relationship between the cause and agent. We can be mistaken 
about either or both. (It is worth mentioning that in this respect Hume’s account indicates that one must be 
a good moral judge in order to have well-founded pride, since properly identifying the just grounds for 
pride is a prerequisite to (or constitutive of) feeling pride appropriately.) 
9 Hume does occasionally use the word value. See T 2.1.2.5, 183, where he says, “Every valuable 
quality of the mind…are causes of pride and their opposites of humility…”  
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and disvaluing. But as Davidson rightly points out, Hume needs to say that for pride to 
arise we must approve of the subject of the pride, not merely be pleased by it (1976, 
748).10 Davidson observes, for example, that while we may not be pleased that others 
own houses more beautiful than ours, the fact that we could be proud or humiliated by 
our house presupposes that we approve of beautiful houses (1976, 748). An evaluative 
judgment, even if it is an implicit one, is necessary for pride.  
Davidson’s apt correction, however, is one that comports with Hume’s overall 
account of pride. Indeed, Hume’s claim that “every cause of pride, by its peculiar 
qualities, produces a separate pleasure, and of humility a separate uneasiness” (T 2.1.5, 
187, emphasis mine) is interpreted by Hume’s commentators to mean that the cause of 
pride is seen to have worth independent of its relation to the recipient of pride.11 Hume’s 
language of “separate” pleasure suggests that the pleasure needed to excite pride is the 
sort of pleasure that is constitutive of an evaluation.12 Of this special sort of pleasure he 
says,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Árdal 1989b concurs saying, that “The two accounts [his and Davidson’s] are also in agreement 
that Hume should have said that the proud person must see the cause of pride as having value rather than as 
an independent source of pleasure” (388). Gabriele Taylor also agrees with Davidson’s critique, pointing 
out that “it is quite possible to value something without finding it pleasant, and conversely, quite possible to 
think it agreeable without in the least valuing it. Mere pleasure is here not enough to account for the 
increase in self-esteem which is so central to pride” (1980, 392-93). (I side with Hume against Taylor, 
though, in maintaining that valuing something always involves some sentiment of pleasure, however subtle, 
even while granting that it is possible for the valuable to be difficult and therefore not immediately 
agreeable.)   
11 See, for example, Davidson (1976, 747-48) and King (1999, 126). 
12 For a helpful interpretation of Hume’s account of the nature of moral evaluation, see Árdal (1964). 
He points out that it is unclear exactly how we should understand the status of evaluations for Hume, given 
that his associational psychology blurs the typical distinctions we typically make between feelings, beliefs, 
and judgments (1964, 344). What is clear is that moral (as well as aesthetic) approbation and 
disapprobation depend upon taking up the general view. Árdal notes that Hume calls approbation and 
blame “nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred” (T 3.3.5.1, 391), but that what 
distinguishes them for Hume, Árdal says, is that love and hatred can be (and often are) biased whereas 
approval and disapproval can only arise if you have taken up the general view (1964, 342). Árdal thus 
thinks that on Hume’s account, approval is only genuine approval if it is made from the perspective of the 
general view, and if it is not, it is merely love and not approval at all, however much a person thinks she is 
being objective and issuing a positive evaluative judgment (1964, 342). If this interpretation is correct, I 
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The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration… We do not infer a 
character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such 
a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in 
our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. Our 
approbation is imply’d in the immediate pleasure they convey to us. (T 3.1.2.3, 
303) 
 
Since our judgments about virtue as well as “beauty, and tastes, and sensations” are the 
sorts of examples Hume uses when he discusses the causes of pride, it is only reasonable 
to suppose that the separate pleasure needed for pride be this special evaluative sort.  
That an evaluation, rather than mere pleasure or pain, is needed to evoke pride or 
humility is also suggested by Hume’s claim that the same qualities that cause pride (or 
humility) in ourselves cause love (or hatred) when we see them in others (T 2.2.1.9, 215-
16).13 James King helpfully calls this Hume’s ‘parity principle’ (1999, 128). According to 
the parity principle, if a person can feel humility upon recognizing that she takes 
malicious pleasure in her hated colleague’s misfortune, it follows that she negatively 
evaluates maliciousness as such and thus also would hate (i.e., disapprove of) the 
maliciousness of others. Thus, although Hume favors the language of pleasure and pain 
in his account of pride and humility, it is clear that for Hume, as Árdal puts it, “pride, 
humility, love, and hatred are, when caused by qualities of mind or character, the four 
basic ways of evaluating people” (1989, 389). Indeed, the parity principle depends upon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
depart in this chapter from Hume’s specialized usage of approval and use it in the ordinary sense, wherein 
approbations can be unjustified. Also, because I want to defer discussions of Hume’s meta-ethical positions 
till the next chapter, I here use the terms evaluations and judgments, without filling out what these would 
exactly entail for Hume.  
13 See where Hume says, “Since then the same qualities that produce pride or humility, cause love or 
hatred; all the arguments that have been employ’d to prove, that the causes of the former passions excite a 
pain or pleasure independent of the passion, will be applicable with equal evidence to the causes of the 
latter” (T 2.2.1.9, 216). 
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the “separate pleasure” being an independent valuation, for mere pleasure cannot account 
for universality implicit in those values that the parity principle assumes.14  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Although I maintain that for Hume pride and humility depend upon an evaluation and one that 
requires a correspondence between pride and love or humility and hatred, I am unconvinced with regard to 
King’s conclusion that the parity principle implies that the general view (or “a disinterested social 
perspective” (p. 127)) is built into Hume’s account of pride (1999, 126-27). To present King’s reasons for 
holding this view would carry me deep into interpretive issues in Hume that are unnecessary to pursue here. 
Suffice it to say, however, that I do not think the parity principle entails the impartiality of the general 
survey. We can imagine, for example, someone who takes pride in being “man of the house” and subjects 
his wife and children to a dominating form of rule. To be sure, his ability to take pride in this conception of 
manliness presupposes that he would approve of other men who embody his conception of manhood. 
Nevertheless, while there is parity between his pride and love, his evaluation of what it is to be 
praiseworthy qua male would not withstand scrutiny from the general view. In other words, I do not think 
Hume’s parity claim commits him to holding that the general view is built into his account of pride and 
humility. (Correspondingly, nor do I think, as King suggests, that all seeming pride which fails to garner 
approval from the general view is better termed a “secret relish,” which is what he claims we must call the 
sensible knave’s would-be pride in his knavery.) I read Hume as attempting to give a thorough account of 
the passions and as such, it would seem odd for him to exclude such a prevalent phenomenon as biased or 
unwarranted pride from his general description of the passion of pride. 
I side with Baier against King in interpreting Hume as allowing for biased pride and correspondingly 
biased love. She says, 
The moral sentiment, restricted in its possible causes to impartially discriminated qualities of mind 
or actions displaying them, may compete with more partial pride and equally partial love, both of 
which involve that jealous “comparison” which for Hume is “directly contrary” (T 593 [T 3.3.2.4, 
379, Norton edition]) to the generalized sympathy needed to generate the moral sentiment. (1978, 
35) 
This passage indicates that Baier would agree with my above point that we can have bias in our 
evaluations, which provide a faulty basis for both pride and love (i.e., that we can have a distorted value 
judgment that nevertheless follows the parity principle). I think this bears itself out in her discussion of 
biased pride, even though in the example she gives, it initially appears that biased pride presents a breach in 
the parity principle. In her example a person takes pride in her illicitly financed fine house, even while 
recognizing the morally deplorable manner in which the house was obtained (1978, 35). This would seem 
to suggest that the homeowner approves of herself even though she would disapprove of others who have 
illicitly financed houses, thereby breaking the parity principle. But Baier rightly observes that instead there 
are two points of view operative here causing the phenomenon that Hume discusses when he speaks of 
contrary feelings coexisting like oil and vinegar (1978, 36). I think we can see thus that the parity principle 
holds in both viewpoints here: the homeowner’s judgment that her behavior is wrong should evoke 
humility (just as it would prompt hatred/disapproval of the same action in another), but she seeks to keep 
such a judgment from the forefront of her mind, attending instead to her positive evaluation of owners of 
beautiful houses and herself as such an owner. To truly attend to the way in which her house was obtained 
would presumably cancel the pride she feels in its beauty, but even amidst her self-deceived failure to draw 
this inference it seems clear that her inadequately grounded pride in her beautiful house (qua beautiful 
house, not qua illicitly financed) upholds the parity principle.   
The possibility of biased pride (which either is founded on distorted judgments of value or fails to be 
properly corrected by other relevant pride-curbing assessments) is crucial to the general argument that I 
want to make in II. For now I will say that Hume seems to allow for biased pride by the very fact that he 
distinguishes between virtuous (i.e., well-founded) pride and vicious (i.e., excessive) pride in T 3.3.2 and 
also in that, as I will discuss in II., he traces certain mistaken judgments to our over-reaching tendency to 
pride. But even if King is correct that the general view is built into Hume’s account of pride—and I admit 
that certain passages lend support his interpretation—still the phenomenon of biased, ill-founded positive 
self-feeling (both individual and collective) causes significant problems for human flourishing that must be 
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In addition to Davidson’s point that Hume should have said we must approve of 
the subject of the pride for the pride to arise, it also sheds considerable light on the nature 
of pride if we look at the particular type of evaluations that are usually operative in an 
experience of pride. Specifically, I want to draw upon Charles Taylor’s distinction 
between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ evaluations (1985, 16-17) and show that strong evaluations 
are often, if not always, needed for pride to arise. Strong evaluations are qualitative 
evaluations of worth that are seen as normative for our desires. Strong evaluations 
employ categories such as noble or base, higher or lower, virtuous or vicious, more or 
less refined, and we see them as corresponding to different modes of life—e.g., as 
worthwhile versus regrettable, as genuinely fulfilling versus empty, as deep versus 
shallow, as authentic versus inauthentic, as artful versus crude. These sorts of evaluations 
always come in essentially comparative pairs: noble is always contrasted with base, and 
so on. Weak evaluations, by contrast, are judgments that x is superior to y because of x’s 
ability to yield maximal satisfaction. In a weak evaluation one option is only contingently 
better than the other based on what we happen to desire and what would happen to be the 
most advantageous way to achieve our desired ends.   
When, for example, a person chooses between vanilla and chocolate ice cream, 
and she judges chocolate to be the superior choice since it will better fill her current 
craving, she is making a weak evaluation. If her companion chooses vanilla, she does not 
condemn his choice as shallow or wicked; she sees him merely as having a different 
preference than she does.15 If, on the other hand, she is considering whether to lie in order 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
addressed. It is this phenomenon that I will explore in II, whether it be better termed Humean pride or 
“secret relish” will be immaterial to the issues I want to raise.  
15 If, strangely enough, she regards those who choose chocolate as expressing an appreciation for 
richness thereby indicating a more cultivated sensibility than those who choose vanilla, then she has made a 
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to attain some desired end, she manifests moral obtuseness if she thinks of the 
alternatives solely in weak evaluative terms—i.e., if she sees lying or truth-telling as 
indifferent alternatives to be judged as better or worse solely by virtue of which will 
better fulfill her desires. Rather, most would hold that she mistakes the nature of the 
decision unless she is able to strongly evaluate that lying is a base temptation even if it 
affords a more favorable outcome and that truthfulness is honorable even if it causes her 
pain.  
It seems to me, as I will soon argue, that pride usually depends at some level upon 
strong evaluation—a point that will become very important in the next chapter. In 
Hume’s explicit account, pride depends upon the agent having merely a “separate 
pleasure” with respect to pride’s cause. If we look, however, at the sort of evaluations 
implicit in Hume’s examples of the causes of pride, most clearly involve strong 
evaluations. Two persistent causes of pride, Hume observes, are virtue and beauty (of 
one’s body, of the excellence of strength and vitality, or of one’s possessions) (T 2.1.7, 
193-95; T 2.1.8, 195-98), both of which are strong evaluative terms. Virtue is seen not 
just as a personal preference but as categorically and normatively praiseworthy and 
constitutive of a higher mode of life, such that a failure to praise virtue would be seen as 
a deficiency.16 (We see this not just in virtues we tend to regard as centrally important, 
such as benevolence or justice. We also see the strong evaluations implicit in less 
significant though nonetheless praiseworthy excellences of mind, such as our sense that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
strong evaluation in a domain where most regard it to be appropriately limited to weak evaluation. Most 
areas of choice can be interpreted in either strongly or weakly evaluative terms. Which sorts of decisions 
are seen as properly involving one sort of evaluation or the other can itself be contentious. 
16 The actual meta-ethical status of virtues and vices as well as the nature of moral evaluations for 
Hume will be discussed in the next chapter. My point here is one about how strong evaluations are 
experienced, not about their actual status or whether the normative demand we experience them to have is 
in fact justified.  
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wit is qualitatively superior to slowness of mind.) Beauty also is not a weak evaluative 
category to be understood in terms of mere preference; it is seen as qualitatively superior 
to its counterpart of ugliness or deformity. Although not all strongly valued goods are 
equally valuable and do not warrant the same degree of pride (e.g., courage is more 
important and pride-worthy than wit or a beautiful appearance), it is evident that each of 
these causes of pride usually involve strong evaluation on the part of the agent.17 
Some of Hume’s examples of the causes of pride are less clearly strongly 
evaluative, however. Hume cites, for instance, riches and power (see T 2.1.3.4, 184) as 
causes of pride, and one might well argue that a person could judge these to be good 
merely because of their usefulness in satisfying our preferences (weak evaluation) rather 
than their contribution to a qualitatively higher mode of life (strong evaluation). To this it 
may be observed, however, that since so much of human life falls under the domain of 
strong evaluation, we are prone to evaluate that which tends to fulfill human desire as 
being qualitatively better. The ‘riches’ of which the wealthy are proud tend to signify for 
us not just material possessions but a grandness of life that stands opposed to poverty, 
want, need. The ‘power’ that causes pride in the powerful tends to signify, for example, 
not merely a greater ability to gratify one’s desires (see T 2.1.10.11 205), but a position 
of strength (and often prestige or honor) that opposes impotence or weakness. More 
importantly, even if we could keep strong evaluative judgments at bay when considering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 It is certainly possible to give reductive accounts of virtue and beauty that would collapse them 
into weak evaluations—e.g., by claiming that what we call virtue and beauty are those characteristics and 
attributes that are quantitatively better for their tendency to produce pleasure (see utilitarianism). Hume’s 
own account tends to be reductive as well—a point I will address in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, in our 
lived experience, we regularly make qualitative distinctions of worth and, as I soon suggest above, it is 
unclear that a merely weakly valued good is sufficient to generate pride, or at least to ground a pride of any 
significance. 
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wealth and power or other such potential causes of pride, it is difficult to see why either 
would serve as much cause for pride if they were only weakly valued.  
We can see this point if we imagine a person who wins the lottery and must 
decide whether to keep the money or to give it away. Suppose that she does not regard 
the money and the life it can provide as holding any intrinsically qualitative worth, nor 
does she strongly evaluate that it would be morally noble to give the money to those who 
need help. (If she were deciding between these two qualitative goods, the character of her 
decision would be drastically different—involving sacrifice of one strongly valued good 
to the other—than if her choice was made solely in weakly evaluative terms.) Imagine 
instead that she considers whether she should keep the money merely by weighing 
whether it will help her better attain the desires she happens to have. She speculates that 
wealth will afford her with ease and luxuries on the one hand, but on the other, it could 
change her relationship to her friends and diminish the satisfaction that comes from 
working for certain goods in her life. If she decides to keep the money because she 
ultimately judges that it will better fulfill the desires she happens to have, her choice is 
akin to the person who chooses chocolate over vanilla ice cream. But then it becomes 
unclear why she would take pride in wealth (or in being a chocolate-lover). Only if 
wealth were seen as qualitatively better (or if loving chocolate were seen as indicative of 
a more cultivated sensibility) would it make sense to feel pride in it.18 Indeed, on what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Nor could she be proud of deciding to give away the money unless she strongly evaluated that 
doing so was qualitatively better than keeping her winnings for herself. If her decision were solely based on 
the judgment that wealth would decrease her happiness, she would have no real grounds for self-approval 
in her decision to give it away—unless of course she strongly values being a good calculator of what will 
satisfy her wants and sees her decision as an instance of good calculation. Kierkegaard’s Aesthete is a 
character that sees alternative options primarily in weak evaluative terms but nevertheless strongly 
evaluates and takes pride in being an expert in judging what will best satisfy his desires.   
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grounds could one be legitimately proud of a mere preference unless one evaluates that 
preference as expressing some strongly valued good?19 
That pride usually involves strong evaluations is also suggested by Hume’s claim 
that there is parity between what we take pride in and what we love in others, for this 
parity suggests the categorical character found in strong evaluations that is lacking from 
weak evaluative ones.20 There is nothing about that which I judge to be good merely 
because I prefer it that ensures that I will approve of that preference in another. While I 
may tend to approve of those who share my preferences, there is no reason why I must 
approve of them or disapprove of those who do not share my preferences. But strongly 
valued goods are otherwise; one regards them as worthy of approbation wherever they 
are found. Thus, in order for Hume to endorse the parity principle, it seems he must 
implicitly have had strongly valued goods in mind in his discussions of pride and love.21 
This is obscured, however, not only because he conflates strong and weak evaluation but 
especially because he, in his attempt to give a science of the passions, prefers and, if he is 
to be consistent, must employ language that is more at home in weak evaluations.22 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Perhaps an exception to this could be the pride and humility felt solely by means of social 
perception. The person who inadvertently responds out of turn at a ceremony blushes with humility at the 
way her voice hangs alone in the air, noticed by everyone in the room. Her humility is likely aroused more 
by social attention being turned on her foible than by failing to live up to something she strongly values. 
While it is possible for humility to arise in this way, however, it lacks the existential significance of 
humility that arises upon being unaligned with a strongly valued good. Needless to say, the same is true for 
pride.  
20 To clarify, by categorical I do not mean that it involves a universal moral demand, as does Kant’s 
use of ‘categorical’ when he defines the categorical imperative. To see art as a strongly valued good in 
human life, for example, is not to think that everyone must become artists. It does mean, however, that I 
will approve of (good) artists qua artist when I encounter them. It also means that I think that art is a good 
that should be recognized by others and that a person lacks adequate formation if she fails to see its 
importance. 
21 On Hume’s account, the parity principle is founded upon his contention that we share a stable 
human nature and hence find the same sorts of things agreeable and disagreeable; hence, as I discuss in 
Chapter Five, it only mimics strong evaluation.  
22 Since Hume discusses the pride and humility of animals who have no capacity for strong 
evaluation (e.g., swans, turkeys, peacocks, nightingales (T 2.1.12.4, 212)), my claim that Hume’s account 
of pride usually implicitly depends upon strong evaluation needs further explanation. On the one hand, 
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One crucial instance in which Hume clearly depends upon pride that is grounded 
in strong evaluations is in his response to the sensible knave. The knave, as mentioned in 
the last chapter, is one who is able to ferret out ways to exploit others for his own ends 
without serious risk of punishment. As we saw, this poses a potential problem for Hume’s 
ethics insofar as it raises the question of whether he has the resources to explain why the 
sensible knave would be motivated to be just if he can get away with securing his private 
pleasure by unjust means. Recall that Hume’s response to this challenge was to maintain 
that we should be motivated to act virtuously, instead of to embrace knavery, because 
only through virtue can we take “invaluable enjoyment” (i.e., pride) in our character; and 
such pride is more valuable than the “worthless toys and gewgaws” (E IX.II, 283) that are 
won unjustly.  
Notice that the sensible knave could, in his knavery, be interpreted as a weak 
evaluator with respect to his deliberations: his desired end is pleasure, and he judges that 
being unjust in particular instances is better because it will be more expedient in helping 
him to achieve his end. Hume’s response to the motivational problem that the knave 
presents involves making the strong evaluative judgments that the knave’s choice 
involves “villainy,…baseness,…treachery and roguery” and that the life of virtue is 
“without price” (E IX.II, 283). Virtue, Hume thereby suggests, is incommensurable with, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Gabriele Taylor may simply be right to argue that the “complexity of thought and assessment in fact 
involved in pride” makes implausible Hume’s claim that pride and humility are to be found throughout the 
animal kingdom (1980, 401). It does seem, however, that nonhuman animals experience pride somewhat 
analogously to human pride. I think we can reconcile the strong evaluative character of human pride with 
Hume’s analogous attribution of pride to nonhuman animals by attending to Hume’s remark that since 
nonhuman animals have no concept of virtue and vice or property, the causes of this pride must be related 
to the body—e.g., its beauty, strength, or swiftness—rather than the mind (T 2.1.12.5, 212). This suggests 
that for the nonhuman animal, pride is dependent solely on the pleasure of flourishing as the sort of creature 
that it is. Thus, if Hume is correct to see an analogy here, we might maintain that since humans do have 
strongly evaluative concepts that nonhuman animals do not have, pride and humility is usually different for 
humans in precisely this way.    
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because qualitatively higher than, the sort of external goods and “feverish, empty 
amusements of luxury and expense” that the knave seeks to attain (E IX.II, 283). Hume’s 
response to the knave thus is not primarily that the knave has calculated wrongly and that 
in light of our human nature the life of virtue is in fact a better method for yielding 
maximal pleasure. Rather, Hume seems to see the life of virtue as a strongly valued good 
such that it is normative for our desires. The knave does not just have a preference for 
acting in a way that will yield less pleasure than virtue; his unconcern for justice is “base” 
and “villainous.” (Whether Hume’s ethic founded on a science of human nature is 
sufficient to support such strongly evaluative claims will be an important point of 
discussion in the next chapter, however.) Thus, Hume’s reply to the problem of the knave 
implies that we should be motivated to virtue not only because, given human nature, it is 
the most probable route to happiness, but perhaps more importantly because—if we agree 
with his strong evaluative claim about the worth of the virtuous life, and Hume assumes 
that his readers do—we will not want to be base, villainous characters.  
An important reason that a prideful concern for our character can be a powerful 
motive for virtue (or for pursuing whatever we strongly value over and above what we 
judge as lesser goods) is connected to the way in which, as Charles Taylor points out, 
personal identity is essentially bound up with our strong evaluations (1985, 34).23 This is 
especially true, he observes, of those strong values that are seen as inseparable from 
ourselves and which, if lost, would cause a breakdown of agency, an identity crisis of a 
particularly deep and disorienting sort (1985, 35). The knave is not motivated to pursue 
justice over and against the more immediate pleasure he would have by injustice 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 By personal identity, I refer not to a philosophical account of identity (the sort of which Hume 
shows to be empirically unidentifiable) but to how we define ourselves when we specify what is most 
central to who we are. 
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presumably because he does not strongly value justice. Its value has no pull on his 
identity: “his heart rebel[s] not against such pernicious maxims, … he feel[s] no 
reluctance to the thoughts of villainy” (E IX.2, 283).24 (Perhaps he instead strongly values 
being a powerful, independent, and clever person, able to rise above convention; these, 
then, will be the values that form his identity and would have particular power to 
motivate him over and against conflicting preferences.) On the other hand, if a person 
sees justice to be admirable, noble, right, then this says something about herself, i.e., that 
she values justice, and that being just is important to her sense of the kind of person that 
she is or wants to become more fully. Moreover, the extent to which she strongly values 
justice is proportional to the centrality it holds on her identity. It is primarily because our 
notion of ourselves is linked to strong values in this way that prideful concern for our 
character can motivate us to resist the pull of immediate self-interest.25 But it also implies 
that for pride to be morally motivating, one’s identity must be informed by the qualitative 
importance of the ethical life in the first place.  
In the previous chapter I pointed out that Hume (rightly) sees that the passions of 
pride and humility matter acutely to us. The pleasure of pride is inherently desirable, and 
even more so because it is a pleasure that pertains to our very self. Now with the category 
of strong evaluation at our disposal, I think that we are better able to see that it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 If he did strongly value justice then he would no longer be the knave that Hume presents but, 
rather, a person who struggles with akrasia or a self-deceived lack of attention to the incongruence between 
his actions and moral judgments.  
25 Enlightened self-interest may also, but to a lesser degree, afford the motivational power to resist 
temptations to injustice and the like. The weak evaluation that it is better (i.e., more expedient but not 
higher or more noble) to act for one’s enlightened self-interest cannot, however, be incorporated into one’s 
identity in such a way as to constitute a concern for character when acting from such motives. If, however, 
one strongly values being enlightened about one’s desires, being strong enough to resist immediate 
temptation, and so on, then it can then become a matter of pride to act from enlightened self-interest. As I 
suggested in footnote #18, we see a case of the person who strongly values acting from enlightened self-
interest, I think, in Kierkegaard’s Aesthete; he feels contempt for the stupidity of those who act on brute 
impulse and enjoys seeing himself as artful and intelligent in his pursuit of pleasure.   
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primarily the quality of our self that is appreciated when we feel pride, and the 
significance of pride to us corresponds to the significance that we take the cause of pride 
to have. We may value beauty and be proud of our beauty; nevertheless, humility may be 
our dominating self-feeling if we fail in some important way to live up to a value that we 
regard as much more significant than beauty—e.g., if we judge ourselves to be petty or 
foolish. There is perhaps nothing more central to a good life than the ability to feel 
genuine self-approval with respect to one’s most cherished values and nothing more 
crushing than humility caused by failure to live up to what we regard as most worthy, 
despite the presence of other goods.26 
 
iii. Sources of Pride 
 
The importance of pride to a good life is further appreciated when we observe 
with Hume that the self-evaluative passions are pervasive in human psychology, making 
it thereby difficult to forget our need for pride when we lack the sources that could 
sustain it. To be sure, on Hume’s account we cannot avoid self-evaluative feeling and, 
moreover, there is a strong inertia towards the self in our emotional lives.27 The specific 
passions of pride and humility are, Hume says, “determin’d [i.e., structured so as] to have 
the self for their object, not only by a natural but also by an original principle [of human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This is in part why the Stoics will go so far as to say that a virtuous person can be happy on the 
racks, for virtue bestows the person with the happiness of self-approval that comes with being good. It is 
also why the humility of failing to live up to some strongly held good can be a pain of the worst sort. We 
might think of Aristotle’s claim that those who have done many terrible actions “hate and shun life because 
of their vice, and destroy themselves” (NE IX.4, 143). We see this in Judas, whose shame in betraying 
Jesus drove him to suicide, or in how intensely the mysterious visitor in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers 
Karamazov suffered (and, indeed, contemplated suicide) after murdering a woman he loved but could not 
have (304-12).  
27 He claims, for instance, “the idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us…” (T 2.2.4.7, 
229) and that we have a “great propensity…to pride” (T 2.2.4.8, 229). 
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nature]” (T 2.1.3.2, 184).28 In other words, the mind’s penchant for turning towards itself 
is not only “constant and steady” (i.e., natural) but unalterably rooted in our nature (i.e., 
an original principle). This explains Hume’s observation that “any thing, that gives a 
pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also 
agreeable, and has self for its object” (T 2.1.5.8, 189, emphasis mine, see also T 2.1.9.5, 
199).29 Self-evaluative feeling arises readily as we engage with others and the world. 
Since the passion of pride is highly and persistently desired, it is worth discussing 
more fully what Hume’s account implies for how pride can be secured. It implies, first, 
that we cannot directly “give” ourselves this passion by force of will.30 Pride is and must 
be supported by causes, and in the absence of such support, the passion of pride cannot be 
sustained. As Hume puts it, “daily experience convinces us, that pride requires certain 
causes to excite it, and languishes when unsupported by some excellency in the character, 
in bodily accomplishments, in cloaths, equipage or fortune” (T 2.1.5.7, 188). It is true 
that the momentary passions of pride and humility can settle into dispositions toward 
self-approval or self-hatred over time and that these dispositions can seem to be general 
and unspecified as to the grounds that undergird them.31 Hume’s account suggests, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 By “original principle” Hume means that we observe it to be true of human nature but that we 
cannot go any further in our explanation of causes for these principles (see T 1.4.7.5, 173). They are the 
bedrock principles that can be identified empirically. They help explain the workings of the human mind 
that depend upon them, but their existence can only be affirmed, for we have no recourse to further 
principles which could explain them. While, for example, the workings of pride and humility and the 
principle of comparison help explain forms of envy and malice (T 2.2.8, 240-45) we cannot posit any 
underlying principle that explains the existence of pride and humility; nevertheless they are undeniably 
present. Hume regards sympathy as another original principle of human nature (see EPM V.2, 219n1). 
29 See also where Hume says, “all agreeable objects, related to ourselves, by an association of ideas 
and of impressions, produce pride, and disagreeable ones, humility” (T 2.1.6.1, 190).  
30 This stands in contrast to a trend in popular psychology to champion self-esteem and to suggest 
that it can be sufficiently had by reiterating to ourselves that we are special. 
31 Arnold Isenberg says this point well: “Pride and shame have been defined as feelings, and that is 
what they are in the isolated act of reflection. But reflection is continual so that the momentary reactions 
establish themselves as dispositions, affect the structure of personality and modify the life pattern” (1980, 
366).  
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however, that habitual self-esteem or disregard must be nourished by particular passions 
of pride or humility that necessarily arise on the basis of specific causes. If the disposition 
to pride is deprived of its support, it deteriorates. This is not to say that we do not play a 
role in the extent to which we feel pride and humility. We may, for example, attend to 
those things that bolster our pride and avoid dwelling upon those things that excite our 
humility, we can frame various scenarios in ways that alter the humility we might feel 
(e.g., conceiving of sexual license not as promiscuity but as a liberated affirmation of the 
body, and so on), and we can seek to act in such a way as to warrant positive self-
assessment. Nevertheless, Hume’s account rightly implies that our immediate feelings of 
pride and humility are not directly under our control.    
This is not only because pride and humility are grounded in their causes but also 
because, as Hume argues, human nature is constituted so as to find certain causes 
admirable and others odious. Thus, despite our natural desire for pride, we cannot simply 
decide willy-nilly to praise whatever we find to be true about ourselves. Although I 
pointed out that in some cases we can seek to frame the phenomena relevant to self-
assessment in various ways, still our human nature imposes limits upon the extent to 
which we can earnestly consider rival interpretations. Hume insists that there is—and 
indeed his account of ethics depends upon—a general universality in the way that we 
experience pleasure and pain, such that if certain sorts of pleasures or pains are related to 
ourselves, we will respectively feel pride or humility.  
This is not just because Hume thinks that we will always feel pleasure in relation 
to the qualities of goodness and beauty and pain in relation to badness and ugliness as we 
experience them. More controversially, Hume expects that there will be a broad 
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agreement of sentiment about what we regard to be good and beautiful or bad and ugly. 
He correspondingly thinks that there is near universal concurrence regarding what causes 
pride and humility. The following passage is worth quoting in full:  
We may, perhaps, make it a greater question, whether the causes, that produce the 
passion [of pride or humility], be as natural as the object [i.e., the self], to which 
it is directed, and whether all that vast variety proceeds from caprice or from the 
constitution of the mind? This doubt we shall soon remove, if we cast our eye 
upon human nature, and consider that in all nations and ages, the same objects 
still give rise to pride and humility; and that upon the view even of a stranger, we 
can know pretty nearly, what will either increase or diminish his passions of this 
kind. If there be any variation in this particular, it proceeds from nothing but a 
difference in the tempers and complexions of men; and is besides very 
inconsiderable. Can we ever imagine it possible, that while human nature remains 
the same, men will ever become entirely indifferent to their power, riches, beauty 
or personal merit, and that their pride and vanity will not be affected by these 
advantages?” (T 2.1.3.4, 184) 
 
The force of Hume’s claims here is, I think, that certain things (be they character traits, 
cultural artifacts, possessions, and so on) just are constitutive of or contribute to a 
flourishing human life, and thus we by nature cannot but approve of them since we are 
inevitably concerned with our own flourishing and, because we are socially dependent as 
well as sympathetically constituted, with the flourishing of society.32 In light of the 
regular and predictable way in which human passions tend to operate, Hume concludes 
that human nature is by and large steady and that we share the same fundamental needs, 
desires, and enjoyments. (If this were not the case, sympathy would not be possible, nor 
would our emotions be intelligible.33) Correspondingly, we are bound by our nature to 
approve of what improves and disapprove of what hampers human life. We are likewise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Of course “flourishing” on Hume’s account is determined by what fosters pleasure, given the 
rational, socially-dependent, sympathetically-constituted kinds of beings we find ourselves to be.  
33 If, for example, a person were to respond to kindness with contempt, this negative sentiment 
towards kindness would be baffling. Such a response could become intelligible were we to find out, for 
instance, that this person was suspicious that an instance of kindness was really a ploy to manipulate others. 
If this were the case, though, the negative response would be to the manipulation, not to the kindness as 
such.  
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bound to feel pride when we possess those characteristics that we take to be constitutive 
of flourishing and that we affirm for that reason.  
Although Hume insists upon a general agreement about those things that are 
estimable or blameworthy (and thus about what will cause pride and humility when 
related to ourselves), in the above passage Hume does concede that there are minor 
evaluative disagreements, which he traces these to differences of temperament. 
Elsewhere, however, Hume seems to acknowledge a greater variation of evaluative 
judgments and has a correspondingly richer account for why such differences occur. “Of 
the Standard of Taste” looks at the role of cultivation in good evaluative judgments, “A 
Dialogue” and The Natural History suggest the role of religious superstition in corrupting 
the “natural and usual force of the passions,” sections of Book II of the Treatise offer an 
account of how certain emotions can compete with sympathy, causing our evaluations to 
be skewed (a point I will explore in II.a.), and Hume’s moral philosophy as a whole is 
able to account for a large range of cultural differences. It thus turns out that Hume does 
admit to a greater degree of value differences than the above passage suggests, but this 
variation of value, nevertheless, Hume sees against a backdrop of widespread agreement 
that he expects will be relatively stable. The “natural and usual force of the passions” (T 
3.3.2.18, 311) operates the way it does because of its origin in human nature, and this 
ensures that what genuinely contributes to a human happiness will generally be met with 
approbation (when viewed impartially from the general survey), unless the passions have 
been inappropriately cultivated or corrupted. 
The fact, though, that sentiments can be inappropriately cultivated or corrupted 
means that it is possible to take pride or humility in the wrong things or to the wrong 
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extent. Hume, indeed, acknowledges that pride can be ill-founded in these ways when he 
distinguishes vicious forms of pride with virtuous ones in Treatise 3.3.2.1. The sources 
for pride and humility thus need not always be “intrinsic values” (see T 2.2.8.1, 240).34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Hume uses the term “intrinsic value” seven times in the Treatise, and he also refers to the 
“intrinsic merit” (e.g., T 2.1.6.4, 191) or “intrinsic worth” of things (e.g., T 2.2.8.1, 240). However, because 
Hume’s sentimentalist account of value commits him to maintaining that “[o]bjects have absolutely no 
worth or value in themselves. They derive their worth merely from passion” (ESY 166), the question 
naturally arises as to what an intrinsic value is for Hume.  
The analogy that Hume, following Hutcheson, draws between secondary qualities and values 
(primarily moral and aesthetic) (THN 3.1.1.26, 301-2; ESY 166n3; LDH # 16, 39-40) is helpful for 
ascertaining the sense in which values can be said to be intrinsic in a Humean sense. This analogy 
maintains (at least) that as sensible qualities like taste and color, for example, reside not in objects but are 
an effect of the way in which our sense organs interact with objects, so too do value-qualities reside in the 
responses of human sentiments as they interact with objects in reliably stable ways. By this analogy Hume 
may be suggesting that although the sensible qualities and values reside in the subject rather than the 
object, there is a kind of objectivity within human subjectivity about secondary qualities and values. From 
within the standpoint of the human community, for example, this lemon really is yellow and a hence 
colorblind person can be wrong about a particular color. Similarly, from within the standpoint of the human 
community (and when viewed impartially), proper pride really is good, and correspondingly, a person with 
malformed sentiments can be wrong about its value (as Hume thinks Pascal is when he embraces humility). 
(See ESY 166n3 for a more complete account of the sense in which secondary qualities [and the values 
analogous to them] are objective: they are, Hume thinks, equally as real and equally as important to us as if 
they were in the things themselves—i.e., as if they were primary qualities.) I presume, then, that by 
‘intrinsic’ goods Hume is referring to those objects or qualities that human sentiment, being structured as it 
is, impartially regards as valuable. It would moreover seem on Hume’s account that human sentiment is 
united in regarding certain things to be intrinsically good because those things contribute to or are 
constitutive of flourishing (as can be affirmed from the general view). (See T 2.1.6.4, 191, where Hume 
points to health as an example of an intrinsic good.)  
Obviously not all sentiments point to intrinsic goods, however, and this is not only because our 
sentiments are strongly prone to bias. Hume usually uses the language of intrinsic merit when he contrasts 
it with some other principle in human nature that plays a role in shaping our evaluative responses, such as 
the principle of comparison whereby an uncommon object is seen as having greater value by virtue of its 
rarity or our tendency to overlook the value of that to which we are accustomed (see T 2.1.6.4, 191). As I 
have suggested in the previous chapter, although comparative evaluations can obscure our awareness of 
intrinsic goods, they need not. Comparisons, I argued, are necessary for honing moral sensitivity (and for 
forming a sense of due pride) because they allow us to recognize greater and lesser goods in relation to 
each other and in different contexts. Nevertheless, comparisons do have the potential for rendering Hume’s 
ethics more contingent than his analogy between values and secondary qualities suggests. Michael Gill 
explores some of contingencies implied by Hume’s account of comparison (2006, 241-61), and although I 
think that he overstates his case by neglecting to emphasize that there is a real spectrum of moral and 
aesthetic grounds for value judgments that underlie our comparatively-informed evaluations (a spectrum 
that Hume’s account of a standard of taste, I think, necessarily depends), there are crucial issues he raises 
for Hume’s moral philosophy that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
(Commentators debate about the extent to which Hume intended the analogy between value and 
secondary qualities to be taken seriously and whether it is plausible in whatever extent he meant it. For 
helpful discussions of Hume’s analogy between value and secondary qualities, see Blackburn (1993, 273-
75); Winkler (1996); Sturgeon (2001, especially pp. 14-16, 28-43); and Gill (2006, 241-61). My 
interpretation of Hume is closest to Winkler’s. Blackburn thinks that Hume did not rely on the analogy in 
his moral philosophy and “could not possibly have done so, for reasons lying deep in his philosophy” 
(1993, 273), but I think that Winkler successfully shows that Blackburn’s interpretation is mistaken and 
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Disordered, biased, or corrupted sentiment-informed evaluations can also undergird these 
passions or can prompt us to seek pride in the wrong ways. (In fact I think that this is far 
more common than Hume’s stress on near universal agreement of sentiment would seem 
to suggest.) The relationship between biased sentiments and pride will be a central topic 
in section II. Before, however, exploring ill-formed pride and its negative consequences 
for flourishing, Hume’s account of pride and humility must be filled out still more by 
situating these passions in their social context. The perceptions of others, Hume argues, 
serve as another source for these passions—often congruent with and lending support to 
the “intrinsic values” that stand behind proper pride but sometimes diverging from them 
and contributing to the undue pride or humility that will be of interest later in the chapter. 
 
b. Pride and Love of Fame 
 
Hume’s account of the passions of pride and humility, which I have sketched 
above, acquires new dimension and complexity when he calls attention to how these 
passions are intersubjectively informed. Hume observes that sociality runs deep in human 
nature, and the phenomena of pride and humility cannot be fully explained apart from 
appreciating the extent to which our self-assessments are influenced by the perceptions 
and values of others, for as Hume says, “besides [the] original causes of pride and 
humility, there is a secondary one in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence 
on the affections” (T 2.1.11.1, 206). In this section I will explore Hume’s observations 
with respect to the social dynamics pertaining to pride and humility.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that Hume did take the analogy seriously (see especially 1996, 14-18). As will become clear in Chapter 
Five, I am not convinced, however, that Hume can ultimately defend this analogy while also cutting off 
cosmic questions and rejecting a teleological conception of human nature.)    
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The reason our pride and humility can be both directly and indirectly influenced 
by others stems from the principle of sympathy (T 2.1.11.1, 206), which Hume thinks is a 
natural and original principle of human nature.35 In the previous chapter I presented 
Hume’s account of sympathy so as to show how the virtue of pride enables us to move 
from our natural, biased sympathy to the wider, more extensive sympathy necessary for 
moral evaluation. Here I again want to present Hume’s initial account of (natural) 
sympathy in order now to show its effects upon the passions of pride and humility, and 
therefore upon one’s sense of oneself.  
Hume thinks that affections arise from sympathy in the following manner: First, 
the external signs (whether verbal or non-verbal) expressed by a person give me the idea 
of her sentiments. For example, my friend’s smile and shining eyes convey to me the idea 
of her happiness, and this idea is reinforced when she tells me of the good news she 
received. Second, my idea of the other’s sentiment is “converted into an impression” in 
me and furthermore “acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very 
passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection” (T 2.1.11.3, 206). 
That is, the idea of my friend’s happiness changes into the feeling of happiness, so that I 
now feel the same joy that she feels. (Note that Hume’s technical meaning of ‘sympathy’ 
is broader than everyday usage. Sympathy can refer to feeling any feeling that another 
has, not merely to feeling along with another in a way that affirms the other’s experience. 
Feeling another’s dislike of me is an instance of sympathy for Hume.)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Hume says, for example, that “no quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in 
its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication 
their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own” (T 2.1.11.2, 206). 
That he sees this propensity for sympathy as an original principle of human nature is clear from footnote 1 
of section V.2 in the Second Enquiry, which reads, “It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, 
why we have humanity or fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a 
principle in human nature” (EPM V.2, 219n1). 
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As discussed in Chapter Three, Hume initially describes sympathy as largely 
passive. In Hume’s language the idea of another’s emotions simply “converts itself” into 
the same emotion in the sympathizer. We can think, for instance, of the little boy who 
“catches” the tears of his big sister, or how, despite our best efforts, we find that we have 
acquired the grumpy mood of our colleague. It would seem on Hume’s initial account of 
sympathy, merely recognizing another’s emotional state can suffice for the other’s inner 
condition to emerge within oneself (though as Hume later points out, our natural 
sympathetic responses can be interrupted by the principle of comparison). As Hume 
observes, “A cheerful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my 
mind; as an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden damp upon me” (T 2.1.11.2, 206). 
The passive elements of sympathy explain why it is impossible to be wholly unaware of 
or unaffected by the affective life of those around us—a point that will become important 
when we look at how sympathy allows us to feel, sometimes quite deeply, others’ 
perceptions of ourselves.  
Hume additionally maintains that sympathy affects our thoughts as well as 
feelings. Among the evidence to which he appeals in order to illustrate our great 
propensity for sympathy he cites the tendency of children to “embrace every opinion 
propos’d to them,” the fact that “men of the greatest judgment and understanding…find it 
very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their 
friends and daily companions,” and the “uniformity we may observe in…the turn of 
thinking of those in the same nation” (T 2.1.11.2, 206). This is in part because, as Hume 
reminds us in his discussion of sympathy, he had argued in Book I that all ideas are 
copies of impressions and these “differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity, with 
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which they strike upon the soul” (T 2.1.11.7, 207). Our ability to receive the 
ideas/impressions of others and our social inclination to concord with others thus makes 
us disposed to accept the beliefs of others. As Hume remarks, “Nothing is more natural 
than for us to embrace the opinions of others,” because “sympathy…renders all their 
sentiments intimately present to us and reasoning… makes us regard their judgment, as a 
kind of argument for what they affirm” (T 2.1.11.9, 208-9). 
Although sympathy is natural, Hume points out that we do not readily sympathize 
with all others to the same extent. Hume observes that the degree, depth, and intensity 
with which we feel another’s condition depends upon the resemblance (e.g., shared 
language, culture, personality) and contiguity (spatial proximity) between ourselves and 
those with whom we sympathize (T 2.1.11.5-6, 207). The transference of sentiment and 
opinion, for example, occurs more readily with respect to those that strike us as sharing 
similar values and ways of viewing the world than those whose beliefs and way of life are 
more foreign to us. Sympathy also arises more easily with people who are physically 
close to us. We are more likely, for instance, to be disturbed by the pedestrian before us 
who got hit by a car than the thought of many more who are suffering from severe 
political unrest in another part of the world.36 
That sympathy, especially with those like and near us, plays a large role in our 
thoughts and feelings (see T 2.1.11.9, 208) is of special importance for Hume’s account 
the passions of pride and humility, for he notes that sympathy “must have a peculiar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 While greater sympathy with those similar and close to us is not de facto problematic, it is 
important, as was discussed in Chapter Three, to seek to extend our sympathy with those to whom our 
initial sympathy would fail adequately to include. Extensive sympathy, as previously mentioned, is 
essential to taking up the general view from which moral judgments can be made, but also, as I will later 
suggest, extensive sympathy is important to cultivating a well-founded pride. As I later show, a more 
narrow sympathy limited to those who are near and like us can work on our natural desire for pride so as to 
entrench a biased perspective and, in turn, to reinforce this more partial, restricted form of sympathy. 
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influence, when we judge of our own worth and character” (T 2.1.11.9, 209, emphasis 
mine). In other words, Hume takes it to be an obvious fact of human nature not only that 
we register the feelings and opinions of others by way of sympathy but also that they 
influence us more strongly precisely when they pertain to ourselves. The way in which 
insightful confirmation or harsh and undue criticism of a youth can respectively shape the 
trajectory of a person’s life for good or for ill insofar as it plays a hand in forming a 
person’s underlying sense of worth is confirmation of Hume’s point. 
Indeed, although Hume observes that we can and do feel a sense of pride with 
respect to the cause of pride “itself,” the opinions of others, he says, have “an equal 
influence on the affections.” His language on this point is strong: “Our reputation, our 
character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other 
causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the 
opinions and sentiments of others” (T 2.1.11.1, 206, emphasis mine). The suggestion is 
that if no one were to care for our virtue, regard us as beautiful, or approve of our riches, 
it is unlikely that these would evoke any deep feeling of pride (especially the latter 
two)—and, conversely, the more others approve of us, the more we feel ourselves to be 
significant.  
Hume takes it for granted, however, that others generally will approve of our 
virtue, beauty, riches, and so on (as long as their judgments are not clouded by envy, 
malice, or value-warping superstitions) because, as discussed above, the principles 
underlying the natural operation of the passions are rooted in human nature. We, by 
virtue of being human, just do approve of qualities that are useful or agreeable to 
ourselves or to others when we have no interfering influences on our passions and 
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passion-informed evaluations, Hume thinks. In this way, Hume claims that social 
approval and blame will be in accord with the causes of pride and humility (T 2.1.11.9, 
208), even if social approval can sometimes have greater influence on these passions than 
the causes themselves. Nevertheless, the very distinction Hume makes between the cause 
of pride and others’ approval coupled with what was argued above, that people’s value-
judgments can be biased, ill-founded, and disordered (e.g., consider the sensible knave 
and Hume’s portrayal of Pascal in “A Dialogue”), opens the possibility that others can 
affect our sense of pride and humility, even when their attitudes are incongruent with the 
genuine grounds for these passions. 
I will explore the consequences of when there is divergence between the just 
causes of pride and humility and people’s actual attitudes of praise and blame more fully 
in section II. But here I want briefly to point out how it is precisely when the judgments 
of others depart from the true grounds for pride or humility that we can more clearly see 
just how influential others can be for our sense of self-worth. The impact of others’ views 
in this way is especially visible with children, who have little capacity for assessing the 
judgments of others about themselves and thus are very prone to internalize praise or 
disapproval, particularly from the central members of their social world. For example, the 
father of Pieter in Alan Paton’s Too Late the Phalarope dislikes his son’s gentleness and 
love of flowers. Due to the particular ease with which sympathy occurs in the 
parent/child relationship, Pieter deeply feels his father’s disapproval, and this feeling in 
turn evokes humility/shame with respect to what his father regards as his feminine 
characteristics. It is unsurprising that although the adult Pieter is able to judge that his 
father’s opinions of him are improper, he still feels shame at his father’s dissatisfaction 
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and implicitly seeks out the approval of others to substitute for the lack of parental 
affirmation.  
Hume does point out that we do not take to heart others’ judgments of ourselves 
indiscriminately. He says that 
tho’ fame in general be agreeable, yet we receive a much greater satisfaction from 
the approbation of those, whom we ourselves esteem and approve of, than of 
those, whom we hate and despise. In like manner we are principally mortify’d 
with the contempt of persons, upon whose judgment we set some value, and are, 
in a great measure, indifferent about the opinions of the rest of mankind. (T 
2.1.11.11, 209) 
 
Certainly we generally do, and should, give more weight to the perceptions of those who 
know us well enough to have insight into our character and whose judgments we trust to 
be sound rather than those who lack these qualifications. This point goes some distance in 
explaining how our sociality and responsiveness to praise and blame is crucial for moral 
formation and for developing the ability to transcend the ill-formed judgments of those 
around us. Nevertheless, insofar as we may be poor judges of whom is most worthy of 
esteem and insofar as the people that are closest and most like us (i.e., those for whom 
sympathy occurs most readily) may well over- or underrate our merits, Hume leaves open 
the possibility that our self-assessments can be deeply formed by others in ways that do 
not fully coincide with, or that even run contrary to, real causes for pride and humility—a 
point that will be explored in II. 
A second way in which the social world influences our sense of pride and 
humility is by providing a context with which the principle of comparison can operate. 
As Hume points out, our self-assessments are dependent upon how we show up in 
comparison to those around us. He notes, 
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[W]e…judge of objects more from comparison than from their real and intrinsic 
merit; and where we cannot by some contrast enhance their value, we are apt to 
overlook even what is essentially good in them. …goods, which are common to 
all mankind, and have become familiar to us by custom, give us little satisfaction. 
(T 2.1.6.4, 191)  
 
In other words, widespread goods are less likely to give us pride than those which are 
rare; commonplace qualities, abilities, or possessions cannot evoke the same sort of pride 
as can that which sets one apart as special. (We can think of the pride that Hume reports 
to have felt because of outshining his classmates.37) Conversely it would hold that widely 
shared negative attributes are less likely to cause the same level of humility as those that 
are uncommon. We tend to take comfort when others struggle as we do, and our shame is 
more acute when we fail in ways that most do not.38  
In certain cases, one’s social context can determine not only the extent of pride or 
humility but which of these passions is experienced. For example, a modestly fine house 
situated in an impoverished town is likely to cause pride in the owner, but if that same 
house were placed in a highly affluent neighborhood, it would likely be a source of 
humility. The person who felt pride in her musical abilities in her small town comes to 
feel shame in those same abilities when she finds that they are surpassed by most of her 
classmates in the prestigious conservatory she now attends.  
The social context, then, not only affects our experiences of pride and humility 
but can also impact the extent to which these passions are appropriately felt. On the one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Boswell writes that Hume “said he had never entertained belief in Religion since he began to read 
Locke and Clarke. I asked him if he was not religious when he was young. He said he was and used to read 
the Whole Duty of Man; that he made an abstract from the Catalogue of vices at the end of it, and examined 
himself by this, leaving out Murder and Theft and such vices as he had no chance of committing, having no 
inclination to commit them. This, he said, was strange work; for instance, to try if, notwithstanding his 
excelling his schoolfellows, he had no pride or vanity” (Boswell 1931, 227-228).  
38 In section II.a. of Chapter Three, I dealt with the apparent discrepancy that Hume’s account of the 
passion of pride seems to be a matter of competition in Book II but his account of the virtue of pride in 
Book III seems to allow that proper pride is not limited to the elite but is a virtue available, in varying 
degrees, to ordinary people as well as great.     
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hand, a wide social exposure can be crucial for cultivating an accurate sense of our 
abilities and weaknesses. The musician mentioned above had an excessive pride in her 
skill when she lacked sufficient experience to make her aware of how far many others 
exceed her. But she nonetheless merits a chastened pride in her musical abilities, which 
are substantial even if she is not among the elite.  
In this example, comparison could facilitate awareness of the “real and intrinsic 
merit” of her source of pride, insofar as it enables her to judge the extent to which she 
possesses musical excellence. But as Hume suggests by contrasting comparison and 
intrinsic value in the quote above, comparison can also obscure our awareness of the 
genuine worth of things. It seems particularly prone to do so when the sphere within 
which we compare ourselves is narrow and when we have a disproportionate attachment 
to certain qualities over other more valuable ones. Depending on the context, then, 
comparisons can cause one to lose sight of the genuine grounds for pride and humility 
and can therefore cause one to have an overblown or too low opinion of oneself. For 
example, if the musician judges her abilities only in relation to the highly select group of 
conservatory students, she may falsely view her genuine talent as worthless. This is 
especially so if she makes being an exceptional musician so central to her identity that 
she fails to appreciate her other valuable character traits or if her sense of shame in her 
“failure” infects her self-evaluations more broadly. (Conversely, if she were the best 
conservatory student, her inordinate valuation of being a great musician to the neglect of 
more significant virtues could cause her to have excessive pride in that fact—pride that 
has more extensive psychological reach than musical talent, even extraordinary talent, 
warrants.)  
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Thus, depending on the quality and range of our social experience, the 
comparisons we make with others can lead to quite different sorts of self-evaluations, 
whether those comparisons help us to correct or whether they distort our understanding of 
the relative worth of our attributes. I will be especially interested in the ways comparison 
can distort self-perception and be socially and personally destructive in section II. In 
preparation for this later discussion, I want further to point out that comparisons can 
combine with others’ perceptions of ourselves in ways that can place an even wider gulf 
between the intrinsic values (that could serve as grounds for pride and humility) and our 
socially-informed self-perceptions than either might do alone.  
I already discussed how others’ approval or disapproval of ourselves can, by way 
of sympathy, transfer to pride and humility as we affectively register these evaluations. 
Now I want to look at how the principle of comparison might shape others’ evaluations 
that we receive through sympathy. Let us consider the younger brother of an 
academically successful older sister. Even without the influence of others’ perceptions, 
the boy would likely compare his intellect to his sister’s, and he would perhaps struggle 
with intellectual confidence on the basis of that comparison, despite his average 
intelligence. But his struggle would be exacerbated if this sort of comparison were 
regularly (even if tacitly) made by the important adult figures in his life. Their emphasis 
on the difference between him and his sister would further encourage him to dwell on the 
comparison and to see it as significant. If his parents and teachers came, by virtue of this 
comparison, to have an unjustly low opinion of his mind, this would shape and give 
further weight to his own unduly low self-assessment.39  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 To reiterate, however, we cannot get away from comparison, nor should we. The way in which we 
can acknowledge that the brother does have good intellectual capacity (though less so than his sister) is not 
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This disproportionately negative self-appraisal is likely to have still further 
psychological influence if his parents and teachers regard intelligence as central to one’s 
self-worth or if they are overly concerned with the way their children’s/students’ 
intelligence reflect upon themselves. If they value intelligence in these distorted ways 
then their judgments that the brother is not intellectually gifted can turn into stronger 
forms of disapproval, such as chastising the brother for not being smarter. Conversely, 
the older sister will likely have a disproportionately high estimation of her intellect and 
its overall significance for her worth the more intently the central social figures in her life 
approve of her mind in relation to others. Certainly the brother’s being less academically 
capable than his sister need not diminish his self-worth, and it is less likely to do so if his 
social milieu does not overvalue intellect to the neglect of other goods and if his parents 
and teachers appropriately value the strengths that he does have. The point, however, is to 
show how deeply the social world can inform our self-evaluations, whether they facilitate 
proper self-knowledge (and hence a proper pride and humility/modesty) or a skewed 
sense of self (and hence an overblown pride or excessive humility).  
Thus although we are dependent upon comparison and the perception of others for 
helping us to attain accurate self-knowledge and self-evaluation, it is also the case that 
these can work in such way as to effect us more than the intrinsic value of the causes. I 
will explore the destructive implications of these possibilities in II. First, however, I need 
to examine the motivational significance of pride so as to show the ease with which we 
might attempt to secure pride in ways that depart from pride’s genuine grounds. It is to 
this topic I now turn.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
by mere assertion but by widening the sphere of comparison to children his age and, on the basis of this 
comparison, recognizing that he has normal aptitude. (More important, though, is to emphasize and 
encourage his strengths and to stress the importance of character over intellectual aptitude.)  
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c. Pride and Motivation 
I have sketched Hume’s basic account of the passions of pride and humility and 
have shown how these passions are shaped by the perceptions of others. In order to 
demonstrate, as I will in II., that Hume’s account of these passions can enrich our 
understanding of much of what undermines human flourishing, it is first necessary to 
explain more carefully how pride and humility (or the desire to experience the former 
passion and avoid the latter) can factor significantly into human motivation.  
At first glance, it may seem that pride and humility do not play a central role in 
motivation for Hume since he does not explicitly discuss these passions in his account of 
action.40 Moreover, it could seem that Hume gives them at best a minor role seeing as he 
maintains that only the ‘direct passions’—i.e., passions that “arise immediately from 
good or evil, from pain or pleasure” (T 2.1.1.4, 182) such as desire, aversion, hope, fear, 
etc.—can motivate action. Because pride and humility are ‘indirect passions’—i.e., 
passions that depend upon associative principles such as cause and effect, resemblance, 
and contiguity—they, according to Hume, have no direct bearing on action. What is thus 
needed to show that pride and humility can nevertheless significantly influence action is 
to explain how these indirect passions link up with the direct ones, particularly with 
desire and aversion.  
This route initially seems to be blocked, however, by Hume’s claim that “pride 
and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not 
immediately exciting us to any action” (T 2.2.6.3, 237, emphasis mine).41 Pure emotions 
are “compleated within themselves” and “rest in that emotion, which they produce” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See Part 3 of Book II in the Treatise for Hume’s account of action. 
41 Hume elsewhere says, “pride and humility…are only pure sensations, without any direction or 
tendency to action” (T 2.2.9.2, 246). 
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rather than “carry[ing] the mind to something further” (T 2.2.6.3, 237). In this way pride 
is contrasted with love, for love is always accompanied by desire for the loved one’s 
happiness (i.e., benevolence) (T 2.2.6.3, 237), whereas pride seems to be, on Hume’s 
account, a self-sufficient emotion.42 If pride and humility, unlike love, are not attended 
with desire, then in what way can they affect the direct passions so as to be, as I want to 
claim, motivationally relevant for Hume?  
The answer to this question lies in appreciating the context in which Hume’s 
discussion of pure and impure emotions arises. Hume draws the distinction between pure 
and impure passions when he discusses benevolence and anger, and he does so in order to 
show that the passion of love is always followed by benevolence (and hatred, by anger). 
Love, he says, “is always follow’d by “a desire of the happiness of the person belov’d, 
and an aversion to his misery” whereas hatred “produces a desire of the misery and an 
aversion to the happiness of the person hated” (T 2.2.6.3, 237). Pride and humility, by 
contrast, do not have any accompanying passions, being “unattended with any desire.” 
This nevertheless does not exclude the possibility that they can influence our desires and 
aversions. Indeed, the very fact that Hume says that pride and humility, being pure 
emotions, do not “immediately excit[e] us to any action” (T 2.2.6.3, 237) indicates that he 
does think that they can influence action but that they do so mediately—i.e., by way of 
affecting some direct passion such as desire. The question remains then as to how pride 
and humility stand in relation to desire.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 When Baier considers the sense in which Hume would regard pride as an emotion that rests in 
itself she helpfully observes that: 1) unlike hunger or thirst, which can be satisfied, “there is no natural 
consummation to pride, no state of repletion that ends the emotion” and, 2) since pride is “a peculiarly 
agreeable emotion,…one in its grip has no reason to switch, even to another agreeable passion” (1980b, 
405).  
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Baier argues, I think rightly, that despite Hume’s claim about pride’s purity, pride 
is in fact attended by desire of a sort. She observes that the purity and self-sufficiency of 
pride depend upon pride’s ability to generate a desire to maintain itself. She suggests that 
when Hume denies that pride is attended by desire, he is speaking of a restless desire that 
arises from discontent or lack rather than what she calls “conservative desire,” i.e., desire 
to remain as we are (1980b, 406-7). Since when Hume discusses desire, he usually means 
the former variety, Baier suggests that he failed to specify that it is only restless desire to 
which he refers in this passage. She then argues that although the purity of pride is clearly 
not attendant with restless desire, pride would naturally be accompanied by the desire to 
retain the sources of its pride.43 She suggests that Hume’s example of how a person’s 
desires are influenced by his pride in his fine clothes (T 2.3.9.4, 281) is an instance of 
pride generating the desire to maintain the grounds that support it (1980b, 406). But we 
can, of course, extend this to more significant sources of pride, such as the desire to 
maintain good moral character, as we saw in Hume’s response to the sensible knave.  
Furthermore, although pride, when it is experienced, may not be attended by a 
restless desire characteristic of lack as Baier has suggested, it may influence our action by 
standing as the object of desire when we do lack it or when we do not possess it to the 
degree that we would wish. Because self-approval is especially vital to our happiness 
whereas humility, when persistent and hard to overcome, is a particularly deep kind of 
pain, it would seem that pride is a chief object of desire and humility of aversion. We can 
think, for example, of the ways in which Socrates’ interlocutors tended to avoid the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 There is of course no corollary here with humility. Humility, though a pure emotion, does not 
generate a desire to retain itself. One might wonder, though, if Hume is wrong to call humility pure, for it 
would seem to be necessarily attended by desire for its remedy. If, for example, one were to claim that she 
felt humility/shame for a moral failing without desiring that she had no such failing, it would seem to call 
into question whether she genuinely felt humility.  
 267 
questions that exposed their ignorance with respect to the beliefs upon which they 
oriented their lives. This is both because of the human tendency to want to evade the 
humility we tend to feel in being shown to be ignorant of important matters and also 
because we are naturally reluctant to having the sources of our significance (i.e., of our 
pride) called into question.44 We can think also of Hume’s claim that we have a natural 
“love of fame” (T 2.1.11.9, 208; E IX.1, 276). This presupposes that we desire pride, 
since loving the approval of others depends upon loving the self-approval that the 
affirmation of others provides.  
Finally, the purity of pride and humility do not prevent them from influencing our 
action by way of coloring our mental and emotional lives. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Hume says that a “due degree of pride…gives us a confidence and assurance in 
all our projects enterprizes,” and that for this reason it is more advantageous to overrate 
than underrate our merits (T 3.3.2.8, 381). He reiterates this point when he says that the 
pleasure attending pride “returns back to the direct affections, and gives new force to our 
desire or volition, joy or hope” (T 2.3.9.4, 281). In these ways Hume suggests that 
persistent experiences of pride and humility form a backdrop to the flow of passions, and 
that our thinking and acting are significantly affected by the extent to which we feel the 
emboldening passion of pride or the dejecting passion of humility. The confidence 
provided by pride allows us, for example, to see challenges as opportunities in which to 
grow, whereas the insecurity of humility is likely to regard challenges in a fearful, self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 While fear of shame/humility explains people’s resistance to Socrates, shame can also play a 
positive role in Plato’s attempt to heal his interlocutors’ souls. Jill Gordon argues, for instance, that Plato 
uses shame to get his interlocutors to confess beliefs, engage in dialectic, and turn to the philosophical life, 
see Turning Towards Philosophy: Device and Dramatic Structure in Plato’s Dialogues (1999, 24). See also 
Richard McKim’s “Shame and Truth in Plato’s Gorgias” (1988). The rehabilitating role of shame discussed 
in these reflections of Plato enriches the above account of the motivational importance of pride by filling 
out its corollary. 
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protective manner. Perhaps the most significant impact of (virtuous) pride on the psyche 
is, as discussed in Chapter Three, the way in which it can facilitate a wider, more 
extensive sympathy; humility, on the other hand, tends to provoke vicious comparisons 
with others as a way of propping up the self through finding fault elsewhere.  
In sum, then, although Hume could have done more to explore the impact of pride 
and humility on human motivation and action, his account is open to, and indeed his 
examples presuppose, these three ways that pride can factor into human motivation: 1) by 
evoking desire to maintain itself, 2) by being the object of desire, and 3) by directing, 
coloring, and informing our mental and emotional lives. Indeed, I think that the desire for 
pride often has a powerful, if often unconscious, influence on human action—whether it 
lends motivational support for pursuing genuine goods in a manner that corresponds to 
their worth or whether it prompts us to seek pride in ways that do not wholly coincide 
with grounds that would justly secure it. In the next section I will explore this latter 
motivational potential of the desire for pride and, with it, some of the dangers to 
flourishing that our desire for pride poses. 
 
II. Pride and Human Flourishing 
 
Against the backdrop of Hume’s account of the passions of pride and humility 
and their motivational significance, I will now look at the sort of problems that can arise 
for human flourishing because of our desire for a stable, well-formed pride. Specifically, 
I will explore the role that the passions of pride and humility play in three often 
interrelated phenomena—moral blindness, a stifled individual flourishing (e.g., in 
crippling shame), and a breakdown of social flourishing (e.g., factions and rivalries 
within communities and larger social bodies). In so doing I will be setting the stage for 
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the next and final chapter, where I will look at the resources that Hume’s immanent moral 
perspective and a Christian humanist’s transcendent moral perspective have for coping 
with these problems.  
 
a. Pride and Moral Epistemology 
 
The first problem for flourishing that I wish to consider is the way in which the 
desire for the passion of pride can result in, perpetuate, and further ingrain bias, 
disordered values, moral obtuseness. While in the last chapter I discussed the importance 
of virtuous pride for moral epistemology insofar as it facilitates extensive sympathy, in 
this section I want to explore how the natural desire for pride can, on the other hand, lead 
to skewed moral judgments (and, in turn, provoke action which is harmful to the self or to 
others). However much Hume is aware that our desire for pride in relation to others is 
essential to the development of our moral attunement, he also indicates at points that the 
desire for pride can lead to false or inadequate judgments of value. In this section it is the 
latter—the potentially negative relationship that can exist with respect to pride and moral 
epistemology—that will be examined.  
As we have seen, Hume acknowledges that there can be a divergence between the 
genuine goods in human life and our perceptions of those goods. He does so, for 
example, when he speaks of how comparative judgments may loosen our appreciation of 
the intrinsic value of things (e.g., T 2.1.6.2, 191; T 3.2.7.8, 345; T 3.3.2.4, 379), when he 
accuses the religiously superstitious of elevating certain vices to the status of virtues (i.e., 
the ‘monkish virtues’), when he discusses in “Of the Standard of Taste” how bias and 
lack of proper cultivation result in poor aesthetic judgments, etc. For Hume it is the 
general view or survey that enables us to determine the ‘intrinsic value’ of things, and 
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while there are critical questions to be raised with respect to the notion of intrinsic value 
for Hume, I will defer that discussion till Chapter Five. Here, however, I want to focus on 
Hume’s recognition that there can be a disjunction between real goods and our judgments 
with respect to those goods, and I want to look at how the desire for pride can play a role 
in distorting our value judgments, particularly as they pertain to the moral life. 
We have already seen in Chapter Three the importance of a well-founded pride 
for facilitating a wider, more extensive sympathy—the sort of sympathy that grounds the 
general view and thus is the basis for moral judgments on Hume’s account. I looked in 
particular at Hume’s discussion in Book II of how the principle of comparison can 
compete with the principle of sympathy, and then at his claim in Book III that it is the 
insecurity characteristic of those with ill-grounded conceit who are prone to compare 
themselves to others (rather than extend sympathy with them) in order to find in them 
some fault by which to inflate their own self-worth (T 3.3.2.7, 380).45 Moreover, I 
explained how these vicious comparisons, due to the way in which they impede 
sympathetic awareness, cause one to misinterpret or to fail to register morally relevant 
information, thus skewing one’s moral judgments in concrete situations. Here I want to 
show how the desire for pride, which tends to arouse these sorts of comparisons, can lead 
to three different types of mistaken value judgments.  
The first and most obvious mistaken value judgment that I wish to consider is that 
of falsely thinking a virtue or vice is present that is not or of failing to see a virtue or vice 
that really is present. I will consider some examples and show how the desire for pride 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 We can distinguish these vicious sorts of comparisons from comparisons made out of an earnest 
desire to develop awareness of one’s relative strengths and weaknesses or to appreciate how one can be 
enriched by the strengths of others. The latter sort of comparisons, as I pointed out in I.b., are in fact 
necessary for self-knowledge and for cultivating virtuous pride and modesty, and they need not inhibit 
extensive sympathy. 
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and the vicious comparisons it evokes can undergird these mistakes in judgment. 
Imagine, for instance, a person who envies her colleague’s success. The achievements of 
her colleague highlight her own inability to be similarly productive and hence arouse in 
her the passion of humility. The humility sparked by the comparison is such that it 
prevents her from feeling sympathetic joy in her colleague’s accomplishments; rather, it 
leaves her with a deflated sense of self. In an attempt to restore her wounded self-esteem, 
she seeks out some vice in her colleague so as to feel superior to him after all. Her 
disposition to prop herself up in this way may lead her to attribute vices to him that he 
does not possess. For example, she may convince herself that he is successful because he 
is a workaholic who neglects his family or that he does his work out of egocentric vanity. 
Hume gestures toward this sort of phenomenon when he says, “[a]ny harm or uneasiness 
has a natural tendency to excite our hatred, and that afterwards we seek for reasons upon 
which we may justify and establish the passion” (T 2.2.4.9). If the “uneasiness” in 
question is the humility caused by comparing oneself to one’s superior, and if “hatred” 
(or resentment) arises on the basis of envy, we may well attempt to demonize the person 
who sets these disagreeable passions in motion, both to justify our hatred and to ease the 
humility we feel.   
In the same way, the desire for pride can lead us to fail to recognize vices or 
virtues that really are present. Imagine again that the envious colleague, in her eagerness 
to secure pride in relation to her successful colleague, seeks to identify his vices so as to 
elevate herself by comparison. Suppose that she does recognize a genuine failing in her 
colleague but does so in a way that causes her to fixate on the vice while other virtues go 
unnoticed. In this case her mistake in judgment is to see the vice as being more deeply 
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rooted and extensive than it is and, accordingly, she fails to see his genuine virtues. Or 
suppose that in her desire to think well of herself she avoids looking at her own vices. 
Rather than turning the sympathetically informed general view on herself in earnest self-
evaluation, she operates at a biased level, ignoring or explaining away her vices while she 
seeks them out in others.  
As Hume points out, judgments of character  
 
are always attended with passion; and nothing tends more to disturb our 
understanding, and precipitate us into any opinions, however unreasonable, than 
their connexion with passion; which diffuses itself over the imagination, and gives 
an additional force to every related idea. To which we may add, that being 
conscious of great partiality in our own favour, we are peculiarly pleas’d with any 
thing, that confirms the good opinion we have of ourselves, and are easily shock’d 
with whatever opposes it. (T 2.1.11.9, 209) 
 
In other words, because judgments about our own character are especially attended with 
passion, we are particularly susceptible to embracing those false opinions that would 
seem to justify our feelings and paint us in a positive light. If attributing vices to another 
or denying them in ourselves “confirms the good opinion we have in ourselves,” then our 
natural desire for pride makes us liable to this temptation.46 
The second sort of mistake I wish to consider is that of how the desire for pride 
can play a role in distorting our perception of an object’s worth in relation to other 
objects, such that a lesser good is elevated above a greater good and vice versa. We saw 
in Chapter One that Augustine gave a great deal of attention to the question of how to 
rightly order our loves, and he was right to see this as a morally and spiritually crucial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The desire for pride can, of course, also be at work in falsely attributing virtue to others. For 
example, if someone has been very important in forming the worldview that guides our lives and gives us a 
sense of significance, we are resistant to seeing this person in any negative light. Furthermore, in certain 
cases we struggle to admit the faults of those to whom our identities are tied (e.g., family and friends). Or, 
we can imagine situations in which a person falsely attributes virtue to an oppressor, so as not to feel as 
dejected in serving a “good” person as a malevolent one.  
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question. Hume does not explicitly address the issue of how to rank various goods, but as 
we saw in Chapter Three, he assumes a sort of answer in his response to the sensible 
knave. He refers, for example, to the sinking value of animal conveniences and pleasures 
compared to inward beauty and moral grace (EPM IX.I, 276). He also says,   
…what comparison between the unbought satisfaction of conversation, society, 
study, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful 
reflection on one’s own conduct [i.e., when we have conducted ourselves 
virtuously]; what comparison, I say, between these and the feverish, empty 
amusements of luxury and expense? (EPM IX.II, 283-84) 
 
Implicit in this statement are not just judgments as to goods for human life, but judgments 
as to which goods are most and least important: virtue supplants other goods in value, the 
goods of culture and the beauty of nature are also very significant, but less so, and an 
abundance of material possessions is “empty” by comparison to these greater goods. In 
the next chapter I will consider the extent to which Hume can ground this sort of value 
hierarchy, but for now let us assume that the scale of value that Hume sketched is 
philosophically justified and reflect instead upon how the desire for the passion of pride 
(as opposed to the virtue of pride) might lead to a disordering of these goods.  
 Consider, for example, the minor character Catherine in Alice McDermott’s novel 
After This, who takes pride in the wealth that she acquired by marriage and as a result, all 
but ignores her lower-class family. In so doing she attributes more value to wealth than it 
merits and assigns significantly less value to family (and, indeed, to virtue, insofar as 
virtue would require her to treat her family with kindness and gratitude) than it deserves. 
Her desire to maintain a sense of pride in a social circle that would disapprove of the 
work and income of the lower-class is what lies behind the formation of her disordered 
emotional responses and judgments. Thus, her sympathy is limited to the social sphere 
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(i.e., the upper class) that would confirm her own good opinion of herself. Were she to 
extend her sympathy to her family, she would both become more fully aware of and 
concerned by the pain she caused them as well as become more aware of their 
perspective of her character (i.e., she would be better able to see her unkindness). But we 
can suppose that extensive sympathy with her family is impeded by a comparative 
element at work in her self-conception, for it is likely that her pride is caused not only by 
having gained wealth but also in rising above the situation to which she was born. In her 
case the two forms of improper evaluations that we have thus far discussed are combined: 
she fails to see vice that she possesses (value-mistake type one) and this is linked to her 
improper judgment of the relative value of wealth in relation to persons (value-mistake 
type two).47  
 A third type of error we can find in judgments of value is when genuine vices 
become interpreted as virtues and vice versa. Nietzsche was of course highly attuned to 
these phenomena, arguing that the weak, in their ressentiment towards the those that 
exhibit the genuine goods of power, strength, and nobility, convince themselves that their 
weakness and the attributes characteristic of weakness are good and that the 
characteristics of strength are evils. Although Hume does not take up this sort of 
distortion of values directly, his critique of the monkish virtues, his overt approval of 
certain things that have aroused suspicion in Christian morality such as fame, riches, and 
power, his discussion of Pascal’s “artificial life,” and indeed his very reversal of pride 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Hume suggests this sort of disordering of values when he says, “A griping miser, for instance, 
praises extremely industry and frugality even in others, and sets them, in his estimation, above all the other 
virtues” (EPM VI, 234n26).  
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and humility all indicate that Christianity inverts our ordinary and correct way of 
evaluating certain goods.48  
 Hume does not give an account of how the desire for pride might have stood 
behind what he takes to be value distortions of this sort, but it is not difficult to see how 
the need for self-esteem can play such a role. For example, according to Nietzsche, the 
desire of the weak to attain the pride that they lack, given their downtrodden position, is 
essential to their generating the distorted catalogue of virtues and vices. The weak, he 
claims, come to affirm those things that characterize or protect weakness (meekness, 
compassion, etc.) and condemn the things that they fear or that keep them lowly (power, 
strength, wealth). That which they deem virtuous in turn serves to generate self-approval, 
since that which they take to be good is that which they are.  
More broadly, though, the desire for pride can be at work in the various ways we 
might tend to interpret morally relevant phenomena. For example, we can think of the 
glutton who regards the temperate person as being stringent and unable to enjoy food 
freely or the anorexic who regards the temperate person’s deep enjoyment of a fine meal 
to be a base over-indulgence. Or we can think of the irascible person who sees her 
irascibility and immediate expression of it to be a form of honesty and regards the 
virtuous person’s emotional stability and self-controlled expression to reflect a flatness of 
personality and a dishonest suppression of feeling. It is indeed not uncommon to observe 
in human life that the desire for self-approval can lead us to make distorted value 
judgments in order to justify ourselves. While I think Hume is right to emphasize our 
general agreement that various characteristics are virtuous (e.g., temperance and honesty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Craig Beam 1996 excellently compares Nietzsche and Hume on their similar ways in which they 
saw Christianity as anti-natural and, correspondingly, as morally corrupting. 
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as suggested here), the desire for pride can easily prompt misinterpretations of moral 
phenomena such that what is in fact virtuous gets falsely labeled as vicious and vice 
versa.49  
It is worth pointing out that, as with the other value misperceptions, value 
reversals often involve a comparative element that supplants sympathy. Nietzsche argues 
that the weak denounce the life-affirming values of the strong because they seek to 
vindicate themselves in relation to their superiors. A sympathy-displacing comparison is 
thus at work when, instead of acknowledging the gifts of the strong, the positive self-
appraisal of the weak is necessarily bound up with condemning the characteristics of the 
strong as evil.50 Similarly, when a person struggles with a vice and seeks self-justification 
through finding fault with the virtue, it is not the genuine desire for moral clarity but the 
biased desire for self-affirmation that motivates the judgment. The vicious person’s quest 
for self-approval finds (spurious) support through invidious comparisons in which the 
virtuous are painted in a negative light. Moreover, the failure to sympathize with the 
virtuous person and to view oneself from the perspectives of those who have acquired the 
virtue in question perpetuates blindness about one’s own vice.  
I have discussed three ways in which the desire for the passion of pride can distort 
value judgments, and I have suggested how all three depend upon vicious comparisons 
made in order to bolster the ego rather than out of an earnest, sympathetically-informed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Aristotle makes a similar point about how those who have a particular vice are prone to see the 
relevant virtue (the mean) as an extreme (i.e., as vicious). He observes that “the coward, for instance, calls 
the brave person rash, and the rash person calls him a coward, and similarly in other cases” (NE II.8.25, 
28). Aristotle does not explicitly link this tendency with the desire for self-approval, though I think that it 
often is connected to our desire to approve of our own character.  
50 Nietzsche thinks that sympathy (albeit understood differently than Hume’s technical definition) 
itself is a value of the weak and promotes instead a comparative competition as a healthy expression of the 
will to power that is at work in us all. The sort of competition Nietzsche endorses, though, is not the sort 
prompted by envious comparison that is characteristic of the insecure, dejected self. 
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desire to arrive at sound moral judgments. I have been largely emphasizing how 
individuals might make these mistaken value judgments, but it is also evident that these 
value misperceptions can become culturally embedded as well. That the third type of 
value error can become socially spread was already implicit in Nietzsche’s analysis of 
how the value-distortions of the weak become the accepted norms in the West, and 
Hume’s discussion of the monkish virtues points to how value misperceptions can be 
socially inscribed among certain Christian groups. The disordered recognition of goods 
(value error type-two) can of course also become socially prevalent. We can think, for 
instance, of Augustine’s critique that his father and teachers placed too much value on 
academic success to the neglect of moral virtue (see C I.xviii.28, 20), or observe that the 
wealthy Catherine’s mistreatment of her family was re-enforced by a social milieu that 
had a disordered attachment to wealth. Finally, the false attribution of vice or virtue 
(value error type-one) can also be seen at a social level. Hume recognizes this point when 
he says, 
When our own nation is at war with any other, we detest them under the character 
of cruel, perfidious, unjust and violent: But we always esteem ourselves and allies 
equitable, moderate, and merciful. If the general of our enemies be successful, ‘tis 
with difficulty we allow him the figure and character of a man. He is a sorcerer: 
He has a communication with demons; as is reported of Oliver Cromwell, and the 
Duke of Luxembourg: He is bloody-minded, and takes a pleasure in death and 
destruction. But if the success be on our side, our commander has all the opposite 
good qualities, and is a pattern of virtue, as well as of courage and conduct. His 
treachery we call policy: His cruelty is an evil inseparable from war. In short, 
every one of his faults we either endeavour to extenuate, or dignify it with the 
name of that virtue, which approaches it. (T 2.2.3.2, 225) 
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Although in Hume’s example, it is not necessarily the desire for pride that motivates 
attributing vice to our enemies and virtue to ourselves,51 we can imagine instances in 
which a collective desire for national or communal self-approval could be at work in 
these sorts of moral misperceptions. For example, it is thought that Hitler’s regime was 
able to take hold in part because Germany’s humiliation after World War I made many of 
its citizens susceptible to his narrative valorizing the Arian race and attributing vice and 
ascribing blame to Jews and other minorities. Even when our community is flourishing 
internally, given the way in which our sense of significance and self-approval is bound up 
with the values that shape our communities and form our communal identities, we can 
easily become collectively defensive and quickly accusatory towards those who threaten 
those values. We see, for example, political parties and certain religious and anti-
religious groups insult their straw-man conceptions of each other. These sweeping 
characterizations, which so often lack carefulness and understanding, serve, among other 
things, to make the members of the group feel a collective confidence and self-approval 
at being in the “right.”  
It is precisely when value misperceptions become socially shared that they can be 
especially pernicious. Our sympathetic constitution and natural concern with the 
perceptions of those others (especially with those like and near us) can be a great aid in 
helping us overcome our value misperceptions when we hold them alone. Our 
misperceptions inevitably rub up against disapproval and disagreement, which helps to 
expose the mistakes in our judgments and forces us to be able to give a satisfactory 
account of our views in light of the input from others. But when a mis-valuation is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Notice here that the first value mistake (attributing vice to others that is not there) combines with 
the third (that of reading the same moral phenomena as virtuous or vicious depending on whether it is in 
one’s self-interest to do so).  
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socially shared, our sympathetic nature in fact tends to ingrain more deeply our mistaken 
views rather than to help us break free of them. This is the case for a number of reasons. 
First, moral blind spots are harder to detect when the community shares these value-
misperceptions. Second, as Hume points out, opinions as well as feelings transfer 
sympathetically, and value judgments, being feeling-laden, are especially prone to 
sympathetic transfer. Shared valuations, particularly those strong evaluations that run 
especially deep in our identities, further contribute to a feeling of confidence as one’s 
own view is bolstered by others and as one’s feelings are intensified by sympathetically 
registering the corroborating feelings of others. Third, when the dearly held values of a 
society are called into question, the dissenter opens herself to scorn and the sorts of 
misattributions of vice of which we have been speaking. There can thus be an implicit 
motivation to leave the dominant valuations unchallenged. 
As I have already pointed out, Hume observes that the young tend to “implicitly 
embrace every opinion propos’d to them” (T 2.1.11.2, 206), and this generational transfer 
of valuations is one way in which distorted social values can become perpetuated. 
Additionally, however, the desire to secure pride by way of securing the approval of 
others can also be a powerful force in propagating misperceptions of value. We see this, 
for example, in Flannery O’Connor’s story “The Artificial Nigger” when Nelson, a young 
country boy in the South, feels humility in front of his grandpa, Mr. Head, for regarding 
the first black person he encountered as an equal person. His shame in his “ignorance” of 
the man’s “inferiority” plays a role in accepting the racism of his grandpa.52 We see this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Here are key points from the relevant passage. After a black man passes Nelson and Mr. Head on 
the train, Mr. Head says to Nelson,  
“What was that?” he asked. 
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in also the young Augustine’s confession that among his friends he “was ashamed not to 
be equally guilty of shameful behaviour when [he] heard them boasting of their sexual 
exploits” (C II.iii.7, 27). Thus, he says,  
I went deeper into vice to avoid being despised, and when there was no act by 
admitting to which I could rival my depraved companions, I used to pretend I had 
done things I had not done at all, so that my innocence should not lead my 
companions to scorn my lack of courage, and lest my chastity be taken as a mark 
of inferiority. (C II.iii.7, 27) 
 
Indeed, our social world shapes our sense of those things that should excite pride and 
humility, even if those things are themselves value misperceptions.  
Although Hume acknowledges our capacity for misperceptions of genuine goods 
in his account of the passions in Book II of the Treatise and elsewhere such as his 
remarks about the negative influence of religion on morality in the Natural History and 
the Second Enquiry, on the whole his moral philosophy appears quite optimistic about 
our capacity for moral insight. It seems, however, that dysfunction and disordered values 
are more commonplace and problematic than Hume seems to acknowledge. In light of 
Hume’s own account of our deeply social nature, of the passions of pride and humility, 
and of these passions’ role in provoking sympathy-displacing comparisons, we need to 
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“A man,” the boy said and gave him an indignant look as if he were tired of having his 
intelligence insulted. 
“What kind of man?” Mr. Head persisted,… 
“A fat man,” Nelson said. … 
“You don’t know what kind?” Mr. Head said in a final tone. 
“An old man,” the boy said… 
“That was a nigger,” Mr. Head said and sat back. … 
… “That’s his first nigger,” he said to the man across the aisle. 
… “You never said they were tan. How do you expect me to know anything when you 
don’t tell me right?” 
“You’re just ignorant is all,” Mr. Head said… 
Nelson turned backward again and looked where the Negro had disappeared. He felt that 
the Negro had deliberately walked down the aisle in order to make a fool of him and he hated him 
with a fierce raw fresh hate; and also, he understood now why his grandfather disliked them. (216) 
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social approval presents for moral epistemology. I will do so in the next chapter. Now, 
however, I will turn to the second way in which the desire for pride can be detrimental to 
flourishing.  
 
b. Pride and Individual Flourishing 
 
In this section I will look at some of ways that the desire for pride can undermine 
individual flourishing. Specifically, I will explore the sort of emotional problems that are 
constitutive of, or that stem, from the inability to procure well-founded pride. I have 
already mentioned above and in the previous chapter that pride, in the sense of a genuine 
and well-formed self-esteem, is one of the most indispensible goods of human life. Here I 
want to consider various ways in which this great good might not be attainable, as when a 
persistent humility shapes one’s life for ill.53  
There are two ways a person might suffer from a steadfast humility: 1) by lacking 
adequate grounds for pride in some respect, and 2) by being subject to social disrespect or 
derision. These two are often interrelated—e.g., the deformed or grumpy person often 
also receives social disapproval for those very reasons. I want to explore these two ways 
and their interrelationship more fully in what follows, considering how forms of moral 
blindness and vicious comparisons can contribute to an over-blown sense of 
worthlessness. I want to leave off for now discussing the person who struggles with 
central and deep forms of vice and for whom an intense shame may be well-grounded. 
My interest is in outlining forms of disproportionate humility and stressing the difficulty 
of overcoming humility when it is felt more deeply than is appropriate.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 My concern in this section is not humility or shame as such, since these emotions play an 
important role in human life. For Hume the experience of humility and the desire to avoid it can motivate 
virtue and is important for moral formation (see Manzer 1996, 340-41).  
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I want first to explore the kind of humility of a person who lacks certain grounds 
for pride. For example, imagine a young person who has learning disabilities, lacks 
certain crucial social skills, and has no special talents. Suppose that others are not overtly 
unkind to this person; nevertheless, she still senses the social distance of her peers and the 
lack of attention and approval she receives from others. She attempts to achieve adequate 
grounds for self-approval by striving to succeed in various endeavors and fantasizing 
about a day when she will attain a sort of greatness that all will recognize, but her efforts 
miserably fail her. Her chief failings here are not moral ones, and she surely has grounds 
for self-approval,54 but nevertheless, her failure to possess those socially obvious traits 
that secure approving recognition diverts her attention from the legitimate grounds for 
pride that she may well have and deprives her of the social support and love that human 
beings need to feel worthwhile.55  
We can imagine another case wherein a person fails to feel adequate pride not 
because she lacks adequate grounds for pride in socially obvious ways but because 
others, due to disordered valuations, fail to recognize her worth. We can think, for 
instance, of a person who is quite talented and virtuous but, nevertheless, because of the 
impossibly high expectations of her parents, never feels her worth confirmed by her 
successes. In this case she has clearly identifiable grounds for pride, but she fails to 
receive the right sort of social approval (e.g., from her parents) that would make those 
grounds felt, perhaps despite the accolades she receives elsewhere. (One may well 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See Jean Vanier (1998) for a powerful account of what he learned from living with those with 
severe disabilities, those who he came to see were very gifted at trust, emotional honesty, and vulnerability. 
It takes, however, a rare attentiveness and openness to others for these less obvious gifts to be appreciated. 
55 Arnold Isenberg in fact argues that “you can reasonably take pride in strength, beauty, or 
intelligence; but you cannot reasonably be ashamed of the corresponding defects” (1980, 356), and he does 
so by arguing that one must be responsible for that which can serve as a reasonable ground of shame. 
Hume’s account of our dependency on the perception of others highlights the difficulty in avoiding shame 
with respect to those things that are not under our control if we receive regular disapproval for them.  
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wonder if the parents’ refusal to approve of anything less than perfection stems from their 
own lack of proper pride, which prompts them to implicitly seek to derive significance 
from motivating their child to strive for perfection.) Or we can think of Arkady of 
Dostoyevsky’s The Adolescent, who was brutally teased and mistreated by his peers and 
teachers at boarding school because he was an illegitimate child. The scorn he suffered in 
that environment, thus, issued from their disordered attachment to social class and 
propriety, rather than from insight into his character.  
Finally, we can think of a situation where a person has adequate grounds for 
pride, but, precisely because of her gifts, she is subject to ridicule. Consider the 
intelligent child who is picked on by the popular child because the popular child feels 
insecure about his lesser intelligence. Here the bully compares himself to the intelligent 
child in a sympathy-displacing comparison. Perhaps he seeks to interpret her intelligence 
as a weakness (e.g., as being “boring and bookish”)—a type of the third sort of value 
misperception mentioned in II.a. Or her intelligence is ignored altogether while some 
other weakness is fixated on, even though it was the superior intelligence that caused the 
bullying. Even with clear grounds for pride, we (particularly as children) are dependent 
on the right sort of social support to withstand the effects of unwarranted disapprobation. 
Just as moral blindness can become culturally embedded, so too can excessive 
humility become socially prevalent. For example, when an underprivileged class is 
consistently looked down upon, members of that class can take on a posture of humility, 
and this can deeply affect a person’s sense of self even if the root cause of the social 
difference stems from forces beyond one’s control such as misfortune or even the worst 
sort of abuse from those in power (slavery, of course, comes to mind). Here, too, all the 
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problematic features of vicious comparison can come into play if the self-worth of the 
privileged person finds support by being supposedly better than the underprivileged. The 
Southern Mrs. Turpin in Flannery O’Connor’s short story “A Revelation” happily 
engages in these sorts of comparisons to feel a self-approving “gratitude” for being who 
she is—and she defines who she is by who she is not, not “a nigger or white-trash or 
ugly” (642). She would sometimes  
occup[y] herself at night naming the classes of people. On the bottom of the heap 
were most colored people, not the kind she would have been if she had been one, 
but most of them; then next to them—not above, just away from—were the white-
trash; then above them were the home-owners, and above them the home-and-
land owners, to which she and Claud belonged. (636) 
 
The story takes place prior to the civil rights movement, and thus her posture of 
comparative superiority is confirmed rather than challenged by her social relations; her 
individual pride is strengthened by the collective pride felt by members of her class. And 
for the same reasons that were discussed with respect to culturally inscribed distortions of 
value, socially shared and comparatively produced pride (or humility) of this sort is more 
difficult to uproot. In Mrs. Turpin’s case, she needed a revelation violently delivered to 
her by a disturbed but perceptive college student to acquire insight into her vicious 
manner of deriving a sense of personal significance.   
I mostly considered children in the examples above because it is easier to see the 
significance of social approval at a stage of human development where social dependency 
for our formation is at its most pronounced.56 Nevertheless, it is clear that some of these 
experiences of humility, whether grounded in failure or the result of social disapproval or 
both, can follow a person into adulthood, even though we more or less acquire the ability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 In Chapter Six I briefly suggest the proper sort of dependence and independence we should take 
towards our social world.  
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to sort out and deal with disapproval as we mature. Additionally, although adults become 
more skilled in masking insecurity and attempts to generate pride by way of domination, 
these phenomena are still abundantly present in all stages of life.  
As we saw in the previous subsection, this sort of insecurity can have far-reaching 
significance for flourishing insofar as it commonly leads precisely to those vicious 
comparisons that block sympathy and distort our moral judgments. Moreover, as I will 
discuss in the next subsection, it can prompt the sorts of rivalries and factions that tear at 
the social body. Before moving onto issues surrounding pride and social disorder, 
however, I want to consider some vicious ways of coping with insufficient self-esteem in 
order to identify further ways that the need for pride can play a role in undermining 
individual flourishing.  
One vice commonly found in the person who lacks virtuous pride is an over-
attachment to approval, thereby taking excessive pleasure with oneself when affirmed by 
others. This over-attachment to approval can take two forms, what classical writers on the 
virtues called vainglory or ambition. According to Aquinas, vainglory is an inordinate 
desire for “glory” (i.e., renown or acclaim) (ST II-II: 132a1). On his account, a person 
can be said to be vain if she indiscriminately desires approving attention, wanting the 
praise of even those with poor judgment (ST II-II: 132.1) or if she seeks glory in a 
superficial good (ST II-II: 132a1). (These two forms of vanity hang together, since it is 
precisely superficial goods that will appeal to the masses rather than to those with the 
capacity for well-formed judgment.) We can think of Rosamond in George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch, who put great effort into learning the arts of grooming and social graces in 
order to be admired by all. Aquinas also points out that vainglory, in its over-reaching 
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concern for praise, can manifest itself in hypocrisy (i.e., in presenting a false self through 
word or deed) in order to impress others (ST II-II:132.5). We can think again of the 
young Augustine, who fabricates stories of his sexual exploits in order to impress his 
friends.  
The vice of ambition (understood in the classical, pejorative sense of the term) is 
the inordinate desire for honor or respect (ST II-II: 131.1). While vainglory seeks acclaim 
as such, ambition seeks the honor that is merited by what is especially worthy of honor. 
The ambitious person thus seeks not widespread approval of just anyone for any reason; 
rather, she seeks respect for that which warrants respect. What is problematic about 
ambition, then, is the excessive attachment to honor, either by wanting more honor than 
one deserves or by wanting honor for its own sake instead of for the benefit of others (ST 
II-II: 131.1).  
Osmond in Henry James’s A Portrait of a Lady is an excellent example of a 
character consumed by ambition. Since Osmond is a gentleman with no noteworthy 
standing or wealth, he seeks to establish himself and to garner respect through cultivating 
a refined sensibility. This not only affords him a means to look down on others for their 
lack of refinement, but it provides the grounds by which he hopes that others will 
recognize this superiority. Osmond seeks to communicate his superiority to others by 
holding regular exclusive parties (wherein he gets to exercise his cultivated sensibility by 
choosing who the initiates will be), by acquiring a fine collection of artwork so that his 
excellent taste will be visible, and by procuring the hand of a beautiful, intelligent, 
wealthy, and virtuous Isabel. (Since Isabel has rejected a man with reputable character 
and enormous wealth, her acceptance of Osmond confirms to him and to others that he 
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must be extraordinary to be chosen by her.) Instead of desiring honor for the sake of the 
common good (e.g., a recognition that would enable him to offer his gifts for the service 
others) or instead of seeking to be truly known and loved in genuine friendship, he 
relishes honor as a means to his own self-aggrandizement.  
Despite their different emphases, both vainglory and ambition involve servility to 
the perceptions of others rooted in their undue reliance on others to support one’s own 
sense of self-worth.57 Both also involve egocentric self-preoccupation, for in both vices 
others become a means for one’s project of self-affirmation.58 And along with the 
awareness of where one stands in the perceptions of others, these vices tend also to 
promote those vicious comparisons of which Hume has pointed out the insecure person is 
especially vulnerable, since to gain approval in the eyes of others is best secured by being 
better than others.59 The tendency toward hyper-comparison, as Hume points out, in turn 
spawns four emotions that further undermine individual flourishing—envy, malice, 
hatred, and contempt—all of which have the tendency to dominate the emotional life 
once they take hold. Since these passions can poison our communal life and motivate 
actions that disrupt the social body, I will consider these emotions in the next subsection, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 While Rosamond seems in command of her social world, she is in fact its slave. She studiously 
observes what will evoke approval and modifies her behavior to ensure she will receive it. She has little 
sense of her own inner promptings since she has habituated herself to behave according to others’ 
expectations. Osmond recognizes his merits but has brooding frustration when others fail to see them. 
Although he feigns indifference to the perceptions of others, Isabel later came to perceive that “indifference 
was really the last of his qualities; she had never seen any one who thought so much of others. …He was 
unable to live without [society], and she saw he had never really done so; he had looked at it out of his 
window even when he appeared to be most detached from it” (479). 
58 Isabel comes to see that “[u]nder his culture, his cleverness, his amenity, under his good-nature, 
his facility, his knowledge of life, his egotism lay hidden like a serpent in a bank of flowers” (479).  
59 We see this especially in Osmond. Of him Isabel came to recognize that “he pointed out to her so 
much of the baseness and shabbiness of life, opened her eyes wide to the stupidity, the ignorance of 
mankind, that she had been properly impressed with the infinite vulgarity of things and of the virtues of 
keeping one’s self unspotted by it. But this base, ignoble world, it appeared, was after all what one was to 
live for; one was to keep it for ever in one’s eye, in order not to enlighten or convert or redeem it, but to 
extract from it some recognition of one’s own superiority. On the one hand it was despicable, but on the 
other it afforded a standard” (479). 
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where I look at the desire for pride and its potentially destructive effects on social 
flourishing.  
 
c. Pride and Social Flourishing 
 
I now will consider how the desire for pride can undermine social flourishing by 
fueling rivalries and spawning social factions. Many of the problems for flourishing that I 
have explored thus far stem from or are constitutive of those vicious sorts of comparisons 
that compete with extensive sympathy. Here I want to look at how these kinds of 
comparisons excite negative passions—namely, envy, malice, hatred, and contempt—that 
can be directly harmful to the social body. While these passions can prevent individual 
flourishing insofar as they afflict and embitter the soul, I discuss them in this subsection 
since these same passions infect our relationships with others, enflaming hatred and 
leading to separation rather than to friendship and benevolence among persons. I will 
present and develop Hume’s account of these passions, showing how the desire for pride 
is fundamental to their most vicious manifestations.  
Envy, on Hume’s account, is essentially dependent upon the principle of 
comparison for its origin. Hume, ever perceptive about the prevalence of comparisons in 
human life, observes that  
we must receive a greater or less satisfaction or uneasiness from reflecting  
on our own condition and circumstances, in proportion as they appear more or 
less fortunate or unhappy, in proportion to the degrees of riches, and power, and 
merit, and reputation, which we think ourselves possest of. Now as we seldom 
judge of objects from their intrinsic value, but form our notions of them from a 
comparison with other objects; it follows, that according as we observe a greater 
or less share of happiness or misery in others, we must make an estimate of our 
own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure. The misery of another gives us a 
more lively idea of our happiness, and his happiness of our misery. The former, 
therefore, produces delight; and the latter uneasiness. (T 2.2.8.8, 242)    
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This passage pertains to pleasure and pain in general and need not involve the pleasure 
and pain constitutive of pride and humility. For example, a friend’s trip to Italy could 
make one’s suburban town seem all the more dreary, without elevating or deflating her 
sense of worth. But many comparisons of this sort do touch upon our sense of self-worth. 
Another’s talent can heighten one’s humility in his lesser ability, or another’s virtue can 
make one feel doubly shamed by her vice. It is particularly the latter type of 
comparison—that which alters our self-assessments—that I want to focus on here. 
 Whenever another’s happiness is perceived as more than our own and by 
comparison diminishes our own happiness, envy can arise (see T 2.2.8.12, 243). Given 
the way in which any pleasure or pain related to ourselves can transfer to pride and 
humility, it is often the case for comparisons grounding the envy to involve a sense of 
pain in oneself for one’s inferior attribute, position, or possession and a desire to possess 
the superiority that the other is perceived to have. Hume suggests this when he says, “The 
enjoyment, which is the object of envy, is commonly superior to our own. A superiority 
naturally seems to overshade us, and presents a disagreeable comparison” (T 2.2.8.12, 
243, emphasis mine), and also when he says that “even in the case of an inferiority [on 
the part of another person], we still desire a greater distance, in order to augment still 
more our idea of ourself” (T 2.2.8.12, 243, emphasis mine). Often, due to the way that 
our self-assessments are influenced by the perceptions of others, envy involves wanting 
the esteem that goes along with possessing that which is envied. This is why Hume points 
out that one can even envy an inferior if she is approaching and threatening to overtake 
him in his quest for glory (T 2.2.8.12, 243).  
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Envy—especially the sort of envy that is bound up with one’s self-worth—is not 
only destructive to the flourishing of the individual consumed by it, but it can undermine 
social flourishing by provoking enmity between individuals as they compete for social 
recognition and strive to prove that they are better than others.60 Since our social nature 
makes us aware of and concerned with social perception of ourselves, envy of two who 
have generally equal status can be bi-directional, as both seek to establish significance by 
besting the other and deriving satisfaction from getting the other to acknowledge one’s 
superiority.61 
It is not uncommon that envy can lead to rivalries in this way, however subtle, 
especially once we appreciate Hume’s point that envy is more likely to arise when there 
is greater proximity and relation between the envier and the one-envied (T 2.2.8.13-14, 
243-44). He notes, 
A common soldier bears no such envy to his general as to his sergeant or 
corporal; nor does an eminent writer meet with so great jealousy in common 
hackney scribblers, as in authors, that more nearly approach him. It may, indeed, 
be thought, that the greater the disproportion is, the greater must be the uneasiness 
of the comparison. But…the great disproportion cuts off the relation, and either 
keeps us from comparing ourselves with what is remote from us, or diminishes 
the effects of the comparison. (T 2.2.8.13, 243) 
 
Hume also observes that envy depends upon relations of certain similarities to arise. A 
poet is not likely to envy a philosopher, Hume says, nor a poet from a different nation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 I by no means want to suggest that all competition is bad. Indeed, it can play a motivationally 
important role in the pursuit of excellence, as Nietzsche points out. I do think, however, that 
competitiveness can go wrong when the primary focus shifts from striving for excellence as such to striving 
to be better than others. The person who seeks excellence would be able to thank the competitor who 
outranks her for helping her be better than she would otherwise be, whereas the person who primarily seeks 
to be the best feels dejected and resentful towards her superiors and tends to view the excellence she has 
achieved has little worth unless if it is surpassed by others.  
61 René Girard has explored the phenomena of envy, rivalry, and violence in human life with 
exceptional insight through his explication of what he calls ‘mimetic desire’—i.e., the human capacity to 
imitate and take on the desires of others. Although I do not go as far as he in seeing these dynamics as at 
the heart of human culture (I think that Girard’s negative view of human nature can be understood as a 
version of hyper-Augustinianism in this regard), he convincingly shows, I think, that they do go very deep 
in human life. See especially his Violence and the Sacred. 
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time period, or genre (T 2.2.8.15, 244). Thus, envy and envy-informed rivalries are liable 
to erupt in the very communities in which we find ourselves—among colleagues, among 
siblings, and so on. 
One need not feel envy, however, for this viciously comparative dynamic to be at 
work in our social relations. We may well occupy a superior position, and therefore, 
rather then envy others, we may take pleasure in contemplating our superiority over 
them. We saw this with Mrs. Turpin, mentioned above, who enjoys recounting her 
superior social status to those in classes below her. This sense of superiority can lead us 
to mistreat those whom we deem to be inferior, as our sense of superiority tends to block 
sympathy and either makes us unaware of our mistreatment or to see it as justified (as can 
be seen, for example, in Mrs. Turpin’s politely condescending attitude toward her black 
servants). We can think also of the way in which, in the current political climate in the 
United States, some people take great pride in being Democrat or Republican, seeing 
themselves (not just their position) to be superior to their opponents whom they 
demonize.  
Robert C. Roberts points out that a competitively derived sense of worth can be 
pervasive even in the apparently closest relationships. He notes that because it is more 
gratifying to be approved of by those equal enough to be competitors rather than those 
who are obviously inferior (1982, 64-66), a person whose self-worth is built upon 
comparison is likely to form friendships with relative equals who are able to come to 
some “understanding,” which serves to build one’s pride (1982, 66). This might consist in 
being the understood superior, where one plays the role of the wise advice-giver. Or it 
might consist in being the understood inferior who, instead of envying the friend, enjoys 
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how his association with his friend heightens his superiority to other persons or groups 
(1982, 66). In contrast to relationships built on genuine love, relationships built on 
comparison are vulnerable to subtle shifts in social status that can rupture the friendship 
and can lead to the passions of envy or contempt that were previously mitigated by the 
association. The person whose advice becomes regularly challenged begins to feel 
insecure and dejected. The person who, through growing success or luck, ascends in the 
social world to a position higher than the friend he previously saw as superior and enjoys 
how the tables have turned, and perhaps now sees the friendship as a dispensable one. 
Such relationships are inherently unstable and infected with a tendency to always look up 
or down at others, always measuring and comparing, never resting secure in relationships 
built on love rather than competition.62 If Hume is right that comparing ourselves to 
others is very commonplace, something that “we are every moment apt to do…” (T 
2.1.6.5, 191), then this unhealthy way of navigating our social life is a persistent 
temptation.  
There are of course progressively brutal ways in which the desire for pride 
secured in relation to others can manifest itself. This is especially the case when a person 
seeks pride through exercising power and through forcing others to acknowledge that 
power.63 Consider, for instance, Vicomte de Valmont in Laclos’ novel Les Liaisons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 We see this tendency in Osmond who harbored “a sovereign contempt for every one but some 
three or four very exalted people whom he envied…” (479). 
63 According to Árdal, Hume sees the passion of pride as “an invigorating emotion that tends…to 
prevent bullying” (1989b, 393). Hume, however, regularly lists power among the causes of pride, and 
certainly the self-elation that accompanies exercising power over another seems to be a feeling of pride 
(i.e., pride caused by power) as Hume describes it. Baier in fact argues that, for Hume, “pride in 
generalized forms of power, such as power over others, or in riches, is pride in its paradigm form” (1980a, 
140). On Baier’s interpretation, although not all pride-producing power is of the dominating sort, neither is 
domination excluded from nor, as Árdal thinks, prevented by Humean pride as a passion. Manzer points out 
that even Hume’s discussion of noble pride “involves a strong elements of naked, willful self-assertion, and 
for this reason it can be classed [in EPM VII] with Alexander’s feeling of ‘dignity and right of empire’ and 
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Dangereuses. Vicmote wants to seduce Madame de Tourvel precisely because she is 
virtuous. To lure her into an adulterous relationship with him—a choice that is morally 
reprehensible to her—would therefore be the ultimate affirmation of his sexual power. It 
is not that Vicmote is interested in Madame de Tourvel’s moral downfall as such, but he 
seeks it insofar as it essentially adds to his self-aggrandizing triumph.64  
There is, however, a passion that Hume discusses in which the desire for a 
comparatively-secured pride can lead to the direct desire for another’s suffering. This is 
the passion of malice, which Hume describes as “the unprovok’d desire of producing evil 
to another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison” (T 2.2.8.12, 243). Malice can 
arise out of envy, when the pain of the envied person is coveted as a way of easing the 
pain of inferiority. But it can also be felt by the one in a superior position, whose delight 
in her superiority increases by the comparative elevation she feels in relation to another’s 
pain. As malice intensifies, it moves from mere desire for evil to befall others to outright 
attempts to facilitate it. Indeed, pride-related malice can lead to utterly diabolical 
behavior. Dostoyevsky is a master at exploring this phenomenon. In The Brothers 
Karamazov, for instance, Ivan recounts to Alyosha a series of reports in which people 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Vitellius’s defiant sense of his own superiority” (1996, 339). While Manzer argues that ultimately Hume 
refines his account of noble pride to center upon a central attachment to one’s character, he acknowledges 
that Hume does initially have a “surprising openness to more dangerous forms of pride” (1996, 339). It thus 
seems to me that, though bullying and brute domination are clearly excluded from Hume’s sense of 
virtuous or noble pride (the bully is indeed pathetic and base), I fail to see why Árdal thinks that the mere 
passion of pride tends to inhibit bullying. It seems, rather, that the desire for this passion is precisely at the 
root of domination for those who struggle to or are insufficiently concerned with securing pride in nobler 
ways. 
64 In a letter to his accomplice, the Marquise de Merteuil, he writes: 
I shall have this woman; I shall carry her away from the husband who profanes her; I shall even dare 
to ravish her from the God she adores. What a delicious pleasure to be alternately the cause and the 
conqueror of her remorse! Far be it from me to wish to destroy the prejudices which torment her! 
They will add to my happiness and my fame. Let her believe in virtue, but let her sacrifice it to me; 
let her slips terrify her without restraining her; let her be agitated by a thousand terrors and be unable 
to forget and to crush them save in my arms. Then I agree, she may say: ‘I adore you’—and she 
alone among all women will be worthy to say so. I shall indeed be the God she has preferred. (Letter 
6) 
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enjoy abusing others (and do so in order to feel the self-elation and elevation that comes 
from having power over them). He tells, for example, of Turks who  
among other things, have also taken a delight in torturing children, starting  
with cutting them out of their mothers’ wombs with a dagger, and ending with 
tossing nursing infants up in the air and catching them on their bayonets before 
their mothers’ eyes. The main delight comes from doing it before their mothers’ 
eyes. (238)   
 
It is the pleading, desperate gazes of the mothers and the tortured acknowledgement of 
the Turks’ complete control over them that is essential to the Turks’ enjoyment of their 
own power and feeling of superiority.   
The desire for pride in relation to others can also provoke the related but distinct 
passion of hatred. While Hume understands humility to be a painful impression of the 
self that is based upon one’s relation to a painful cause, hatred is a painful impression 
with regard to another for his or her relation to a painful cause (T 2.2.1.1, 214). But just 
as humility can be ill-founded, so too can hatred, and in fact ill-founded hatred is 
especially prone to arise at the pride-wounding disapprovals of others. Hume observes 
this when he says, “nothing more readily produces kindness and affection to any person, 
than his approbation of our conduct and character: As on the other hand, nothing inspires 
us with a stronger hatred, than his blame or contempt” (T 2.2.2.27, 224).65 The 
implication is that regardless of whether another’s disapproval of us is warranted, the 
displeasure we feel in having our character criticized tends to produce hatred toward the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See also where Hume says,  
Nothing is more evident, than that any person acquires our kindness, or is expos’d to our ill-will, in 
proportion to the pleasure or uneasiness we receive from him, and that the passions keep pace 
exactly with the sensations in all their changes and variations. Whoever can find the means either by 
his services, his beauty, or his flattery, to render himself useful or agreeable to us, is sure of our 
affections: As on the other hand, whoever harms or displeases us never fails to excite our anger or 
hatred. (T 2.2.3.2, 225) 
What is of particular interest here is when the pleasure or uneasiness received is that constituting the 
pleasure of pride and the pain of humility. 
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person who calls our worth in question in some respect. This hatred need not be limited 
to direct disapprobation from another, however. Those who challenge the values by 
which we derive our sense of significance and worth can become an object of hatred. We 
can think, for example, of how Socrates was hated for exposing the ignorance underlying 
the very things in which people took pride (e.g., Euthyphro’s piety, Meletus’s patriotism, 
the value of Gorgias’s oratory skill, and so on).66  
As we saw in I.c., Hume strongly links hatred and anger. He argues that “hatred 
produces a desire of the misery and an aversion to the happiness of the person hated” (T 
2.2.6.3, 237), and that anger is “conjoin’d with [hatred], by the original constitution of the 
mind” (T 2.2.6.6, 237). In contrast to malice, which is unprovoked and necessarily rooted 
in a desire for a pleasure that, by comparison, increases in proportion to another’s pain, 
hatred arises on the basis of a cause and seeks the misery of another but presumably does 
so in order to obtain satisfaction for the anger, not necessarily to glean pleasure from the 
comparison. When hatred and anger are unjustly founded, the actions that anger instigates 
can be harmful indeed, as we see in the trial of Socrates portrayed in the Apology. 
Moreover, when hatred arises towards someone who has injured one’s pride, anger and 
malice (“which imitates the effects of hatred” (T2.2.8.1, 240)) can emerge together, 
jointly motivating the desire to inflict pain on the person who caused offense. We might 
speculate that Meletus was pleased by Socrates’s sentence to death, not only because he 
thought Socrates to be corrupting the youth (and seemed to harbor a hatred-inspired anger 
toward Socrates for that reason) but also because it may have felt gratifying to see the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 It is worth pointing out, too, that loving those who love us can also be socially destructive, as for 
example when the flatterer receives special attention and favors at the expense of others. 
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downfall of the person who shamed him by exposing his ignorance of what makes a good 
citizen before the members of the Athenian courts.  
Yet another potentially destructive pride-related passion that can arise for us in 
relation to others is contempt. Contempt, on Hume’s account, is a mixture of pride and 
hatred, which “arises from a tacit comparison of the person contemn’d…with ourselves” 
(T 2.2.10.3, 251). Of this mixture “contempt or scorn has so strong a tincture of pride, 
that there scarce is any other passion discernible” (T 2.2.10.4, 251). In the next chapter I 
will briefly pursue the question of whether and in what sense contempt (or hatred) can be 
appropriate, but here I want to point out that, if contempt is ever justified, it is clearly 
often a dangerous emotion. There is hardly another passion aside from malice that has 
such a potential for limiting sympathy and blinding us to the humanity of the condemned 
one. We see the danger of contempt, for example, in Ivan Karamazov, who, out of nobly 
high aspirations and a great capacity and will to pursue them, feels contempt for the 
unremarkable masses. He thinks it is “possible to love one’s neighbor abstractly, and 
even occasionally at a distance, but hardly ever up close” (237) because he recoils at the 
weaknesses and vices of others. In addition to his own suffering that follows from his 
isolation and inability to love, his contempt makes him impotent for getting involved in 
the world in a way that can help heal others and encourage them toward the very ideals to 
which he aspires. And his particular contempt for his father plays a direct role in his 
willful detachment from his family’s crisis, which in turn facilitates his father’s murder.  
As we have observed with other phenomena related to pride and humility, these 
negative passions can become collective through the workings of natural sympathy, and 
hence the rivalries and conflicts that envy, relishing one’s superiority, malice, hatred, and 
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contempt can produce between individuals can create factions between larger social 
bodies and have further detrimental effects on social flourishing.67 Hatred has a particular 
tendency to spread not just through natural sympathy with those like us but also through 
group association. On this point Hume says that when we  
love or hate any person, the passions seldom continue within their first bounds; 
but extend themselves towards all the contiguous objects, and comprehend the 
friends and relations of him we love or hate. … A quarrel with one person gives 
us a hatred for the whole family, tho’ entirely innocent of that which displeases 
us. Instances of this kind are every where to be met with. (T 2.2.2.18, 221) 
 
Those in the hated group are apt to return the sentiment with equally far-reaching spread, 
bringing anger, malice, and contempt in its train.  
As was discussed above, when ill-founded passions become transferred in a 
group, it is particularly difficult to perceive and uproot the evaluative error. The passions 
discussed here are especially liable to this problem for three reasons. First, these passions 
are what Hume calls “violent,” tending especially to overwhelm our critical capacities. 
Second, these passions (except for hatred) by their very nature contain a comparative 
element that runs counter to extensive sympathy. When these passions are shared in a 
group, it is less likely that a member will have sufficient sympathy with those outside to 
call into question the justice or intensity of these feelings. (Although hatred is not 
comparative, its corresponding desire for the hated one’s misery tends to block extensive 
sympathy as well.) Third, the very violence of these passions, particularly when bound up 
with the desire for pride, makes them especially prone to sympathetic contagion, causing 
them to be felt more intensely and confidently as they reverberate through the social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Since in Hume’s technical definition malice is unprovoked desire of producing evil to another in 
order to feel pleasure by comparison, it is less likely that malice would become collective. But we can still 
imagine cases where it does—for example, when a gang of adolescents vandalize the courthouse in order to 
feel empowered by desecrating a publically important space. 
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body. In more extreme cases, the heightened passions of (ill-grounded) hatred and 
contempt, for example, can contribute to a false sense that violence is justified or that 
seeking to understand the “enemy” is to commiserate with them.68 The potential for 
heated social divisions to occur when collective pride or shame is at stake, it seems, is 
particularly great, since our sense of significance or self-worth can matter more to us than 
conflicts over material goods.  
I do not mean to suggest that all conflict owes itself to the dynamics of pride and 
humility. The tendency to protect self-interest more broadly plays an obvious role in 
social factions, as do earnest disagreements about how best to live together. But because, 
as Hume points out, “the idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us” (T 2.2.4.7, 
229) and the pleasure of pride and the pain of humility matters so crucially for us, we so 
often see the desire for pride operative (frequently working alongside other factors) in the 
sorts of conflicts and factions that are unnecessary and harmful to flourishing.  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 I have presented Hume’s account of the passions of pride and humility in the 
context of social life and have shown how pervasive they can be in human psychology 
and human motivation. I have also shown how Hume’s account of these passions sheds 
light on various phenomena that stand opposed to human flourishing, such as moral 
blindness, unwarranted shame and the vices that arise because of it, and unnecessary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Again, it remains to be explored in the next chapter whether well-grounded hatred or contempt 
(and perhaps violence that ensues) is justified, and we will have to consider the epistemological basis for 
knowing that these emotions are adequately grounded, especially given their tendency to limit sympathy 
and overtake critical reflection.  
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conflict and factions.69 Despite, then, the importance of virtuous pride to the moral life 
for Hume, we have also seen (and as Hume to a large extent acknowledges) that the way 
in which the passion of pride factors into human psychology can create problems that can 
have far-reaching negative effects.  
The next two chapters will explore what Hume’s account of virtuous (and 
immanently derived) pride and Aquinas’s Christian humanist Aquinas account of 
virtuous (essentially transcendently oriented) humility can offer to mitigate these 
problems. In and through this discussion, I will examine the strengths and weaknesses of 
secular versus religious (specifically, Christian humanist) accounts of morality with 
respect to human flourishing.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Pride’s relation to the issue of factions is a particularly interesting problem for Hume given that, as 
Herdt has convincingly argued and as I have stressed in Chapter Two, his interest in providing a secular, 
non-sectarian account of ethics was motivated in part by a desire to mitigate religious faction. 
 300 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE LIMITATIONS OF HUME’S ACCOUNT OF PRIDE AS A 
VIRTUE 
 
 
“By our continual and earnest pursuit of a character, a name, a reputation in the world, 
we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, and consider how they 
appear in the eyes of those who approach and regard us. This constant habit of surveying 
ourselves…in reflection, keeps alive all the sentiments of right and wrong, and begets, in 
noble natures, a certain reverence for themselves as well as others, which is the surest 
guardian of every virtue.” (EPM 276) 
 
“But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too strong to be 
counter-balanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, 
consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct; these are 
circumstances, very requisite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every 
honest man, who feels the importance of them.” (EPM 283)  
 
“Korsgaard tells us that if we violate our self-authored maxims we are no longer able to 
think of ourselves under the description under which we value ourselves, find our lives to 
be worth living and our actions to be worth undertaking. … It gets things the wrong way 
round. The reason why we cannot live with ourselves, or consider life worth living, if we 
contradict our moral sentiments is because we take them to be the claims of something 
absolute upon us” (Angus Ritchie, 155) 
 
 
 My aim in this and the following chapter is to explore the degree to which Hume 
has resources for coping with those problems for individual and social flourishing that 
have their roots in our natural desire for the passion of pride. I, thus, look at the limited 
extent to which a prideful concern for character (i.e., Hume’s conception of virtuous 
pride) can motivate extensive sympathy over vicious comparison so as to curtail the 
moral blindness and unjustified emotions that contribute to faction. I also identify the 
limitations in Hume’s ability to promote the conditions for building a stable, secure self-
esteem in a social world wherein vicious comparison is widespread. These limitations 
and their practical import will emerge more clearly, however, in the next chapter, where I 
compare Hume’s secular perspective and the picture of virtuous pride that it supports 
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with Christian humanist humility and the Christian moral framework within which it is 
understood to be a central virtue.  
To appreciate the place of this and the following chapter in the overall argument 
of this dissertation, it will be helpful to summarize where we have come. I began by 
pointing to two of Hume’s central criticisms of religious (and particularly Christian) 
morality. First, Hume thinks it undermines individual flourishing by distorting the 
ordinary operation of the passions, which causes religious believers to shun the genuine 
sources of this-worldly joy as they pursue a false, otherworldly happiness. For Hume, the 
self-deprecating conception of humility prevalent in the Scottish religious culture of his 
time was a prime example of how religious outlooks could subvert the passions. Scottish 
Calvinism both elevated the highly disagreeable trait of humility and condemned as 
damnable the natural and highly agreeable self-affirmation of pride. Moreover, on 
Hume’s view, since Christian morality puts forward impossibly high moral standards that 
are ill-suited to human nature (see ESY 83 and EPM IX.1, 270), it diminishes the sources 
of self-affirmation insofar as our efforts at goodness always fall painfully short of what 
true virtue demands.  
Second, Hume thinks that religious morality undermines social flourishing by 
exciting particularly pernicious social factions. This worry, too, is captured in Hume’s 
critique of Christian humility. Again drawing from the conceptions of humility 
bequeathed to him by his religious upbringing, Hume understands Christian humility to 
involve abject submission to the supposed decrees of God—a submission so complete 
that it requires even the silencing of one’s intellect. This sort of submission to a deity 
inevitably creates factions. It does so, first, because different groups hold submissive 
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reverence for conflicting conceptions of God and of God’s demands. Second, because 
focusing on these differences directs attention away from those shared goods of human 
life (which are more evident than religious claims), it undercuts sympathy and 
sympathetic dialogue. Moreover, these two criticisms of Christian morality (and of 
humility in particular) are linked. The religiously-induced malformation of our passions 
undermines the basis for sympathy and shared discourse, leading to unnecessary faction.   
Over and against the religious (and especially Christian) morality he critiques, 
Hume thinks that his secular ethic of ordinary life and his rehabilitation of pride can 
better promote individual and social flourishing. His account of morality is at home in the 
ordinary operation of the passions and focuses on those common goods of human life and 
do not depend upon those, as he sees it, grand but unempirical religious claims that make 
social factions so embittered and intractable. As part of this project, he recovers pride as a 
virtue, showing its significance not only for a flourishing human life but also for 
motivating morality and enabling a wider, more extensive sympathy. However, despite 
the importance of Hume’s concerns about the detrimental effects of religious morality, in 
this chapter I want to show that Hume’s moral philosophy carries with it its own threats 
to individual and social flourishing precisely because it rejects any appeal to a 
transcendent moral source.  
These threats become apparent in light of the problems that, as identified in the 
previous chapter, arise due to the pervasiveness of our desire for the passion of pride and 
our dependence on the perceptions of others for sustaining it. To review, we saw that the 
desire for pride can lead to: 1) moral blindness (insofar as it promotes vicious comparison 
rather than extensive sympathy and disposes us falsely to see virtue in ourselves and vice 
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in others), 2) a dejected self (insofar as persons fail to receive the requisite affirmation 
needed for acquiring a stable self-esteem; and lacking the security of a stable self-esteem 
before others often leads to vicious attempts to secure pride through vainglory and 
ambition), and 3) unjustified faction-inducing passions (such as envy, malice, hatred, 
anger, and contempt). Indeed, as I showed in the last chapter, these phenomena are 
pertinent to the very problems that Hume was keen to mitigate by developing a secular 
ethic—namely, the problems of individual unhappiness and social conflict.  
By more closely examining Hume’s account of virtuous pride in this chapter and 
by comparing it with the Christian humanist humility of Aquinas in the next, I want to 
bring out some of the weaknesses of Hume’s secular perspective with respect to its ability 
to promote and sustain human flourishing. In so doing, I intend also to show that despite 
Hume’s criticisms of Christian humility as part of his secularization of ethics, it can go 
further in diminishing the problems caused by our natural desire for the passion of pride 
than can Humean virtuous pride.  
 
I. Prideful Concern for Character and the Problem of Faction 
 
 In this section I examine the extent to which Hume’s immanent moral philosophy 
can mitigate the problem of unnecessary factions that arise due to our desire to secure the 
passion of pride.1 I thus focus on the problems of moral blindness and of faction-inducing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Clearly some conflicts are necessary and may well arise among virtuous and sympathetic parties 
who nevertheless have incompatible convictions regarding the good. My interest here is in those 
unnecessary social divisions that are prompted and perpetuated by a vicious attempt to secure pride and by 
lack of sufficient sympathy.  
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passions, since, as I showed in II.a. and II.c. of Chapter Four, both directly contribute to 
social division.2  
As we saw in the previous chapter, moral blindness and unjustified faction-
inducing passions both stem from the sorts of vicious comparisons that prohibit the 
development of a wider, more extensive sympathy.3 We have also seen, however, that for 
Hume, a person can only recognize that her moral judgments have been mistaken or that 
her passions are unjustified when she takes up the general view—a view that is made 
possible by the very sort of sympathy that is curtailed by the comparisons that underlie 
our biased passions and judgments in the first place.4 Thus, the central question I here 
wish to raise is: Why, on Hume’s account, should a person in the grip of vicious 
comparisons be motivated to take up the general view so that she can, first, see her error 
and, second, seek to align her passions and actions with what they ought to be? A 
Humean response to the problem of faction must be able to give a satisfying answer to 
this question. 
The deepest resources Hume has for dealing with the problematic directions that 
the desire for passion of pride can take lie within his notion of the ultimate source of 
moral motivation, i.e., pride as a virtue. His answer to the question of what can motivate 
a more extensive sympathy when our passions of pride are at stake would thus have to be 
something like this: prideful concern for one’s character can keep us from succumbing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 While the problem of the dejected self is indirectly related to social faction insofar as it is those 
with low self-esteem who are especially prone to the sorts of vicious comparisons that undermine sympathy 
and lead to moral blindness and faction-inducing passions, here I concentrate on the direct causes of faction 
relating to the passion of pride and to deal with the problem of securing pride in section II.   
3 Whether and when hatred, anger, and contempt are justified is an important issue, and one that to 
which Hume and Christian humanists are sure to give different answers. I want to side step these important 
but difficult topics and focus here on those cases in which these passions are clearly unjustified.  
4 See Korsgaard’s excellent discussion of Hume’s normative conception of the passions (1999, 9-
12). 
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vicious forms of pride, the unjustified passions that flow from them, and the vicious 
comparisons that make them possible, since these biased responses would deprive us of a 
satisfactory review of ourselves. 
There is an obvious problem of circularity with this response, however. On the 
one hand, the unjustified passions of pride to which we are tempted depend upon vicious 
comparisons that displace extensive sympathy. But, on the other hand, according to 
Hume, it is only extensive sympathy that enables us to take up the general view—that 
special perspective from which specifically moral judgments can be made. If it is only the 
general view afforded by extensive sympathy that allows one to affirm that certain 
passions are biased and ought not determine our actions and that virtuous pride is to be 
sought, how can and why should we be motivated to extend our sympathy when we are 
not in the perspective that can answer these normative questions in the first place?5 In 
other words, how is prideful concern for our character to solve the motivational problem 
if it assumes what it needs to motivate (i.e., a wider, more extensive sympathy)? 
This question can be understood in two ways. First, it can be seen as a 
psychological question about how we in fact come to take up the general view and how 
the desire for the passion of pride can play a role in motivating us to extend our sympathy 
so as to arrive at this perspective. Second, it can be seen as a philosophical question about 
whether the judgments we make from the general view (and, hence, which give us a 
conception of the sorts of character traits and appropriate passions that would yield 
positive self-survey for the virtuously proud) are in fact genuinely normative. This is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Another way of stating this problem is: Why take up the general view at all? It is only from the 
general view that an answer of why we should do so could be given, but any normative reason that could be 
given to the person standing outside the moral perspective has no force until she has entered it.  
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question about why we are morally obliged to extend our sympathy at all so as to take up 
the general view.6  
We can surmise an answer Hume might give to the psychological question when 
we appreciate the ways in which Hume’s account of human nature suggests that we are 
impelled by our very constitution to take up the general view throughout the course of 
human life. As we saw in Chapter Four, our natural desire for pride coupled with our 
natural sympathy (both of which are captured in, what Hume calls, our “love of fame” (T 
2.1.11, 206-11)) causes us to be deeply concerned with how others regard us, especially 
with those who matter most to us. Often when a young child receives praise from her 
parents, for example, she feels gladness (and usually pride), and she feels displeasure 
(and often humility) when she receives blame. This serves as implicit motivation to 
persist in the behaviors that evoke approval and to avoid those things that result in 
disapprobation. As she enters into a wider social world, she observes that many of those 
same things that her parents praise and blame are the same things that others praise and 
blame as well. This, she comes to understand, is because people approve of being treated 
in ways that are agreeable and useful to themselves, just as she approves of others who 
treat her in those same ways. As her sympathetic awareness develops through increasing 
engagement in social life, she also comes to affirm those character traits that are 
agreeable and useful to others themselves, just as those same traits in herself are 
agreeable and useful to her. In short, I think Hume could maintain that 1) the generally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I am indebted to Christine Korsgaard who differentiates between the psychological and 
philosophical questions that can be made with respect to the question: Why take up the general view? She 
also identifies a question of moral anthropology—namely, the question of “why we are inclined to think 
that the judgments we make from it are normative” (1999, 4). This third question I will indirectly address—
and I give a different analysis than does Korsgaard—when I discuss the way in Hume’s account of moral 
judgments mimics but is crucially different than the strong evaluative claims that are at the heart of our 
concepts of normativity. 
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stable way in which human nature determines that human sentiment will yield pleasure 
and pain in the same sorts of things, 2) our social nature as is rooted in natural sympathy 
(even a limited sort), and 3) our desire for the approval of others, work together to lead us 
to take up the general view. 
This account does assume that those in one’s social world will by and large 
approve of virtue and disapprove of vice. We saw in Chapter Four, however, that 
mistaken or disordered values often shape the sorts of traits one sees as virtuous and as 
due grounds for pride. Nonetheless, I think that Hume is right that human nature is stable 
enough that we can and will, at least at times, arrive at the general point of view within 
the course of human life. (It is, after all, not mere coincidence that many moral values are 
broadly held in common among different cultures.) And once we begin to view others 
and ourselves through the impartial standpoint of the general survey, we have entered 
into the normative perspective that can motivate us to actively seek to take up this 
perspective more regularly and with greater refinement. As we do so we acquire a greater 
ability to differentiate between the biased, disordered values of our social milieu from 
genuine virtue. Exercising a wider, more extensive sympathy is bound up with this 
process. 
This account of the way in which we are naturally led to take up the general view, 
at least minimally, provides grounds for non-viciously circular psychological answer to 
the question of how prideful concern for character can motivate a wider sympathy when 
we are tempted by vicious comparison. However irregularly we take up the general view, 
it should afford us with insight into the distinction between excessive/unjust and due 
pride. The former—to which we often assign terms of disapprobation such as arrogance, 
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haughtiness, or conceit—we recognize as disagreeable to others, and we likewise feel 
disapprobation when we see another person transparently seek to buoy up her ego by 
criticizing his perceived inferiors. On this basic recognition, we do not need to have 
perfectly attained virtuous pride to be nevertheless motivated by a concern that we be 
persons who avoid such disagreeable behavior. Neither do we need perfect extensive 
sympathy at all times to be mindful that humans, including ourselves, are prone to 
partake in vicious comparison and that if we want to avoid vicious forms of pride (and 
the moral blindness and unjust faction-inducing passions that ensue from it), we need 
actively to seek the sort of extensive sympathy that gives us proper perspective on 
ourselves and others in various circumstances. We do not, then, need first to have 
extensive sympathy in a particular situation before a prideful concern for one’s character 
can motivate the practice of the sort of wider sympathy that can curtail the formation of 
unjustly felt pride.  
Although Hume does not face an insuperable motivational problem with regard to 
the psychological question, however, he must be able to address the philosophical one. 
For even if we do inevitably take up the general view in the course of human life, Hume 
still has the burden of explaining why this special perspective acquires normative force 
that is in fact binding for us such that we are right to see it as determinative for the 
quality of our characters and that we are wrong to fail to see it. Relatedly, he must 
explain why we ought to take up this perspective when we are operating from our 
immediate, biased passions. In what follows I will argue that Hume’s moral philosophy 
cannot generate the normativity needed in order to account for why prideful concern for 
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character should motivate, and I will then later discuss the subtle but important practical 
implications of this lack.   
I want to situate the issue of normativity in Hume within the way in which he 
seeks to develop a secular ethic that does not depend upon specific answers to larger 
metaphysical and religious questions. Prior to Hume, moral theorists by and large and to 
differing degrees tended to appeal to some transcendent moral source or some larger 
cosmic view to ground claims regarding what is most noble about human beings as well 
as why we are obligated to pursue virtue. This is especially evident in ancient and 
medieval thinkers who gave teleological and eudaimonist accounts of ethics. Aristotle, 
for example, appeals to our rational element as what makes us specifically human, but 
also he argues that it is our noblest feature insofar as it bears the most likeness to the 
divine (i.e., the Unmoved Mover) (see NE X.7, 1177b-1178a). Employing our rationality 
in characteristically human ways is integral to his whole account of the virtues and of 
why we ought to pursue them. Although modern moral theorists tended to reject 
eudaimonism and often sought to be more metaphysically minimalistic in their ethical 
theories, most still had recourse to some sort of broader metaphysical view to justify 
certain components of their accounts. We saw, for instance, in Chapter Two that Hume’s 
immediate predecessor Hutcheson accounts for our having a ‘moral sense’—that curious 
faculty of human nature that enables us to identify virtue and vice—by appealing to its 
divine bestowal from a providential God. His metaphysical picture supports his claim that 
the judgments delivered by our moral sense should trump the judgments that issue from 
our other senses should they come into conflict.7 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Michael Gill’s helpful discussion of the place of theism in Hutchenson’s moral system (2006, 
181-200, 214, 217).   
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   It represents a crucial shift in the tradition of moral philosophy that Hume seeks 
to articulate and defend an account of ethics solely upon the resources made available by 
a secular, non-teleological science of man. So while Hume shows how our capacity for 
sympathy and generality enables us to distinguish between virtue and vice and explains 
how we come to have a common language of praise and blame, he does not, and cannot, 
appeal to any deeper explanation for why sympathy is metaphysically special.8 Of 
sympathy he says, “It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have 
humanity or a fellow-feeling [i.e., sympathy] with others. It is sufficient, that this is 
experienced to be a principle in human nature. We must stop somewhere in our 
examination of causes; and there are, in every science, some general principles, beyond 
which we cannot hope to find any principle more general (EPM 219-20, fn. 1).9 
Hume maintains then that sympathy (or fellow-feeling and humanity) is an 
original principle that we find when we observe human nature. But it is one principle 
among many. Hume thus needs to explain why we should seek to extend our sympathy 
over and against our other original principles that might run contrary to it, such as our 
natural desire for revenge or for the passion of pride. Why not, for example, champion 
will to power as Nietzsche did and see overcoming as the best expression of human 
flourishing? Why not give full credence to the competitive impulse in humans rather than 
seek to restrain it through extending our sympathy?10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Korsgaard’s discussion (1999, 20-21). 
9 In footnote #61 of Chapter Two I discuss the relationship between sympathy (which he maintains 
to be the source of moral distinctions in the Treatise (see, e.g., T 3.3.6.1, 393-94)) and fellow-feeling or the 
‘sentiment of humanity’ (which he tends to speak of as the source of moral distinctions in the second 
Enquiry).   
10 In II. I do show that there are some tensions in Hume with respect to what sort of place to give our 
tendency towards comparison and competition in relation to sympathy. He is not as clear in this regard as 
one would wish.  
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Hume’s response, I think, would first be to point out that it is sympathy, not other 
original principles, that help explain how we come to have a common language of praise 
and blame and are able to make specifically moral judgments at all. Although he may 
grant that we have no normative reason for privileging sympathy over other competing 
principles in human nature prior to taking up the general view, once we find our way into 
the general view (which we inevitably do in the course of human life) we are in the moral 
perspective that enables us to see why sympathy ought to be prioritized and extended, as 
well as why our biased passions ought to be subdued.   
This response is inadequate, however, since it fails to explain why what we 
regard as normative when taking up this special perspective in fact is normative. 
Otherwise put, it does not explain how and why the general view yields strong 
normativity in addition to the mere phenomenological experience of it.11 To see this point 
more clearly I want to return to Charles Taylor’s distinction between strong and weak 
evaluation that was discussed in I.a.ii of Chapter Four. Recall that strong evaluations are 
qualitative distinctions of worth, which we understand to be categorically normative for 
our desires. Weak evaluations, by contrast, judge that something is a good insofar as it 
best satisfies the desires we happen to have. ‘Virtue’ and ‘vice’ are terms of strong 
evaluation; and unless one accepts a reductive account of these terms, they are meant to 
express truly higher and lower modes of life in which we show ourselves to be morally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 By “strongly” normative, I mean that we have a genuine moral obligation to feel and act in certain 
ways regardless of how we happen to feel. We can contrast this with a kind of “weak” sort of normativity, 
where the sense that we “ought” to do something means nothing more than that it would be a prudential 
means for attaining some desired end (e.g., if you want to play the oboe well, you ought to practice, or if 
you want others to like you, you ought to learn to be kind). Certainly, these two senses of normativity are 
not mutually exclusive. On a traditional eudaimonist accounts of ethics, for example, what we ought to do 
in a strongly normative sense is also thought to be pleasant and useful to the person of virtue (see 
Aristotle’s NE 2.3.1004 b29-1105a1). I will show, however, that even though Hume’s moral philosophy 
resembles eudaimonism insofar as it emphasizes a happiness that ultimately depends upon a noble pride in 
virtue, it can only support weak normativity.  
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dull if we fail to recognize this distinction and to pursue the former. We saw that Hume 
himself freely employs strongly evaluative language in his morally exhortative passages. 
He describes the sensible knave as “base” and “villainous” and declares that the knave 
relinquishes the “unbought satisfaction” of virtue in favor of “worthless toys and 
gewgaws” and the “empty amusements of luxury and expense” (EPM 283-84). By 
employing these terms, Hume is not just asserting that he does not prefer knavery; he is 
really claiming that we ought not prefer knavery and that we are morally obtuse if we do. 
I want to show, however, that in using these strong evaluative terms and, more crucially, 
in claiming that the life of virtue is qualitatively higher than knavery, he goes beyond 
what his methodology allows him to say.  
Indeed, to be consistent with his empiricist commitments Hume only has recourse 
to weakly evaluative terms (e.g., pleasure and pain or expedient and disadvantageous) 
when he sets out to trace the concept of virtue to its original impressions. In a manner 
true to his method he maintains that virtue is a term we apply to those qualities that are 
agreeable and useful to ourselves and others,12 and that when we judge a character to be 
virtuous, our judgment involves pleasure of a particular kind—a calm and pleasing 
sentiment of approbation felt from the general survey.13 Hume’s attempt to give a science 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 It is worth noting the contrast with Aristotle here. Aristotle distinguishes between the pleasant, the 
useful, and the noble and argues that the virtues are all three (NE 2.3.1004 b29-1105a1). Aristotle has a 
metaphysic that can explain the category of the noble: he has an account of higher and lower faculties 
situated in an account of higher and lower being based on a thing’s affinity to the Unmoved Mover, as well 
as a teleological conception of nature oriented towards its own perfection. Hume’s account lacks the 
category of the noble, and he cannot metaphysically ground such a category so long has he rejects teleology 
and remains within the scientific language of pleasure and pain. (We can see Hume’s explicit rejection of 
appeals to teleology in his letter to Hutcheson (Letter 13). He says, “I cannot agree to your Sense of 
Natural. Tis founded on final Causes; which is a Consideration, that appears to me pretty uncertain & 
unphilosophical. For pray, what is the End of Man? Is he created for Happiness or for Virtue? For this Life 
or for the next? For himself or for his Maker? Your Definition of Natural depends upon solving these 
Questions, which are endless, & quite wide of my Purpose” (LDH, 33).  
13 I hold something of the view that our judgments of value point to objective value, and that while 
emotions are constitutive of these judgments, our judgments of value are not reducible to them as the 
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of man furthermore requires him, I think, to take a reductionist view of virtue and moral 
judgments; not only do certain sorts of impressions give rise to our concept of virtue on 
Hume’s account, but I think he must also maintain that we are not empirically warranted 
in claiming anything more about them. In other words, we can neither maintain that 
virtue really means or is anything beyond those generally agreeable and useful traits as 
ascertained when taking the impartial, general view. (Whether it is important for virtue to 
mean more than this is a question I will take up later in this section.)  
Hume is able to slide almost imperceptibly into strong evaluative language, 
however, because his reductive and necessarily weakly evaluative empirical account 
brilliantly, but only seemingly, captures two interrelated elements of the categorical 
character of our moral (and therefore strongly evaluative) judgments—namely, that 
morality is objective (which includes the sense we can be right or wrong about what is 
virtuous) and holds universally (what I judge to be virtuous I take to be not an expression 
of my preference but, rather, a trait that is good for human beings as such). Hume mimics 
the moral objectivity component when he appears to appeal to objective values, as he 
does, for example, when he speaks of intrinsic value and when relies upon a sort of 
normative conception of the passions, which is assumed when he refers to feelings that 
are unjust, biased, or artificial. (We saw this normative conception of the passions at 
work in his account of pride. Excessive or vicious pride is unjustly felt pride, whereas 
virtuous pride is pride felt in due proportion to one’s merits.) What Hume cannot mean 
by intrinsic value or by referring to just and unjust emotional responses is that there are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
emotivists or error theorists contend. For accounts of the emotions that I think have it right, see Martha 
Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought, John Macmurray’s Reason and Emotion (Chapter One), and Edith 
Stein’s Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (pp. 157-167). But Hume’s account points in a more 
reductionistic direction, as I go on to explain above. 
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mind-independent values that are categorically normative for our desires regardless of 
what we happen to desire. Hume is a sentimentalist subjectivist about value, claiming that 
“[o]bjects have absolutely no worth or value in themselves. They derive their worth 
merely from passion” (ESY 166). Nevertheless, from within the standpoint of our 
agreement of sentiment as is secured by the general view, Hume can speak of just and 
unjust emotional responses, right and wrong moral judgments. It should be noted, 
however, that what a just emotional response or correct moral judgment must mean for 
Hume is nothing more than that it rightly tracks what does in fact make humans generally 
happy on the basis of intersubjective agreement about human happiness and is supported 
by an account of our common human nature and operation of the passions. It cannot 
mean that there are genuine values that determine how we ought to feel. 
Hume is able to mimic the sense in which morality is binding for us all by arguing 
1) that on the basis of human nature, there is widespread agreement in our emotional 
responses and, 2) that on the basis of sympathy, we are able to see that the same traits that 
are agreeable and useful for us are also agreeable and useful for others and vice versa. He 
is therefore able to give an empirically descriptive account of our moral language that is 
able to explain why we take certain traits to be virtuous for human beings as such. It 
appears, then, that the virtues are the same for us all and that we ought all ought to pursue 
them (because, so he tries to argue, virtue will best conduce to our happiness). Notice, 
however, that this universality only holds if it is empirically true that all human beings 
share the same fundamental emotional responses.14 And even if we do, the sense that we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It is worth pointing out that Hume’s account of virtue is contingent upon how human passions 
happen to operate; if human desire were radically different, virtue would also have to be other than it is. 
Interestingly and ironically, in this way Hume’s account bears resemblance to the theological voluntarism, 
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“ought” to pursue virtue is necessarily a weak ought. Hume cannot explain why agreed 
upon pleasure and expedience should be strongly valued;15 taking up a particular 
perspective (the general view) may explain some of what we are doing when we make 
strong evaluations, but it does not justify the move to strong evaluations.16  
Crucially, however, even if Hume is right that we for the most part agree about 
what is agreeable and useful to human beings as such (see T 3.3.1.7, 368)—a claim that is 
itself certainly contestable—and even if he is therefore able to speak in a modified way 
about the universal application of our moral concepts and the rightness or wrongness of 
our ethical judgments, his account can never legitimately move beyond weak evaluations, 
even as it resembles certain aspects of strong evaluations. His account is, therefore, 
insufficient to establish any strong view of normativity and, correspondingly, of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
though for Hume it is not God’s will but human desire (both of which could have been otherwise) that 
determines what is good and bad.  
15 It is a significant matter of debate whether Hume intended to offer an account of normativity in the 
first place or if he merely sought to give a descriptive account of our common language of moral praise and 
blame. Gill, for example, makes a strong case for the view that at least the Treatise account is meant to do 
only the latter (2006, 201-3, 309-314n2). Gill cites Hume’s letter to Hutchenson (Letter 13) in which Hume 
addresses Hutchenson’s concern that Hume’s moral philosophy in the Treatise “wants a certain Warmth in 
the Cause of Virtue” and emphasizes that he is taking up the role of an “Anatomist” whose task is to 
“discover its most secret Springs & Principles” of the mind rather than that of a “Painter” who seeks to 
“describe the Grace & Beauty of its Actions.” Nevertheless, Hume does stress that “An Anatomist, 
however, can give very good Advice to a Painter… And in a like manner,…a Metaphysician may be very 
helpful to a Moralists.” He also says that he is “ambitious of being Esteemed a Friend to Virtue,” yet he 
must limit himself to the Anatomist’s task out of concern for taste, “otherwise I must despair of ever being 
servicable to Virtue (LDH 32-33). So, even if Gill is right, over and against important commentators who 
argue that Hume is offering an account of normativity (he engages in particular with Baier 1991, Korsgaard 
1996, and Sayre-McCord 1994), it is clear that Hume wants his descriptive account to be morally 
informative. Moreover, as I have mentioned in Chapter Two, in the second Enquiry Hume clearly moves to 
moral exhortation at points, takes it as a burden of his moral philosophy that he must give an account of 
moral motivation, and he uses his account of morality to critique religious morality and artificial lives. I 
have thus been assuming that Hume wants his descriptive account to be normative. Whether or not Hume 
meant his moral philosophy to be merely descriptive, however, what is important for my purposes is to 
show the weaknesses of Hume’s secular ethic with respect to grounding and motivating virtue, and these 
weaknesses hold in either case.  
16 In the same way, neo-Darwinian accounts of why we come to regard certain traits as virtuous 
(because it is necessary for the continuation of the species), explain psychologically how we have come to 
regard something as good but not why we are obligated to pursue it.   
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objectively valid moral truth that goes beyond intersubjective agreement.17 Hume’s 
reductive account of our moral language, then, cannot ground what we, in our pre-
philosophical moral discourse, take to be the case—i.e., that our moral judgments are 
recognitions of real values that make claims upon us. What Hume does give us is an 
account of what he regards as the most satisfying kind of life based on a careful 
observation of human nature. On this basis he may seek to convince us to pursue virtue 
(i.e., those traits that are useful and agreeable to ourselves and others) by attempting to 
persuade us that doing so is our surest means to happiness. In fact he does exhort in such 
a way in his concluding section of the second Enquiry. There he says, 
But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society, than those  
here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging 
charms, and make us approach her with ease, familiarity, and affection? The 
dismal dress falls off, with which many divines, and some philosophers, have 
covered her… She talks not of useless austerities and rigours, suffering, and self-
denial. She declares that her sole purpose is to make her votaries and all 
mankind, during every instant of their existence, if possible, cheerful and happy… 
The sole trouble which she demands, is that of just calculation, and a steady 
preference of the greater happiness. (EPM 279, emphases mine) 
 
Leaving aside the question of whether Hume’s claim is in fact correct, it is important to 
note here that between his account that it is to our advantage to pursue agreeable and 
useful traits (what we call “virtues”) and an account that that we categorically ought to 
pursue virtue (understood as traits that are noble or constitutive of a “higher” mode of 
life) stands an unbridgeable divide.  
The implications of this are striking. Hume, for example, could implore the Nazi 
concentration camp guard to give up his post by arguing in various ways that his actions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Korsgaard (1999, 13-14) for a compilation of passages from the Treatise that point to the 
centrality of agreement in Hume’s moral philosophy. It makes sense that Hume would be interested in 
agreement not just because he was concerned to promote social peace but also because he needs to make 
sense of the universal applicability that we take to be part of our moral concepts, and in keeping with his 
empirical method, he seeks to find this universality through actual agreement (albeit of an idealized sort). 
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will undermine his own happiness. Hume might contend, for example, that to engage in 
this work the guard must radically blunt his natural sympathy, but that given his 
constitution, he will be unable fully to eradicate his sympathetic awareness; thus, the 
suffering of his victims will leave a haunting trace on his consciousness. Hume might 
seek to persuade him that the greater party of humankind will find his behavior revolting, 
hoping that such disapproval would motivate the guard to forfeit his affiliation with the 
Nazis. Or Hume could appeal to the possibility that he may someday have to face severe 
punishment if the Nazis lose the war. Hume may even claim that his behavior is “wrong,” 
in the sense that it goes against the intersubjectively agreed upon sense of virtue as is 
rooted in the typical responses of sentiment that we tend to find in human nature. In 
making these arguments, Hume would be right on all points. But what Hume cannot 
consistently say is that the Nazi’s behavior is simply and categorically wrong and his 
character objectively corrupt as we would normally understand it. Hume cannot use such 
strongly evaluative language in the usual way in which it is meant.  
Now I wish to return to the philosophical issue of moral motivation as it pertains 
to the unnecessary problems of factions that arise due to our desire for the passion of 
pride and our propensity to secure it unjustly. (At this point we can note that “unjustly” is 
to be understood as departing from the judgments that would issue from the general view, 
not as being wrong in a more strongly normative sense.) Hume cannot claim that we 
categorically ought extend our sympathy, tame our tendency to secure pride unjustly, and 
correct our unjustified faction-inducing emotions that stem from undue pride. All he can 
do is seek to persuade us that we will be happier if we do so, given his account of what 
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human beings are like.18 What he would need to argue, then, is that although the passion 
of pride is inherently agreeable, we will he happier if we forsake undue pride that is 
procured at the cost of vicious comparison.  
When recommending most virtues, Hume’s approach is to show how they 
contribute to our happiness either 1) directly, by being immediately agreeable or useful to 
ourselves (as do, e.g., the virtues of cheerfulness, magnanimity, industry, prudence) or 2) 
indirectly, through the sympathy we have with others and by the positive perception they 
take towards us for giving them pleasure (as do, e.g., the virtues of good manners, wit, 
decency, humanity, generosity, beneficence) (see EPM IX.2, 280-1). Deflating our 
passion of pride is obviously not immediately agreeable to ourselves. But, as I suggested 
above, there is a degree to which vicious forms of pride (e.g., conceit, arrogance, etc.), 
vicious comparison, and the unjustified passions that arise from the unchecked desire for 
the passion of pride evoke the disapprobation of others, and in this way our concern for 
the approval of others can motivate overcoming these vicious tendencies.  
What, however, might Hume say to a person with an unjustified pride who is able 
to enjoy her perceived superiority without revealing it to others (perhaps she successfully 
conceals her pride with the social grace of modesty)?19 What can be said to a person 
whose unjustified pride and faction-inducing passions are affirmed by the untutored 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 And in fact this is just what he does do when he addresses the question of moral motivation in 
general at the end of the second Enquiry. He says, “Or what theory of morals can ever serve any useful 
purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties which it recommends, are also the true 
interest of each individual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing system seem to be, that it furnishes 
proper mediums for that purpose” (E IX.2, 280).  
19 We might ask whether Hume would regard a socially undetected, unjustified pride to be a 
problem, since on his account, pride is agreeable and largely advantageous to the person who feels it, and 
his account of modesty seems to imply that if pride is not socially detected, then it is not doing any harm to 
others (I say more on this point in section I. of Chapter Six). I do, however, think that vicious pride has 
considerably negative effects on the prideful person herself (insofar as it can cultivate an egocentric 
orientation, foster inattentiveness to others, and excite the afflictive emotions of hatred, envy, and so on). 
Undue pride can also lead faction by triggering faction-inducing emotions or deprive another of the means 
to cultivate a healthy self-esteem, even if that pride is not noticed or condemned by others. 
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emotional responses of those around her or at least from those whose approval especially 
matters to her?20 It would seem harder to explain here how one’s individual happiness 
would be better secured by forgoing one’s pride, especially since Hume acknowledges 
the advantages of pride, even when it is excessive (T 3.3.2.8, 381).  
The motivational problem posed by vicious pride that fails to meet with social 
disapproval is thus in many ways analogous to the challenge of the sensible knave.21 In 
both instances, secret injustice and hidden or socially approved vicious pride could seem 
to reap more pleasure for the individual than justice and a properly subdued pride,22 
making it difficult to see how Hume can establish his claim that virtue is always in the 
individual’s best interest (see EPM IX.2, 280). Significantly, it is in response to the 
knave’s challenge that Hume appeals to the motivational significance of a prideful 
concern for one’s character, for it enables him to claim that the “invaluable enjoyment of 
a character” procures a greater happiness than does the immediate pleasure that the unjust 
“acquisition of worthless toys and gewgaws” can provide (EPM IX.2, 283). Presumably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It is not sympathy with the disapproval of anyone that makes a crucial difference but sympathy 
with those are ‘relevant others’ for the one-sympathizing (I unfortunately do not know who to credit for 
coining this phrase). An adolescent may have disapproval from her teacher for her smart-aleck arrogance, 
but she may be largely indifferent to her teacher. For her, approval from those peers that she picks out as 
being the important ones to please (say, those ones who like her for cleverly attempting to show up her 
teacher) will be more decisive. 
21 One important difference, however, is that the knave is usually aware of his knavery, whereas, as 
was pointed out in the last chapter, we are often fail to see when our pride is vicious and our faction-
inducing emotions are unjustified. Thus, the motivational problems surrounding unjust pride pertain not 
only to how to motivate us to forego immediate but vicious forms of pride but also how to see when our 
pride needs correcting in the first place.  
22 Hume notes how difficult it is to motivate action that seems to oppose our immediate self-interest. 
He says, 
But however the general principle of our blame or praise may be corrected by those other principles, 
it is certain they are not altogether efficacious, nor do our passions often correspond entirely to the 
present theory. It is seldom men heartily love what lies at a distance from them, and what no way 
redounds to their particular benefit; as it is no less rare to meet with persons who can pardon another 
any opposition he makes to their interest, however justifiable that opposition may be by the general 
rules of morality. Here we are contented with saying, that reason requires such an impartial conduct, 
but that it is seldom we can bring ourselves to it, and that our passions do not readily follow the 
determination of our judgment. (T 3.3.1.18, 372) 
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the same sort of appeal would be made in response to the problems of unjust pride: the 
desire for “inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our 
own conduct” (EPM IX.2, 283)—i.e., virtuous pride—can motivate extensive sympathy 
and honest self-appraisal over vicious comparison, even when doing so is immediately 
disagreeable and meets with social disapprobation.  
Interestingly, it is precisely when Hume appeals to the motivational significance 
of the desire for a positive review of one’s character that he makes free use of strongly 
evaluative language. In light of my argument in section I.a.ii. of Chapter Four that strong 
evaluation is needed to make sense of the phenomenon of pride, it should come as no 
surprise that Hume lapses into strongly evaluative language when he appeals to the desire 
for virtuous pride as a ground for moral motivation. I want to show, however, that once 
Hume’s strongly evaluative language is unmasked for what it is on his account (namely, 
those particular sentiments of pleasure and pain to which our strongly evaluative concepts 
can be traced), he is unable to give a satisfying answer to the philosophical question 
posed above. To see why this is the case, I want first to explain just what work strong 
evaluation is doing in Hume’s response to the knave’s challenge.  
To do so, it will be helpful to review why weak evaluations are typically 
insufficient to generate the passion of pride. A weak evaluative judgment determines a 
thing to be good because it satisfies a preference we happen to have; hence, when 
deciding between weakly valued goods, we perform something of a cost-benefit analysis 
to determine which good will best fulfill our preferences. Since weakly valued goods are 
not seen as determinative for our desires, these sorts of judgments lack any binding sense 
that we categorically ought to pursue one good over another. Correspondingly, in 
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weighing a decision between what we regard to be weak goods, the quality of our 
selfhood is not at stake; we do not see ourselves as becoming more virtuous or vicious, 
noble or base, expressing a higher or lower mode of existence through our choice. Rather, 
our concern when deciding between weak goods is whether we accurately calculate 
which course of action will produce more pleasure.23  
For this reason, as I previously argued, it is difficult to make sense of how 
standing in relation to some weakly held good is sufficient to produce pride. Since 
weakly valued goods are valued simply because we prefer them, it is unclear why we 
would take pride in ourselves for being related to them. We can appreciate this point 
when we notice that the sorts of comparisons we make with others that are relative to 
pride and humility are not mere descriptions of preferences and the ability to satisfy 
preferences; they are comparisons by which we feel ourselves to be qualitatively superior 
or inferior. It is the strong evaluative nature of pride that makes sense of why, as I 
showed in II.a. of Chapter Four, when our pride is diminished through comparison with 
others, we are often inclined to bolster ourselves up by making false strong evaluative 
judgments about them (e.g., we interpret our vice as a virtue, attribute vices to the person 
to whom we compared ourselves, and so on). Indeed, it would seem that for pride to arise 
we need a sense that we stand in right relation to something that is worthy of pride, not 
simply to something that happens to give us pleasure. (And certainly if it were possible to 
feel pride in what we take to be a weak good, such pride would not be as deep or 
enduring as a pride rooted in a what we regard as a strong good.)   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 If we have reason to think that others have the same general responses of pleasure and pain as we 
do (e.g., on the basis of a common human nature, as Hume argues), we may judge that others fail to 
calculate in a way that is most advantageous for satisfying their preferences, but we cannot on this basis 
judge the quality of their characters (unless we strongly evaluate being a good calculator). 
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We especially see the necessity of strong evaluation when we look not just at 
what can generate the passion of pride, but when we look at what is needed for the 
development of specifically virtuous pride—i.e., the sort of pride that serves as the 
ultimate source of moral motivation for Hume. As I discussed in section II. of Chapter 
Three, Hume regards virtuous pride as a trait by which we tend to have passions of pride 
that are proportionate to their causes, as would be affirmed by the general view (see T 
3.3.2.1, 378; T 3.3.2.8, 381). For Hume this appears to require not just feeling pride for 
those values that can be affirmed from the general view but feeling pride proportionate to 
the relative worth of various goods in relation to each other. Virtuous pride is primarily 
concerned with being able to take pride in what Hume suggests is most worthy of pride—
namely, pursuing the life of virtue (see EPM IX.2, 283-84).24 The notion, however, that 
virtuous pride involves due pride in what is most deserving of pride (i.e., virtue) 
necessarily depends upon qualitative distinctions of worth that are characteristic of strong 
evaluations.     
We have seen, though, that Hume’s secular, quasi-scientific framework cannot 
support the strong normativity needed to ground the strong evaluations upon which 
virtuous pride depends. As I have argued, on Hume’s analysis, virtue, a strongly 
evaluative term, in fact cloaks a sophisticated kind of weak evaluation about what is 
pleasurable and useful for human beings based on our human nature. There is no strong 
normativity that arises when we take up the general view and judge certain traits to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 As I pointed out, Hume appeals to a rough hierarchy of value (presumably as would be ascertained 
when taking the general survey): of greatest value are the virtues, followed by companionship, study, 
health, and natural beauty, and last of all wealth (EPM IX.II, 283-84; see also EPM IX.I, 276). Due pride 
consists not only in having pride in that which is valuable but in feeling pride in proper measure to the 
worth of the good of which one is proud. As I suggested, a person who is wealthy, and thus would merit 
pride in her wealth, nevertheless does not have virtuous pride if she overrates the value of wealth and hence 
of herself for being wealthy.  
 323 
virtues because they are useful or agreeable to ourselves or to others.25 But once this is 
granted, it becomes difficult to see how prideful concern for one’s character can serve as 
a philosophical explanation to the problem of moral motivation. If Hume could give an 
account of normativity that would accord with our strong evaluative sense, then he could 
explain how it really is beneath our dignity to forgo the life of virtue for “worthless 
gewgaws” or for an “unjust” sense of self-worth. But we only can consistently see vice as 
being decisive for the quality of our selfhood if we see it as being truly wrong, base, or 
low, and, correspondingly, if we see virtue as making a real demand on us regardless of 
what we may happen to desire.26 Indeed, if we weigh “virtue” or “virtuous behavior” (be 
it justice, subduing excessive pride, etc.) against “vice” in solely weak evaluative terms, 
then we would not have reason to feel any self-approving pleasure (i.e., pride) in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 A further upshot of this discussion is that if indeed we choose certain character traits for the sake 
of pleasure, Hume seems to have given us an instrumentalized account of the virtues (I explain this point 
further in II. of Chapter Six). This contradicts what he wants to maintain in “Of the Dignity or Meanness of 
Human Nature”—that we do not pursue virtue for the sake of the pleasure it brings as the egoists would 
claim but, rather, that pleasure only follows upon pursuing virtue because we love virtue in the first place 
(ESY 85-86). Hume rightly captures our moral psychology in making this claim, but his framework cannot 
explain it. We do feel the most significant sort of self-approval when we embody those values that we 
regard as most worthy, but Hume cannot account for why certain values are worthy beyond saying that 
because our human nature is what it is, we agree that these values are agreeable and the useful when taking 
an impartial perspective. 
 If Hume could ground a strongly evaluative view of the virtues, he would be able, I think, to show 
what he claims to be the case in this same essay—that concern for one’s character and love of virtue are 
two sides of the same coin. A person can love virtue for its own sake, and because she loves virtue, she 
desires for her character to be aligned with what she loves and affirms as categorically good (or, stated 
from the other direction as Hume does, a person’s concern to be a virtuous person reveals that she loves 
virtue). It is difficult to see, however, how prideful concern for one’s character can be specifically morally 
motivating if, in the end, a weakly evaluative happiness is ultimately what is sought. More importantly, it is 
unclear how prideful concern for character can be motivating at all insofar as concern for character assumes 
that there are moral demands that are decisive for the quality of one’s character to begin with. For example, 
with regard to the knavery issue, more pleasure is yielded to the person who refrains from knavery if she 
strongly values justice and would will look poorly on herself for failing to be just. If, however, she sees 
justice as merely more expedient to her own pleasure given the way human beings are constituted, then 
concern for character is irrelevant.  
26 I mention in a quote by Agnus Ritchie at the outset of this chapter with respect to the way 
Christine Korsgaard, a constructivist, appeals to concern for character to support her account of moral 
motivation, and his critique of her position holds for Hume as well. We can only make sense of why the 
quality of our selfhood and our most important self-assessments depend upon pursuing virtue if we see 
virtue as making absolute demands upon us. 
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choosing virtue nor shame in choosing vice. Hume’s account of the role of prideful 
concern for character motivationally holds if we strongly value virtue, but Hume cannot 
explain why we should strongly value virtue and see vice as base.  
To state the problem in another way, the weakly evaluative language of pleasure 
and utility—language to which his scientific approach commits him—is insufficient to 
explain why the person who forfeits the pleasure of vice without consequence would in 
fact be happier. Thus, it is precisely when it becomes difficult for Hume to argue that 
virtue will always conduce to individual happiness (as is the case with the sensible knave) 
that Hume needs to appeal to the sustained pleasure had by a satisfactory review of 
conduct in order to maintain that virtue really is desirable in all cases. Since, however, the 
pleasure of positive self-survey depends upon strongly valuing virtue—a sort of 
evaluation that Hume cannot explain—he is left with a crucial explanatory gap at the 
heart of his account of moral motivation.  
This gap amounts to a vicious circle with respect to our particular question of how 
to motivate extensive sympathy when we are in engaged in vicious comparisons in an 
attempt to shore up our pride. As we saw, Hume could give a psychological answer to 
how we might come to be motivated to widen our sympathy. Hume cannot, however, 
philosophically explain why we should have prideful concern for our character insofar as 
his science of man cannot ground the strong evaluations that make this possible, and he 
thus cannot explain how prideful concern for character should motivate extensive 
sympathy or should lead us to pursue virtuous traits and just passions as ascertained by 
taking up this wider sympathetic perspective. In short, if we take Hume’s moral theory to 
be consistent with his avowed method, prideful concern for character cannot be a 
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motivational source to which Hume appeals without illegitimately importing a strongly 
evaluative sense of normativity that his framework cannot support. Specific to the issues 
directly pertaining to the passion of pride as it relates to social faction, Hume cannot give 
a philosophical account of motivation that explains why we ought to take up the general 
view and forgo our illegitimate pride or unjustly-founded faction-inducing passions.  
Does, however, this philosophical problem with Hume’s account of moral 
motivation have any practical effects for morality in general and for the problems of pride 
and faction in particular? At first glance, it may seem morally undermining to have a 
clear sense that our deepest moral values, values that we experience to be binding for us 
no matter what we may happen to feel, are in fact contingent upon the sentiments human 
nature just happens to have and to agree upon. And I think it is. There is a significant 
disenchantment that can come with seeing our most cherished moral beliefs—beliefs that 
are constitutive of our identities and of our sense of life’s meaning—as mere expressions 
of our own sentiments, based on how human nature contingently happens to be. This sort 
of deflated conception of the moral life can, for some, be more than disquieting.27 
Hume, however, claims his sentimentalist rejection of genuinely objective values 
has “little or no influence on practice” (T 3.1.1.26, 302). “Nothing can be more real,” he 
says, “or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if 
these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the 
regulation of our conduct and behavior” (T 3.1.1.26, 302).28 I will argue in section II. of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Indeed, it can diminish one’s sense of life’s meaning. See John Cottingham 2002 for a good 
discussion of the importance of objective meaning and purpose in life and of the limitations of finding our 
own “meaning” in the activities that matter to us.  
28 It is worth noting that Hume puts this in terms of a conditional clause: if our sentiments of 
pleasure are favorable to virtue, then nothing further is needed to regulate our behavior. And that our 
sentiments are favorable to virtue is of course just what he argues (which depends both upon his descriptive 
account of the operation of the passions as well as on lowering the standard of virtue). But to what degree is 
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Chapter Six that Hume’s meta-ethical position can make an important practical 
difference, but there is a way in which it makes less difference than one might expect. 
This is, I think, because we cannot help but be strong evaluators,29 even if we come to see 
our moral convictions as lacking strong normativity and even if we cannot adequately 
articulate the grounds for our deepest values, we usually still continue to think that 
human beings really ought to behave in certain ways and not others. This is why Hume is 
so often right that prideful concern for character can motivate virtue. Because we 
regularly do experience virtue as being strongly normative, we correspondingly do 
experience the quality of ourselves to be at stake in many of our decisions and want to 
make the sorts of choices that enable us to see ourselves as in line with our sense of the 
good. Moreover, we are constituted in such a way that, moral concepts aside, we enjoy 
when others are kind, generous, and so forth, and we enjoy when others approve of us for 
having these attributes.  
Nevertheless, Hume’s inability to ground our strong evaluations can, indeed, 
diminish our moral practice in a number of more subtle ways. I will here mention them 
briefly, but I will explore them in greater depth in section II. of Chapter Six, where I 
compare Hume’s secular ethics with Aquinas’s Christian ethics. First, a strong account of 
normativity might be very important in cases of deep moral struggle, where virtue can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
this so? And to what degree does this rely on artifice to shape our approbations? I have noted Korsgaard’s 
point that Hume’s account of the general view implies a normative conception of the passions; thus, even 
according to Hume’s lower aspiring ethic, some of our immediate passions may be quite biased and 
vicious. While Hume argues that virtue is more conducive to our pleasure given our sympathetic 
constitution and so forth, often virtue is difficult and does not coincide with our untutored passions. I will 
argue in Chapter Six, section II. that it is when this is the case that the loss of grounding for strong 
normativity can make a practical difference.  
29 Indeed, I think that the philosophical problem in Hume’s account of moral motivation is often 
obscured by the fact that we are inevitably strong evaluators and do tend to regard those traits that are 
useful and agreeable to ourselves and others under the aspect of strong evaluation, and so we therefore do 
not notice when Hume smuggles in language he cannot justify.  
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seen to have ultimate significance. Second, a background metaphysical picture that 
supports our moral framework can enable us to articulate, and therefore live out, the good 
more fully. Third, a background picture, can hone our moral acuity, for example, by 
drawing our attention to certain moral phenomena (such as human dignity, the 
importance of love, etc.). Indeed, I will argue that Hume’s attempt to bracket out the sort 
of metaphysical pictures that could make sense of strong view of normativity, as I will 
point out in the Conclusion, makes his account of ethics less able to transcend certain 
biases and more susceptible to moral decline.  
These three ways in which a strongly normative grounding of our moral 
convictions can be motivationally significant will be pertinent to my discussion of the 
practical problem of what can motivate us to a wider sympathy specifically when we are 
in the grip of vicious comparisons in an attempt to bolster our pride. Motivating a wider 
sympathy in these cases is especially difficult for two reasons: 1) we often feel justified 
in our morally blind judgments and unjustified emotional responses that have their roots 
in pride and, 2) our natural propensity to pride (even to unjustified pride) makes it 
particularly unpleasant to acknowledge our mistakes and inferiority or even to grant the 
legitimacy of the other’s view. It is with a view towards these practical motivational 
difficulties that I want to compare the resources that Hume’s secular ethic and Aquinas’s 
Christian humanist ethic has for addressing the problem of faction posed by our natural 
desire for the passion of pride. But to do so adequately I must lay out the philosophical 
account of moral motivation that Aquinas’s teleological, eudaimonist perspective can 
provide. First, however, I want to look at Humean pride in relation to the issue of 
individual flourishing.  
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II. Proper Pride and Individual Flourishing 
In section I. I considered the philosophical difficulty that Hume’s secular 
framework has in explaining how to motivate overcoming the vicious comparisons that 
stem from our desire for the passion of pride—comparisons that result in the moral 
blindness and unjustified emotions that give rise to social faction. Here I want to look at 
the extent to which Hume’s secular framework can address the problems that our desire 
for the passion of pride poses for individual flourishing, given that there can be 
significant obstacles to securing a stable, virtuous pride in a social world that will 
inevitably be, to varying degrees, shaped by vicious comparison and disordered values.   
Although in the last section I primarily focused on the question of why we should 
care to reform unjustified passions of pride, in this section I focus on just or virtuous 
pride, insofar as I wish to consider the difficulty of cultivating a stable, well-founded self-
esteem in light of social pressures against it or when we lack those talents or traits that 
tend to garner social recognition.30 To do so I want to begin by re-examining Hume’s 
account of virtuous pride in order to bring to the fore certain crucial tensions and 
ambiguities in Hume’s conception of due pride itself. This will, in turn, allow me to bring 
out more sharply the challenges to developing and sustaining a stable self-esteem before 
others as well as the limitations of Hume’s account of virtuous pride for providing the 
social conditions that are favorable to individual flourishing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 As I emphasized in the last chapter, I want to reiterate here that individual and social flourishing 
are of course inseparable. The person who has developed virtuous pride will be more capable of sympathy 
(since she will not seek to support her pride by vicious comparison). This will affect both her moral 
awareness and capacity for concord with others, and she will be more motivated to let her passions be 
instructed by the normative conception of the passions that arises when taking the general view, since 
virtuous pride entails that her concern for her character will be motivationally significant for her.   
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The first feature of Hume’s account of virtuous pride that I wish to examine is 
that it does not seem to preclude enjoying one’s superiority to others. In Chapter Three I 
emphasized that, for Hume, it is the viciously proud (i.e., those with ill-grounded conceit) 
who incessantly compare themselves to others and who habitually dwell upon the faults 
of others in order to elevate themselves. I argued that still, on Hume’s analysis, the 
virtuously proud also rely on comparisons in regulating their pride insofar as comparisons 
are necessary to discern the extent to which one merits pride by helping us to identify 
whether our talents are mediocre, noteworthy, or especially exceptional. I nevertheless 
stressed the components of Hume’s account, which rightly suggest both that the 
virtuously proud need not be the best in order to feel due pride for the strengths they do 
have and that they primarily take pride in their characteristics that merit pride instead of 
in being better than others. There are other components of Hume’s portrayal of the 
virtuously proud, however, which can suggest that they often enjoy the fact that their 
pride-meriting characteristics make them better than many of their fellows—a stance that, 
I will argue, promotes the sort of vicious comparisons that I showed in Chapter Four to 
be so harmful.  
I wish to point out at least two ways in which Hume’s account of virtuous pride 
suggests that the virtuously proud may enjoy contemplating their superiority to others. 
First, Hume’s primary examples of those who exhibit noble pride are characters that 
value themselves in part because of their superiority to others. Hume speaks of Alexander 
the Great’s feeling of “dignity and right of empire” and Prince of Condé’s approving 
remark of Alexander that: “Wherever he found men, he fancy’d he had found subjects” 
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(EPM VII, 252; T 3.3.2.12, 382).31 See also Hume’s example of the magnanimous sage 
who, “conscious of his own virtue,…looks down on inferior mortals engaged in pursuit 
of honours, riches, reputation, and every frivolous enjoyment” (EPM VII, 252). 
Additionally, Hume includes “love of glory” as a heroic virtue that is “admired under the 
character of greatness and elevation of mind [i.e., virtuous pride]” (T 3.3.2.13, 382)—a 
trait that is concerned with being perceived as exceptional by others.32  
Second, Hume’s Treatise account of virtuous pride follows a more general 
discussion about the prevalence of the principle of comparison in the operation of the 
human mind, particularly in relation to our own self-conceptions. He says:   
We judge more of objects by comparison, than by their intrinsic worth and value; 
and regard every thing as mean, when set in opposition to what is superior of the 
same kind. But no comparison is more obvious than with ourselves; and hence it 
is that on all occasions it takes place, and mixes with most of our passions. (T 
3.3.2.4, 379, emphases mine)33 
 
On Hume’s analysis, the regular operation of the principle of comparison explains why 
we tend to disapprove of pride when we detect it in others; “[pride] causes uneasiness in 
all men, and presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison” (T 3.3.2.7, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See also Vitellius, who maintains a staunch sense of superiority to his tormentors (EPM VII, 253) 
or, Phocion, who says to one of his fellow-sufferers, “Is it not glory enough for you…that you die with 
Phocion?” (EPM VII, 253). 
32 Love of glory, without the right distinctions, could arguably be seen as vicious (see Aquinas’s 
account of the vices of vainglory and ambition, discussed in II.b. of Chapter Four.  
33 In interpreting Hume’s account of virtuous pride (see Chapter Three II.a.) I have tried to make 
sense of: 1) how comparison is always relevant to pride while doing justice to Hume’s point that the 
virtuously proud are proud of their genuine merits and need not rely on others being worse than oneself to 
have pride, 2) Hume’s suggestion that due pride is in principle available to all, regardless of one’s station, 
and 3) that virtuous pride involves having a basic security or dignity of self that does not feel one’s sense of 
worth is altered by the superior gifts of others. I have suggested that the virtuously proud do necessarily 
make comparative judgments and that these are necessary for gauging how much pride is proportionate to 
their merits. I also maintained these sorts of comparisons need not be at odds with sympathy. In the passage 
quoted above, however, Hume suggests that comparison and sympathy are fundamentally incompatible; he 
says, “This kind of comparison [i.e., comparisons with ourselves] is directly contrary to sympathy in its 
operation” (T 3.3.2.4, 379). I think he gets the phenomena wrong here. While comparison very often 
displaces sympathy in practice, these operations are not necessarily opposed. We can recognize the 
inferiority or superiority of our talents or traits to another without failing to sympathize with that person.  
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380). If, however, a disagreeable passion is naturally aroused by another person being or 
perceiving themselves to be superior to others (most especially to ourselves), it also 
follows that we naturally feel the pleasure of pride when we take ourselves to compare 
favorably to others.34  
I argued in Chapter Three that Hume should be interpreted as holding that for the 
virtuously proud, the passion of pride is not generated by comparison primarily but by 
having that which truly warrants pride (which is discerned in part through comparison). 
Nevertheless, here I want to emphasize that a faithful reading of Hume also shows that 
comparison heightens the passion of pride in even the virtuously proud (and, given our 
sympathetic constitution as discussed in I.b. of Chapter Four, the passion of pride further 
increases when others treat us as being superior). In these cases, the feeling of pride may 
rest more on the good that one possesses (and which the comparison highlights) or on 
being superior, but Hume fails to make this morally relevant distinction. It thus appears 
that, on Hume’s account, the virtuously proud may well enjoy being better than others, 
even if they do not engage in the petty, small-minded exercise of dwelling on others’ 
inferiorities. But the corollary implication is that we also naturally dislike being 
surpassed by those whose previous (real or perceived) inferiority supported our pride. In 
Hume’s Treatise account of pride, he maintains, “we all have a wonderful partiality for 
ourselves…” (T 3.3.2.10, 381, emphasis mine), and this, he suggests, is no less true of the 
virtuously proud than the viciously proud. Although the virtuously proud may be less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 As does Hume when he outshines his classmates as a boy. See Hume’s conversation with Boswell 
where Boswell reports that Hume said that he “used to read the Whole Duty of Man; that he made an 
abstract from the Catalogue of vices at the end of it, and examined himself by this, leaving out Murder and 
Theft and such vices as he had no chance of committing, having no inclination to commit them. This, he 
said, was strange work; for instance, to try if, notwithstanding his excelling his schoolfellows, he had no 
pride or vanity” (Boswell 1931, 227-228).  
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susceptible to swings in their self-assessments based on comparisons than the viciously 
proud, they are concerned with how they stand in relation to others just the same. 
It therefore seems that even virtuous pride cannot entirely escape the implication 
that a stable self-esteem before others is to some degree a good of competition. While I 
have argued that, for Hume, the virtuously proud need not be the best to have the security 
of selfhood characteristic of such pride, it also seems that they must have sufficient merit 
to enjoy a respectable social position relative to their social station. In other words, they 
may need to be better than a good number of others for pride to arise (enough virtue that 
sets them above or at least in company with ordinary people, enough talent in their work 
to make them at least an equal member of their community of colleagues, and so on).35 
Moreover, since Hume discusses virtuous pride primarily as greatness of mind, his 
account of noble pride focuses on those who are particularly great (i.e., who are on the 
upper end of human achievement).  
It would seem that self-esteem, on Hume’s account, depends upon comparison not 
only because virtuous pride depends upon truly meriting pride (merits of which are in 
part determined by comparison), but also because of the way in which social perception 
plays a significant role in our experience of pride. As was discussed in I.b. and II.b. of 
Chapter Four, pride in large part relies upon the affirmation of others, and others tend to 
approve of those personal traits that stand out as special by comparison to others. So, the 
ways in which we find ourselves in the middle or upper regions of the social ladder and 
enjoy the security and self-approval of our social position are often themselves supported 
by the approval of others precisely for being equal to or above those on the bottom.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Michael Gill’s important discussion of Hume’s account of the role of comparison in pride and 
also in our judgments with respect to who is virtuous (2006, 244-258).  
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The elements of Hume’s account of virtuous pride that seem to involve being (and 
being perceived as) equal to or better than others, however, can stand in tension with 
Hume’s indication that the stable self-esteem constitutive of virtuous pride facilitates a 
wider, more extensive sympathy and mitigates vicious comparisons (see section II.b. of 
Chapter Three). The inevitably comparative component of pride threatens a wider 
sympathy from two directions.36 First, to the extent that pride involves enjoying our 
superiority to others who are relatively near us in merit, we are vulnerable to sliding into 
vicious comparisons when others begin to outshine us and thereby destabilize our self-
esteem. Often a ready and generous sympathy towards others relies upon a security of 
self tacitly afforded by being in a stable social position. Since, however, social positions 
are vulnerable to change, so too is our wideness or narrowness of our sympathy—perhaps 
to some degree even if we actively practice extensive sympathy with vigilance and 
attention. Second, to the extent that virtuous pride rests on true greatness (which by 
definition involves being superior to most in certain respects), it is prone to produce 
contempt or misanthropy for the unimpressive masses.37 While in the first case it is our 
close proximity to the unremarkable that sparks sympathy-displacing comparisons, in the 
second case it is one’s considerable distance from the normal person that provokes them. 
In the first instance, the sympathy-displacing comparisons to which we succumb are 
made with those we find to be worse than ourselves in order to boost our self-assessments 
by way of contrast, whereas in the second instance, if our pride is justified, our contempt 
may be well-founded but still can be destructive to sympathy. (We considered the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 I mentioned in footnote #33 that Hume says that all comparison is counter to sympathy. While I 
think he is wrong about this, his mistake reveals that pride, as he understands it, is ultimately competitive.  
37 See T 2.2.10 for Hume’s account of contempt and its relation to pride, hatred, and the principle of 
comparison.   
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problems of contempt through looking at the character of Ivan Karamazov in II.c. of 
Chapter Four.)  
One might argue, however, that although pride is always to some degree unstable 
and vulnerable to sympathy-displacing comparisons, if due pride is primarily taken in 
virtue rather than skills, appearance, or possessions, as is the case on Hume’s account of 
virtuous pride, the pride would be more stable and less susceptible to competition than 
vicious pride. While I do think that this is importantly true in certain respects, it is worth 
noting that virtue itself can subtly become an object of competition. We can imagine, for 
example, that among those working together for a just cause, tensions and disputes might 
erupt over how far one is willing to go in living up to the just ideal, how much one is 
willing to sacrifice for it, etc. On this point it is interesting that Hume explicitly links love 
of virtue with love of fame (EPM 276). Love of fame, he says, prompts in us the habit of 
seeing ourselves from the perspective of others and evokes in us the desire to possess 
those traits that others would especially praise (i.e., the virtues).38 But Hume’s use of the 
word ‘fame’ suggests the dominant presence of comparison in the moral life.39 To 
achieve fame requires us to stand out as exceptional, and this introduces a competitive 
element in the pursuit of virtue itself.40 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 I showed in Chapter Four, however, that Hume is too quick to assume this will be the case. If our 
social milieu has disordered values, distorted conceptions of the virtues, and other forms of moral 
blindness, genuine virtue will not be as recognized as Hume’s moral theory suggests.  
39 Again, I do not mean to imply that we can or should do away with comparison when it comes to 
virtue. Comparison between the characters of others and between others and ourselves is important for 
honing our moral acuity. The moral achievement, in my view, is not to let such comparisons undermine 
sympathy with those who are morally less developed. I will later suggest how the virtue of humility (which 
I argue can be to some degree articulated and defended from within a secular Humean framework), is an 
important character trait for making and keeping us alive to the humanity of others. 
40 Interestingly this was Jesus’s central critique of the Pharisees. Their desire to be and to be 
perceived as better than others made them spiritually blind to those they saw as inferior as well as overly 
preoccupied with the outward markers of religious piety rather than the inner reality that religious practice 
was meant to cultivate. Hume does not seem to be appropriately concerned to warn against this moral 
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Moreover, when we look more carefully at Hume’s account of virtuous pride, it 
sometimes appears to involve holding contempt for the vicious and unaccomplished or in 
other ways stands in tension with sympathy (and the benevolence that often flows from 
it). Hume says, for example, that it is a mark of meanness to “degrade” oneself by 
association with “undeserving inferiors” (EPM 253), suggesting that contempt for them is 
required by proper pride. Furthermore, as previously mentioned Hume describes the 
magnanimous sage as someone who, “conscious of his own virtue,...elevates himself 
above every accident of life; and securely placed in the temple of wisdom, looks down on 
inferior mortals engaged in pursuit of honours, riches, reputation, and every frivolous 
enjoyment” (EPM VII, 256, emphasis mine).41 Moreover, Hume observes that noble 
pride (in the form of heroism or military glory) leads to great destruction but nevertheless 
affirms this sort of pride as virtuous (T 3.3.2.15, 383). It is thus unclear whether and to 
what extent virtuous pride (and just contempt) might stand in tension with extensive 
sympathy (or the sentiment of “humanity,” as he likes to say in the second Enquiry) and 
benevolence.42 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
pitfall, and his lack of concern is reflected in the ambiguous nature of Humean pride especially when 
compared with Christian humility, as I hope will become clear in the following chapter. 
41 This passage points to another puzzle in Hume’s account of virtuous pride. On the one hand, 
Hume’s moral philosophy is in many ways very clearly a lower aspiring, less demanding vision of the good 
life than we find in most other moral philosophies that have previously prevailed in the history of thought. 
Indeed, I have stressed that Hume’s moral philosophy is meant to counter what he saw to be the overly 
stringent and anti-natural moral demands of the Scottish Calvinism in which he was raised. On the other 
hand, however, if we esteem greatness of mind as a virtue and if true greatness belongs only to those who 
have achieved particular excellence, then it seems to push in the direction of high aspiration where we 
should seek virtue perhaps even to the neglect of (and contempt of) ordinary human happiness and those 
who enjoy it. Hume’s discussion of the magnanimous sage is especially interesting in this regard. 
42 If virtuous pride does involve just contempt, though, it is not clear what sort of contempt would 
count as just for Hume. We can raise this issue in terms of how Hume might respond to the stances of two 
characters in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov: Alyosha, a monk in training, and Ivan, the atheist 
intellectual who, though in some ways drawn to the Christian vision of love, finds in himself deep contempt 
for the wickedness he sees in human beings, a contempt that occludes his capacity to love others. Would 
Ivan Karamazov’s pride and contempt be virtuous or excessive by Hume’s account. Is Ivan’s lack of ability 
to love “up close” (236-37) a right response to human failure or a moral defect? My sense is that Hume 
ends up somewhere between Ivan and Alyosha on this question. Hume seems not to seek, nor to endorse, 
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I now want to consider how Hume’s insight into how deep comparison and 
competition run in human life and how the tensions and ambiguities in Hume’s account 
of virtuous pride relate to the problem of individual flourishing posed in the last chapter. 
There are two issues that I want to take up. First, if even virtuous pride is itself supported 
by comparison, is self-esteem ultimately a good of competition in which there are 
inevitably winners or losers? To what extent, then, is there hope that those individuals 
who lack noteworthy skills or talents (or, worse, are severely disabled or have been so 
emotionally damaged that they are incapable of normal relationships and functioning) can 
develop a healthy self-esteem on a Humean account of pride and its relation to social 
life? If they cannot, is it possible to avoid the negative social effects that issue from a low 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the sort of active love to which Alyosha aspires. (Hume would, I think, be apt to agree with Ivan’s remark 
to Alyosha that the monk breathing into the sick man’s mouth displays a sort of “laceration” of the self. See 
Hume’s critique of the Catholic saint Bellarmine who “patiently and humbly allowed the fleas and other 
odious vermin to prey upon him. We shall have heaven, said he, to reward us for our sufferings; But these 
poor creatures have nothing but the enjoyment of the present life” (NHR X, 164). Such extremes of 
religiously-inspired behavior Hume seems to find absurd.) But neither does Hume share Ivan’s disgust at 
humanity. It is hard to know how much if this, though, has to do with Hume’s disposition rather than a 
rigorous philosophical account of what deserves contempt and how it relates to virtuous pride. 
 The difficulty of discerning when and to what extent our pride (and contempt) is merited, and 
hence virtuous, is further complicated by Hume’s observation that we are prone to mistakes in our self-
assessments. He says, “Nothing is more disagreeable than a man’s over-weaning conceit of himself: Every 
one almost has a strong propensity to this vice: No one can well distinguish in himself betwixt the vice and 
virtue, or be certain, that his esteem of his own merit is well-founded” (T 3.3.2.10, 381). Moreover, 
although the perceptions of others can serve to correct our misguided self-assessments, we saw in the last 
chapter that social perception can also foster and further entrench undue pride. Our mistaken judgments 
about ourselves can be socially supported, when, for example, those around share our false conceptions of 
virtue or our disordered sense of which virtues are most important. We can think of Meletus, Socrates’ 
accuser in the Apology, who sees himself as an exemplary Athenian citizen and who clearly regards both 
his pride in his character as well as his contempt for Socrates to be just. His success in convincing most of 
the jury that Socrates should be killed indicates that he receives social approval from the very people he 
takes to have the correct perception of what good citizenship entails. He is not open to Socrates’ 
criticism—Socrates’ approval is not importantly relevant for him since he has already branded Socrates as 
politically dangerous—so while he does not receive unanimous social support, he receives sufficient 
support to persist in his unjustly founded pride and contempt. Thus, in addition to the dangers, instabilities, 
and ambiguities implicit in Hume’s account of pride, it also presents us with a substantial epistemological 
problem of how we know when our pride is in fact virtuous in light of our propensity to self-deception in 
this sphere. Given that unjust pride and contempt can be so harmful and so difficult to identify, it is 
unfortunate that Hume did not say more about the relationship between virtuous pride, contempt, 
sympathy/humanity, and comparison and work towards a clearer account of just what genuine greatness of 
mind involves.  
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self-esteem and an attempt to boost one’s sense of self in vicious ways? Second, if the 
virtuously proud and the viciously proud alike depend upon comparison for their pride, to 
what degree can the social conditions that are necessary for persons to develop and 
sustain a stable self-esteem be secured? We saw in the last chapter that pride, even 
merited pride, to a large degree depends upon the right sort of social affirmation—
particularly from those others who matter most to us in key moments of our development. 
If even the virtuously proud can lapse into vicious comparisons (which in turn lead to 
moral blindness and unjustified faction-inducing emotions) or can engage in a 
sympathetically closed contempt for the weaker or more vicious members of society, then 
to what extent is it possible to expect that social environments can be formed so that 
persons of lesser ability can have the sort of self-respect that is necessary for a good life?  
With respect to the first issue, it does indeed appear that self-esteem, on Hume’s 
account, is ultimately a matter of competition. The fundamental reason for this lies, I 
think, in Hume’s secular framework and its inability to metaphysically ground human 
dignity. I have mentioned in Chapter Three that Hume’s account of virtuous pride seems 
to appeal to some notion of pride in one’s dignity (most especially one’s moral dignity).43 
It should be clear from I. that Hume’s attempt to give a science of man prevents him from 
accounting for the strong evaluative notion of dignity or from having a metaphysical 
account of the human being that can make sense of the notion of human dignity as such. 
Hume’s empirical method describes what it finds. The concept of “dignity” appears to be 
nothing other than a certain sort of approbation we feel from the general view, and we 
would seem to have “dignity” insofar as we possess those traits that can be affirmed from 
the general view. The more significant we take the trait to be, the more dignity those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See especially Jacqueline Taylor’s “Hume on the Dignity of Pride” (2012).  
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traits may seem to have (e.g., we would judge that there is more dignity in courage than 
in cleanliness, both of which Hume regards as virtues). If dignity can only be empirically 
ascertained in this way, human beings are inevitably stratified on a continuum of better 
and worse, with no way to ground a notion of fundamental human dignity that can make 
sense of a basic equality beneath differences in the quality of our characters.44 It thus 
does seem to be an unavoidable consequence of Hume’s framework that dignity is only 
acquired through our praiseworthy traits and, correspondingly, that we are seen to have 
greater dignity or worth when we are better than others. In this way, our worth is always 
subject to comparison and competition.45 
We might wonder whether Hume, like Nietzsche, would regard the Christian 
attempt to quiet the pervasively competitive aspect of human life as an aim that runs 
deeply counter to human nature and thus is liable to have its own undermining effects on 
human flourishing.46 Although, unlike Nietzsche, Hume rarely suggests that the centrality 
of love in the Christian tradition is harmful or unintelligible,47 he certainly does not 
emphasize caring for the weak, seeking out the less obvious gifts of the socially 
overlooked, and so forth in his moral philosophy. Nevertheless, he is concerned with the 
issues of social faction and securing the conditions for individual happiness—both of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 This point about human dignity raises a more fundamental question for Hume about sympathy in 
general. Namely, ought we seek to extend our sympathy with all others? If so, why, to what extent, and on 
what basis? Why should the great have sympathy with those who they may perceive as not being worthy of 
sympathy, such as the morally degenerate or the pathetically weak?  
45 I do grant that our worth qua attribute is determined by how it ranks in relation to others, but the 
crucial issue I mean to bring out is whether there is also some underlying notion of dignity or worth that 
cannot be diminished or lost by comparison. For Hume I think the answer must be no.  
46 See Manzer’s discussion of Hume’s “surprising openness to more dangerous forms of pride” 
(1996, 339).  
47 He does, however, critique the monk Bellarmine, who, out of pity, allowed “fleas and other odious 
vermin to prey upon him” (NHR IX, 164) as well as Pascal for “endeavor[ing] to be absolutely indifferent 
towards his nearest relations, and to love and speak well of his enemies” because of his (superstitious) 
Christian commitments (EPM 343-44). While these are arguably straw man portraits of Christian love (that 
nevertheless contain some truth), they do raise the fundamental question of whether the central Christian 
virtue of charity is too high-aspiring to be healthy or even fully intelligible.  
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which are dramatically impacted by the passion of pride and its turbulent relationship to 
sympathy, as we saw in Chapter Four. Thus, it is helpful to look at the resources that 
Hume’s secular, reductive, non-teleological framework has for coping with the 
difficulties that arise from pride and competition, even while he refrains from 
condemning our comparative and competitive impulses as such.  
One way in which Hume could go about this is by making a distinction between 
kinds of social affirmation along the lines of Aristotle’s distinction between being loved 
and being admired (NE VIII.8). Hume’s discussion of our “love of fame” (T 2.1.11) 
connotes our pleasure in being admired but does not immediately suggest the more 
important sort of social affirmation needed for human flourishing—our need for love (a 
love which is based on knowledge and appreciation of one’s particularity) and 
participation in community. The upward-looking gaze of admiration (and the 
corresponding downward glance of the admired-one) is at home in the comparative 
ranking of merit that is so pervasive in social life and often opposes sympathy. A loving 
affirmation of and receptivity to a person’s concrete reality, on the other hand, depends 
upon sympathetic attention and inclines towards benevolent concern. These two types of 
social approval tend to promote more of their kind: the admired one is likely to relate to 
the other in a way that makes the comparative judgment central and the one who 
experiences the delight another takes in her existence is likely to reciprocate that sort of 
loving affirmation.48  
Hume collapses these two forms of social approval, but he need not do so, and in 
fact distinguishing between them sheds important light on the relationship between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See Jules Toner’s “Personal Friendship” in Love and Friendship for an account of the possibility 
of loving a person’s unique way of being, a love that is not based on qualities that can become subject to 
competition.  
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affirmation, security of self, and extensive sympathy. For it seems the stability of 
selfhood that facilitates a wider, more extensive sympathy and which restrains the 
tendency towards vicious comparisons belongs to those who have been deeply and 
consistently loved in this latter way, especially from an early age, by the important adult 
figures in one’s life. It is these persons who possess a secure sense of their value, even if 
they are not the best or widely recognized, since they have experienced their significance 
through feeling their significance to others. By contrast, those who have been regularly 
admired and praised primarily for their achievements may well have due pride in their 
merits, but it is difficult to see how those merits and social affirmation suffice to keep 
them from those vicious comparisons that are at odds with sympathy.49 And while they 
may, indeed, have the sort of tacit security afforded to those who enjoy socially 
respectable positions, they lack the more abiding sort of security experienced by those 
who are deeply loved and accepted.  
It looks now as if Hume needs a crucial distinction in his account of the 
relationship between social perception and pride if he wants to promote a stable self-
esteem that is not critically vulnerable to competition (which would be necessary if he is 
concerned to encourage a more widespread individual flourishing) and if he wants to 
lessen the destructive potential of comparison and competition (and thereby to promote 
greater social harmony). This possibility will become a point of further discussion in 
section III. of Chapter Six, but it would require a clearer account on Hume’s part of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 For a keen description of how some highly successful students at elite institutions (i.e., those who 
have the capacity to garner much admiration for their achievements) can become incessantly comparative 
and can vacillate from extreme confidence to self-berating, from looking down on their peers (while 
nevertheless seeking their approval) to self-contempt, depending upon how they fare in the comparison of 
the moment, see William Deresiewicz (2012, 50-55). Whether or not he over-estimates how prevalent these 
dynamics are, he describes them well.  
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grounds of such love and of what sort of place to give comparison in human life and in 
the formation of our pride than Hume is perhaps philosophically equipped to provide. 
We now turn to the second issue posed above: since our pride always depends to a 
large degree on social affirmation, how do we best create the social conditions for 
persons to develop healthy self-esteems, and to what extent is this possible given the 
prevalence of vicious forms of comparison and the moral blindness and unjustified 
faction-inducing passions that emerge from it? In many ways, the motivational issues 
discussed in I., are pertinent here insofar as what is needed for these favorable social 
conditions is the practice of extensive sympathy and curtailment of vicious comparison. I 
suggested there that even though Hume cannot ground a strong evaluative sense that we 
ought to practice extensive sympathy and seek to curb our more biased passions 
pertaining to pride, the extent to which we do strongly evaluate being sympathetic 
persons will go some distance in fostering a social world that is attentive to and 
generously affirms the good in others. More fundamentally, the extent to which persons 
have been genuinely loved rather than merely admired is relevant to the extent to which 
they will have the security of selfhood and experiential orientation to relate to others in 
an appropriately appreciative and not in a viciously comparative manner. 
Nevertheless, it is easy, even when conditions are optimal for proper affirmation 
and acceptance of others, to lapse into subtle comparisons, especially when Hume can 
offer no over-arching moral framework that can articulate worth apart from empirically 
recognized goods—goods which can always be grounds for comparison. Since insightful 
affirmation of and loving receptivity to others takes attention and willingness to forgo the 
pleasure of seeing oneself (whether rightly or wrongly) as greater, the absence of a 
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metaphysical account that can articulate why we should move towards this will, I think, 
be practically less effective than one that can, as I will show in the next chapter. 
This point is partially suggested by Raimond Gaita’s recollection of his time 
working as a ward-assistant at a psychiatric hospital in the early 1960’s. It is worthwhile 
to quote him at length, since his reflections on his experience are so relevant to the issues 
being raised here. Gaita recalls that  
The patients were judged to be incurable and they appeared to have irretrievably 
lost everything which gives meaning to our lives. They had no grounds for self-
respect insofar as we connect that with self-esteem; or, none which could be based 
on qualities or achievements for which we could admire or congratulate them 
without condescension. [Although family] had long ceased to visit them [and they 
were often] treated brutishly by the psychiatrists and nurses, [a] small number of 
psychiatrists did…work devotedly to improve their conditions. They spoke, 
against all appearances, of the inalienable dignity of even those patients. I admired 
them greatly. Most of their colleagues believed these doctors to be naïve, even 
fools. Some of the nurses despised them with a vehemence that was astonishing.  
It probably didn’t help their cause for the psychiatrists to speak of the 
inalienable dignity of the patients I described. Natural though it is to speak this 
way, and although it has an honoured place in our tradition, it is, I believe, a sign 
of our conceptual desperation and also of our deep desire to ground in the very 
nature of things the requirement that we accord each human being unconditional 
respect. To talk of inalienable dignity is rather like talking of the inalienable right 
to esteem. … 
One day a nun came to the ward. …[E]verything in her demeanour 
towards them—the way she spoke to them, her facial expressions, the inflexions 
of her body—contrasted with and showed up the behaviour of those noble 
psychiatrists. She showed that they were, despite their best efforts, 
condescending, as I too had been. She thereby revealed that even such patients 
were, as the psychiatrists and I had sincerely and generously professed, the equals 
of those who wanted to help them; but she also revealed that in our hearts we did 
not believe this.  
…In the nun’s case, her behaviour was striking not for the virtues it 
expressed, or even for the good it achieved, but for its power to reveal the full 
humanity of those whose affliction had made their humanity invisible. Love is the 
name we give to such behaviour (Gaita, 17-20)  
 
We see Gaita and some of his colleagues deeply wanting and attempting to relate 
to the patients as equal in dignity and struggling to give a grounding and a language for 
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their sense that the patients were worthy of being regarded in this way. Because of the 
lack of evident empirical evidence for these claims of equal dignity, however, many of 
the other doctors and nurses failed to be convinced by such appeals.50 And to a certain 
degree, the “noble psychiatrists” and Gaita failed to be convinced as well; they were not 
fully able to believe or to live out that which they, nevertheless, “sincerely and generously 
professed.” Interestingly, however, the nun’s capacity to love the patients, to truly relate 
to them as equals, Gaita recalls, revealed to him the reality and significance of their 
humanity. And he says, “For me, the purity of the love proved the reality of what it 
revealed,” despite that “from the point of view of speculative intelligence, [he] allow[s] 
for no independent justification of her attitude” (21-22). 
I want to return to Gaita’s reflections on this experience in section II. of the next 
chapter. Gaita is rightly cautious about too quickly attributing the nun’s behavior to her 
religious outlook (an outlook Gaita appreciates but does not himself share), but neither 
does he deny that it has importantly contributed to her moral formation. In Chapter Six I 
will explore just what sort of motivational and character-informing significance Christian 
humanism might have on issues pertaining to how to create the social conditions for 
promoting healthy self-esteems wherein persons are able to flourishing individually. As 
with the practical motivational issues surrounding the passion of pride and the problem of 
faction, we will better be able to pinpoint the limits of Hume’s perspective after we have 
discussed the resources that a Christian humanist framework has for responding to the 
problems we have been considering. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The contrasting perspective of the doctors can perhaps be said to reflect the ambiguity that is 
present in Hume’s account of virtuous pride: does prideful concern for one’s character involve distancing 
oneself from the “lowly” or actively seeking sympathy with them? 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIAN HUMANIST HUMILITY 
 
We have seen that Hume’s key criticism of Christian morality—and Christian 
humility as informed by the Christian moral framework—is that it undermines individual 
and social flourishing. I showed in Chapter Three, however, that Hume’s objections to 
Christian humility were largely appropriate criticisms of hyper-Augustinian conceptions 
of humility and that Christian humanist humility (as expressed, for example, by Aquinas) 
mostly resists Hume’s critiques. I have also highlighted the ways in which Hume’s 
account of our natural desire for the passion of pride has problematic implications for 
individual and social flourishing, and I have pointed to the limitations of Hume’s secular 
ethic and conception of virtuous pride for addressing these problems. In this chapter I 
want to show that a Christian humanist humility (and the Christian moral framework 
within which this conception of humility takes shape) can in some ways better respond to 
the problems of individual and social flourishing that were identified in Chapter Four.1  
To this end, in I., I show how a Christian humanist’s perspective and Hume’s 
secular perspective would differently shape their respective conceptions about what is 
involved in being rightly related to our strengths and weaknesses, even while they are 
united in seeing self-esteem as a morally important good and self-hatred as vicious. In II. 
I explain how a eudaimonistic ethic that is situated in a Christian humanist teleological 
framework is able to give a satisfying philosophical account of moral motivation that has 
practical significance. In III. I explore the ways in which Christian humanist humility is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I will primarily be discussing humility as articulated by Aquinas, since he is our representative 
Christian humanist, but I will also suggest aspects that of humility fit within a Christian humanist 
framework, but that Aquinas does not mention or develop. At points I will speak of ‘Christian humility’ 
rather than ‘Christian humanist humility,’ and I do so when the aspect of humility under consideration is 
would be held by Christian humanists and hyper-Augustinians alike.  
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virtue particularly suited to ensuring a healthy self-esteem and to motivating a wider, 
more extensive sympathy over and against the sort of vicious comparisons that stand at 
the root of so many problems for human flourishing.  
 
I. Humean and Christian Humanist Conceptions of Proper Self-Assessment 
In order to explain just how a Christian humanist conception of Christian humility 
can better cope with some of the problems that the passion of pride can pose for 
flourishing and to bring out some of the larger issues at stake in Hume’s secularization of 
ethics, I need to locate the key differences between Hume’s and Aquinas’s common 
stances regarding our proper self-assessments. I showed in Chapter Three that beneath 
the seemingly opposed terms that Hume and Aquinas use to designate various forms of 
self-assessments, they hold much in common regarding the importance of acquiring a 
stable, secure selfhood. In this section, however, I want to bring into focus the real 
differences between Hume and Aquinas’s conceptions of pride and humility in order to 
show in III. the significance of Aquinas’s conception of humility over and against 
Humean pride for addressing the problems for flourishing that I am considering. When 
we get clear on just where their differences reside, the more interesting and significant 
issues between Hume’s and a Christian humanist’s stance toward pride, humility, and 
human flourishing come to the fore.  
The differences can be traced to their competing visions of the moral life, which 
themselves depend upon the answers that Christian humanists give to certain larger 
metaphysical questions, on the one hand, and upon Hume’s attempt to avoid such 
questions in his moral reflections, on the other. At the heart of the Christian moral vision 
is the ideal of communion, with God and with one another—an ideal understood to be 
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partially realizable in this life and only fully realizable in the next. This moral and 
spiritual focus on love coincides with a Christian metaphysical account of God’s very 
nature: the Godhead itself is understood to be a Trinity (a three-in-one unity of love 
between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), and the two most momentous events in the 
Christian narrative, the Incarnation (God coming to dwell among us) and the Crucifixion 
(God’s suffering with and for us, which is the culminating expression of the costliness 
and gift of such love), are seen as the ultimate revelations of divine love. Since Christian 
morality and spirituality centers on seeking to love and be like God, and since God is 
love, charity—i.e., friendship with God that extends to all others (even the most 
overlooked and despised)—is seen as the crowning virtue of the Christian life.2 
Correspondingly, the tradition is rich with imagery meant to point to the centrality of 
love, communion, and reconciliation. We can think of the injunction to regard the 
stranger as one’s brother or neighbor, and of the image of the wedding banquet or of the 
lion lying down with the lamb.  
By contrast, I think it can be said that Hume’s moral vision does not point toward 
a single over-arching ideal or end. In fact, while we can speak of especially important 
virtues such as benevolence and justice as moral “ideals” to pursue, I suspect that Hume, 
in his wariness of utopianism and of over-theorization would resist the language of ideals 
altogether. Rather it seems as though Hume’s moral vision consists in promoting the best 
sort of happiness that is possible for us in light of an honest appraisal of the way we are 
and the limits of what we can be. This corresponds to Hume’s rejection of teleology and 
his descriptive project of giving an account of human nature as we observe it, not as we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See 1 John 4:7-8 (KJV): “Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and everyone who 
loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love.” 
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think it should be. It can seem for Hume, then, that while he does assume a rough of 
hierarchy of values in his response to the sensible knave, there is no highest value or 
highest object of love to which he appeals that serves as an ultimate standard for ordering 
other goods. He is more inclined, I think, to let certain tensions in human life stand. We 
saw this tendency to admit tension surface in the way in which he promotes extensive 
sympathy but then also does not unambiguously rule out factors that oppose sympathy in 
his account of virtuous pride. In general Hume’s moral vision rests more easily with 
human nature as we find it than does an ethic based upon a teleological conception of the 
cosmos and our place within it and which seeks to articulate human nature in its 
perfection. 
There are two other related ways in which the Christian humanist’s and the 
Humean’s wider perspectives and subsequent moral visions differ and which lie behind 
their disagreements about what proper self-assessment involves. First, as I have 
mentioned in Chapter One, Christians regard the love of God to be the fulfillment of our 
nature; as Augustine says, “our hearts are restless, O Lord, until they rest in you” (C I.i.1, 
3). We saw that Aquinas thought we could understand natural human flourishing apart 
from God, but Christians are united in affirming that, apart from God, we cannot fully 
understand the meaning and purpose of our lives. In other words, from a Christian 
perspective, God is not some add-on to an intact moral sphere, but is central to the whole 
Christian eudaimonistic framework. Hume, however, seems to conceive of God as 
irrelevant and superfluous to human fulfillment (and, indeed, he regards a Christian 
conception of God to be detrimental to human happiness).  
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Second, as we saw in the previous section, the Christian and Humean moral 
perspectives have different stances toward human worth. The Christian understands all 
persons to have fundamental value—being made and loved by God, and bearers of God’s 
image. The dignity of every person persists, Christians believe, even among the most 
marginalized, deformed, and morally degenerate members of society, and it is a 
noteworthy component of Jesus’s life that he sought out those who were most socially 
rejected and taught that we are to extend our love in such a way. By contrast, as we saw, 
Hume’s ethic founded upon on a secular science of man does not and cannot appeal to 
some notion of basic human dignity. Instead Hume’s framework only allows him to base 
worth upon empirically recognizable traits as would receive approbation from the general 
view—and these traits will always be comparatively ranked.   
In the Introduction I sketched the general structure of what I call virtuous pride 
and virtuous humility (i.e., virtuous ways of being related to strengths and capacities, on 
the one hand, and our weaknesses, failings, and dependencies, on the other), and I 
explained how one’s larger metaphysical commitments (or attempt to avoid them and 
remain in the “immanent” sphere, as in Hume’s case) affect how virtuous pride and 
humility are conceived. I now want to examine how these underlying differences between 
a Christian humanist’s and a Humean’s perspective shape their respective stances 
towards the proper way of being related to our strengths and capacities, on the one hand, 
and our failings and weaknesses, on the other. Through this discussion, I also want to 
gesture towards what a secular account of virtuous humility might include. 
First, as we saw in the Christian tradition, humility primarily refers to submission 
to God. This involves recognizing one’s place in the cosmos (as Augustine put it in his 
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opening prayer, we are “a little piece of your creation” (C I.i.1) and that God, not 
ourselves, is the highest object of love. It also includes showing proper reverence and 
love for God, which in turn shapes our passions and actions. While Hume, by contrast, 
will refer to the proper respect and deference due to authorities, teachers, and the like 
(EPM VIII, 263-64, T 3.3.2.11, 382),3 there is nothing that commands our ultimate 
reverence and to which we must align our loves. Interestingly, if the judgments made 
from the general view were strongly normative, Hume could have a sort of secular 
analogue to humility as submission to God. As we saw, he often speaks as if the general 
survey generates judgments that are normative for our passions and actions. Loosely 
analogous to the way in which Augustine thinks that our loves need instruction, then, 
Hume’s account could suggest that our immediate desires and biased responses ought to 
“submit” to those normative demands upon us. We saw this in his response to the 
sensible knave: on Hume’s view the knave should recognize that he ought to reverence 
virtue and thereby shun his inclinations to injustice, and Hume regards him as base for 
failing to do so. We are not genuinely obligated to pursue Humean virtue, however. The 
moral “demands” upon us derive merely from sentiments we happen to be constituted to 
have. 
In the Introduction I explained the structural relationship between virtuous pride 
and virtuous humility: not only is virtuous humility needed to prevent pride from going 
beyond its bounds (and hence becoming vicious, excessive pride) and vice versa, but also 
the background picture that makes sense of what one understands to be the content of just 
humility is bound up with the content of virtuous pride. This is apparent in the way in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is worth nothing that on Hume’s account respect is a mixture of the passions of love and humility 
(T 2.2.10.1, 251)  
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which Christian reverence for God and a Humean reverence for virtue (even if it is not 
ultimately grounded) are connected, for both traditions, to the sources of proper self-
esteem. The Christian, for example, sees our relation to God to be a key source of our 
dignity. That we are made in the image of God and moreover are loved by God requires, 
Christian humanists think, a kind of self-love and affirmation of our worth—a proper 
pride, if you will. In addition to this basic dignity, our moral dignity deepens as we 
become more like God in the way we treat others. The grounds for proper self-
affirmation for the Christian are thus the same as those for proper humility: we find our 
dignity (proper pride) in honoring that which is worthy of honor (i.e., God and that which 
is of God) rather than placing our desires at the center of things (proper humility), and 
conversely we demean ourselves (vicious humility) when we proudly overstep our 
bounds (vicious pride).4 Similarly for Hume, we build up our character, making our pride 
just, by “submitting” to virtue, and we deserve the passion of humility, i.e., we diminish 
our worth, if we disregard virtue by favoring of our untutored desires, as does the knave.5  
Second, we saw in the Christian tradition that humility involves the proper 
recognition and acceptance of our dependency, primarily on God, but Aquinas and 
Augustine are also keen to point out our dependency on others (who are understood 
ultimately as gifts of God).6 Dependency on God takes several forms. Since all being is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Augustine explicitly links humility to exaltation and pride to our degradation. He says, “devout 
humility makes the mind subject to what is superior. Nothing is superior to God; and that is why humility 
exalts the mind by making it subject to God” (CG XIV.13, 572). He similarly says, “Now it is good to ‘lift 
up your heart’, and to exalt your thoughts, yet not in the self-worship of pride, but in the worship of God. 
This is a sign of obedience, and obedience can belong only to the humble” (CG XIV.13, 572). 
5 Interestingly, both Augustine and Hume hold that pursuit of virtue (though virtue is differently 
understood) begets inner peace (both a peaceful conscience and internal order) and that following our 
untutored passions begets internal conflict. See my discussion in Chapter One on this point in Augustine 
and Baier on this point in Hume (1991, 133).  
6 The notion of dependency understood more widely runs throughout Augustine’s Confessions, for 
example. He begins by talking about his dependency on his mother’s milk, acknowledging our physical 
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seen to derive from God, we are dependent on God for creating and sustaining our 
existence. Christians have also maintained that we are also dependent on God’s grace in 
helping us grow in virtue, for endowing us with particular talents, and for providentially 
guiding our lives in various ways. As mentioned in Chapter One, while hyper-
Augustinians tend to see God’s grace as displacing human agency, Christian humanists 
such as Aquinas accept a cooperative model of divine and human agency. Thus, for 
Aquinas, humility does not entail giving God all the credit to the neglect of 
acknowledging our own role our achievements. Neither are we to attempt to parse out 
how much we contributed to our achievements so as to “own” them as our own 
possession and to measure how we stand in relation to others. Rather, humility involves 
an awareness of our deep indebtedness to God (and others and factors beyond our 
control) for the good that we have, and it disposes us joyfully to acknowledge the help we 
have received instead of to dwell on ourselves.7  
From within Hume’s immanent framework, proper recognition of our dependency 
obviously would not involve dependence on God, but it certainly could involve a sense of 
our dependence on others (and the natural world). Hume’s account of justice points 
obviously to our physical interdependence, and his account of natural sympathy points to 
our dependence on others, as we have seen, for the formation of a healthy pride. 
Moreover, his framework is open to a more developed account of human dependency that 
could be used to develop a secular account of virtuous humility. It could, for example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
need for nourishment and care, and continues by recalling the influence, both positive and negative, of his 
peers and teachers on his intellectual, moral, and religious formation. Likewise Aquinas says, “For every 
man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a social 
animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life” (ST II-II:129.6.r1). 
7 We can infer that Aquinas does not think a constant, explicit sense of our dependency on God is 
needed at all times to have proper humility from his analogous discussion of why we do not have to think 
constantly of God to have perfect charity in this life (see ST II-II:24.8).  
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include MacIntyre’s observations in Dependent Rational Animals that we enter the world 
in utter need, wholly relying on others for nourishment, for comfort and support, for the 
acquisition of language and the tools for reasoning, for being initiated into a moral and 
cultural form of life, and so on.8 It could include a sense of our dependence upon our 
genetic endowments for the natural proclivities we have toward certain excellences and 
on luck in our circumstance for the ability to foster our talents. It could also include 
awareness of our dependence on the natural world for our continued biological 
sustenance and for the experiences of beauty and the sense of renewal it bestows.  
Hume’s framework therefore could allow that the proper attitude befitting the 
humble recognition of our dependency is appreciation and gratitude, a willingness to care 
for others in their dependency as we have (or should have) been cared for in ours, and an 
acceptance of our need for help, rather than a hardened resistance to be indebted to 
others.9 (These facts of our dependency could be built into a Thomistic understanding of 
the content of virtuous humility as well. In this respect, there are fertile grounds for 
overlap between a Christian humanist and secular account of virtuous humility.) This 
recognition of dependency becomes vicious, however, if it obscures our sense of our real 
agency and the significant contribution we make to our own formation—aspects 
belonging to proper pride. Indeed, as MacIntyre observes, although our very capacity to 
become independent practical reasoners depends deeply on others, we remain in 
intellectual and moral immaturity if we fail adequately to take up our capacity to reason 
independently (see 1999, 81-98). Similarly, although we depend on others for our self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 MacIntyre does not discuss humility in his discussion of the virtues of acknowledged dependence 
(see 1999, 119-128), but it worthwhile to consider humility is central to them.  
9 The unwillingness to be indebted to others is a classic problem in Aristotle’s account of the 
magnanimous person. In my view, this is one way in which Aquinas’s Christianized account of 
magnanimity and its relation to humility is an improvement upon Aristotle.  
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assessments, we ought not indiscriminately to absorb others’ judgments nor fail to trust 
our own insight into our character.10 I suggest therefore that analogous to the cooperative 
model of grace and human agency, proper recognition of our dependency on others, luck, 
and the natural world would be accompanied by a right recognition and employment of 
our capacities and independence, without falsely downplaying our real contributions to 
our achievements. Just as Aquinas’s account of humility does not require us to detangle 
how much of our accomplishments are of our own making and how much is due to God 
and others, so too could a secular acknowledgment of our dependencies involve a 
willingness to forgo the tendency to be overly possessive of what we have made of 
ourselves and, correspondingly, to see our accomplishments as grounds for looking down 
on others.11  
Interestingly, however, although much could be said about virtuous ways of being 
related to our dependency from within Hume’s secular framework, and although Hume is 
himself quite sensitive to our social dependency, his account of modesty—“a just sense 
of our weakness”—does not seem to include such awareness. Nor, as we saw, does his 
account of virtuous pride seem to exclude enjoying one’s superiority to others, even 
though it would seem that such enjoyment would be subdued by an appropriate 
awareness of our indebtedness. Hume’s failure to explicitly incorporate aspects of our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Hume suggests that, although we depend upon others for our own self-perceptions, we should not 
be overly dependent such that we fail to make our own best judgments of our character or that we give too 
much weight to the opinions of those of poor judgment (see T 2.1.11.11-12, 209). (Hume’s actual language 
is that we do give greater weight to “the approbation of a wise man than with that of a fool” (T 2.1.11.12, 
209). But this is not always true. If we do not recognize who the wise are or if we lack sufficient sympathy 
with wise persons, their judgments will matter less to us than they ought.) Nor should we be so independent 
from the perceptions of all others that we fail to be open to important critique (such self-protective 
invulnerability is a vicious form of pride). Such extreme independence that ends up being closed to others 
belongs, I suggest, to excessive rather than virtuous pride. 
11 We can think of a person who humbly and graciously receives an award for a great achievement. 
She does not glory in her success as her own but sees is as the work of many. Neither, though, does she 
give all the credit elsewhere; such false humility would fail to give due acknowledgment to her own hand 
in her accomplishment. 
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dependency into his account of virtuous pride is perhaps connected to his promotion of an 
ethic that by and large tries to work with and affirm our natural tendencies. Hume 
recognizes our deep propensity to pride—a pride which often arises upon being better 
than others—and his account of virtuous pride as a specifically natural virtue is one in 
which the natural pleasure we take in being superior is accepted, so long as it is properly 
concealed by modesty.  
By contrast, for Aquinas, who embraces a Christian worldview wherein giving 
and receiving is connected to our ultimate telos of communion with God and others, an 
awareness of our dependency is integral to his account of magnanimity. While in 
Aristotle, the magnanimous person strives for self-sufficiency (since this is to attain 
greater likeness to the Unmoved Mover), in Aquinas the magnanimous person “deem[s] 
himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God” (ST II-
II:129.3.r4). Aquinas also maintains that it belongs to magnanimity to be confident in 
God’s assistance (ST II-II:129.6.r1). Furthermore, Aquinas sees our strengths primarily 
as gifts we have been given for the good of others, not for self-aggrandizement.12 Indeed, 
the Christian ideal of love encourages being outwardly focused. Proper self-affirmation 
does not rest with itself but turns towards God, others, and the common good. 
It is worth noticing on this point that although Hume does indicate that the secure 
person with a healthy self-esteem is better attuned to others, his account of pride (whether 
excessive or just) is that of a passion that rests with ourselves rather than an attitude that 
directs us outward (see Chapter Four I.c.). Hume’s secular framework, however, allows 
for the possibility of an account of virtuous pride that, by including an awareness of how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I am indebted to Mary Keys’s discussion of this point (2003, 43). She draws from both the Summa 
(ST, I–II 19.10; 61.5; 66.4; II–II 58.12) and the Commentary (lectio x, 760, 779) in her discussion of this 
point.  
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others have contributed to our strengths (i.e., as a component of virtuous humility), would 
tend to soften our tendency to enjoy our superiority. Perhaps this recognition of our 
dependency could also encourage a practice of regarding our strengths primarily as gifts 
(in the sense that we rely upon many factors beyond ourselves for their development) to 
share with others, thus liberating the virtuously proud person from excessive attention on 
the self.  
Third, Christian humility involves humility before others. This means, in the first 
instance, recognizing the dignity, the image of God, in all human beings—a dignity for 
which reverence, respect, and love is the proper response.13 For the Christian, a person’s 
fundamental worth is of more significance than talents and social status, and humility is a 
reverential mode of relating to others primarily not in a comparative way whereby we 
size up who is better than whom, but where we regard others, even those who are difficult 
to love, as important. Robert C. Robert convincingly argues that Jesus’s teachings of 
humility in the Gospels suggests that humility does not mean denying one’s attributes, 
but, rather, it involves not clinging to the social status that our strengths usually merit 
(2009, 128-29). Christian humility, he contends, involves relating to others fundamentally 
as persons of intrinsic value in other-directed love rather than having one’s strengths and 
merits and social markers in view in a self-directed emphasis.    
In the second instance, many Christians have thought, following St. Paul’s 
injunction to “in humility count others more significant than yourself” (Phil. 2:3, ESV) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 One might wonder whether this is best categorized as humility when one ought to recognize this 
same dignity in oneself. Why not better call it an appreciation of our fundamental equality? I think, 
however, that it is appropriate to include this attitude under humility because of the reverence it involves 
and also because our propensity to excessive pride (and thus to look down upon others) makes our ability to 
get beyond ourselves and affectively register another’s dignity as more belonging to humility. I think that 
Aquinas is right to see humility as a restraining virtue, a virtue that restrains our tendency to excessive 
pride, and often humility is needed precisely to curb the sort of pride that would desensitize us to another’s 
dignity. 
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that there is a sense in which it is right to regard all others as better than ourselves. As we 
saw in Chapter One, Aquinas holds something of this view. He insists, however, that 
humility before others in this sense does not mean that one deny when one has superior 
abilities to another (see ST II-II:161.3). To do so would be false humility, and 
additionally it would be harmful to the social body, for we need to acknowledge where 
we have greater gifts than others in order to discern how to best offer our talents to the 
common good (see ST II-II:132.1). Rather, Aquinas thinks that we cultivate a just 
humility before others if we compare what we have of ourselves with what others have 
from God (ST II-II:161.3.r2).14 And if what another has from God is not apparent, 
Aquinas proposes that through faith we ought to believe that God is at work inwardly in 
the person, that she has goodness that we cannot see. While it is logically impossible that 
all others can be better than all others, there is perhaps an important spirit towards others 
that Aquinas means to capture, and which has practical significance in light of our 
tendency to vicious forms of comparison. Aquinas’s faith that God is at work in all 
persons and that all persons can enrich us with their gifts, is a way of orienting ourselves 
to others, of disposing us to look for and be receptive to others’ strengths, rather than to 
delight in our (apparent or real) superiority to those with less obvious talents. In light of 
the problems of moral blindness and unjustified faction-inducing passion that arise from 
our tendency to unjustified pride, we can see the moral value, I think, in encouraging 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not 
with the same measure of reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with 
humility to all our neighbors for God’s sake” (ST II-II:161.3.r1). See also: “If we set what our neighbor has 
of God’s above that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood [by having humility before all 
others]. Wherefore a gloss on Philip. Ii. 3, Esteem others better than ourselves, says: We must not esteem 
by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for another person to have something that 
is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are apparently 
better than he, be not hidden” (ST II-II:161.3.r2). 
See also where Aquinas says, “Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than 
ourselves, in so far as we see some of God’s gifts in them” (ST II-II:129.3.r4).  
 357 
attention to others and a disposition to acknowledge and take joy in their gifts.15 Indeed, 
such generous attunement to others takes moral strength and is very different from a 
servile, self-mistrusting way of tending to regard others as better than ourselves.  
In a Humean framework, however, to what extent does it make sense to articulate 
a humility before others that goes beyond the appropriateness of respect for obvious 
superiors? I have already argued in II. of Chapter Five that given Hume’s empirical 
project of providing a science of man, he cannot appeal to an underlying metaphysical 
grounding for human dignity, but can only point to empirically recognizable traits that 
warrant esteem.16 While Humeans may attempt to defend an account of what, from the 
general view, is worthy of respect in human nature itself (e.g., our capacity to reason, our 
capacity for benevolence, etc.), there are philosophical and practical problems with this 
route. As we saw the general view is insufficient for establishing the strongly evaluative 
notion of dignity. Additionally, it could seem that the very failure to actualize those 
capacities better warrants contempt rather than respect for those persons. Perhaps, 
however, somewhat analogous to Aquinas’s conviction that God is at work in others and 
has given others gifts even if we cannot see them, a secular outlook could similarly affirm 
the inadequacy of our epistemic position with respect to others, one that acknowledges 
that there is always more to people than we can readily see and that every person likely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Father Zosima in The Brothers Karamazov recommends that we take a similar spirit of humility 
before others, seeing ourselves as “guilty before everyone” (298).” If another has a vice that repulses us and 
tempts us to elevate ourselves in relation to him, Zosima suggests that we think that the ripple effect of sin 
is such that maybe if we had acted differently on a certain occasion, that person might not struggle as they 
do (320-22). This attitude checks our tendency to feel superior to others for their failings by way of vicious 
comparison, and it helps us to speculatively sympathize with the way in which others’ vices are often set in 
motion by mistreatment from others, while simultaneously acknowledging that we have mistreated others 
ourselves. 
16 Hume is unclear on the following crucial questions: Is, and if so, to what extent is some notion of 
human dignity assumed by the sort of extensive sympathy needed for the general view? Must human 
dignity be acknowledged from the general view itself? Does Hume’s account of the general view require 
extending our sympathy to all others? On what grounds could it do so? Moreover, how deep must this 
sympathy go? 
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has something important to offer, even if it is not apparent to us. Hume does not develop 
an account of humility before others along these lines, however. Once again, his 
discussions of proper self-assessments sit more easily with the competitiveness and 
comparisons that pervade social life and are used to measure social status.   
This becomes even more apparent if we look at Hume’s discussions of modesty. 
In Chapter Three I emphasized Hume’s initial description of modesty as a “just sense of 
our weakness” (T 3.3.2.1, 378), and I highlighted ways in which Hume suggests that it is 
related to being open to others.17 In fact, however, most of Hume’s account of modesty 
suggests that it is merely an outward social grace, useful for easing social relations by 
preventing the offense that an open display of pride could evoke in others; and as 
important as this social grace is,18 it hardly denotes a genuine reverence towards others.19 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 We get this sense when he says that modesty’s “most usual meaning is when it is opposed to 
impudence and arrogance, and expresses a diffidence of our own judgment, and a due attention and regard 
for others. In young men chiefly, this is a sure sign of good sense; and is also the certain means of 
augmenting that endowment, by preserving their ears open to instruction, and making them still grasp after 
new attainments” (EPM VIII, 263). 
18 Modesty in this sense goes some way in mitigating the problems that desire for pride can pose for 
flourishing. The modest person is less likely to make others feel insecure, and thus softens the tendency in 
those others to compare rather than sympathize with her, feel inadequate themselves, or to feel envy, 
hatred, anger, and so on because of the insecurity she elicits in them. 
19 Hume says, 
good-breeding and decency require that we shou’d avoid all signs and expressions, which tend 
directly to show that passion. We have, all of us, a wonderful partiality for ourselves, and were we 
always to give vent to our sentiments in this particular, we shou’d mutually cause the greatest 
indignation in each other,…by the immediate presence of so disagreeable a subject of comparison… 
[so] we establish the rules of good-breeding, in order to prevent the opposition of men’s pride, and 
render conversation agreeable and inoffensive. (T 3.3.2.10, 381)  
Modesty, Hume says, is this rule of good-breeding, which opposes pride or arrogance (T 3.3.2.9-10, 381 
and EPM VIII, 263). How does modesty contribute to our own happiness? Hume says that others are more 
apt to indulge our “secret sentiments” of pride if we “carry a fair outside, and have the appearance of 
modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and behavior” (T 3.3.2.10, 381-2). Even directly after he 
talks about the importance of students modestly listening to their teachers (a passage I just quoted in the 
previous footnote), he says that modesty “has a further charm to every spectator; by flattering every man’s 
vanity, and presenting the appearance of a docile pupil, who receives, with proper attention and respect, 
every word they utter” (EPM VIII, 263-64, emphasis mine). (In this case, Hume is explicit about the way in 
which modesty feeds the vanity of others (and he does not seem to suggest that this vanity is harmful to the 
person who harbors it).) And as with his account of modesty in the Treatise, Hume’s account in the second 
Enquiry thereafter turns to a more lengthy discussion of modesty as a mostly outward manner that eases 
social relations.  
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It seems in fact that, for Hume, modesty has more to do with pride than having a “just 
sense of our weakness,” for modesty serves to conceal our strengths from too public a 
display. As Hume says, no careful observer of human nature will assert that this form of 
good-breeding and decency require us to “[go] beyond the outside, or that a thorough 
sincerity in this particular is esteem’d a real part of our duty” (T 3.3.2.11, 382).20 As 
such, Humean modesty appears to be compatible with enjoying one’s superiority to 
others and even with contempt.  
A fourth aspect of virtuous humility in the Christian tradition is a right 
recognition and remorse for one’s moral failings (which, in a Christian worldview is 
understood as sin) and acceptance of one’s limitations and weaknesses. The Christian 
vision of communion again lies at the heart of seeing humility, in this respect as well, to 
be significant. On the Christian view, sin is so problematic because it disrupts our 
relationship to God and divides us from one another. Awareness of one’s moral failings is 
thus important because it is the precondition for seeking reconciliation and moral 
transformation. Furthermore, such awareness disposes us to bear with the moral 
weaknesses of others, recognizing that others have borne with ours. In contrast to what I 
argued to be the over-emphasis on sin in the hyper-Augustinian tradition, a Christian 
humanist conception of the value of recognizing one’s failings and limitations would be 
accompanied by due sense of one’s significance, therefore avoiding self-deprecation.  
Once more Hume’s framework allows for a secular analogue here. While a “just 
sense of our weakness” would not involve the notion of sin before God, it could certainly 
include a sense of our moral failings and their effects, as well as acceptance of our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 By contrast, Aquinas maintains that “humility resides chiefly inwardly in the soul.” He says that a 
person can bear reverence to another without outwardly subjecting oneself to another when doing so would 
be detrimental to that other’s welfare; outward acts of humility require moderation (ST II-II:161.3.r3). 
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limitations and weaknesses. Like a Christian awareness of sin, this would better make 
possible moral growth, reconciliation, and sensitivity to the struggles and of others. 
Again, though, Hume does not mention awareness of our moral failings in his account of 
modesty and seems not to have seen it as especially important insofar as it does not show 
up in his discussion of the virtues. Perhaps Hume’s silence on this point is in part a 
reaction to the over-emphasis on sin in the Scottish Calvinist tradition in which he was 
raised.21 Perhaps it is also because Hume’s more worldly moral vision regards a wider-
range of passions and actions as morally acceptable. In any case, there is nothing in 
Hume’s secular framework that prevents him from defending this aspect of humility or 
modesty as virtuous, and given our tendency to vicious forms of pride that fails to see our 
own excess, this practice would be important for the cultivation of proper pride.  
In sum, then, although both Aquinas and Hume affirm the value of self-esteem 
and condemn small-mindedness, there are significant differences that remain with respect 
to the content of these attitudes, which are rooted in their respective religious and secular 
outlooks. Aquinas emphasizes dependency and other-centered orientation even in his 
account of magnanimity, while Hume seems to see enjoyment of one’s superiority to be a 
natural and acceptable component of virtuous pride, and even his account of modesty 
seems to lack inward awareness of our debts to others. While I have argued that any 
conception of virtuous self-assessment will include proper recognition of and ways of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 I have argued in previous chapters that hyper-Augustinian humility problematically over-estimates 
human sinfulness insofar as it wrongly interprets many efforts toward the good as ultimately motivated by 
selfishness or pride. I have also argued that the hyper-Augustinian emphasis on sin in its account of 
humility places too much focus on the self rather than in orienting one’s focus outwardly. Hume perhaps 
can be read as offering a subtle critique of this over-emphasis on sin when, in his account of the passion of 
malice, he discusses the phenomena of self-malice. Hume says, “a person may extend this malice against 
himself, even to his present fortune, and carry it so far as designedly to seek affliction, and encrease his 
pains and sorrows” as we see “with those penances which men inflict on themselves for their past sins and 
failings” (T 2.2.8.11, 242-43). We should note, too, that Hume later lists penance as a monkish virtue in 
both the second Enquiry and the Natural History (EPM VIII, 270; NHR X, 163).   
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being related to our strengths and weaknesses, capacities and dependencies, our worth 
and relative smallness, etc., it is not insignificant the Christian tradition emphasizes 
humility and Hume pride. 
 I have not only pointed out, though, that key differences between a Christian 
humanist and Humean outlook informs different conceptions of the content of virtuous 
pride and humility, but also that a broadly Humean framework itself can support different 
ways of filling out what is involved in proper stances towards ourselves in relation to 
others. This is due, I think in part, to the various principles in human nature and the way 
in which Hume’s non-teleological perspective does not and ultimately cannot explain 
why certain principles (such as sympathy, when extended) ought always to be privileged 
over others (such as comparisons, when vicious). The tensions in human nature leave 
much room for debate about the extent to which we should subdue, refine, or favor 
certain principles so as to best flourish in light of the kinds of beings that we are. I have 
hinted at the possibility of a secular account of humility that is more analogous to a 
Christian humanist one than is Hume’s account of modesty, and I will later say more 
about the importance of developing a secular humility along these lines.22 For the 
remainder of this chapter, however, I want simply to look at the extent to which a 
Christian humanist eudaimonist moral framework (such as Aquinas’s) and the account of 
virtuous humility it supports is able to address the problems for flourishing that arise 
from our desire for the passion of pride.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Even though a secular framework allows for articulating the good of humility on naturalistic 
grounds, humility has been particularly neglected in secular moral philosophy. I think this is in part because 
a religious worldview and its appeals to a transcendent moral source perhaps better dispose one to dwell 
upon one’s dependency. 
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II. Normativity, Moral Ontology, and Motivation 
 Before I look specifically at Christian humility in relation to the problems for 
flourishing posed by pride, I need to show more generally how Aquinas’s Christian 
humanist ethical framework can provide a satisfying philosophical account of moral 
motivation. Aquinas, building upon both Aristotle and Augustine, embraces a teleological 
conception of the cosmos and of the human person as oriented by our nature to God and 
explicitly endorses a eudaimonistic account of ethics, whereby goodness is understood as 
that which contributes to the fulfillment of our nature and, correspondingly, to the 
genuine happiness of well-being in the good person. In this section I want to show how 
Aquinas’s teleological perspective, which is itself supported by certain answers to the 
sorts of larger metaphysical questions that Hume seeks to do without, is able to ground an 
account of strong normativity and to provide a background moral ontology that is 
motivationally significant.23 
 As I mention in I.a., most moral theorists writing before Hume, to greater or 
lesser degrees, appeal to a conception of some transcendent moral source or some larger 
metaphysical account of the cosmos in order to substantiate moral claims such as why 
certain features of our nature point to what is noblest and best about us, why we are 
obligated to pursue virtue, and what would motivate us to do so. I want to look first at the 
metaphysical background picture that supports Aquinas’s account of natural law and the 
natural virtues and then to look at how his Christian commitments enrich his conception 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 I primarily discuss Aquinas here because he is explicitly a eudaimonist (and because he represents 
the Christian humanist tradition). I think, however, that all religious outlooks tend to be implicitly 
eudaimonistic in the sense that they assume that the moral and spiritual life (as they understand it) is 
constitutive of a higher, more fulfilling way of being. Moreover, all religious traditions rely upon a moral 
ontology, provided by answers to the larger metaphysical questions that Hume avoids in his secular account 
of ethics, in order to make sense of why that way of life is higher and more fulfilling.   
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of moral ontology and normativity. In Chapter Two we discussed Hume’s objections to 
both natural and revealed religion, and by observing the role that both play in Aquinas’s 
moral philosophy, I aim to show the significance of precisely that which Hume wants to 
make irrelevant to ethics.  
In many ways Aquinas’s account of natural virtue is similar to Hume’s moral 
philosophy. Both give an account of natural human flourishing of sorts. Hume’s account 
of virtue, as those traits that we regard to be useful and agreeable when taking an 
impartial view, points to a picture of human happiness and well-being. Similarly, 
Aquinas understands natural virtue as those traits that are constitutive of our living and 
doing well as rational and social animals. Both, moreover, think that we arrive at these 
moral judgments by rationally reflecting upon our sentiments. For Hume, we take up the 
impartial perspective of the general view towards the way in which our passions operate 
in order to identify what traits are useful and agreeable to human beings as such, and for 
Aquinas, we rationally reflect upon our natural inclinations, which direct us to our natural 
well-being. Furthermore, for both, all humans, regardless of their larger metaphysical 
commitments, in principle have the capacity for arriving at correct moral judgments 
pertaining to natural human flourishing because reason and emotion provides us with the 
relevant information needed to comprehend the good. Finally, both appeal to an account 
of human nature to make sense of their claims. For Hume, the natural operation of the 
passions that we find when we observe human beings are rooted in human nature, as are 
the natural inclinations that form the basis of Aquinas’s account of natural virtue and 
natural law.  
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 While there is indeed important overlap in Aquinas’s and Hume’s approach, their 
conceptions of human nature are importantly different and therefore differently shape the 
sorts of philosophical explanations that they can give to questions of normativity. Hume’s 
conception of human nature is non-normative, non-teleological; it denotes what we can 
say upon strictly observing what is usually and for the most part the case. And as we saw, 
on Hume’s purely descriptive, non-teleological account of nature, he is able to explain 
how and why we have arrived at a common language of praise and blame and hence why 
we have specifically moral concepts at all, but he cannot explain why what we take to be 
morally obligating actually is binding for us. Furthermore, he is not fully able to explain 
why we ought to privilege certain features of human nature over others (e.g., sympathy 
over the principle of comparison), nor in how far we should go in doing so (e.g., how far 
we should extend our sympathy). Aquinas’s account of natural virtue, by contrast, 
depends upon holding a teleological view of the cosmos supported by certain answers to 
the larger metaphysical questions that Hume thought we should avoid. As I showed in 
section I. of Chapter Five, a teleological view of the human person situated in a 
teleological conception of the cosmos is metaphysically able to support a conception of 
human nature in its perfection and is thus able to ground a eudaimonist ethic that 
maintains the objectivity of the good and the strongly normative demands it makes upon 
us. 
A eudaimonist ethic situated in teleological conception of the cosmos is also, in 
contrast to Hume’s non-teleological, descriptive approach, able to provide a philosophical 
account of moral motivation. A teleological eudaimonistic ethics maintains the following: 
1) human nature is oriented towards its telos/perfection, 2) we genuinely flourish to the 
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extent to which we realize our telos, 3) the virtues are those character traits that are 
constitutive of flourishing, and, 4) we attain eudaimonia (the happiness of well-being) 
through the virtues. Thus, if the cosmos really is teleologically ordered and if we are in 
fact really oriented toward certain ends, we should be motivated to pursue virtue because 
we will attain the happiness of eudaimonia and nobility of soul only through the life of 
virtue; the immediate pleasure gained through vice cannot deliver true happiness. 
Certainly, in order for the claims of a eudiamonistic perspective to be practically 
motivating for us as such, we need to conceive of reality in this way. (Indeed, many 
traditional eudaimonists, such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, take great 
pains to argue for their metaphysical conclusions, and they also seek to convince us that 
the life of amusement, luxury, and status is not the route to genuine fulfillment.) 
Regardless of whether we fail to be philosophically and existentially convinced of their 
conclusions, however, it is significant that a teleological eudaimonistic framework is able 
to give a philosophical account for moral motivation that, unlike Hume’s, goes beyond 
mere expedience and explains why we should be concerned to pursue virtue as such.  
Hume thought that we do not have sufficient basis in reason for believing in a 
teleologically ordered world. In particular, we saw in Chapter Two that Hume rejected 
the arguments typically employed by Deists for concluding that the world was created 
and maintained by a providentially wise and good deity, a view that could serve as the 
basis for understanding the cosmos as teleologically ordered,24 and, accordingly, for 
grounding a eudaimonist virtue ethic (as it was for Aquinas). I suggested, however, that 
Hume prematurely closes the possibility of the reasonableness of certain conclusions of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Alasdair  MacIntyre remarks that “the only type of teleologically universe in which we have good 
reason to believe is a theistic universe” (1998, 152). Thomas Nagel, however, has argued for the possibility 
of a non-theist teleological view (2012).  
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natural religion, even if he is right to maintain that reason cannot get us certainty in these 
matters. I want to maintain, moreover, that Hume was wrong to indicate that nothing of 
great importance for ethics is lost with his attempt to do away with a transcendent moral 
source and the teleological cosmic picture such a source usually provides. As I have 
shown, both strong normativity and a philosophical account of moral motivation are lost, 
the latter of which I have still to argue makes a practical difference.  
I showed in Chapter Two that Hume did seem to suggest that natural religion, 
though he did not think it necessary for morality, could be morally helpful. He thought 
that revealed religion (and Christianity was his chief concern), however, was not only 
more epistemologically problematic than natural religion (indeed, he usually represents 
revealed religion as positively opposed to reason and experience), but he also thought that 
revealed religion is often morally destructive. I explained particularly how Hume’s 
reversal and redefinition of pride and humility was meant to counter what he saw to be 
the corrupting effects of Christian morality’s long-standing condemnation of the former 
and exaltation of the latter. Ironically, however, I want to show that it is the revelation-
dependent, distinctively Christian components of Aquinas’s moral vision (and the way it 
shapes his account of humility) that in certain respects has better resources for promoting 
the individual and social human flourishing than does Hume’s own secular vision.  
When Aquinas’s broadly Aristotlean teleological account of natural human 
flourishing (a teleology that could be supported by natural religion) gains further 
dimension by incorporating a specifically Christian conception of reality into its account 
of the virtues, the account of moral motivation becomes: human beings are by nature 
directed towards knowing and loving God (who is understood to be a personal God who 
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invites us into friendship with himself) and by extension, knowing and loving what God 
has made, especially other persons; we fulfill what is noblest and best about ourselves 
through the life of charity (which is facilitated by humility); this simultaneously is 
constitutive of genuine happiness.25 By this account, we should be motivated to pursue 
virtue (both natural and theological virtues) because doing so leads to the happy 
fulfillment of our nature. With respect to the issues I am concerned with here, we should 
be motivated to seek a more extensive sympathy instead of bolstering our pride with 
vicious comparisons because, given the kinds of beings that we are and the ultimate end 
towards which we are oriented, true fulfillment is found through widening our love.  
So in contrast to Hume’s moral philosophy, Aquinas’s teleological, eudaimonistic 
account of ethics is able to provide a philosophical account of strong normativity and 
moral motivation. I now want to look at ways in which Aquinas’s account can make a 
practical difference. In section I. of Chapter Five, I argued that although Hume cannot 
give an account of strong normativity and ultimately cannot explain why it should be a 
matter of pride to pursue virtue, accepting his secular moral philosophy might not 
drastically alter our moral practice so long as we regard the qualities that are useful and 
agreeable to ourselves and others under the aspect of strong evaluation. I also said, 
however, that the lack of strong normativity can, nevertheless, subtly undermine moral 
formation or cannot carry as far as other moral perspectives might. I want to unpack this 
more fully here. I suggest that there are several ways in which a Christian humanist 
eudaimonstic ethic can be motivationally significant in a way that Hume’s 
metaphysically quiet ethic cannot. In what remains of this section I will discuss the 
difference that a Christian metaphysic can make for moral motivation more generally and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Natural virtue also yields genuine, but imperfect happiness for Aquinas.  
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then, in III., look briefly at the motivational power that Aquinas’s Christian moral vision 
and account of humility has for dealing with the problems that pride poses for social and 
individual flourishing. 
I want to begin by returning to Hume’s claim that his (secular and non-
teleological) sentimentalist commitments will have “little or no influence on practice” (T 
3.1.1.26, 301-2). He maintains that just as secondary qualities of colors, temperature, and 
sound matter to us as much as they did before modern philosophy discovered that they 
are perceptions in the mind rather than qualities in objects, so too, “[n]othing can be more 
real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if 
these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the 
regulation of our conduct and behavior” (T 3.1.1.26, 302). Hume thus seems to think that 
our sentiments will remain wholly unchanged by seeing morality in this new, subjective 
light. I take him to hold that, like the way we experience other secondary qualities (e.g., 
color, temperature, and sound), the operation of the passions and what we praise and 
blame is rooted in our nature and that our passions (and the actions that flow from them) 
will therefore be unaffected by our realization that our sense of morality “lies in 
[ourselves], not in the object” (T 3.1.1.26, 301) as we previously thought. Hume’s 
proposal seems to be that no account of strong normativity is needed because we care 
about virtue no less without it. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine that, for example, our 
love for our children, an affection that springs from our nature, would be diminished were 
we to lose the sense that there exists some strong normativity to care for them. Similarly, 
given our natural constitution, it is certainly plausible that we will continue to care about 
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benevolence, justice, generosity, and so on, whether or not we believe there to be a moral 
ontology backing them. 
It is this conviction, I think, that explains why Hume sees morality that is 
informed by revealed religion as largely being either corrupting or superfluous. On his 
view, the “natural and usual force of the passions” from which are moral judgments are 
derived will continue to operate in the way that they do regardless of whether we accept a 
larger metaphysical picture that lends support to the moral sense our nature already 
bestows us with. If, then, a religious conception of reality does have an effect on our 
passions that is different than our natural responses would otherwise be, then it must be 
corrupting, making our lives artificial. If, on the other hand, a religious conception of 
reality affirms what we, due to our human nature, would affirm regardless of holding that 
religious view, then it is redundant. For Hume it seems that doing away with the 
metaphysical background that could ground strong normativity would be an 
improvement, for it pulls the rug out from all the religiously contrived counterfeit virtues 
that occlude human happiness while leaving genuine virtue in tact.  
Hume’s view, however, that the loss of a metaphysical picture that grounds and 
makes sense of our moral judgments will have no negative practical impact on our 
passions and actions is, I think, false. It does, indeed, seem that because many of our 
moral convictions are rooted in human nature, we will not stop caring about those traits 
we regard as virtues, even if we see that they lack the strong normativity or categorical 
character that we, in our pre-philosophical moral experience, take them to have. 
Nevertheless, lacking a moral ontology that can adequately ground our moral judgments 
forces us to view the content of these judgments differently, and this changes the nature 
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of the sentiment-laden experience of those values in a way that is disanalogous to 
secondary qualities. While it does alter how we think about the color red to know that 
redness is not in the red object but only in our subjective experience of it, our experience 
of red itself is unchanged by this knowledge. By contrast, the very experience of values 
themselves is modified when we see them as our own projections (and hence as more 
sophisticated weak evaluations) rather than as making genuine demands upon us. This is 
in part because our experience of secondary qualities such as color, temperature, sound, 
and so on is causally produced in us, and will thus continue to occur in the same way, 
regardless of what we think about its nature; passions, however, depend upon concepts in 
order to arise.26 We experience emotions (especially the moral sentiments of approval 
and disapproval) for reasons; they necessarily rely upon the understanding. We are sad at 
our friend’s loss, delighted by the stranger’s kindness, proud of our garden. And if our 
view of that towards which we feel changes, our feeling changes along with it. If, for 
instance, we come to see the stranger’s unexpected “kindness” as a ploy to lure people 
into an advertising scam, our delight will turn to anger. If comparison with other gardens 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Hume hits upon this difference when he divides impressions into those of sensation and those of 
reflection. All the traditionally mentioned secondary qualities are delivered to us by way of sensation, but 
as Hume notes, “passions, desires, and emotions…arise mostly from ideas” (T 1.1.2.1, 11). Of course there 
are exceptions and complexities that Hume does not discuss, such as moods, drives, appetites, or impulses 
that are affective but may not depend upon “ideas” in order to arise. Moods, for example, may be causally 
triggered by, say, a poor night of sleep or the endorphins released by a good run; in turn, they underlie and 
color the emotions that arise upon ideas (e.g., when a person’s exhaustion puts him in a sour mood, which 
in turn causally disposes him to feel anger that his toddler is being uncooperative). But moods can also be 
triggered by ideas (e.g., when a person is elated by good news and thus becomes disposed to notice and 
responds with joy toward the good things in one’s life). Likewise, appetite (a kind of desire) can arise due 
to blind causality (e.g., when one’s empty stomach causes her to desire food), but it can also be set in 
motion by an idea (e.g., when passing a bakery evokes the desire for cake). I focus here on those aspects of 
our affective lives that are intentional in the Husserlian sense—that depend upon concepts for their 
existence. (Husserl’s student Edith Stein offers a very interesting analysis of the interrelation of causal and 
intentional sources for our affective lives, both within the individual and the community, in Philosophy of 
Psychology and the Humanities (see especially pp. 39-115, 133-96)   
 371 
puts our garden into perspective, our pride will be less strongly felt.27 How we conceive 
of the moral life also affects our sentiments, which in turn can impact moral practice.  
 The way in which we can see the effects of our understanding on our morally 
relevant sentiments becomes evident when we look at the gap between our biased 
passions and the passions we ought to feel (as ascertained when taking the general view). 
(I will call those sentiments that would be affirmed by the general view as expressing 
virtue as ‘moral sentiments.’) While, indeed, we are not likely to love or care for our 
children any less upon thinking that we have no genuine obligation to do so, it is less 
clear that crucial changes in how we conceive of the moral life will not effect the place 
given to our natural tendencies and sentiments that can conflict with the dictates of the 
general view (e.g., our tendencies to revenge, vicious comparisons, bias, etc.). Moreover, 
the character and strength of those moral sentiments that we continue to feel can also 
undergo subtle modification. 
The first kind of alteration of sentiment I want to explore pertains to the ways our 
passions might be affected by coming to think, as Hume’s account entails, that there is no 
genuinely strong normativity. One rare but possible response to this could be to embrace 
nihilism, to celebrate the freedom from any genuine moral obligation. At the extreme, 
this view could undergird actions that require us to radically blunt our natural sympathy 
(or which, due to some neurological abnormality, is blunted already). We can think of the 
nihilist Smerdyakov who murders his father in the Brothers Karamazov. Another, more 
common, response is to feel despair or at least unease upon accepting the view that the 
values that give our life meaning have no objective correlate. Nietzsche was, of course, 
acutely sensitive to the possibility that a malaise and sense of meaninglessness threatens 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See T 2.3.3.7 for a brief discussion of how passions change as our understanding changes.  
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to follow the collapse of a religious worldview, and with it an objective grounding for 
morality.28 The erosion of a moral ontology that could support our strong evaluations has 
long been seen as a problem—what Weber famously called the problem of 
disenchantment—for such removal can be deflating, giving our moral judgments a certain 
hollow ring. Ivan Karamazov represents this sort of moral despair. Like Smerdyakov, he 
thinks that atheism entails that “everything is permitted,” but he finds anguish rather than 
liberation in this view. 
I have been speaking of the possible shape of our emotional response to the meta-
ethical implications of Hume’s moral philosophy. Thus far these possible responses—
liberation, despair, or unease—are second-order sentiments; they are sentiments about 
our first-order moral responses. I want to focus on how our second-order sentiments 
about the nature of morality could impact our first-order moral responses, for if the latter 
remain relatively unchanged, then Hume would be right that his view would likely have 
little or no effect on practice, aside from the positive one of correcting for the corrupting 
influence of revealed religion.29 With Hume, I think that a range of moral sentiments 
would persist insofar as they arise from human nature. However, I also maintain that our 
moral formations can differ quite markedly depending upon whether we attend to or 
ignore our moral sentiments, whether we seek to justify biased emotions, and how the 
moral sentiments are understood in light of the background metaphysical pictures that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Nietzsche’s response to the threat of nihilistic despair was of course to affirm the fact that we 
create our own values and are radically free to shape our own lives through the striving of self-overcoming. 
But it is an open question whether despair over nihilism is the more honest response. We might feel that 
that to affirm with Nietzsche the brute suffering and evil requires us to dampen something of our moral 
sensitivity. Ivan Karamazov saw the threat of nihilism and to my mind it points to a nobility of character 
that he was not able to take joy in a world in which “everything is permitted.” 
29 Even a nihilist would have no apparent motivations for going against the moral conventions if his 
or her passions of “pleasure and uneasiness… be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice” (T 
3.1.1.26, 302) as Hume cpontends that they will be for most people.  
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inform them.30 We cannot weed out our natural sympathy, for example, but we can 
weaken it by habitually turning our attention away from our sympathetic responses or we 
can extend it by actively considering another’s position. I thus want to look at how 
removing the grounds for strong normativity can affect our emotional formation in these 
ways.   
With respect to those who would rejoice in liberation from the strictures of 
morality there may be a more active intent to ignore our moral sentiments when they 
conflict with self-interest or a competing conception of the noble. The way in which 
Smerdyakov was disrespected as a child (Grigory who raised him would say to him, 
“You think you’re a human being, you were begotten of bathhouse slime, that’s who you 
are…” (124)) already fed his natural human tendency to resent those who harm us and to 
desire revenge, and it deprived him of the sort of environment that would encourage him 
to practice and cultivate a wider sympathy. Smerdyakov’s poor emotional formation 
disposed him to accept with pleasure Ivan’s argument that “if God does not exist, 
everything is permitted,” and he, being an atheist himself, used this view to legitimate his 
act of murder. Furthermore, it enabled him to regard having a sense of moral obligation 
as a sign of “weakness” and of failing to see things clearly; correspondingly, he saw 
himself as special and uniquely strong (i.e., as in a sense noble) for being able to carry 
out a deed that most could not countenance. While Smerdyakov, who was a sociopath of 
sorts,31 arguably would have the capacity to act in abominable ways regardless of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Hume does affirm that custom and culture play an important role in refining our moral and 
aesthetic judgments (see “A Standard of Taste”), and of course he does discuss how a religious worldview 
can negatively shape our emotional responses. He does not, however, examine how a conceptual shift to the 
secular could impact our passions. 
31 Smerdyakov had shown sociopathic tendencies from a young age, doing things like hanging cats 
and giving them religious burials. While nihilism can give credence to these tendencies, it is both unlikely 
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views, his nihilistic outlook played a role in his motivational psychology, serving to 
justify his heinous crime in his mind in a way that an outlook that would stand in deep 
tension with Smerdyakov’s behavior would not. The sociopath, however, is not my 
primary concern.   
My central concern is the shift in emotional formation that may occur among 
those who come to accept a Humean meta-ethical position and who either find it 
disquieting or are unperturbed, believing with Hume that it will make no practical 
difference. In these cases, the lack of belief in strong normativity can diminish the 
strength of moral feeling or foster a relaxation of moral effort. Particularly when we are 
tempted to entertain and to act upon those sentiments that stand in tension with moral 
ones, it can make a difference whether or not we think that certain feelings and actions 
are categorically wrong and vicious. We tend to try to see ourselves on the side of the 
good and therefore, when we want to act upon morally questionable desires, we often 
seek to justify them, to give ourselves reasons as to why doing so is permissible. Losing 
the sources that could be used to articulate why certain useful and agreeable traits are 
moral requirements makes it easier to rationalize more vicious ways of behaving.  
We saw that a Christian humanist conception of the world (and indeed a 
teleological conception of the world in general) can make sense of strong normativity, 
and so, if it can be believed, it can avoid these problems. Many people, however, do not 
notice the lack of grounds for their deepest moral intuitions. We can think, for example, 
of those who hold together a reductively scientific, materialist conception of the world 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that the sociopath would be kept in check by a worldview that could support an account of strong 
normativity or that nihilism would itself cause a normal person to be sociopathic.  
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and a notion of equal human dignity that such a view is incapable of supporting.32 Would 
Hume’s secular moral philosophy in any way diminish the moral seriousness of those 
who do not realize that their secular moral perspective cannot support their moral 
convictions in the strong evaluative manner in which they are experienced? In other 
words, would Christian humanism be any better able to inspire virtue than Hume’s 
secular perspective for those people who would continue to believe that virtue is strongly 
normative for us upon accepting Hume’s account of morality? I think it would. Christian 
humanism adds to a secular view not only an account of strong normativity but also a 
specific way of conceiving of reality, wherein all that exists is in a sense sacred, wherein 
persons are made for communion, and so on. This specifically Christian conception of 
reality can encourage moral sentiments in several ways.  
One way in which a Christian humanist conception of reality can foster and 
nourish our moral sentiments is by honing our moral attention. The most obvious and 
general way it does so pertains to the inherent seriousness and centrality it gives to the 
moral life, for it is inseparable from fulfilling our teleological end of charity. Christians 
are therefore encouraged by their own worldview to reflect regularly upon their 
characters and to seek to grow in goodness. This general orientation is further supported 
by religious communities and practices which are meant in part to draw our attention to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See Peter Singer’s critique of the notion of special human dignity:  
The traditional ethic is still defended by bishops and conservative bioethicists who speak in reverent 
tones about the intrinsic value of all human life, irrespective of its nature or quality. But, like the 
new clothes worn by the emperor, these solemn phrases seem true and substantial only while we are 
intimidated into uncritically accepting that all human life has some special dignity or worth. Once 
challenged, the traditional ethic crumples. Weakened by the decline in religious authority and the 
rise of a better understanding of the origins and nature of our species, that ethic is now being brought 
undone by changes in medical technology with which its inflexible strictures simply cannot cope. 
(1994, 4)  
For those who hold that the concept of human dignity is important but reject the metaphysic that gave 
expression to this notion, the burden is to explain how such dignity can be grounded.  
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the core aspects of the moral life (e.g., love of neighbor) and to do so communally such 
that we can help one another to become better. Additionally, the specific content of the 
Christian vision can direct our attention in ways that aid moral formation. For example, 
seeing others as bearers of God’s image disposes us to be attentive to their needs, 
receptive to their gifts, and more inclined to notice persons we might have otherwise 
overlooked. 
The way in which Christianity informs our conception of reality not only 
encourages moral attention but it also can shape the emotions themselves and their 
content in morally helpful ways. Emotions, as responses to ideas (i.e., impressions of 
reflection), are affected by how we conceive of the world. The emotional content that 
serves as a fitting response to (and is arguably in part constitutive of) believing others to 
be made and loved by God and intrinsically valuable requires a depth and strength of 
affirmation that seeing others as nothing more than remarkably complex organisms does 
not. Otherwise stated, to believe that others are sacred demands emotional responses that 
are in keeping with this belief; whereas believing that others are value-neutral material 
beings is compatible with scorn for those who bear characteristics that one sees as 
offensive, unimpressive, etc. The Christian conception of the world essentially demands 
love and reverence as a response to its real worth. A secular perspective does not exclude 
this sort of response, but it does not require it and in fact allows for other opposing 
responses.  
The kind and quality of our affective responses towards the world in turn shape 
our moral practice, for good or for ill. We can think of Gaita’s experience at the 
psychiatric ward. There some of his colleagues did not conceive of the patients as 
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valuable nor feel them to be so—quite the contrary. By contrast, the nun conceived of 
and affectively responded to the patients as equal in their humanity and worthy of love. 
(And for Gaita, the nun’s love had the power to reveal to him their real worth 
(1998,19).33) Gaita does not think that the nun’s religious worldview was necessary for 
regarding the patients as full equals and loving them as such, but he does affirm that her 
religious commitments and vocational practice that they inspired formed her in such a 
way to be capable of this sort of love (1998, 20).34 More generally it can be said that a 
Christian humanist perspective should point one to a wider love, if one earnestly seeks to 
be affectively shaped by the vision of reality it puts forward, but a secular perspective 
such as Hume’s does not have the conceptual tools for encouraging this sort of affective 
formation to the same degree. A Humean could certainly seek to develop a love that 
recognizes that dignity and common humanity of the most deformed and socially rejected 
among us, but it would involve personal initiative over and above what the perspective 
demands.  
Not only can a Christian humanist worldview foster greater attentiveness to others 
and encourage us to affectively respond to them as beings worthy of love; it can also 
empower us to go morally further than we otherwise would. We can think, for example, 
of Mother Theresa’s work with the destitute, Jean Vanier’s work with the mentally 
disabled, or Martin Luther King Jr.’s struggle for civil rights. The Christian beliefs of 
these three figures were integral to their morally imaginative ways of responding to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 It is too great a topic to explore what is at stake in the competing moral visions of Aquinas and 
Hume, considering particularly whether the Christian ideal of love is ultimately incongruent with human 
nature (and therefore mangling) or points to something very deep in human experience and helps us to live 
it out more fully. How one answers this question is related to the extent to which one can ultimately see 
Christian humanist humility (or its possible secular analogue) as a virtue to which we should aspire.  
34 To this I would add that if Gaita is right that the nun’s love was truly revelatory of the worth of 
those on the margins of society, then this fact asks to be made sense of and can serve as support for belief 
in a worldview that account for the dignity of all persons.  
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deep needs of those who were oppressed or seriously neglected, and the beliefs served as 
a source that helped them persist in their difficult work. For example, King’s conviction 
that “the arc of the moral universe is long but it bends towards justice”—a conviction that 
is born out of his Christian beliefs and which cannot be made intelligible on a secular 
view—empowered his remarkable courage in fighting for equality. Again, it is not that 
those embracing a secular perspective cannot be similarly courageous. My point is that a 
secular perspective does not lend itself to nor have the conceptual tools for supporting 
this degree of courage as does a Christian one.  
It should be clear from Chapter Four how easy it is for us to tacitly seek to do 
good in order to congratulate ourselves, but pride can only go so far in sustaining us in 
difficult work. We can think of Rayber in Flannery O’Connor’s A Violent Bear It Away, 
an ex-Christian convert to secular humanism who sought to educate and so liberate his 
orphaned nephew Francis from the Christian fundamentalism in which he was raised. 
Rayber imagines that Francis will be grateful for his efforts but instead Francis proves to 
be wholly stubborn, recalcitrant, and combative. In the end, Rayber is not able to sustain 
his commitment to care for his nephew; far from the love he imagined himself feeling for 
Francis, against his own will, he ends up hating the boy. I want to reiterate that I in no 
way mean to imply that those who adopt a secular view cannot persevere in virtue when 
it is especially difficult to do so, nor that religious believers are not susceptible to 
significant, sometimes horrific, moral failure. My point is, rather, that a Christian 
humanist conceptual framework has resources that can empower virtue, which Hume’s 
secular perspective lacks, and that these resources can make a real difference.   
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In these ways, then, a teleological perspective, which can make sense of a notion 
of strong normativity and, furthermore, a specifically Christian humanist conception of 
reality, can be motivationally impactful. Hume, in his attempt to avoid larger 
metaphysical questions in his moral philosophy, claims merely that sympathy is a 
principle of human nature, but he cannot explain why we should (understood in a 
strongly normative sense) widen our sympathy, and from the standpoint of expedience, 
he cannot explain why we should extend it very far. Christian humanism, however, is 
able to account for why we should seek a wider love and offers a view of reality that give 
footholds for this moral endeavor. Thus while Christianity as a form of revealed religion 
can be corrupting (a point that I will develop further in the Conclusion), it can also better 
point us in directions that Hume thinks are important (e.g., to a more extensive sympathy) 
than his own secular ethic can.  
In Chapter Two I discussed Hume’s reasons for rejecting the view, common to 
many theists and Deists of Hume’s day, that God was ultimately needed to provide an 
account of moral motivation by making possible the notion of an afterlife in which 
goodness would be rewarded and evil punished. Against this Hume (through the 
characters Philo and Epicurus, who speak in a manner consistent with his avowed 
account of moral motivation in the second Enquiry) contends that the prospect of the 
afterlife is unnecessary for ultimately accounting for moral motivation (ECU 140, 146; D 
60), that it is too remote to have the motivational impact it is purported to have (D 60), 
and also that a “steady attention…[to] eternal salvation” is “apt to extinguish the 
benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, contracted selfishness” (D 124-25).35 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See section IV.b. of Chapter Two for my discussion of Hume’s objections to the idea that the 
doctrine of the future state is morally necessary. 
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Moreover, as David Fate Norton has pointed out, Hume would have objected to the way 
in which appealing to the motivational importance of the final judgment instrumentalizes 
the virtues, where they are chosen not for their own sake but out of fear of punishment 
(2006, 157). Hume, we saw, replaces the explanatory role of the “future state” played in 
accounts of moral motivation with prideful concern for character and the peace of mind it 
affords as the ultimate source of moral motivation (EPM IX.2, 282; EHU 140).  
I argued in section I. of Chapter Five, however, that prideful concern for character 
depends upon a strongly normative account of the virtues, which Hume’s secular, 
scientific framework is fundamentally unequipped to offer. If we do strongly value 
virtues despite lacking a way of accounting for our normative sense of the moral life, we 
can succeed in pursuing them for their own sake and doing so will afford the peaceful 
conscience that Hume promises. Moreover, since our strong evaluations are also 
constitutive of our identity, loving the virtues for their own sake is inseparable from 
wanting to embody those virtues, making concern for our character a source of moral 
motivation. If we remain within the bounds of what Hume’s science of man allows us to 
say, however, we have only the resources to claim that we should be motivated to pursue 
virtue because, given the way our passions contingently happen to be constituted, the life 
of virtue is ultimately more pleasurable or expedient for us. Ironically, it thus looks as if 
Hume cannot escape instrumentalizing the virtues, for without the means to account for 
strong normativity, he cannot explain why the virtues should be pursued for their own 
sake rather than for the pleasure they provide. Despite what I think Hume wants to say, 
from within his framework prideful concern for character as the ultimate source of 
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motivation therefore ultimately collapses into a sophisticated and enlightened form of 
(sympathetically-constituted) self-interest that acts for its own pleasure.  
More importantly, insofar as Hume lacks a background metaphysical picture that 
can make sense of strong evaluation, his account of prideful concern for character as the 
ultimate source of moral motivation, practically speaking, has less power for motivating 
the moral life than one that can articulate and ground our strong evaluations regarding 
virtue. Hume seems to see the only significant way in which religion could purport to 
empower the pursuit of virtue is by the promise of eternal reward and the threat of eternal 
punishment. But this way of conceiving of the importance of God for moral motivation, I 
think, obscures the more significant ways in which a religious picture can be morally 
important. A specifically Christian picture, we have seen, puts forward a vision of love 
that can inspire a longing to love others with the love of God and to see the real beauty or 
goodness in places that seem most devoid of it.36 Hume’s failure to acknowledge how a 
religious framework can empower the moral life in this way is related to his inability to 
see the problem with his secular, scientific account of morality and pride as its ultimate 
motivational source; in failing adequately to appreciate the significance of the 
background picture provided by a religious view of the world, he also neglects to see the 
loss that his removal of a larger background picture entails for his secular moral 
philosophy.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This is not to say that the afterlife is not motivationally significant for religious people. But it can 
avoid the instrumentalizing charge if heaven is understood as Aquinas understood it. Heaven, in which one 
beholds God face to face (the beatific vision) is the culmination of loving God and virtue, a continuation of 
the “kingdom of heaven” as it is experienced in part on earth. It is not a mere external reward for the moral 
life; heaven (i.e. beholding God) is receiving what you love. See Jennifer Herdt’s discussion, however, of 
how heaven comes to look like an external good in a hyper-Augustinian framework (2008, 104-6, see also 
p. 94). 
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III. Christian Humanist Humility, Faction, and Individual Flourishing 
I have argued that a moral ontology can be motivationally significant in general, 
and I thus now want to consider specifically how the Christian humanist’s metaphysical 
background picture can be motivationally helpful for addressing the specific problems for 
flourishing posed by our natural desire for the passion of pride. I want also to show how 
humility as a central virtue within the Christian moral vision is particularly important for 
mitigating these problems, and indeed is more helpful in this regard than virtuous pride 
and modesty as Hume understands them. I will also argue that although a version of 
secular humility can go further than Humean modesty in lessening the problems that the 
passion of pride can pose for flourishing, it is not as motivationally powerful as is 
Christian humanist humility. 
We saw that the problems for flourishing that are rooted in our desire for the 
passion of pride arise because of our tendency towards vicious, sympathy-displacing 
comparison. I showed how a comparison that seeks to inflate one’s pride can lead to 
moral blindness, such as falsely attributing vices to others, misconstruing the nature of a 
particular virtue so as to affirm the traits that one has, and simply failing to register 
morally relevant information about others due to an excessive self-orientation. 
Unjustified faction-inducing emotions such as envy and malice essentially depend upon 
vicious comparisons and often anger, hatred, and contempt, when unjustified, depend 
upon them as well. Sympathy-displacing comparison, furthermore, undermines the social 
conditions necessary for developing a healthy sense of self-worth (particularly for the 
young and the less gifted), and it contributes to a sense in those with socially-recognized 
talents that they are only worthwhile because of their achievements. 
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Against our tendency to vicious comparison, the Christian vision of communion 
and of charity as the crowning virtue upholds the importance of being sympathetically 
attuned to others and of relinquishing our attempt to secure our worth by those 
comparisons that are opposed to love.37 Christian humanist humility (and magnanimity) 
is, as we saw, deeply tied to this vision. In many ways Aquinas’s account of humility 
shows great insight into the destructive dynamics of comparison and of our tendency 
towards vicious pride, both for the prideful individual and for the social body. Thus, 
rather than being a chief detriment to human flourishing as Hume thought, Aquinas saw 
humility to be a chief cure. In what follows I want to discuss some of the ways in which 
each of the components of Christian humanist humility that I discussed in I. could curb 
the tendency to vicious comparison and the problems for flourishing that arise from it.  
First, that aspect of Christian humility that involves fundamental reverence for 
and love of God, a reverence that seeks to order our loves according to the way that God 
loves (i.e., according to the objective scale of value) necessarily involves widening one’s 
sympathy. Since according to a Christian conception of reality, all human persons are 
seen to have dignity, to be fundamentally loved by God, it is part of humbly ordering 
one’s loves that we regard others as bearers of God’s image. This involves a reverence 
for others that stands directly opposed to using them to prop up our ego in vicious 
comparisons. In other words, because Christian humility is understood in the first 
instance as submission to the will of God, and because the will of God consists primarily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 As discussed, the metaphysical account of the world as teleologically ordered wherein the human 
person is made for and most deeply fulfilled through love of God and neighbor can provide a philosophical 
account of why we should seek to order our loves in such a way that is rightly responsive to the value of 
others: when we live in this way, we find true satisfaction. 
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in loving others,38 an earnest attempt to cultivate humility is inseparable from cultivating 
a more extensive sympathy towards others.       
Second, the dimension of Christian humility that involves recognition and 
acceptance of one’s dependency also disposes one to a wider sympathy. Right 
appreciation of our dependence, I have argued, does not deny our agency, but rather 
makes us attentive to our real indebtedness. Awareness of how the contributions of God, 
others, and circumstance are integral to our own successes help to quiet our tendency to 
feel haughty in our achievements. It also inclines us, on the one hand, to be gracious to 
others in their weakness, recognizing that they, too, are dependent and perhaps did not 
receive the requisite support and resources more adequately to develop their characters 
and talents. The Christian vision of communion is one in which we (magnanimously) see 
our strengths as gifts, both in the sense that they are ours in part because of the help of 
God and others and also because they are meant to be offered to God and others. The 
direction of attention is outward: our gifts are for sharing, not for elevating ourselves. 
When we seek to secure our worth by vicious comparisons, however, our attention 
terminates with ourselves and others become fodder for our own self-glorification. 
Humility as awareness of our dependency, by contrast, directs our attention away from 
ourselves and disposes us to gratitude for those who have helped us. 
Third, that aspect of Aquinas’s account of Christian humility that involves 
regarding others as better than oneself by virtue of the gifts they have from God, further 
fosters a wider sympathy. While a Christian notion of the dignity of all should instill a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See where Jesus says, “’Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and 
with all your mind.’ This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: ‘Love your 
neighbor as yourself.’ All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments” (Matt. 22:37-40, 
NIV). 
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basic reverence towards persons, this component of humility inclines us to a reverence 
for the individual and her specific strengths. This attitude encourages an attentive 
receptivity to others, an orientation that seeks out and appreciates their gifts. This aspect 
of humility also requires the greatness of soul characteristic of magnanimity. It takes 
strength of character to be so generously attuned to others as well as to subdue our 
excessive thirst for recognition. 
Fourth, the element of Christian humanist humility that involves (justly, i.e., not 
excessively) recognizing our failings also disposes one to a wider sympathy instead of 
vicious comparison. This sort of self-knowledge helps us appreciate the moral struggles 
of others, even if they are different than our own struggles. Alyosha Karamazov 
demonstrates this the way in which knowledge of our imperfections can lead to a wider 
love of others in his conversation with Lise about the money he had tried to offer a poor 
officer and his family. The officer, feeling ashamed by his poverty, had trampled on 
Alyosha’s gift as a means of maintaining his honor. Alyosha speculates to Lise that the 
officer, having proved his pride, will accept the money at their next meeting. Lise asks 
Alyosha, “[Isn’t there something in all this reasoning of ours,…isn’t there some contempt 
for him, for this wretched man…that we’re examining his soul like this, as if we were 
looking down on him?” Alyosha replies,  
No, Lise, there is no contempt in it. …Consider what contempt can there be if we  
ourselves are just the same as he is, if everyone is just the same as he is? Because 
we are just the same, not better. And even if we were better, we would still be the 
same in his place…I don’t know about you, Lise, but for myself I consider that 
my soul is petty in many ways. And his is not petty, on the contrary, it is very 
sensitive…No, Lise, there is no contempt for him. (217)  
 
Alyosha’s insight into his own weaknesses allows him to see them in the weaknesses in 
others, to see the universal human struggle in failure wherever it is found. Thus, proper 
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humble recognition of our imperfections, weakness, and vulnerabilities can and should 
open us to others in a common struggle rather than to quickly “disown” others for their 
failures.  
A Christian humanist moral vision that promotes charity and humility additionally 
has motivational resources for creating the social conditions that make possible the 
cultivation of a healthy self-esteem of individuals (thereby promoting individual 
flourishing). Not only can its vision foster a wider sympathy over vicious comparison and 
dispose one to seek out and affirm the good in others. It also encourages the sort of social 
approval that I noted in section II. of Chapter Five is most conducive to a stable self-
esteem—that is, love rather than admiration. But more than providing the social 
conditions needed for learning proper self-esteem, this Christian picture offers a 
transcendent source of love upon which to build one’s security (as St. Paul puts it in his 
letter to the Ephesians, to be “rooted and grounded in love” (Eph. 3:17, KJV).39 
Moreover, the love of God is believed to be unconditional, i.e., not based upon our merits 
in relation to others but directed toward the concrete reality of the person, no matter how 
disabled or marred by vice. Hence, the sort of security provided by receptivity to divine 
love is one that is not subject to loss. And while it may not be possible to believe in and 
to root one’s being in divine love apart from having analogous experiences of human love 
(as we find, for example, in the healthy parent’s way of delighting in and wishing the 
good for his or her child), Christian community at its best strives to practice this sort of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 There is rich Biblical imagery that expresses this point. For example, “Let your roots grow down 
into him, and let your lives be built on him” (Colossians 2:7, NLT). Or, the Psalmist who says that the 
person “whose delight is in the law of the Lord…is like a tree planted by streams of water, which yields its 
fruit in season and whose leaf does not wither” (Psalms 1:2-3, NIV). 
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love for one another—a practice that can make a significant difference in quality of 
family relationships, friendships, and the wider community over time. 
In addition to the motivational limitations of Hume’s secular ethic in general, his 
own accounts of pride and modesty are impoverished with respect to resources for 
mitigating vicious comparisons and promoting a wider, more extensive sympathy. As we 
saw, he cannot offer an account of strong normativity to which noble pride should seek to 
align itself. Furthermore, even if he could, Hume’s account of virtuous pride seems not to 
exclude enjoying and perhaps even dwelling upon one’s superiority to others. It thus 
seems that, contrary to what a surface reading of Hume’s account of virtuous pride 
suggests, Humean virtuous pride ultimately does not transcend what are arguably vicious 
forms of comparison. Additionally, Hume gives no over-arching ideal of love to which 
we ought to orient ourselves, and which could inform and animate us to avoid the 
vicious, pride-building comparisons in favor of other-regarding attention. We also saw 
that his accounts both of pride and modesty, in contrast to Aquinas’s account of 
magnanimity and humility, fail to emphasize our dependency, nor does he anywhere 
discuss the importance of reflection upon our moral failings—both of which I argued are 
helpful in curtailing vicious comparison. He also does not offer an account of human 
dignity that would support advocating that we adopt an attitude of reverence for others 
regardless of how well they have actualized their capacities. In all these ways, Hume’s 
secular ethic and his articulation of virtuous pride and modesty are less able than 
Christian humanist accounts to promote extensive sympathy over and against our 
tendency towards vicious comparison (and all the problems for flourishing that arise from 
it) that so readily flows from our desire for the passion of pride.    
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I have pointed out, however, that Hume’s framework allows for the development 
of secular account of humility as a virtue (and a correspondingly corrected portrait of 
virtuous pride) that goes a greater distance in mitigating vicious comparison and 
promoting extensive sympathy than Hume’s own account. This humility would involve 
appreciation of our dependency on others, luck, and environmental factors for our 
achievements, cognition of our limited understanding of a person’s whole story, and 
awareness of our failings, especially moral ones. (Moreover, the extent to which a non-
Humean secular moral perspective could give an adequate grounding for strong 
normativity and human dignity, humility would include submission to the demands of 
virtue and reverence of others.40) Extolling this sort of secular humility as a virtue could 
encourage the cultivation of a wider, more extensive sympathy, and with it, discourage 
vicious comparison and the problems for social and individual flourishing that arise from 
it. However, as important as this possible secular component of humility is, it is a 
necessarily thinner notion of humility. Correspondingly, it lacks a metaphysical 
worldview wherein persons and love are at the center and which could therefore enrich 
our conception of the world and more richly inform and instruct our sentiments. 
Moreover, a secular perspective cannot appeal to a worldview that can make as obvious 
sense of the importance of humility and disposes us to it as much as a Christian humanist 
one. 
We furthermore saw that a central problem that arises due to our desire for the 
passion of pride is that moral blindness and biases can become culturally inscribed. When 
this occurs, it is especially difficult to become aware of our blindness because others 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See Ritchie 2012, however, for an excellent and succinct treatment of each of the major secular 
moral theories and their difficulties in accounting for strong normativity.  
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support our distorted moral judgments by way of agreement and by approving of us (thus 
bolstering our pride) for displaying disordered values. A Christian moral ontology, 
however, offers a reference point that transcends immanent social perception and the 
Christian tradition has resources for re-aligning one’s loves when our communities are 
dysfunctional. If, though, as Hume proposes, we do without a larger metaphysical 
framework that could help us to orient our moral life and instead rely only on social 
praise and blame of a special sort, we may arguably be more prone to mistake too easily 
the values of one’s cultural milieu as virtue—a point Alasdair MacIntyre has made 
particularly well (1981, 230-32). 
I have been focusing on Aquinas’s account of humility, since he has given 
particularly extensive expression to Christian humanism, which I have been promoting 
over hyper-Augustinianism and because, within that tradition, his account of humility is 
perhaps the most detailed.  It is worth, however, returning to Augustine at this point of 
the dissertation, for we are now better able to appreciate the ways in which Augustine 
saw humility to be necessary for acquiring the psychic harmony that follows from having 
rightly-ordered loves (hence, for individual flourishing), as well as the peace that marks 
the Heavenly City (hence, for social flourishing). Augustine’s notion of the restless heart 
includes within it the human search for security of being, a need that he found in his own 
life led him to seek self-glorification (pride) through approval for his sexual exploits, 
stealing of pears, and academic success, and which ultimately led him to seek humble rest 
in God. This upward turn of humility provided the fulfillment and security (firma 
securitas)41 that enabled him to loosen his attachment to his disordered pursuits and to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Augustine prays, “[W]ho can take away from you what you love? There is no reliable security 
except with you” (C II.vi.13). 
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finding significance through approval of others for them. Augustine’s autobiographical 
narrative is meant to point to the inner workings of the human soul in general, and he thus 
sees humility before God to crucial to healing our wayward loves, thereby securing inner 
unity of desire and freeing us to love of neighbor rather than attempting to use others 
merely for our own aims (including the vainglorious desire for excessive or wrongly 
directed admiration rather than love). In light of the problems that accompany our natural 
desire for the passion of pride (in Hume’s sense), Augustine’s stress on the importance of 
humility makes good sense. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, Hume, like Augustine (and Aquinas (see ST II-II: 
129.6)) also sees the importance of security of self, for it facilitates a wider, more 
extensive sympathy over vicious comparison. But he does not directly raise the question 
of what can serve as more stable and good sources of security. Although as I pointed out 
in II. of Chapter Five, Hume does not distinguish between admiration and genuine love, 
his framework allows for such a distinction and with it, the possibility of humbly 
allowing oneself to find a sort of security in the unearned love of others and in seeking to 
return that love, thus fostering the bonds of friendship and family within which human 
beings can flourish individually and jointly. Moreover, while Hume’s avowed scientific 
approach to ethics raises questions with regard to whether our strong evaluations can be 
made sense of and thus whether the virtues can be pursued for their own sake, if we live 
within our strong evaluative responses of the virtues, they can be pursued for themselves. 
This also provides the possibility of finding security of self through commitment to the 
virtues—goods that, if human nature is as stable as Hume supposes, are not subject to 
change and loss as are the other things of which we might be proud (e.g., social position, 
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possessions, a beautiful appearance, and so on). The pursuit of virtue, too, leads to an 
increasing inner harmony of desires and fosters a greater social harmony that the virtues 
make possible.42 Aquinas’s articulation of true but imperfect virtue allows for the 
possibility, from a Christian perspective, of a relative and virtuous security taken in 
human love and the pursuit of goodness for its own sake, while still retaining the 
Augustinian insights about the importance of God for individual and social well-being. 
Such a possibility, far from only articulating how virtuous humility may be available to 
pagans, is useful for pointing to real insights that a religious tradition can offer for secular 
accounts of the virtues needed for flourishing.  
I hope, then, to have shown how Christian humility can contribute to our 
understanding of how best to cope with certain problematic features of our need for 
pride/security, and that many of its insights regarding how to do so can be appropriated 
within a secular perspective. I have also argued, however, that lacking the metaphysical 
backdrop that could direct our attention and dispose us to a humility as well as a Christian 
perspective can is a limitation of not only Hume’s secular moral philosophy but also of 
secular accounts of ethics as such.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 In Chapter Two I recounted Hume’s observations about the way in which 
religious (and particularly Christian) morality can undermine individual and social 
flourishing, and I further brought out Hume’s critique of Christian morality in Chapter 
Three where I discuss Hume’s objections to Christian humility and to making pride the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Annette Baier’s discussion of how Hume’s “concentration in Book Two [of the Treatise] on 
conflict and emotional see-saws…are also important topics for Hume’s later account of how morality 
depends on a calm and steady sentiment, and of how its role is to prevent or end unwanted conflict, both 
within a person and between persons” (1991, 133) 
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chief sin. In these chapters I have also stressed the strengths of Hume’s secular moral 
philosophy for correcting these problems. In Chapters Five and Six, however, I have 
looked at the limitations of Hume’s secular ethic and corresponding account of virtuous 
pride for promoting individual and social flourishing, and I have also shown how a 
Christian humanist moral framework and its corresponding conception of humility can 
better foster flourishing in these respects. It is to a final assessment of pride and humility, 
religion and secularity, and their relation to human flourishing that I now turn in the 
Conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION: HUMILITY, RELIGION, AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 
 
I have explored how Hume’s secular redefinition and inversion of the traditional 
Christian categories of pride and humility has been bound up in his critique of Christian 
morality and his concern that its appeals to a transcendent moral source undermine 
individual flourishing and exacerbate social factions. I have also shown how Hume’s 
attempt to establish an ethic independent of any larger metaphysical or religious claims 
carries its own threats to flourishing at both the individual and social level, due to its 
limited ability to motivate and make sense of a moral imperative to cultivate a wider 
sympathy in the face of the temptations posed by our natural desire for the passion of 
pride. I now want to conclude by briefly looking at some of the broader issues and 
implications of this study for the more general topic of the relationship between religion, 
morality, and human flourishing.  
Throughout this dissertation I have been implicitly developing a critique of the 
hyper-Augustinian tradition, a tradition Hume quite rightly saw as fraught with problems, 
however much he wrongly took it to be representative of the Christian tradition more 
generally. As part of my concluding assessment of the relationship between religion and 
flourishing, I want to make this critique more explicit by summarizing how the hyper-
Augustinian positions on nature and grace, faith and reason, religion and morality 
(especially as understood by the Protestant Reformers) encourage the sort of factions and 
warped emotional formation that Hume charged revealed religion with facilitating. I will 
also summarize ways in which the theological commitments typical of Christian 
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humanists can in fact promote dialogue and proper emotional formation.1 I argue, 
therefore, that Christian humanism can serve as a healthier model for conceiving of the 
relationship between religion and morality (and relatedly, faith and reason, the natural 
and supernatural, etc.) with respect to religion more broadly.  
Nonetheless, I also want to show that, due to our natural desire for the passion of 
pride, religious frameworks—which necessarily provide the sources for the passion of 
pride (self-approval) among the religiously committed and tend to be high aspiring in 
their moral visions—pose certain threats to flourishing. I therefore think that Hume is 
rightly wary of revealed religion, even when it has conceptual resources for curbing these 
threats, as does Christian humanism. Thus, I will argue that despite Hume’s failure to 
recognize crucial theological distinctions, his critique of religious morality can motivate 
religious traditions to reshape and improve themselves. I also, however, brought out in 
the previous chapter how the strengths of a Christian humanist perspective highlight 
certain weaknesses in Hume’s secular moral philosophy precisely because it seeks to do 
without a transcendent moral source and, similarly, I want to argue that religious 
perspectives such as Christian humanism can serve to make secular moral traditions 
better.2 I will conclude, then, that an adequate account of flourishing must take account of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Whether Christian humanism can better promote mature emotional formation than Hume’s secular 
perspective, however, depends in part upon how one conceives of mature emotional formation in the first 
place. Recall, for example, the story of Raymond Gaita’s experience at the psychiatric ward that I discuss 
in section II. of Chapter Five. If we share Raymond Gaita’s sense, as do I, that the nun’s attitudes toward 
the patients revealed their real dignity, then we are apt to see a Christian worldview as having better 
conceptual resources for shaping our emotional responsiveness than a perspective that cannot articulate the 
significance of persons who are profoundly disabled or disturbed. If, however, we think that there is no real 
dignity among such persons, as does Peter Singer (1994, 4), for example, we are apt to see a perspective 
that recognizes this (such as Singer’s) as better promoting emotional maturity. 
2 I am talking more generally here than my arguments allow. For me to claim that religious moral 
traditions (particularly Christian humanism) can serve to better secular moral traditions in general, we must 
be able to find analogous limitations in other secular moral traditions as I identified in Hume’s. I do think 
these can be found, and Charles Taylor has argued particularly well that secular moral traditions have a 
difficulty grounding their moral sources (see particularly Sources of the Self but also A Secular Age). I trust, 
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the dangers of both secular and religious traditions and that humble dialogue across 
difference is needed to best promote flourishing.  
I want to begin by reviewing some of Hume’s worries about revealed religion. As 
I partly explained in Chapter Two, Hume’s concerns about religion’s potential for harm 
are deeply related to his epistemological convictions. Hume holds the following: First, 
religious claims are very remote from our sources of knowledge (i.e., sense experience) 
and, correspondingly, are highly uncertain. Second, experience is indeterminate with 
regard to what we are to conclude about our cosmic situation. Religious inquiry is thus 
largely bound to be fruitless, and it, moreover, deflects our attention from a philosophy of 
common life—i.e., from investing our philosophical energies in what we can know. 
Third, since experience is insufficient to support religious belief, such beliefs must be 
generated not primarily by reason, but by some other principle in human nature. Hume 
argues that it has arisen from fear of unknown causes.  
On Hume’s account, belief in revealed religion, thus, promotes faction for at least 
two reasons. First, because religious claims are highly speculative and inadequately 
supported by experience, they can vary widely. He holds that beliefs more immediately 
founded upon sense experience (i.e., those matters of inquiry pursued on the basis of a 
science of man) are confirmed to be more reliable by the way in which they comport with 
the experience of others. By contrast, competing religious claims cannot be settled by 
appealing to common experience since experience does not give conclusive evidence for 
any particular theological conception of God and the world. Revealed religions thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
however, that it is worthwhile to gesture towards the broader implications of this specific focus on Hume 
and Christianity for issues surrounding secular and religious moral traditions in relation to flourishing more 
generally, however much particular features of different religious and secular traditions will be not 
insignificant. 
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spawn faction by virtue of the contentious and unresolvable nature of their claims. 
Second, he thinks that because religious conviction arises not out of reason but out of a 
fear-driven need to make sense of evil and misfortune, it is especially liable to foster 
those bitter divides that accompany emotionally-charged beliefs.  
Hume’s epistemological critiques of revealed religion are also, as we saw, 
connected to his concerns about the corrupting effects that revealed religion can have on 
the passions, which in turn undermines individual flourishing. In accord with Hume’s 
belief that religious matters are remote from and ultimately incongruent with experience, 
he sees religious demands as being often at odds with the natural operation of the 
passions as we find them when we adequately observe human nature. For Hume, seeking 
to inculcate the virtues that are unique to religious morality (e.g., the monkish virtues) 
contributes to emotional malformation. This is because by following religious precepts 
that run counter to pleasure and utility, the religious person loses touch with the common 
sources of pleasure and pain that form the basis of sympathy and shapes our conception 
of the good. Thus, not only did Hume think that revealed religions put forward ideals of 
how we should live that are out of keeping with human nature and thus harmful to those 
who seek to escape the kinds of beings that they are. He furthermore thought these ideals 
would distort the very passions that would make possible discourse and agreement with 
others with regard to how we should structure our common life. For Hume, then, the 
effects of revealed religion on the passions undermines social as well as individual 
flourishing.  
In part as a response to these problems, Hume attempts to sideline larger 
metaphysical questions by arguing that they are both futile and practically unnecessary, 
 397 
and, moreover, by contending that a secular ethic grounded in an account of the ordinary 
operation of the passions as we find them in human nature is better able to make sense of 
our moral concepts and behavior. I argued in section I. of Chapter Two, however, that 
although Hume’s skeptical arguments successfully show the immense difficulty of the 
larger questions of existence and that we cannot have certainty with respect to them, he 
does not give a convincing account of why larger metaphysical and religious questions 
should be barred from a philosophy of “common life,” nor of why it is illegitimate to 
seek an overall picture of reality that best makes sense of the totality of our experience. 
Rather, it seems to me that just as Hume seeks to give the best, most probable account of 
various phenomena in his naturalistic projects, so too might we pursue (tentative and 
revisable) answers to larger metaphysical and religious questions.3 I also show in 
Chapters Five and Six that Hume is wrong to see our answers to these larger questions as 
being, if not harmful, largely practically irrelevant.4 Against this, I argued in Chapter Six 
that a Christian background picture can attune one to the world in a way that can be 
morally improving, and similar arguments can be made about ways in which various 
accounts of reality such as offered by other religious traditions can help (and/or hinder) 
our moral formation.5  
Despite my objections to Hume’s attempt to turn our attention away from larger 
questions, however, Hume’s concerns about the negative effects of religion are important, 
even if he seems to lack sufficient awareness of the problems that can arise if we attempt 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Perhaps we cannot avoid assuming certain answers to the larger questions. And if this is so, it is 
better to face our assumptions explicitly than to sideline them, since they will inevitably shape how we live.  
4 Two philosophers who cogently argue for the existential and moral benefits of a religious 
worldview are John Cottingham (see especially On the Meaning of Life) and, of course, William James (see 
Varieties of Religious Experience and “The Will to Believe”).  
5 These two points are not unrelated. If a religious worldview can be existentially and morally 
beneficial, then we have special motivation for raising the larger religious questions and weighing whether 
it is reasonable to believe in or hope for certain religious answers to them.  
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to avoid such questions. Indeed, Hume’s critiques of religion are based in first-hand 
experience of trying as a young boy to live out the psychologically damaging spiritual 
instruction of Scottish Calvinism as expressed in The Whole Duty of Man and in 
witnessing religious factions and religiously-inspired intolerance in Scotland (an 
intolerance that had significant personal ramifications for Hume who was denied a chair 
in moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh because of his unorthodox views). 
Whatever the shortcomings of his views on religion, he is right that larger metaphysical 
and religious matters are more difficult and far less certain than many of the beliefs 
arising out of what he understands as “common life.” He of course correctly sees that 
religious convictions admit a wide range of variation and hence are more divisive, 
particularly because of the way in which they are often emotionally charged. Hume also 
rightly recognizes that religious commitments can divert our attention from those things 
that unite us and are especially pertinent to our social life (namely, the shared goods of 
common life) and, relatedly, can blind us to experience, leading to poor emotional and 
moral formation.  
Not all religious outlooks are equally disposed to these dangers, however. Among 
the two dominant theological traditions in Western Christianity, the hyper-Augustinian 
stance on the absolute fallenness of human nature and its implications for its conception 
of the relationship between faith and reason as well as between nature and grace do more 
than Christian humanism to foster the sorts of harms that Hume sought to mitigate by his 
turn away from religion. In Chapter Three I showed how Hume’s concerns about 
religious morality as manifested in his critique of humility better targets the hyper-
Augustinian conception of humility (and the broader theological commitments that 
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inform its conception) than the Christian humanist understanding. It will nonetheless be 
helpful at this point to restate more generally how, when compared with a Christian 
humanism, hyper-Augustinianism is particularly subject to Hume’s critiques.  
First, hyper-Augustinianism is more prone to faction because of the way in which 
it can undercut dialogue and appreciation for other perspectives. As was discussed in 
Chapter Three, the hyper-Augustinian view that reason is corrupted by sin theologically 
insulates hyper-Augustinians from critique from without. We saw in Chapter One various 
examples of hyper-Augustinian theologians who counter objections to their religious 
views not with direct argument but by charging the objectors with a sinful resistance to 
God. This sort of theological precedent for resisting the critiques of others and for seeing 
their objections as rooted in vice quite clearly lacks extensive sympathy and sufficient 
resources for genuine dialogue. By contrast, Christian humanists affirm that our ability to 
reason, even about moral and spiritual matters, persists to a significant degree despite the 
distorting effects of the Fall. Aquinas, for instance, argues that humans by nature (i.e., not 
by special grace) desire to know the truth about God and the world, and have the capacity 
to attain moral knowledge with regard to our natural ends. Such a view should promote 
dialogue among those who hold it, insofar as it assumes that others can have valuable 
insights to offer regardless of religious belief.  
Second, the hyper-Augustinian separation of nature and grace also undermines 
dialogue, especially about moral matters. As we saw in Chapter One, on the hyper-
Augustinian view, the Fall has thoroughly corrupted our natural passions such that all our 
affections ultimately issue from selfishness and pride and, accordingly, cannot be trusted 
to be morally revelatory. Such a view precludes openness to the passion-informed 
 400 
accounts of the good held by religious outsiders, since such accounts are, for the hyper-
Augustinian, necessarily skewed by sin. By comparison, the Christian humanist tradition, 
in accord with its conviction that the effects of the Fall were not totalizing, expects that 
much of our natural passions point us to the good. Aquinas, for example, held that the 
five natural inclinations, shared by all humans, orient us towards our flourishing as 
rational and social beings. This theological position assumes a shared domain of 
discourse (i.e., the sphere of natural human flourishing) and disposes us to think that we 
find great commonality with and can learn from the affective responses of others, 
including those from other religious and secular traditions. Furthermore, Aquinas’s 
account of true but imperfect virtue allows that non-Christians can have virtues and thus 
can be morally instructive for Christians.  
Third, the hyper-Augustinian denigration of reason and separation of nature and 
grace also makes that tradition more liable to Hume’s critique that revealed religion can 
foster “artificial lives” and impede individual human happiness by inducing its adherents 
to forsake the ordinary sources of pleasure for imaginary, other-worldly goods. Hyper-
Augustinians ultimately hold that: 1) our natural passions are fundamentally at odds with 
true Christian virtue and, 2) our (distorted) natural passions cannot point us to moral or 
spiritual truth. Those in the hyper-Augustinian tradition thus have theological precedent 
for holding a worldview that lacks continuity with and resists being challenged by the 
“natural and usual force of the passions” (T 3.2.2.18, 311) and the conception of 
flourishing that they would support. We can think, for example, of the assertion in the 
Whole Duty of Man that we are “poor worms of the earth…polluted and defiled, 
wallowing in all kind of sin and uncleanness…” (II.2-3, 34-35). The fact that we do not 
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naturally feel and judge ourselves or others to be utterly depraved would suggest that the 
Calvinist position is too strong to be true.6 If, however, our natural sentiments are seen to 
be inherently untrustworthy, they are barred from informing or correcting one’s theology 
(unless of course one undergoes a paradigm shift). Instead, the hyper-Augustinian is to 
seek to inculcate the emotions that her religious framework deems laudable, and since the 
natural passions are seen as corrupt, the supposed correct emotions will be wholly 
different in kind (even if they are mimicked by worldly virtue, as Nicole thought). Hence, 
hyper-Augustinianism is more susceptible to Hume’s charge that revealed religion creates 
artificial lives, lives wherein one shuns ordinary sources of pleasure and embraces 
disagreeable practices. (In showed in Chapter One how the Protestant Reformers in 
particular tended to see our natural pleasure in our successes as vicious pride and 
encouraged us to cultivate a deep and persistent sense of our wretchedness, which they 
saw as proper humility.)  
The Christian humanist, on the other hand, maintains continuity between faith and 
reason, grace and nature, and this can discourage the formation of artificially-induced 
emotional responses.7 Christian humanism both affirms the basic goodness of much of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Gill (2006, 7-11) for some of the horrifying passages that Calvinist children in seventeenth 
century England were taught to recite every morning in order to instill in themselves an (unnatural) belief 
in the profundity of human wretchedness and the eternal torment that we thus deserve.  
7 It may seem that I am begging the question here by suggesting that Hume’s account of the 
emotions (and the normative conception of the emotions provided by the general view) is the standard 
against which artificiality is measured. In the discussion of Pascal in III.a. of Chapter Three, however, I 
explained why I think that Hume’s position is more convincing than the hyper-Augustinian one. The hyper-
Augustinian view, I think, is dubious because: 1) it gets into certain unsolvable problems by seeing certain 
aspects of the normal operation of the passions as bad (e.g., because Luther condemns the natural passion 
of pride that arises upon judging that we have done good, he ends up perpetually feeling himself to be 
mired in damnable pride), 2) it must assume some satisfaction or fulfillment for the “graced” virtues but its 
anti-eudaimonist stance suspiciously regards this pleasure as expressing self-interest, and 3) it makes the 
emotional responses operative in the sphere of grace unintelligible.   
As I have indicated in Chapters Five and Six, I think there is a worthwhile debate to be had about 
whether a Christian humanist or a Humean account of well-formed emotions is a better one. I showed there 
is quite a lot of overlap in Aquinas’s account of natural law (founded on the natural inclinations) and 
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this-worldly happiness while being attentive to the ways in which our passions need to be 
transformed, particularly so as to be in keeping with the virtue of charity. Its conception 
of nature and grace allows for the possibility that our natural passions can be morally 
significant and that mature affective formation does not require a break with our nature 
but that we direct and order our natural passions in the right sort of ways. We saw this, 
for instance, in the way in which Aquinas defends magnanimity as a virtue and affirms 
the appropriateness of our natural tendency to feel self-approval for our good qualities 
(ST II-II:132.1), so long as it is accompanied by a grateful awareness of our dependency 
on God and others for our strengths (ST II-II:131.1; ST II-II:129.6.r1). In general, his 
account of the virtues are shaped by a distinctively Christian worldview as well as careful 
attention to experience, and the Christian elements of his account of the virtues are seen 
not as opposed to nature but as the fulfillment of it. Thus, while a hyper-Augustinian 
conception of virtues sees virtues as involving passions different from those that are 
natural to us and hence can foster the formation of artificial lives by promoting the 
cultivation of these anti-natural virtues, a Christian humanist perspective is better able to 
affirm our natural passions even as they are seen as needing to be rightly ordered. 
Whether or not Christian humanism still causes a malformation of the passions in its 
promotion of charity—a character trait that Nietzsche and others have charged with being 
incongruent with human nature—as a guiding moral ideal is too large an issue to address 
here. Nevertheless, it suffices to note that the Christian humanist tradition does not regard 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hume’s account of the virtues (and the passions of approbation that constitute them). Nevertheless, there 
are differences, for example, with respect to how high we should aspire, how we should respond to vices in 
others, etc. The most interesting issue, I think, is whether the demanding nature of charity leads us to 
emotional maturity or whether it is mangles our humanity by requiring us to distort our nature. Those who 
agree with Gaita that the nun’s love for the psychiatric patients revealed their real value are apt to see a 
Christian humanist picture of emotional formation as mature (and spiritually liberating), but those who 
disagree with Gaita are apt to see it as mangling, an expression of artificial lives.  
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our natural passions as fundamentally needing to be violently reshaped into something 
wholly other than they are but, rather, as needing habituation into the virtues and 
elevation through grace. As such, Christian humanism is less susceptible to Hume’s 
critique that religious morality involves the dishonest and unintelligible emotional 
formation that we see in artificial lives.  
Christian humanism (and perhaps other religious forms that do not see human 
nature as wholly degenerate), at its best, thus can resist much of Hume’s moral objections 
to religious morality.8 I nonetheless think that Hume has put his finger upon certain 
negative tendencies commonly found among adherents of revealed religion, even among 
those whose theological categories should help to restrain rather than to encourage those 
tendencies. In what follows, I want to consider two ways in which revealed religion, even 
in its better versions, can play upon our natural desire for the passion of pride and natural 
sympathy (two original principles in human nature) in ways that foster the very factions 
and moral blindness that it has the conceptual potential to mitigate.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 I have been emphasizing the destructive aspects of hyper-Augustinianism, but I do think that they 
have contributions to make. The hyper-Augustinian tradition, precisely because they are more prone to be 
suspicious of non-Christians or “false” Christians, are perhaps less likely to acquiesce to the cultural biases 
of the day; however problematic the hyper-Augustinian tradition is, for those who think that Christianity 
offers important moral insight, it may be that the hyper-Augustinian stream is at times better able to remain 
fixed upon and to remind us of these insights than one that is (nevertheless rightly) more disposed to learn 
from other traditions. Furthermore, there is something admirable and instructive in the hyper-Augustinian 
yearning for perfection, even if this is accompanied with too strong a dissatisfaction with the state of the 
world. (This is analogous to the way in which Plato’s ardent longing for the Forms inspires us to the noble 
but is unfortunately accompanied by a denigration of the imperfect, sensible world.) 
9 What I am looking at here is the relationship between our concepts and natural operation of the 
passions as they are typically found in human nature. In Chapter Six I focused on how our concepts can 
shape and inform our passions, and I have looked at some of the ways in which hyper-Augustinian, 
Christian humanist, or Hume’s secular categories can impact our emotional formation. But we are not 
“blank slates” upon which ideas can radically shape our feelings and desires; human nature carries with it 
original principles that cannot be eradicated or easily bent. These original principles can influence how 
certain concepts are taken up in human life and can thwart our ability to live according to them. I thus want 
to look at how our natural desire for the passion of pride can effect how a religious framework is lived out, 
and to explore some of why religion can be destructive even when its central moral vision is one of love. In 
other words, I want to show how, although religion has the potential to help us to flourish, it also can 
exacerbate the potential for harm that accompanies our natural desire for the passion of pride.  
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First, it is inherent to the way in which religion becomes bound up with our 
natural desire for the passion of pride that it can lead to a limited sympathy—one that 
resists dialogue and can be used to justify faction-inducing passions, even among those 
religious outlooks that embrace a theology that discourages these tendencies. I explored 
in Chapter Four how our strong evaluations about that which is most noble, significant, 
and good, are inseparable from our deepest sources of the passions of pride (when we 
stand in alignment with what we evaluate as good) and humility (when we fail to live up 
to our sense of what is most worthwhile). Because a religious framework shapes the 
believer’s strong evaluations and forms the backdrop against which she sees herself as 
moving closer or farther from the good, it is thus central to her self-assessments and 
assessments of others. I showed in I.a.ii. of Chapter Four that the link between our strong 
evaluations and our sources for pride or self-approval explains why our strong 
evaluations can be especially morally motivating: we desire to express in our character 
that which we regard as most noble, and this concern with the quality of our selfhood can 
empower us to avoid temptations to act contrary to our sense of the good.10 However, it is 
precisely this link between our concern for the quality of our selfhood and our strong 
evaluations that can lead to moral blindness, vicious comparisons, and faction-inducing 
passions when our pride is threatened; it is only because our self is at stake in our strong 
evaluations that we tend towards these problematic responses when our strong 
evaluations are challenged, or when we fail to live up to our sense of the higher, or do so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 And I argued in Chapter Six that since the teleological worldview of Christian humanism is better 
able to account for objectivity in ethics and since the centrality of love in the Christian moral tradition is 
able to ground and defend a moral vision that promotes extensive sympathy, I argued that it has better 
conceptual (and thus practical) resources for supporting the strong evaluations that are especially important 
in helping to motivate us to overcome the problems for flourishing posed by our natural desire for the 
passion of pride. 
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less well than others. Although I showed how the Christian appeal to a transcendent 
moral source (especially as articulated within Christian humanism) has the potential for 
motivating a wider sympathy than does Hume’s secular perspective, it may be that the 
weight and uncertain nature of religious claims makes religious beliefs particularly likely 
to excite some of the more negative tendencies inherent to our desire for the passion of 
pride, both as they relate to social and individual flourishing.  
We saw that the natural desire to secure the passion of pride can lead to factions 
in the social body if we seek to bolster our sense of self-worth through vicious 
comparisons that block adequate sympathy with others. Often the more significant we see 
the value against which we viciously compare ourselves to others, the more limited our 
sympathy might be. We might, for instance, generate some degree of self-approval by 
comparing ourselves to others with respect to what we regard as less significant goods, 
i.e., goods which have little or nothing to do with the quality of one’s character. When we 
do so, as, for example, when we feel pride in having a more beautiful appearance or a 
nicer house, our sympathy with those with whom we compare ourselves will not be 
significantly diminished. Only if we have radically distorted the value of a beautiful 
appearance or material possessions will that comparison preclude more significant forms 
of sympathy.  
Religious values, however, are inherently weighty and are regarded to be of 
paramount significance by the religiously serious person. If, when engaging in vicious 
comparisons, we see ourselves as more righteous than others, for example, for holding 
orthodox beliefs, for following religious precepts more closely, or for more fervently 
engaging in religious practice, then our self-approving pride will be more deeply felt and 
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the judgment of others for failing to bear the markers of religious piety can be more 
condemning in a way that makes us less attentive to our common humanity. (It is no 
coincidence that many religious persons are criticized for holding a “holier than thou” 
attitude—a saying that captures the lack of sympathy implicit in the comparisons by 
which one deems oneself to be qualitatively better than others.) Certainly many religious 
traditions affirm that the proper spiritual orientation towards others involves respect and a 
more extensive sympathy. We saw that Aquinas’s account of humility involves a 
humility before others that encourages reverence for all persons. Nevertheless, due to the 
way in which our natural desire for the passion of pride tends to evoke vicious 
comparison, religion too often becomes a tool for unjust exclusion and repudiation of 
others. Moreover, because religion is seen to be of utmost importance by the religiously 
committed, the exclusion is of a particularly significant sort.  
Furthermore, the way in which certain claims of revealed religion go beyond 
reason and essentially require faith may, when it supports our particular crucial positive 
self-assessments, also lead the religiously committed to resist dialogue and critique from 
without. As we saw, because our strong evaluations support our sense of our own worth, 
we tend to become defensive and closed to revising our views or even to acknowledging 
our ignorance when challenged by others (as Socrates well saw). Matters of faith always 
carry the potential to spark self-protective ways of avoiding critique, and they do so for 
several reasons. First, the content of faith pertains to the central ways in which the 
religious conceive of life as most meaningful and to question it can lead to a spiritually 
disorienting crisis of meaning. Second, many may worry that to doubt or question the 
core claims of their religion is a mark of unfaithfulness to God. Third, the uncertainty 
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inherent to faith (even faith understood to be reasonable) can arouse psychological 
defenses against critique due to the (perhaps dim) awareness that many challenges to 
faith can never be decisively warded off.  
Thus far I have suggested two ways religion can promote faction because of the 
way it can become bound up with our natural desire for the passion of pride: 1) it can be 
used as a measuring stick to separate the “good” from the “bad” in a way that undermines 
sympathy,11 and 2) it can evoke our resistance to dialogue and critique. This social 
division increases when, in our attempt to secure the grounds for our self-approval, we 
falsely attribute vices to those who challenge our views and when unjustified faction-
inducing emotions are aroused toward those who make vulnerable our pride—two often 
interrelated phenomena that were discussed in II.a. and II.c. of Chapter Four.  
All of these tendencies are further exacerbated when they become collective. The 
contagion of emotions in natural sympathy with those near and like us heightens the 
sentiments constitutive of religiously-informed strong evaluative judgments, the 
increased intensity of feeling generates a sense of certainty that can overwhelm due 
epistemological caution, and the unanimity of view creates an echo chamber wherein a 
sense of certainty is strengthened as is the tendency to mischaracterize outside positions 
and the persons who hold them. This can especially damage the social body when the 
types of moral blindness discussed in Chapter Four is shared among its members. Moral 
blindness becomes increasingly destructive when it leads to collectively held unjustified 
faction-inducing passions, for it is easy to regard these shared passions and the actions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Again, every strong evaluation provides a standard against which we can measure up as better or 
worse. This is not inherently problematic (indeed, it is moral necessary that we have a way to judge 
whether our actions and character traits are better or worse). What is, I think, problematic is when those 
comparisons undermine sympathy.    
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they might motivate as really justified. Some religious groups are particularly prone to 
employ theological justification for these attitudes, seeing hatred and violence towards 
others as obedience to God (the Crusades, burning of heretics, and Islamic suicide 
bombers come readily to mind) and, hence, as a source of self-approval. Moreover, 
because religions all involve communally gathering to jointly attend to its core teachings 
and to engage in rituals and spiritual practices, they provide a social context that is ripe 
for moral blindness and unjustified faction-inducing emotions to become collective and 
hence more dangerous. Furthermore, due to the height of the moral and spiritual ideals at 
the center of religious communities, they are also liable to suffer from internal factions as 
these groups inevitably develop different conceptions of how their religion is best 
understood or of how intently one must engage in religious practice to be considered “in 
the fold.”12  
The existential seriousness entailed by religious conceptions of the world not only 
makes religion prone to induce factions of a particularly deep sort; it also is connected to 
Hume’s second critique of religious morality—namely, that it undermines individual 
flourishing. As I have pointed out, Hume saw religious morality to be too high aspiring, 
to demand what is not possible for us given our human nature. This places a needless 
psychological burden on those who judge themselves against a standard of divine 
perfection (see ESY 83), a standard which they are by their nature fundamentally unable 
to attain and which so often results in undue guilt and self-condemnation, i.e., the passion 
of humility. While, on the one hand, Christianity affirms the fundamental worth of all 
human beings and the unearned love of God for persons and hence can offer a source for 
security of the self that Hume’s secular perspective lacks, on the other hand, the height of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This is a problem inherent to any group centering around an ideal, however. 
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Christian ideals and the seriousness of failing to attain them can weigh heavily on the 
psyches of believers.13 And this can create a more pronounced insecurity of self than a 
less-aspiring moral vision, and especially one in which there is no accountability for 
one’s life before God. 
Because our strong evaluations are always significantly bound up with our natural 
desire for the passion of pride, however, these problems are by no means limited to the 
religiously committed. One’s sense of meaning and self-approval, for example, can be 
had in being anti-religious, as can be seen in the pride certain atheists take for being 
“freethinkers” and for doing their part to liberate humanity from the bonds of revealed 
religion. (The strong evaluative affirmations underlying this perspective perhaps involve 
some notion of human progress and independence as well as a certain conception of hard-
headed rationality that is courageously unwilling to be comforted by delusions.) This 
source of one’s pride and significance can, just as with religious pride, lead to the same 
sorts of vicious comparisons, blocked sympathy, and unjustified faction-inducing 
emotions—both among individuals and larger social bodies—towards which religious 
groups are susceptible.14 Atheists, for example, may generate a sense of pride in 
themselves through engaging in vicious comparison with (let us assume thoughtful) 
religious believers whom they unjustly portray as unintelligent and thus inferior to 
themselves. This depends upon and further leads to a limited sympathy and may instigate 
unwarranted hatred and contempt as well.15 Moreover, like religious traditions, secular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Of course, unlike Hume, Christianity offers the promise of divine forgiveness, but a “guilt 
complex” is nevertheless not uncommon among Christians.  
14 One might think that Hume’s insistence that answers to larger metaphysical questions are beyond 
our ken could help us to avoid these problems. But here one may take pride in seeing the complexities and 
difficulties surrounding belief and unbelief and can lack sympathy for those who do not see it.  
15 As I showed within the Christian tradition, certain perspectives can better foster or preclude 
sympathy. Ironically, I think that just as the hyper-Augustinian separation of nature and grace gives 
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traditions can use their own strong evaluative notions to justify exclusion or violence 
against outsiders; the atheist regimes of the twentieth century demonstrate the capacity of 
secular traditions for justifying violence with horrific clarity.  
Perhaps we might think, then, the deepest danger for flourishing lies not in 
revealed religion per se but with any moral vision that puts forward high ideals 
(especially when coupled with intolerance for those who do not embrace them or who fail 
to live them out) and, which excites a religious-like allegiance among its members.16 We 
might think of Hume as offering a counter vision not only to religion but also to any 
attempt to put forward strong moral ideals that can inspire fervor (or “enthusiasm,” as 
Hume might say) among its adherents. Hume’s moral philosophy expects and accepts 
that at best there will be relatively minimal progress from human beings.17 Rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
theological precedent to lack of sympathy and dialogue, Hume accepts and secularizes this separation in a 
way that similarly impedes sympathy with religious traditions. While hyper-Augustinians tend to see the 
realm of grace (e.g., divine revelation and activity) as the true source of wisdom and moral direction, Hume 
sees what can be ascertained empirically (i.e., the “sphere of nature”) as the only legitimate authority that 
could govern our beliefs and actions. While hyper-Augustinians are apt to see “mere” human reason and 
the natural operation of the passions as being corrupt and thus as being morally misguiding, Hume is apt to 
see the views issuing from revealed religion as arising from superstition and thus as distorting and harmful. 
In short, both see reason and faith, the natural and supernatural, as two distinct spheres. The hyper-
Augustinian position, we saw, gives theological justification for not engaging with rational arguments that 
would threaten it, insofar as those arguments are seen to originate from prideful reason. Similarly, though, 
Hume is likely to sideline revealed religion altogether insofar as he regards it as epistemologically 
groundless and not worth engaging. He leaves in his wake a reductionist empirical tradition that sees 
science or reason as opposed to faith, naturalism as opposed to super-naturalism, and similarly 
characterizes religious people as intellectually and morally backward, as people who, qua their religious 
commitments, have no valuable critiques or insights to offer. (Note that my point here is merely a practical 
one about how a worldview can foster or impede dialogue. I am not here arguing that a Humean position on 
these matters is false. It is worth mentioning, however, that I think there are better versions of non-
reductive naturalism on offer. See, for example, the work of Thomas Nagel (2012), Fiona Ellis (2014), and 
John Cottingham (2012). See also Roger Scruton (2012, 2014) for important discussions of the limitations 
of scientific understandings of human nature.)  
16 I do not mean to limit “high ideal” or “high moral aspiration” to traditional morality. One need not 
embrace a more conservative morality, in order to hold some high moral principle that one thinks human 
beings should all live out (e.g., we can think of certain vegans, social justice promoters, etc.). 
17 This is a standard reading of Hume, though I do think that there is a tension in his affirmation of 
ordinary life and his account of greatness of mind. I maintain that for Hume a due pride can be taken in any 
station and for the degree of virtue one does have, but clearly Hume takes as his paradigm of virtuous pride 
the truly impressive individuals of whom “there is something so dazzling in his character, the mere 
contemplation of it so elevates the mind” (T 3.3.2.15, 383), and thinks that more pride and more respect is 
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holding up a guiding ideal that could desensitize us to who we are and what is possible 
for us given the kinds of beings that we are, Hume attends to the principles of human 
nature that limit or counter our natural other-regarding concern, tendencies which will 
always be with us.18 Instead of giving a moral principle for action that could be applied in 
all cases, Hume provides an “on the ground” ethic by identifying what we do in fact 
praise. When there are certain tensions in what we praise, Hume is disposed to let them 
stand (as we saw in Chapter Five with respect to a degree of tension between noble pride 
and extensive sympathy).  
Hume’s lower-aspiring ethic does have potential for minimizing the negative 
effects on social and individual flourishing that a more demanding ethic or ideal for 
humanity might instigate. It is more inclusive, and its account of virtue is not so 
demanding that it sees the ordinary person as morally inadequate; rather, Hume widens 
the net of those who might be called virtuous.19 This helps curb the problem of factions 
insofar as it discourages excessive comparison with others with respect to some ideal and 
factious problems following upon the group identification and zeal that follows upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
due them. It does seem, then, that on Hume’s account there are grounds for aspiring high. Interestingly, 
though, it is unclear the extent to which Hume thinks that those who achieve greatness may justly feel 
contempt for the average (and less-than-average) person for his common amusements and minimal moral 
and intellectual development. If contempt is due here, it becomes unclear how deeply Hume affirms 
ordinary life in the end.  
18 Hume argues that our conception of what counts as virtue allows for an expected degree of self-
interest. He says, 
When experience has once given us a competent knowledge of human affairs and has taught us the 
proportion they bear to human passion, we perceive, that the generosity of men is very limited, and 
that it seldom extends beyond their friends and family, or, at most, beyond their native country. 
Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities from him; but 
confine our view to that narrow circle, in which any person moves, in order to form a judgment of 
his moral character. (T 3.3.3.2, 384)  
In other words, we judge a person who is, for example, generous and benevolent to friends and family to be 
a generous and benevolent person, even if she does not give and extend benevolent help widely beyond her 
known community.  
19 See Michael Gill’s excellent discussion of how: “Hume’s arguments do imply that our normative 
expectations are leashed to our predictive expectations, that our judgments of what people ought to do are 
made from a point of view shaped by our beliefs about what people are likely to do” (2006, 256) and 
Annette Baier (1991, 187). 
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collective allegiance to that ideal. It also should promote dialogue by focusing on that 
which brings pleasure to human beings as such, rather than on the notoriously divisive 
topic of religion. Additionally, by putting forward an ethic that is more in line with our 
natural passions, it would foster individual flourishing by lessening guilt and legitimating 
enjoyment of this-worldly goods. 
We cannot clearly affirm Hume’s route, however, as the best for promoting 
human flourishing. Although there are some gains in Hume’s attempt to remain in the 
confines of “ordinary life” as he understands it, there are clear costs that accompany his 
approach. First, as we saw in Chapter Five that by avoiding all larger metaphysical 
questions in his moral philosophy, he deprives it of the moral sources that could articulate 
why we should seek a wider, more extensive sympathy, and hence for motivating us to 
overcome some of the problems that accompany the desire for the passion of pride. While 
Hume’s lower aspiring ethic is potentially less volatile, I argued that it cannot inspire us 
to cultivate our potential for benevolence as deeply as a Christian vision can.  
Second, it can be stifling for Hume’s moral philosophy to preclude us from 
seeking the sources of our strong evaluations through raising larger metaphysical 
questions. We are meaning-seeking beings, i.e., beings who attempt to understand the 
world and ourselves, and it is unclear that we can sustainably turn our attention away 
from the ultimate questions or can do so without ignoring something important about 
being human.20 Hume seems to neglect the extent to which our natural desire to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 While Hume famously reports that his own “philosophical delirium” caused by angst over larger 
metaphysical questions was cured by playing backgammon and participating in the common affairs of 
ordinary life (T 1.4.7.9, 175), he gave much attention to cosmic questions through the body of his works 
(explicitly in EHU X-XI, NHR, D, and implicitly in T, EHU I-IX and XII, EPM). Even though his 
conclusion was that we are better off turning away from such questions, he was himself preoccupied with 
them throughout his life.  
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understand will inevitably and rightly lead many to seek to make ultimate sense of our 
deepest moral convictions. He also seems not to take seriously that a legitimate crisis of 
meaning and moral despair could follow from accepting his deflationary account of the 
nature of morality.  
Third, Hume’s lower-aspiring moral philosophy can be unsatisfying. Annette 
Baier nicely puts it that for Hume, “the qualities picked out as virtues be ones that human 
nature regularly does turn up” (1991, 187). Hume’s moral philosophy can be seen as 
leveling insofar as it often affirms a mediocre moral development and by and large fails 
to inspire extraordinary moral achievement. The most morally admirable and ardent 
among us, however, do not themselves remain content with normal goodness and may 
well find a moral vision that can invite and challenge us to rise as high as we are able to 
be more fulfilling. Indeed, another aspect of being meaning-seeking individuals is that 
beyond our desire for explanation, we seek the significance, the meaningfulness of 
things, and growing in goodness is a primary way in which we can see our lives as being 
meaningful. Thus, while a low-aspiring ethic could well help reduce guilt and shame,21 it 
is correspondingly shallower and less able to serve as a source of significance as a 
higher-aspiring one.  
Finally, and most importantly, Hume’s more minimally-aspiring ethic threatens 
not to remain at the mid-range of human moral achievement, but to sink quite low, since 
it removes the moral sources that help to nourish, sustain, and make sense of our deepest 
moral intuitions. Although his account of the virtues rests fairly easily with the natural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 And given the important role that shame can play in the moral life, whether this is seen to be a 
good thing depends upon one’s view of when and to what extent shame is warranted in a given situation.  It 
is certainly undesirable for guilt and shame to be felt too intensely or for inappropriate reasons, however, 
and while Hume’s ethic may arguably promote less shame than really is due, it likely would also correct the 
tendency to feel more shame than is appropriate.     
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operation of the passions, we saw that his account of the general view leaves a gap 
between our passions as we find them (biased and untutored) and our passions as the 
general view judges that they should be. (Indeed, no moral theory can affirm merely what 
we are, but must point toward what we ought to be.) I pointed out in the previous chapter 
that, in contrast to Augustine and his order of love, for example, Hume offers no highest 
moral principle or account of aspiration that explains how we ought to order our inner as 
well as social and political lives. This can be problematic not only because it leaves us 
without a clear moral focus, especially when our social surroundings are subject to moral 
blindness. It also disposes us to take the status quo as a kind of standard, and so to 
succumb to the cultural biases of our time. Moreover, because we have strong tendencies 
to self-interest and biased pride and readily tend to justify these impulses, a status quo 
morality will likely further decline as vice becomes more normalized and garners further 
widespread approval.  
It is not, then, religion or remaining in the “immanent” sphere, or higher 
aspiration or lower aspiration, that is easily or entirely to blame for curtailed human 
flourishing. Rather, the various problems for social and individual flourishing that were 
discussed in Chapter Four stem from our natural desire for the passion of pride—a 
passion that is morally important insofar as it is crucial for moral motivation but that has 
great potential for harm when wrongly directed. I am not, of course, suggesting that, 
since the desire for pride is rooted in our nature, all perspectives are equally capable of 
dealing with the problems that arise from it. Indeed, I have taken pains to show that our 
conceptual frameworks make a practical difference, as is evident when I argued for the 
practical significance of a Christian humanist perspective over a hyper-Augustinian one 
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and when I argued that the Christian tradition (particularly Christian humanism) has 
resources for coping with the problems of pride that Hume’s metaphysically silent 
perspective lacks. My point here is that in light of the propensities and temptations that 
come with being human, Christian morality and Hume’s secular morality (and in many 
ways, religious and secular morality more broadly) are both problematic and helpful for 
human flourishing and are often problematic and helpful in different ways.  
In light of this, I want to end with two concluding points. First, I think that we 
need both religious and secular traditions and the mutually corrective tensions they 
provide for each other in order for us best to flourish as the kinds of beings that we are. In 
particular, Hume’s critiques of religion and his insight into the passion of pride in human 
life can help the religiously committed to attend to the ways in which religion can go 
wrong and, even in the case of Christian humanism, be used in ways that are contrary to 
the very heart of its moral teaching. On the other hand, many secular traditions such as 
Hume’s can be improved by the ways in which critiques from religious perspectives can 
highlight how lacking an adequate moral ontology for his core moral concepts (e.g., 
extensive sympathy and prideful concern for character) threatens to diminish their 
importance for us over time and lacks the prescriptive power needed to curb more sharply 
the destructive effects of biased pride. Since we often fail to see the weaknesses of the 
traditions that inform our identities and ways of life, critical dialogue across difference is 
crucial to making us mindful of the harmful tendencies to which our own traditions are 
prone.  
Such dialogue I suggest is not, as Hume proposes, one that sidelines larger 
metaphysical questions or from bringing our answers to these question to the table. Our 
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larger metaphysical frameworks (whether well-articulated or assumed) shape how we 
understand the moral life, and when we bracket off such questions we fail to understand 
the moral conceptions of others in a way that undermines rather than facilitates sympathy. 
We can think, for instance, of the way in which the moral sensibilities of conservative 
religious groups in the United States have been unintelligible to many non-religious 
persons and vice versa. As a result, there has been a breakdown of fruitful discourse of 
moral matters that concern United States political life—a breakdown which cannot, I 
think, be repaired without acquiring a deeper understanding of the worldviews and moral 
sources that shape the competing moral positions on offer. The less intelligible another’s 
moral perspective becomes to us, the more likely we are to see them as morally 
insensitive and unintelligent. In so doing we prematurely disregard their perspective—a 
move that itself deepens faction and perhaps precludes us from receiving insights into the 
weaknesses and dangers of our own perspective.22 Although Hume arguably sought to 
strengthen our sympathy by urging us to attend to a science of man rooted in common life 
rather than to larger metaphysical questions, this move may ultimately weaken our 
capacity for sympathy and discourse because it makes the metaphysical commitments of 
others seem more obscure, alien, and unintelligible. 
While I therefore think that Hume goes wrong in proposing that we turn away 
from the ultimate questions in our moral discourse, he nevertheless teaches an important 
lesson, namely, that larger metaphysical debates should never be so central that we fail to 
appreciate what we share with others. In this way Hume serves as an important corrective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Hume himself seems to do this when he suggests that the ‘artificial lives’ of religious believers are 
unintelligible to those on the outside (“no one can answer for what pleases or displeases them”). Surely, 
though, a hyper-Augustinian perspective can be generally understood (and aspects of it can be appreciated) 
so that the way it shapes moral approbation and disapprobation of those within that perspective can make 
sense to outsiders. 
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to the excesses of religious commitments that devolve into bitter disputes and lose sight 
of our common humanity. We do well, rather, to seek an understanding of and critical 
engagement with the larger metaphysical frameworks that inform our differences as well 
as attend to our common human nature and to that which we, as humans, tend to agree 
(e.g., Hume’s account of the virtues as those traits that we impartially judge to be useful 
and agreeable).  
It is not always clear, however, to what extent we do agree, even within the sphere 
of common life and the natural operation of the passions, as Hume understands them. We 
may well affirm that justice, temperance, benevolence, etc. are agreeable and useful to 
ourselves and others, but how we understand what is just, temperate, benevolent and how 
high we should aspire will be shaped both by the extent to which we have acquired the 
virtues as well as our overall understanding of the nature of reality. We saw this 
especially clearly when looking at the accounts of what is involved in virtuous and 
vicious forms of self-assessment in relation to others. Deep moral disagreement may 
always be part of the human condition, and while consensus is desirable, more important 
is to learn how best to cope with disagreement, to keep alive our awareness of the full 
humanity of our opponents, and to be as receptive to learning from and being challenged 
by those of different views.  
This brings me to my second concluding point. For full human flourishing we 
thus need a virtue to help us cultivate openness to others and a willingness to see our own 
weaknesses and failings. Thus, we need the virtue of humility—a virtue that has been 
much neglected (even, I think, in the Christian tradition of late) and misunderstood. In the 
previous chapter, through showing the ambiguity of Hume’s accounts of pride and 
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modesty, I provided a brief sketch of what a naturalistic account of humility might look 
like in light of our dependencies, limitations, and failings and how a right appreciation of 
these conduces to flourishing. A thorough account of humility is far beyond the bounds 
of what I can achieve in this dissertation, but these initial proposals give some sense of 
what a more developed account might include. Certainly any conception of virtuous 
humility, as we have seen, will be shaped by the larger worldview within which it 
conceived, and thus, there is no metaphysically or religiously neutral account of humility 
to be had that would be accepted by all. Nevertheless, my suggestions of what a 
naturalistic account of virtuous humility would involve, I think, could be widely affirmed 
across various traditions insofar as it can be seen to be constitutive of natural human 
flourishing, even if it would be modified and enriched by the particular religious content 
of a particular religious framework. (We saw, for example, that Aquinas’s account of 
humility involves distinctively Christian elements and also elements that can be affirmed 
by non-Christians and non-religious persons.) As such, it could be jointly pursued and 
sought as a guiding virtue in moral disputes that stem from our different larger 
metaphysical commitments. 
In any case, what I think has been shown by Hume’s account of the psychological 
significance of the passions of pride and humility and the way in which they pose 
problems for human flourishing, is the need to articulate an account of and to practice a 
virtuous humility if we are to curb the destructive potential of our natural desire for the 
passion of pride. Such humility would foster a wider sympathy and check our tendency to 
moral blindness and unwarranted faction-inducing passions. It would better promote 
communities marked by solidarity rather than obsession with social ranking. And it 
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would be wed to a true magnanimity founded on generous sympathy and courageous self-
critique rather than a sham pride that requires invidious comparisons for its sustenance. In 
short, although Hume rejects (a certain conception of) humility as a monkish virtue, I 
suggest that true humility would promote the very social and individual flourishing that 
Hume sought, with his secular ethic and rehabilitation of pride, to encourage.  
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